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Foreword
One of the noteworthy global achievements of the past two decades has been 
the remarkable increase in the number of children in school and completing the 
primary cycle. But this achievement has come with more challenges. Larger 
classes and higher pupil-teacher ratios and a more diverse, heterogeneous class-
room of learners—speaking more local languages, from a wider range of socioeco-
nomic backgrounds, with a greater range of abilities and disabilities—have made 
the task of the teacher in the classroom far more difficult. The task becomes even 
harder where education systems are unable to expand school facilities, produce 
more textbooks, and train more teachers (of sufficient quality) needed to match 
the higher enrollments. In many countries the result has been that many children 
are learning poorly, if at all. This fact has reinforced the need to focus more on 
quality—beyond “schooling” (students in a classroom) to “learning” (what  students 
learn and whether they learn how to keep on learning). And this requires systematic, 
comprehensive reforms of entire education systems and, accompanying those 
reforms, equally systematic and comprehensive policies.
Nowhere are such policies more needed than in regard to teachers. Teachers 
are the transmitters, by both word and deed, of what any nation wants its chil-
dren to learn and how it wants them to live. Once recruited, they teach for 
decades, shaping the knowledge and skills of generations of children who pass 
through their classrooms. They account for a large percentage of all education 
sector budgets. Truly, the ultimate policy choices related to teacher management 
and development (from initial recruitment to preservice training, certification, 
induction and probation, and continuing professional development), as well as to 
teacher status and remuneration, are some of the most important decisions that 
any ministry of education must implement—and implement well.
But systematic documentation of teacher policies across countries, especially 
of well-performing education systems, is difficult to find. For this reason, the 
World Bank has embarked on a process to develop a Systems Approach for 
Better Education Results (SABER) on a range of important education policy 
areas, including on teachers. One of these efforts, SABER—Teachers, has been 
developed to analyze education systems according to eight core policy goals. 
These core policy goals were developed based on a review of international litera-
ture that documents their relevance for student or teacher performance, their 
possible prioritization for resource allocation, and their potential to be achieved 
xii Foreword
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through policy reforms. This program collects information on key teacher policy 
areas and then shares resulting analyses and other knowledge products to 
 promote a more-informed dialogue around teacher policies and ultimately a 
more collaborative approach to improving the quality of teaching.
Over the past decade and more, Indonesia has embarked on a set of innovative 
education policies, including the decentralization of education service provision, 
the promotion of school-based management, the development of national 
 quality standards, and the provision of annual operational grants to all primary 
and secondary schools. This book, Teacher Reform in Indonesia: The Role of Politics 
and Evidence in Policy Making, therefore, comes at a critical time. Against a 
 backdrop of the broader set of policies, it examines the implementation of recent 
teacher policies, their impact on teachers and student outcomes, and the 
 challenges and occasional failures in this implementation process. Critical to the 
teacher policies was the passage, in 2005, of the Teacher and Lecturer Law, which 
was meant to improve both the quality of teaching and the welfare of teachers. 
Its implementation these past eight years has revealed new challenges, as well as 
unexpected rewards and key lessons that can be used to improve Indonesia’s 
dynamic education system. Evidence from an impact evaluation of critical 
 components of this law and from detailed classroom observations of teaching and 
learning has also shed new light on the complexities of undertaking such 
 comprehensive reforms. 
In middle-income countries, innovative solutions and knowledge services that 
the World Bank can offer are increasingly in greater demand than financing. How 
to improve teacher quality and performance is a policy challenge that begs for 
new knowledge and practical solutions. This book aims to contribute to meeting 
this challenge. It is especially relevant to—and useful reading for—other coun-
tries contemplating teacher reforms similar to Indonesia’s. It also demonstrates 
that the SABER—Teacher tools that have been used in this study can inform 
research, dialogue, and choices about better teacher management and 
development.
Elizabeth M. King
Education Director, The World Bank
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Background of teacher reform in indonesia
In 2005 the Indonesian government approved a comprehensive Teacher and 
Lecturer Law that was meant to radically reform the nation’s teacher manage-
ment and development process. Its overall objective was to change the nature 
and enhance the quality of one of the largest and most complex education 
 systems in the world. This book analyzes the educational and political economy 
context in which this law was formulated and implemented; describes the 
 structures, strategies, and processes that arose from the law; and assesses its 
impact on both (a) teacher subject and pedagogical knowledge, classroom skills, 
and  motivation, and (b) student outcomes.
With close to three million teachers—from kindergarten through aca-
demic and vocational secondary education; in public, private, and Islamic 
schools; and with both civil service and temporary, school-based contract 
status—Indonesia has one of the largest and most diverse cadres of teachers 
in the world. The critical role played by teachers in enhancing the quality of 
education is especially salient in this context. The evolving nature of its edu-
cation system and the increasing, and increasingly complex, challenges facing 
individual teachers and the teaching profession as a whole are of immense 
importance. How the country is attempting to reform its teacher  management 
and development system and strengthen the teacher education institutions 
and processes that produce its teachers—and the kind of impact this reform 
effort is having on the quality of education and on the outcomes of its 
 learners—are therefore of great importance to the future development of the 
nation.
Managing teachers (individually, both in a classroom and throughout a career, 
and collectively as an entire cadre) is a difficult enough task. Ensuring that they 
progressively develop in their profession, from first recruitment to final retire-
ment, only adds to the complexity of the challenge facing ministries of education 
around the world. Meeting this challenge successfully requires a comprehensive 
framework of teacher reform. This reform must be based on essential teacher 
standards and competencies and result in the structures, strategies, and processes 
required to ensure that these competencies are achieved, assessed, continuously 
improved on, and ultimately rewarded. It must also be supported by a political 
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economy context that provides the financial and political support needed for it 
to succeed.
Most attempts to enhance the quality of teaching are piecemeal in  fashion. 
The framework used in this book makes clear the need to develop a comprehen-
sive approach to this process by assessing and improving all the essential compo-
nents of a systematic teacher management and development system. These 
components include recruitment; preservice education;  induction, mentoring, 
and probation; formal certification; continuing  professional development; teacher 
performance appraisal; and ongoing career development.
provisions and objectives of the teacher law of 2005
The Teacher Law, as it is known, and the many ministerial regulations that 
arose from it, defined (a) the competencies required of teachers in four areas 
(pedagogic, personal, social, and professional); (b) their incorporation into 
national teacher standards; (c) the role of various ministry units and agencies 
in supporting teachers to reach these competencies; (d) the teacher certifica-
tion process and the qualifications required for such certification; and (e) the 
conditions under which teachers could receive special and professional 
 allowances. The law also raised important issues concerning teacher 
 management and development for further consideration: continuing profes-
sional development and its link to promotion and salary increments, teacher 
performance appraisal, and the role of principals in instructional leadership. 
In other words, the Teacher Law provided a comprehensive package of 
reforms that established an ambitious agenda for improving the national 
education system.
Specifically, the 2005 law and the many presidential and ministerial 
 regulations that govern its implementation have major components covering 
virtually all aspects of teacher management and development. These include the 
following:
•	 The core principle that teaching is a “profession”
•	 The requirement that all teachers must meet a minimum standard of a four-
year degree before being certified and that all teachers should be formally 
certified after the four-year degree has been gained
•	 The reform of preservice teacher education institutions
•	 A mandatory 24-period (18-hour) per week workload required to gain and 
maintain certification
•	 A “special” area allowance to be paid to teachers in defined areas such as 
remote locations, border regions, and so forth
•	 Improved processes of in-school induction and probation
•	 A comprehensive system of teacher appraisal and public service salary increases
•	 A more systematic program of continuing professional development
•	 The merit-based appointment of principals and supervisors based on mastery 
of the four core competencies for educators
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reform issues Addressed by this volume
But these reforms—partly because they are so comprehensive and basic—proved 
not easy to put in place. Many political and economic factors delayed and even 
temporarily derailed the reform process, including early political tensions over 
the nature of competency assessment; the pressure to certify many teachers 
quickly (rather than carefully) and to focus on the number certified rather than 
the continuing post-certification support they would require; bureaucratic 
 complexities and delays; battles over responsibilities among different agencies 
and between levels of the government; and other deleterious effects of the 
 political and economic factors that can accompany decentralization.
In analyzing the above process of reform, this book focuses on several 
 important issues:
•	 The nature of Indonesia’s teaching profession—and its supporting structures 
and mechanisms—before and after the Teacher Law of 2005
•	 The triggers for the comprehensive reform of this profession and the political 
economy context in which the reform was developed and implemented
•	 An impact evaluation of a unique component of this reform: the automatic 
and unconditional doubling of teachers’ income upon certification
•	 Two pioneering research activities that explored the impact of the reform both 
on teacher knowledge, skills, and behaviors and on student outcomes— 
including (a) a randomized control trial with data representing approximately 
50 percent of the country’s primary and junior secondary schools; and 
(b) a  classroom-based, time-on-task analysis of 8th-grade mathematics  teaching 
practices linked to student achievement in the Trends in International 
Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) studies of 2007 and 2011
•	 The (in)efficiencies derived from—and not yet resolved by—the reform in 
terms of the system’s financing and the distribution of its teachers, especially 
in terms of the trade-offs policy makers face when a decision is made to 
 significantly increase investment in education
This assessment is developed in several chapters that explain the relevance of 
the Indonesian teacher reform to other countries; outline the research and analy-
sis methods used in the studies upon which the book is based; describe the politi-
cal economy context, the status of the teaching profession, and the situation of 
Indonesian education before the reform; explain the key triggers for the reform; 
and identify the major components of the Teacher and Lecturer Law of 2005. 
The book also presents a definition of quality and describes the book’s  conceptual 
frameworks related to teacher quality and teacher management and develop-
ment; describes the institutions, mechanisms, strategies, and processes derived 
from the laws and regulations supporting the teacher reform; examines the 
impact of the reform on teacher quality and student outcomes through the lens 
of a rigorous study, using a randomized control treatment design; looks inside the 
“black box” of teacher practice in a set of 8th-grade mathematics classrooms; 
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examines the financial and efficiency implications of reshaping the system 
postreform, especially in terms of the impact on teaching force composition, 
teacher distribution, teacher supply, and the education budget; and presents 
 lessons learned and recommendations derived from the book’s analyses.
These lessons and recommendations include the following:
•	 The doubling of teacher income has significantly increased the status of the 
teaching profession and attracted better candidates to apply to teacher training 
institutions.
•	 The mere fact of certification and the consequent doubling of teacher income 
have not achieved what was expected: better teaching and better learning by 
those who were paid double.
•	 No significant differences were apparent between certified and uncertified 
 primary school teachers in terms of either competencies (subject knowledge 
and pedagogical skills) or student learning outcomes.
•	 The Ministry of Education and Culture needs to more carefully analyze the 
serious financial implications of the current teacher certification and 
 remuneration process in regard not only to the sustainability of this process 
but also to the implications for financing other aspects of education expansion 
and quality improvement.
•	 A quality assurance framework needs to be put in place from the beginning of 
any reform process and should include the development of a cadre of  principals 
and supervisors selected on merit; specifically trained for their work (both 
administrative and academic); deployed to where they are needed most; and 
focused on the essential teacher management and development tasks of induc-
tion, mentoring, probation, and ongoing teacher appraisal and improvement.
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Why indonesia?
The critical role played by teachers in enhancing the quality of education is espe-
cially salient in a populous, geographically dispersed, and culturally diverse coun-
try such as Indonesia. The evolving nature of its education system and the 
increasing—and increasingly complex—challenges facing individual teachers and 
the teaching profession as a whole are of immense importance in Indonesia. 
Indonesia has one of the largest and most diverse cadres of teachers in the world, 
with close to four million teachers from kindergarten through academic and 
vocational secondary education; in public, private, and Islamic schools; and with 
both civil service and temporary, school-based contract status.1 How the country 
is attempting to reform its teacher management and development system as well 
as the teacher education institutions and processes that produce its teachers—
and the kind of impact this reform is having on the quality of education and on 
the outcomes of its learners—is therefore of great importance to the future 
development of the nation.
The Indonesian teacher reform was designed and is being implemented as a 
genuinely comprehensive program, not a piecemeal effort as many teacher 
improvement efforts are. From its beginning, it has therefore considered and 
attempted to incorporate all of the necessary stages of an effective teacher man-
agement and development process.
The seriousness of this effort is underlined by two important facts:
•	 The reform is embedded in law—the pioneering Teacher and Lecturer Law 
(hereafter called the Teacher Law) of 2005—which was both built upon an 
even more comprehensive Education Law of 2003 and extensively discussed 
by a wide range of stakeholders (ministry officials, parliamentarians, civil 
 society representatives, and teacher associations) and ultimately adopted by 
the Indonesian Parliament.
•	 The financing of the reform has been made possible through funds derived 
from a constitutional mandate that requires the government to spend 20 
 percent of its budget for education. This has had serious implications for the 
percentage of that budget spent on teacher salaries and professional 
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allowances. The reform calls for the provision of such an allowance equivalent 
to the base salary of all certified teachers—in essence, doubling (and in some 
cases tripling) the income of literally millions of teachers in Indonesia.
The importance of this reform is further underlined by the efforts made by 
the Ministry of Education and Culture,2 supported by the World Bank, to exam-
ine (a) the quality of existing (prereform) and new (postreform) teachers in the 
system; (b) the promotion of higher standards and enhanced competencies for 
teachers through more effective processes of recruitment, teacher education, 
certification, remuneration and other incentives, ongoing professional develop-
ment and support, and career promotion or progression; and (c) the impact of 
these actions on teacher behavior and knowledge, student achievement, and the 
financing and efficiency of the education system.
Thus, the World Bank team, with the Indonesian Ministry of National 
Education, designed and managed a wide range of research projects and program 
support activities that, taken together, tell the story of the design, implementa-
tion, and impact of this reform. The result, outlined in this publication, Teacher 
Reform in Indonesia: The Role of Politics and Evidence in Policy Making, is based on 
the premise that a multifaceted reform related to teacher development and man-
agement as comprehensive as that in Indonesia can inform countries elsewhere 
in the world seeking to improve their education systems and, ultimately, the 
outcomes of their teachers and students.
contributions of this volume
Of particular importance in regard to this book is its systematic basis in analysis 
and evidence. In addition to over 50 background reports, it presents the results 
from
•	 Two innovative, methodologically rigorous studies;
•	 An exploration of the political economy (PE) of the time, which strongly influ-
enced the design and implementation of the reform; and
•	 An analysis of the tensions and trade-offs around policy making when educa-
tion investments are significantly increased (for example, trade-offs between 
large teacher salary increases and investments in other system expansion and 
quality improvement strategies).
New Studies
In terms of the new studies, the book first reports results from a randomized 
controlled trial that aims to evaluate various impacts of Indonesia’s teacher cer-
tification program and its subsequent doubling of teacher income. (Box I.1 
describes the method used in this trial.) The explicit objective of this impact 
evaluation study is to assess the effect of this increase in teacher income on per-
formance. And because this increase is not conditional on later performance 
improvement (of either the teachers or their students), the analysis will add to a 
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growing body of research that is investigating the effect of pay increases that are 
conditional on performance (Bruns, Filmer, and Patrinos 2011).
The second innovative study featured in the book examines, at the classroom 
level, the links among the teacher quality improvement reforms, changes in teach-
ing practices, and student learning. This video study relates to the Indonesia Trends 
in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS). It aims to clarify what 
takes place in the classroom through detailed coding of videotaped lessons to 
provide insights into classroom activities in terms of the time spent on teaching 
and the frequency of various teaching-learning activities, their sequencing, and the 
quality of delivery. (See box I.2 for a description of the method used in this trial.)
Political Economy Analysis
The second important methodological aspect of this book is the analysis of the 
PE that shaped the reform. Early in the development of this book, it became 
clear that the full story of the origin, evolution, implementation, and impact of 
the teacher reform process in Indonesia could only be told against the 
Box i.1 Design and methods of the teacher certification impact evaluation study
The discussion in chapter 4 includes evidence from a randomized controlled evaluation of 
Indonesia’s teacher certification program. Such an evaluation has the explicit objective of esti-
mating the causal effects of a program or intervention under minimal statistical assumptions. 
For the study, 240 public primary and 120 public junior secondary schools were sampled. All 
core subject teachers (n = 3,000) and all students (n = 90,000) were tested using a multiple-
choice subject matter test. Teachers were also interviewed. The data are representative of 40 
percent of the primary and junior secondary schools in Indonesia. Three rounds of data have 
been carried out: a baseline in November 2009, a midline in April 2011, and an endline in April 
2012. This book presents findings from an analysis of the first two rounds of data collection. 
The final results, which include the analysis of endline data, are expected subsequent to this 
book’s publication.
One-third of the schools were randomly selected into a treatment group; the remaining 
two-thirds became the control or comparison group. The random selection into treatment and 
control ensures that treatment schools are similar to control schools, on average, prior to the 
study’s intervention. The study intervened by granting immediate access to the certification 
process for all teachers in treatment schools who prequalified for certification. Prequalified 
teachers in control schools were subject to the standard procedure. The number of certified 
teachers in control schools is consequently much lower, but not zero. The intervention created 
an artificial difference between treatment and control schools. If the certification process were 
to have any effects, differences would be observed between treatment and control schools 
within one or two years after the project’s intervention.
Chapter 4 presents the effects of this intervention (teacher certification and the associated 
professional allowance) on teacher behavior and welfare and on student learning outcomes. 
For a more detailed discussion of the research design, see De Ree et al. (2012).
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background of the political and economic context that influenced this process. 
This insight resulted in the development of a detailed questionnaire exploring 
various aspects of a PE analysis and a series of interviews with individuals both 
involved in and affected by the teacher reform. (See box I.3 for a more detailed 
description of this process.)
Box i.2 Design and standards of the timss eighth-Grade mathematics video 
study in indonesia
The video study took place in two phases (2007 and 2011) and involved 205 eighth-grade 
mathematics teachers and over 6,000 students. The two-phase approach allowed for the 
 identification of general patterns and changes in teaching practices since the beginning of the 
teacher reform. The teachers and students in the study also participated in Trends in 
International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), providing unique benefits in terms of 
nationally representative sampling; extensive student, teacher, and school background 
 surveys; and student assessment results.
The use of video provided many advantages. Because the videos are permanent records of 
classroom activities, multiple analyses could be performed in an iterative manner and revisited 
whenever necessary. Different observers were also able to focus on the same video as the basis 
of a shared analysis. The videotaping sessions involved two cameras, with one on the teacher 
and one on the students, allowing different aspects of the classroom to be captured 
simultaneously.
A mixed-methods (quantitative and qualitative) analytical approach was used. The quanti-
tative analysis used advanced forms of multilevel and value-added modeling. The coding of 
teaching practices followed a model developed for the international 1999 TIMSS Video Study 
(Hiebert 2003). The codes have their foundation in prominent theories on effective teaching 
and cover the themes of Structure of Lessons, Content of Lessons, Actions of Participants, 
Instructional Practices, and Classroom Climate and Resources. The practices were linked to 
 student, teacher, and school survey data and student learning outcomes as measured through 
pre- and posttesting in the eighth grade.
The qualitative analysis used case studies of 10 relatively high-impact teachers to provide 
an in-depth examination of the “how” and “why” aspects of practices. Over intensive one-week 
visits, the teachers participated in multiple interviews, additional videotaping of lessons, 
 stimulated recall sessions (where teachers watched their own videotaped lessons and 
 discussed specific events), and a mathematical scenarios game. Specific topics included 
 teachers’ use of questioning, the selection and use of problems, the handling of student 
 misconceptions, and the decision-making process for teaching approaches. It also explored 
two apparent drivers of teaching practices: teachers’ mathematical beliefs and mathematical 
knowledge in teaching.
Its scope, magnitude, and distinctive approach make the study unique and allow it to 
 contribute significantly to the understanding of how key background and contextual factors 
play a role in determining what takes place in the classroom as well as the relationship between 
teaching practices and student learning outcomes.
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Box i.3 Design and methods of the political economy Analysis
“Political economy (PE) is the study of both politics and economics and specifically the 
 interactions between them. It focuses on power and resources, how they are distributed and 
contested in different country and sector contexts, and the resulting implications for develop-
ment outcomes. Political economy analysis involves more than a review of institutional and 
governance arrangement: it also considers the underlying interests, incentives, rents/rent 
 distribution, historical legacies, prior experience with reforms, social trends, and how all of 
these factors effect or impede change” (World Bank 2011). It is these PE drivers or triggers that 
explain why things are the way they are and therefore also help to explain the content of the 
reform and the process by which it came about.
Based on these principles outlined in “Political Economy Assessments at Sector and Project 
Level” (World Bank 2011), a detailed questionnaire was developed regarding the following 
issues:
• Rationale for, and origin of, the Teacher Law—for example, the problems that the law was 
meant to solve, the political and economic context of and reasons for the law, and the most 
controversial components of the law
• Implementation of the Teacher Law at both national and local levels—for example, what insti-
tutional, structural, and financial changes had to be made to implement the law; the key 
actors, challenges, and internal and external obstacles to its implementation; the monitor-
ing and evaluation of the law’s implementation; the capacity building required to improve 
the implementation of the law; and the “rent” processes (corruption, favoritism, political 
interference), if any, that might have had an impact on its implementation
• Impact of the reform—for example, its perceived success, most powerful impacts, and 
 greatest failures; its effect on the balance of power among key political actors; and the gaps 
between the reform’s vision, design, and implementation
A stakeholder analysis, central to this process, required information concerning which 
 levels and actors in the system benefited (or lost) because of the reform, what kind of resis-
tance or opposition to the reform existed and how it was overcome, and the major champions 
of the reform. The stakeholders examined were teachers and teacher associations, politicians 
and parliamentarians, individual units of the Ministry of Education and Culture (including the 
minister), local governments, the private sector, external development partners, the media, 
civil society organizations, the general public, and parents.
The authors interviewed important original designers of the Teacher Law, both in the 
Ministry and in Parliament; the leadership of the largest teacher association of the country; 
the president of a well-known private university in Jakarta; and the educational leaders of 
two districts, including the head of the district education office in West Java, a member of the 
district legislature’s education commission, the chair of the local district-level Education 
Council, and the secretary of the local branch of the teacher association. Interviews at the 
district level focused especially on the impact of decentralization on the implementation of 
the reform.
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Policy Trade-Off Analysis
The third important focus in this book is its in-depth analysis of the trade-offs 
that policy makers face when a decision is made to significantly increase 
 investment in education. The Indonesian government has invested heavily in 
education. Between 2001 and 2012, spending doubled in real terms, partly from 
the fulfillment in 2009 of a constitutional commitment to spend 20 percent of 
the government budget on education. By far, most of this additional spending has 
gone to teachers through increased recruitment as well as significant improve-
ments in pay (Cerdan-Infantes and Makarova 2013). Despite these  massive 
investments in education, Indonesia’s scores on international assessments of 
educational achievement have not improved significantly. The book looks closely 
at the trade-offs associated with the higher investment in teacher salaries and 
explores the extent to which it has crowded out investments in other areas to 
improve educational quality and expand pre- and postbasic educational 
opportunities
Virtually every country in the world—in every region of the world—faces 
similar trade-offs related to teacher quality improvement, management, and 
development. This is especially true for countries such as Indonesia that have had 
relatively high and stable rates of growth and therefore can (or could, if they 
wished) significantly increase their investments in education. Equitably distribut-
ing teachers across all schools regardless of their location is a challenge faced by 
all countries. And demand for schools and teachers in rural and remote areas is 
also moving to towns and cities even as the need to keep good teachers in less-
developed parts of the country, where they are often needed the most, remains 
large.
lessons from indonesia
The Indonesian experience is particularly relevant because it not only presents a 
comprehensive approach to reform but also highlights the interplay among the 
complex political and economic contexts of the nation, policy-making processes, 
and the challenges in both implementing a comprehensive reform and creating 
an evidence base for future actions. Although few countries have to deal with 
Indonesia’s size (or, for that matter, its problems of a teacher surplus and unrea-
sonably low student-teacher ratios), most have serious concerns about the whole 
range of challenges related to teacher management and development.
Indonesia’s experience, as described in this book, can provide useful lessons in 
regard to these concerns—lessons that involve examining questions such as these:
•	 What can be done to raise the status of the teaching profession, especially in 
countries where teaching is seen as a second-class, last-choice profession?
•	 What is the impact of the level of remuneration as a result of certification on 
the number and quality of candidates to the teaching profession?
•	 How can teacher education institutions be reformed to better ensure that their 
graduates (both new students and in-service trainees) have the subject and 
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pedagogical competencies required of the education system? What is the 
impact of a more systematic certification process on the number, nature, and 
programs of teacher education institutions?
•	 How and when are teachers best “qualified” and “certified”? How can one 
guarantee that formal qualification and certification result in better teaching 
and enhanced learning?
•	 What are the likely short-term and long-term impacts of a more systematic 
certification process and higher remuneration on teacher behavior and 
 attitudes, teaching-learning methods, and student outcomes?
•	 What is the cost of serious imbalances in the distribution of teachers— 
especially to remote, isolated, and difficult areas—and the effectiveness of vari-
ous mechanisms to solve this problem?
•	 How can in-service training be made both more accessible and of better 
 quality—for example, through distance learning, formal training in teacher edu-
cation institutions, within schools, or through school clusters?
•	 What role should processes such as induction and probation play in the 
 certification process?
•	 What can be said about the ultimate cost, and cost-effectiveness, to an 
 education system of a more systematic teacher certification process and a con-
siderably higher remuneration for certified teachers?
•	 What is the potential impact, negative or positive, of decentralization on an 
improved teacher development and management process? What tensions 
around this process might arise between central and decentralized 
authorities?
organization of the Book
Answers to these questions are sought in the chapters that follow, briefly 
described here:
•	 Chapter 1: The PE and situation of teachers in Indonesia prior to the reform
•	 Chapter 2: The book’s conceptual framework of quality education
•	 Chapter 3: The pre- and postreform structure and processes of the entire 
teacher management and development system
•	 Chapter 4: The impact of these efforts on teacher status, motivation, and skills 
and on student outcomes generally
•	 Chapter 5: The impact of reform efforts in relation to eighth-grade mathemat-
ics teaching
•	 Chapter 6: An in-depth analysis of the pre- and postreform efficiency of 
Indonesia’s education system—both financially and in terms of teacher 
 distribution and student-teacher ratios—and of what is still needed to ensure 
that the current reforms are, in fact, sustainable
•	 Chapter 7: A summary of the major impacts and key messages arising from the 
entire reform process and of the influence of Indonesia’s PE on the reform’s 
outcomes
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It is hoped that the data and analyses discussed in this book will be able to 
unravel some of the complexities of the teacher reform process in Indonesia and, 
therefore, make available insights and recommendations useful to other countries 
faced with similar challenges.
notes
 1. Though exact numbers vary according to source and, of course, over time, for the 
purpose of this book, data from the school census of 2010 are used. These indicate 
approximately 2.7 million teachers managed by the Ministry of Education and 
Culture (from kindergarten to senior secondary school), with around 2 million at the 
primary and junior secondary level; these 2 million are the priority target of the 
teacher certification process. The Ministry of Religious Affairs manages close to an 
additional 1 million teachers. These figures have certainly increased since 2010 
(NUPTK 2010). 
 2. At the time of the Teacher Law of 2005, the Ministry was named the Ministry of 
National Education. In 2011, its name changed to the Ministry of Education and 
Culture.
references
Bruns, B., D. Filmer, and H. A. Patrinos. 2011. Making Schools Work: New Evidence on 
Accountability Reforms. Human Development Perspectives Series. Washington DC: 
World Bank.
Cerdan-Infantes, P., and Y. Makarova. 2013. Spending More or Spending Better: Improving 
Education Financing in Indonesia. Jakarta: World Bank. 
De Ree, J., K. Muralidharan, M. Pradhan, and H. Rogers. 2012. “Double for What? The 
Impact of Unconditional Teacher Salary Increases on Performance.” Unpublished 
manuscript, World Bank, Washington, DC.
Hiebert, J. 2003. “Teaching Mathematics in Seven Countries: Results from the TIMSS 
1999 Video Study.” National Center for Education Statistics, U.S. Department of 
Education Institute of Education Sciences, Washington, DC.
NUPTK (Unique Identifier for Educators and Education Personnel, Nomor Unik Pendidik 
dan Tenaga Kependidikan) (database). 2010. Teacher database maintained by NUPTK, 
Jakarta.
World Bank. 2011. “Political Economy Assessments at Sector and Project Levels.” How-To 
Notes, Government and Anticorruption (GAC) in Projects Initiative, World Bank, 
Washington, DC. 
   13 Teacher Reform in Indonesia • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-9829-6 
Indonesia as a Case Study for 
Comprehensive Teacher Reform
introduction
Indonesia has constructed a definition of ‘teacher’ that fits the unique contours of 
the nation’s social, historical, and political landscape. The structure and goals of the 
government have exerted a particularly powerful influence on the behavior of 
school employees…. State authority in Indonesia is, and has always been, so perva-
sive that few individuals question their lack of power in the schools. As civil servants 
they have learned to follow the directives of upper level officials, not dispute 
them…. The Indonesian government has ensured… that educators treat the civil 
servant identity as ‘superordinate’…. One effect of that emphasis is that teachers 
have not established an identity for themselves separate from that applied to all civil 
servants, or a distinct set of professional standards.
—Christopher Bjork, Indonesian Education: Teachers, Schools, and Central 
Bureaucracy (2005)
The story of teacher reform in Indonesia must begin with a description of the 
historical status and significance of its teaching profession. As in many other 
countries of the world, teaching was once a highly respected and desirable 
 occupation in Indonesia. Given the limited number of schools during both 
Dutch colonial rule and the Japanese occupation and the important role given to 
education by the early leaders of independent Indonesia—a feeling shared by the 
leaders of virtually all of the nations that became independent as the world of 
colonialism crumbled—teaching was originally a vocation of choice. Only the 
best of students were admitted, with scholarships, into teacher education 
 programs. As a result, teachers, especially those in rural areas, were not only often 
the best educated and most influential members of the community; they were 
also, in a larger perspective, the actors who were meant to transform Indonesia 
into a democratic, prosperous nation and bring it into the modern world. The 
image of the wise, incorruptible, and hard-working teacher—often struggling 
alone under difficult circumstances, in remote villages and urban slums, with 
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little pay but much dedication—is one that an older generation of Indonesians 
still fondly remembers.
But eventually several issues came into play. First, the education system 
expanded rapidly in the 1970s and 1980s with a massive national program 
 promoted by then-President Suharto. This program built tens of thousands of 
new primary schools between 1975 and 1987 and rapidly hired and trained 
 hundreds of thousands of new teachers who were often thrust into classrooms 
with only a minimum amount of initial teacher education, few opportunities for 
further training, and therefore limited subject knowledge and inadequate 
 pedagogical skills. This infusion of new, but not very rich, blood diluted the 
strength of the teacher cadre; blurred the mythic image of the teacher as 
 community leader and nation builder; and ultimately, combined with a large 
expansion of the rest of the civil service, reduced the salaries of teachers and 
other civil servants relative to other professions. “The principal attractions of a 
career in the civil service became job security, undemanding work, short work 
hours, and lifetime employment. Low expectations led to decreased  productivity” 
(Bjork 2005, 96). The result was an increase in second jobs (often quite menial 
in nature), an increase in teacher absenteeism, an ultimate decline in many 
 teachers’ work ethic, and consequently a further decrease in the status of 
the profession.
This loss of a sense of “vocation” and the “deprofessionalization” of teaching 
in the decades before the turn of the century were significant. Teachers were 
clearly seen—and were meant to see themselves—as civil servants first, 
 answering “up” the system rather than “out” to students, parents, and local 
school boards. At a time of considerable political uncertainty and even 
 instability in the transition from the rule of President Sukarno to the “New 
Order” of President Suharto, teachers were meant to demonstrate loyalty and 
obedience to the government and to transmit the national curriculum, promote 
the national creed of Pancasila,1 and thereby strengthen national unity. “This 
designation of teacher as civil  servant carried profound implications for the 
definition of the educator and for the way that Indonesian instructors 
approached their work. Educators, like post office workers and tax collectors, 
conceived of themselves as public servants first and foremost” (Bjork 2005, 94). 
Teachers, in other words, “came to define their professional responsibilities 
quite narrowly: to faithfully disseminate a set of ideas formulated in the capital” 
(Bjork 2005, 110)—in other words, to “educate” their pupils in terms of moral 
and ethical development rather than to “teach” them in terms of intellectual 
growth (Bjork 2005, 107).
As the new century approached, however, Indonesian political life became 
more stable and predictable, and its economy began to grow. Along with 
these developments came an increase in the number of community  members—
village leaders, government extension workers, private entrepreneurs—with 
educational levels and salaries equal to or exceeding those of teachers, 
thus further weakening teachers’ earlier privileged position within the 
community.
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And then the education system as a whole became larger, more complex, and 
more challenging to teachers in many ways:
•	 Partly as a result of efforts following the Jomtien and Dakar Education for All 
(EFA) commitments2 and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for 
education (the latter two made in 2000),3 the system rapidly expanded with 
much higher enrollment and an increasing number of teachers (which led 
finally to an oversupply of teachers and one of the lowest student-teacher 
ratios in Southeast Asia).
•	 Educational programs and options at all levels of the system (from preschool 
to tertiary education) became more diversified, each demanding better and 
more specialized facilities, teachers, and materials.
•	 The curriculum also frequently changed and often was made more  complicated, 
all within less than 10 years—from a competency-based  curriculum  introduced 
in 2004 to a school-based curriculum in 2006 and now to a very different 
 curriculum for 2013. Overall, the curriculum became both more accelerated 
(teach faster) and congested (teach more)—moving from the essentials of 
reading, writing, and arithmetic (and the national creed of Pancasila) to a 
wider range of content areas (such as sustainable  development and life skills) 
and new ways of teaching (for example,  child-centered and interactive). 
Sometimes the new content areas have been treated as separate subjects, and 
sometimes they have been integrated into a basic subject such as language. 
These frequent changes have often been  difficult for most of the teachers, 
many of whom are quite senior but with weak subject knowledge, limited 
professional support, and few opportunities for further training.
•	 Schools and individual teachers faced more learners of ever more diverse 
 backgrounds and identities, who have (a) varying values, ways of thinking, 
behaviors, and motivations; (b) greater independence, creativity, and 
 open-mindedness and more enterprising minds; and (c) skills often better 
than their teachers’ skills in using new information and communication 
technologies.
•	 The governance of the education system was quite radically and rapidly 
 decentralized, leading to new and sometimes difficult accountabilities and 
expectations of teachers—changes often made more difficult by newly 
empowered school committees (SCs) and more educated parents who 
demanded more from their schools.
•	 Finally, despite the frenzy surrounding the annual national examinations at the 
end of primary, junior secondary, and higher secondary school and the 
 exceedingly high rates at which they are passed, increasing evidence from both 
international and national studies of achievement showed that despite the best 
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intentions, higher enrollments, greater investments, and steady progress toward 
quantitative global targets, the Indonesian education system and its teachers 
were failing to achieve the results expected of them.
Indonesia’s answer to these challenges was the pioneering Teacher Law of 
2005. The most salient feature of this law was its attempt to “reprofessionalize” 
teaching—to once again make it a “profession”—both through formal  certification 
and through the doubling or even tripling of teacher incomes by granting a 
 professional allowance upon certification. The law also called for a  comprehensive 
package of reforms that established an ambitious agenda for improving the 
national education system by laying out the roles and responsibilities of teachers, 
principals, supervisors, and local education authorities as well as the strategies 
needed to improve their quality and welfare in support of the earlier Education 
Law of 2003.4
the status of indonesian education before teacher reform
The Indonesian experience in reforming the nation’s teacher management and 
development structures and processes has been unique both in its 
 comprehensiveness and in the attention paid to analyzing and assessing its 
 implementation and impact. Before we assess the reform’s impact on teachers, 
teaching, students, and the system as a whole, we must understand the status of 
teachers before the reform, why reform was considered essential, what the 
reform’s major components were, and the political-economic context in which 
the reform was developed and has been implemented.
For a decade and more from 1990, Indonesian education policy was generally 
directed at increasing the number of children with access to formal education. 
Given the focus of the MDGs on universal primary enrollment and gender 
equity and the prioritization of EFA targets toward enrollment (MDG Goal 2) 
rather than quality, the country’s education system was most concerned with 
increasing access to school. The result was a significant increase in the primary 
school net enrollment rate to 94.76 percent by 2010.
But with its stronger focus on a more comprehensive definition of quality, the 
Dakar World Conference on EFA in 2000 shifted government thinking around 
the world to greater concern about the nature and relevance of the education 
being provided. This shift led to more careful analyses of a range of indicators 
seen as useful proxies for quality. One important set of indicators focused on 
teachers—particularly their educational level, subject matter competency, and 
pedagogical skills. (This analysis was later followed by systematic studies of 
 student outcomes such as the Trends in International Mathematics and Science 
Study [TIMSS], the Program for International Student Assessment [PISA], and 
the Early Grade Reading Assessment [EGRA].)
Before enactment of the 2005 Teacher Law, the Ministry of National 
Education in Indonesia had identified a number of shortcomings in the education 
system related to teachers. First, teaching standards were ill-defined. 
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Although standards were specified, they were neither sufficiently detailed nor 
clearly defined, and therefore, were difficult both to translate into the curricula 
of the wide range of teacher education institutions in Indonesia and to enforce 
through supervision at the school level.
Second, the teacher management system in Indonesia was characterized by both 
inefficiency and inequality. The certification of teachers was nonexistent (beyond 
successfully passing probation), and the appointment, deployment, and further 
professional development of new teachers, haphazard. Standards regulating these 
processes were inconsistent over time and across regions and often subject to 
personal relationships rather than professional training or competence, especially 
for temporary and contract teachers. This confusion worsened during the 
 decentralization that began in 2000, which the Education Law of 2003 
later defined.
In theory, the Education Law mandated that the employment and 
 remuneration of teachers (except in Islamic schools), the setting of standards, 
the monitoring of performance, and the implementation of sanctions and 
remediation should be transferred from the Ministry of National Education to 
district offices. But issues around the granting of incentives, the dismissal and 
deployment of teachers (both within and across districts), the appointment 
and training of school  principals and supervisors, the continuing professional 
development of teachers, and the request for the establishment of new civil 
service posts for teachers remained ambiguous. In fact, the overhiring of 
 teachers was rampant and was partly the consequence of decentralization, 
which gave local governments strong incentives to hire more teachers whether 
needed or not. As a result, national student-teacher ratios were low, but 
 inefficient distribution meant that many schools had insufficient teachers. 
Schools in rural and remote areas also tended to have teachers with lower 
academic qualifications.
The Low Status of Teachers
A third shortcoming was that teacher status was low compared with other 
 occupations in Indonesia and with teachers in some neighboring countries. Such 
status derives from a combination of many factors, including the following:
•	 Educational qualifications
•	 Salary or income level
•	 Competence in both subject matter and pedagogy
•	 Perceived motivation to teach (the extent to which teachers are considered 
committed to their work)
•	 Official certification (in the Indonesian case, official recognition that a teacher 
is a “professional”)
Educational Qualifications
Before 2005, Indonesian teachers, in general, had relatively low educational 
 qualifications, and a significant proportion of serving teachers were 
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 underqualified. Counting all teachers—kindergarten through senior secondary 
school and  vocational secondary schools (excluding Islamic schools)—more 
than 60 percent did not hold the four-year degree required by the Teacher 
Law. In fact, around 25 percent of the teachers had failed to go beyond high 
school.
Table 1.1 illustrates how the new higher-qualification mandate in the Teacher 
Law compounded the training requirement for in-service teachers.
Salaries
As discussed above, the salaries of teachers were also low and contributed to their 
low status. Although traditionally high relative to other occupations, especially in 
rural areas, teacher salaries had been declining in real terms as the number of 
teachers increased. By 2005, incomes from teaching were low relative to those of 
other occupations requiring a similar educational level.
Also, teacher salaries in Indonesia compared unfavorably with those in other 
middle-income countries in the region. For example, in 2008, the starting salary 
of a primary or junior secondary school teacher in Indonesia was approximately 
40 percent of average per capita income. However, in the Philippines, starting 
teaching salaries were around 145 percent of average income (UNESCO 
Institute of Statistics 2010).
Absolute differences were also large. Compared with other nations in the East 
Asia and Pacific region, salaries of starting primary school teachers in Indonesia, 
in U.S. dollars, were less than one-third the salaries of teachers in Malaysia and 
the Philippines and less than half of those in Thailand. Their top salaries showed 
even greater disparities with those in Malaysia and Thailand. In Indonesia, a pri-
mary school teacher earned $1,002–$3,022 per year or a mere 50 percent of 
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, according to United Nations 
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) estimates. Primary 
school teachers in the Philippines and Thailand earned over twice as much in 
terms of GDP per capita—in relative terms, a fourfold greater salary than their 
Indonesian counterparts.
table 1.1 in-service teacher training requirements in indonesia, 2006
Teacher category
Postsecondary 
education required 
before 2005 Teacher 
Law (years)
Teachers below 
required level 
before 2005 
Teacher Law (%)
Postsecondary 
education required 
by 2005 Teacher Law 
(years)
Teachers below 
required level 
set by 2005 
Teacher Law (%)
Primary 2 34 4 83
Junior secondary 3 23 4 38
Senior secondary 4 18 4 18
Source: Calculations based on the 2006 NUPTK/SIMPTK teacher’s census.
Note: NUPTK = Unique Identifiers for Educators and Education Personnel (Nomor Unik Pendidik dan Tenaga Kependidikan). 
SIMPTK = Management Information System for Educators and Education Personnel (Sistem Informasi Manajemen Pendidik dan 
Tenaga Kependidikan). SIMPTK is the teacher database maintained by NUPTK.
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Thus, the teaching profession was unattractive for individuals who were bet-
ter educated and had more opportunities for more challenging, better-paid 
jobs, as shown in figure 1.1. On the other hand, wages for the three-quarters of 
primary school teachers with second-level diplomas or below were high in 
comparison with the wages they could expect to receive outside of the teach-
ing profession—indicating strong incentives for individuals with these qualifi-
cations to enter the teaching profession. However, the wages of better-qualified 
teachers were  significantly below the wages of individuals with similar qualifi-
cations who worked outside of education. The wage structure, therefore, cre-
ated incentives for less well-qualified candidates to enter the profession, while 
better-qualified and more-able candidates were likely to opt for nonteaching 
careers.
Pedagogical and Subject Matter Competency
Also related to status, Indonesian teachers in general demonstrated low 
 competency on subject matter tests. Such results were due not only to the 
 relatively low levels of initial education for many teachers—especially those 
hired at the time of the great expansion of primary education in the 1970s and 
1980s—but also to relatively few opportunities for systematic in-service training. 
Thus, for example, in a study completed by the Ministry of National Education 
Figure 1.1 primary school teacher Wages in indonesia relative to nonteacher Wages, by 
educational level, 2004
Source: Ragatz 2010.
Note: The bars show the percentage difference between a teacher’s salary and the salary of other workers of 
the same educational level. For example, primary school teachers with a first- or second-level diploma earn 
32 percent more than individuals of the same educational level who are engaged in a nonteaching 
occupation.
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in 2004, a large percentage of one million teacher applicants competing for 
64,000 positions as civil service teachers (many of whom were already likely 
teaching on local, temporary contracts) demonstrated poor content mastery, even 
in the subjects that they would be required to teach. On a general test for 
 primary school teachers, the average score was 34 correct answers for 90  questions 
(with a range from 6 to 67); on tests in 14 special subjects (for  example, civics, 
art, language, biology, and art), in only 4 subjects was the average score more than 
50 percent (Ragatz 2010).
Motivation
In terms of commitment and motivation to teach, many factors before  enactment 
of the Teacher Law of 2005 reinforced doubts about the status and  professionalism 
of teachers. The low wages of teachers were perceived to have a significant effect 
on teacher behavior; many teachers, especially those in primary schools, were 
concerned quite correctly about the welfare of their families. This led in many 
cases to second jobs and high teacher absenteeism. A teacher absenteeism study 
covering the academic year 2002/03 showed that 19 percent of teachers were 
absent when enumerators made surprise visits to a random sample of primary 
and junior secondary schools (Usman, Akhmadi, and Suryadarma 2004). These 
relatively high rates of absenteeism were likely to have been driven by the fact 
that many teachers held second jobs to supplement their incomes from teaching. 
Such absenteeism affects the quality of teaching, of course, because it disrupts 
the learning process by reducing teacher-student contact time and interfering 
with the relationship between teachers and students.
The commitment of teachers to their profession was also put in doubt because 
of what was seen as a relatively light workload. Many had few teaching hours per 
week in classes with low student-teacher ratios. A World Bank study in 2005 
found considerable variety in teacher work, but the “total percentage of teachers 
whose teaching workload [was] below the set minimum of 18 hours per week 
[was] 23 percent for primary schools and 44 percent for junior secondary 
schools” (Jalal et al. 2009). The average number of hours taught by teachers in 
remote schools was considerably higher than in urban and rural schools, likely 
indicating an undersupply of teachers in these remote areas. Indonesia also had 
(and still has) some of the lowest primary and junior secondary student-teacher 
ratios in the world, as shown in figure 1.2. At the primary level in 2003, Indonesia 
had a teacher for every 20 students, a ratio similar to Japan’s and much lower 
than the Republic of Korea’s. The student-teacher ratio for junior secondary 
schools in Indonesia was 12 to 1. These low ratios have arisen because of the 
practice of providing staff to schools based on the number of classes rather than 
the total number of students.
Official Certification
Prior to the reform, the government fully relied on and trusted the preservice 
teacher training universities to certify teachers. The universities issued two types 
of certificates for the universities’ graduates: academic certificates (for example, 
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Figure 1.2 student-teacher ratios preceding indonesian teacher reform, selected 
countries and country income Groups, 2003
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for three-year and four-year education programs) and teaching licenses at 
 different levels to accompany the academic certificates. No further certification 
by the Ministry was required.
Teacher Supply and Distribution Issues
Another shortcoming identified as a serious problem in relation to teachers 
in Indonesia concerned supply and distribution. Before the education reforms 
in the mid-2000s, there was no attempt to match teacher education 
 institutions’ intake with the demand for teachers. Most countries rely on the 
demand for teachers to signal prospective teacher trainees about the benefits 
of becoming a teacher. However, in Indonesia, a far greater number of 
 individuals enter teacher education institutions than required relative to 
overall needs. A recent study showed that only 53 percent of students 
 graduating from teacher education courses could actually be employed as 
teachers (Ragatz 2010).
In 2005, a survey using the existing entitlement formula showed that 
55  percent of primary schools in Indonesia were overstaffed and 34 percent 
understaffed. Despite incentives to overhire and the low aggregate student-
teacher ratios that result, the distribution of teachers before the reforms was 
uneven. In 2004, the primary student-teacher ratio ranged from less than 10 to 
1 in some districts to more than 30 to 1 in others (World Bank 2008). In junior 
secondary schools, approximately 20 percent of all districts had a student-teacher 
ratio of less than 20 to 1. Small schools tended to have low student-teacher ratios 
because of low enrollment and generous staffing standards. Remote schools 
tended to have higher than average student-teacher ratios because of the diffi-
culty in deploying teachers to these schools.
Although nationally there was an oversupply of teachers in 2004, poor 
 distribution meant that a significant number of schools did not have enough 
teachers (World Bank 2008). In 2005, it was estimated that approximately a 
third of all primary schools were short of teachers according to the prevailing 
staffing standards at the time. Rural and remote areas tended to have a greater 
 proportion of schools with shortages compared with urban schools. Conversely, 
55 percent of primary schools had more teachers than the minimum standards 
set at the time.
Another aspect of inequitable distribution was that teachers in rural and 
remote schools tended to have less education than their counterparts in urban 
areas. A 2005 survey showed that less than 10 percent of primary school 
 teachers in remote areas had a four-year degree compared with 27 percent of 
urban school teachers (World Bank 2008). The differences in teacher 
 qualification levels, as shown in figure 1.3, tend to reinforce patterns of 
 inequality across Indonesia. Remote areas tend to be the poorest, and children 
in these areas, the most disadvantaged. To the extent that teacher characteristics 
are causal factors in student learning, it is likely that the prereform teacher 
distribution pattern widened disparities in learning achievement for children in 
rural and remote areas.
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Figure 1.3 educational levels of primary school teachers in indonesia, by location, 2005
Source: World Bank 2008.
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Low Level of Student Outcomes
A final—and critical—shortcoming related to teachers in Indonesia was the low 
level of student outcomes, especially as measured by international comparative 
tests. Indonesian students simply performed poorly relative to students in other 
countries. International benchmark tests showed (and continue to show) that 
student outcomes in Indonesia are lower than those in neighboring countries. For 
example, in 2007, Indonesia ranked 36th out of 49 countries in the TIMSS test. 
In science, it ranked 35th. In the 2006 PISA, which focuses on how well 
 15-year-olds are prepared for real-world situations, Indonesia ranked 48th out of 
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56 countries in reading. It also ranked 52nd in science and 51st in mathematics. 
As figure 1.4 shows, most of the country’s PISA scores remain well below the 
average score among Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) countries, which is about 500.
Key triggers for reform
The increasing complexity of the education system in Indonesia, as outlined in 
the Introduction, and an increasingly sophisticated and insightful analysis of the 
challenges faced by its teachers convinced policy makers of the need for a major 
reform of the country’s teacher management and development system. Originally, 
the key trigger for the reform was the relatively low pay and low status of the 
teaching profession, leading both to (a) the prevalence of second jobs and high 
absenteeism rates, and (b) the generally small number and poor quality of candi-
dates applying from secondary education to teacher education institutes. This 
situation created a general consensus around the need to improve teacher “wel-
fare” (greater income) but to do this not through a routine increase in the base 
salary (which would have led to demands for similar increases from other civil 
servants) but rather through a “professional allowance.” Such an allowance would 
also reinforce the sentiment, strongly endorsed by Indonesia’s teacher associa-
tions, that teaching had to be seen again as a “profession”—closed to those who 
are not adequately qualified and not officially certified.
As described above, this focus on income and status was linked to the realiza-
tion that a large percentage of the teachers in 2005 had been hired during the 
Figure 1.4 indonesian pisA scores, 2000–09
Source: OECD 2010.
Note: PISA = Program for International Student Assessment.
330
340
350
360
370
A
ve
ra
ge
 P
IS
A
 s
co
re
380
390
400
410
Math Reading Science
2000 2003 2006 2009
Indonesia as a Case Study for Comprehensive Teacher Reform 25
Teacher Reform in Indonesia • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-9829-6 
large expansion of the system in the 1970s–80s with a relatively low level of 
initial education; little preservice education; few opportunities for later  systematic 
in-service upgrading; and exposure to a school culture that rewarded passivity 
and loyalty rather than proactive, innovative approaches to the improvement of 
student outcomes. Many of these teachers still had another decade or more to 
work but had little incentive and few opportunities for further professional 
development (in 2005, some 77 percent of Indonesia’s teachers were 41 years of 
age or older, with a retirement age of 60), all at a time when they were faced with 
many changes in the education system: a more diversified and accelerated 
 competency-based curriculum, a more child-centered pedagogy, a more varied 
student body, and more empowered SCs.
The realization by the Ministry of National Education that the teacher 
cohort of the time was not only failing to respond adequately to these changes 
but also producing disappointing student outcomes led it to insist that any 
increase in the status, welfare, and income of teachers as professionals would 
need to be  accompanied by an increase in quality. It therefore saw both (a) the 
need to condition the granting of the professional allowance to active teachers 
on some system of certification, and (b) the opportunity presented by the 
retirement of such a large cohort of teachers in a relatively short period of time 
to recruit and educate new generations of higher-quality teachers. This 
 marriage of the “status trigger” with the “quality trigger” produced a rare 
 consensus among the major actors on the need for a comprehensive new law 
on teachers.
Over time, another set of triggers added incentives to the implementation of 
the Teacher Law and led to a variety of complementary guidelines and  regulations 
to help ensure the law would achieve what it was expected to achieve. These 
triggers included
•	 The need to enhance the capacity of teachers and their role in school 
 self-assessment and improvement given the increasing decentralization of the 
system, which has given more authority (and accountability) for improving 
the quality of education to the school (that is, the school principal and his or 
her teachers);
•	 The increasing amount of funds being transferred directly to schools on a 
 per-student basis for quality improvement through an operational cost 
 program, which puts more demands on teachers to take part in school 
 self-assessment and improvement programs and to produce better student 
outcomes; and
•	 The eventual flood of new funding into the system, from both internal and 
external sources (resulting from the constitutional amendment to earmark 
20 percent of the national budget for education), which gave the Ministry of 
National Education an opportunity to undertake a range of programs under 
the reform.
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major components of the teacher law of 2005
These various triggers sparked enactment of the pioneering Teacher Law of 2005, 
which laid out the roles and responsibilities of teachers as well as the strategies 
needed to improve their quality and welfare in support of the earlier Education 
Law of 2003. The Teacher Law defined the competencies required of teachers in 
four areas (pedagogic, personal, social, and professional); the incorporation of 
those competencies into national teacher standards; the role of various ministry 
units and agencies in supporting teachers to reach these competencies; the 
teacher certification process and the qualifications required for such certification; 
and the conditions under which teachers could receive special and professional 
allowances. The law also raised important issues concerning teacher management 
and development that required further consideration: continuing professional 
development and its link to promotion and salary increments, teacher  performance 
appraisal, and the role of principals in instructional leadership. In other words, 
the Teacher Law provided a comprehensive, clearly defined package of reforms 
that established an ambitious agenda for improving the national education 
system.
Specifically, the 2005 law and the many presidential and ministerial  regulations 
that govern its implementation have major components covering virtually all 
aspects of teacher management and development. These include the following:
•	 The core principle that teaching is a “profession.” Teachers who fulfill certain 
established academic qualifications and demonstrate essential pedagogic, 
personal, social, and professional competencies must be considered 
“ professional” and therefore worthy of a professional allowance equal to their 
base salary.
•	 The development by the National Education Standards Board of a standards 
framework for courses, tests, role definitions, and other education elements to 
underpin change. The board centered its core standards and indicators on the 
four core competencies mandated in the Teacher Law.
•	 The requirement that all teachers meet a minimum standard of a four-year 
degree before being certified.
•	 A course of additional professional training after the four-year degree—mostly 
classroom-based—of six months for primary school teachers and one year for 
secondary school teachers.
•	 The requirement that all teachers be formally certified after the four-year 
degree has been gained, through either a portfolio of the teacher’s education 
and teaching achievements or a 90-hour remedial in-service course.
•	 The reform of preservice teacher education institutions so that their subject 
and pedagogical courses were closely linked to the school curriculum 
 competency standards to ensure that all graduates meet the new performance 
standards for the teaching profession and are eligible for certification.
•	 Reformed practicum experience through improved links with districts and 
schools, the key feature of which is the requirement that education students 
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undertake the largest part of their pedagogical training and practice under 
supervision in the classroom.
•	 A mandatory 24 period-hour (18-hour) per week workload required to gain 
and maintain certification.
•	 A “special” area allowance to be paid to teachers in defined areas (such as in 
remote or border regions).
•	 Improved processes of in-school induction, mentoring, and probation to ensure 
that a beginning teacher receives close supervision and guidance in the 
 workplace to successfully make the transition from university education to 
the school.
•	 A system of teacher appraisal and public service salary increases that links the 
teaching objectives of schools to individual teacher performance appraisal, 
career progression, and salary increments.
•	 A more systematic program of continuing professional development that links 
backward to the teacher appraisal process and forward to salary increments 
and career progression in a new career development framework for teachers.
•	 The strengthening of teacher working groups to bring teachers together in a 
forum to discuss teaching problems and to work cooperatively to undertake 
common tasks such as curriculum development, the creation of teaching aids, 
and the design of test items.
•	 The more systematic, merit-based appointment of principals and supervisors 
based on mastery of the four core competencies for educators, meant to be 
achieved through early identification of promising candidates, careful selec-
tion, and further training before promotion to more senior positions.
the political-economic context of the teacher law
As can be seen, the Teacher Law of 2005 and the plethora of regulations that 
flowed from it produced an unusually substantial and comprehensive reform of 
not only teacher management and development but also many other aspects of 
the education system. Such a reform—both its content and its implementation—
did not happen in a vacuum but rather must be understood in terms of the 
political and economic environment of the day. This environment has always 
been particularly complex in Indonesia given its history; its geographic spread; its 
large and growing population; and its cultural, religious, and linguistic diversity. 
In general, therefore, a range of political economy factors were important in the 
context of the development of the Teacher Law.
Part of the environment of decision making in Indonesia relates to the 
 complexity of the nation itself. This complexity derives from many sources. In 
the most ordinary sense, Indonesia is one of the most ethnically and linguistically 
diverse, and geographically challenged, countries of the world. A combination of 
722 language groups spread out over a 3,000-mile archipelago of more than 
17,000 islands—with a matrix of Islamic, Buddhist, Hindu, Protestant, and 
Catholic faiths (and dozens of animistic beliefs) underlain by English, Dutch, and 
Chinese heritages—makes any standardized or centralized approach to change 
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difficult. The primacy of the national language, Bahasa Indonesia, which has 
penetrated at least administratively to all regions of the country, has facilitated 
standardization to some extent, but cultural, religious, and historic differences 
have still prevented full achievement of the national aspiration of “bhinneka 
 tunggal ika”: unity in diversity. Related to this diversity is another challenge to the 
implementation of reform: the sheer isolation and remoteness of many of the 
country’s communities, be they found on small, distant, rarely visited islands or 
equally hard-to-reach mountain peaks and valleys.
History of Reform
At the beginning of the century, Indonesia aspired to play a larger role both 
within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and internationally. 
This role required a government both more visibly stable and democratic and—
at least in the eyes of the major international development agencies (both 
 bilateral and multilateral) active in the country—having long-term, systematic 
national and sectoral development plans. In the context of increasing  globalization 
and the economic changes this process demands, Indonesia also began to more 
clearly understand the importance of a better-trained workforce, educated within 
a more diversified, responsive education system and ultimately more adaptable 
to the ever-changing demands of a growing and changing economy.
Development of Consensus
This understanding led to the unusual mandate, contained in a 2002 amendment 
to the 1945 Constitution, requiring that 20 percent of the national and local 
budgets be devoted to education—a percentage often promoted internationally 
but rarely made legally binding at the national level. But the size of Indonesia’s 
population and of its teaching cadre presented a difficult financial challenge: how 
to make a significant impact in terms of qualifying and certifying so many 
 teachers and then radically increasing their remuneration in a country as large as 
Indonesia, even when 20 percent of the national budget is reserved for 
education.
At the same time, evidence began to accumulate that despite the best 
 intentions and increased resources, the education system was not producing the 
kind of graduates needed to face the political and economic challenges of the 
new century. This was the challenge to be addressed. The aging, relatively poorly 
paid, poorly educated, and often demotivated (and “deprofessionalized”)  teaching 
force (at least relative to Indonesia’s comparable ASEAN partners) began to be 
considered as a major factor in the perceived poor quality of the education 
 system and its graduates. But teachers were also considered to be important 
opinion leaders in the communities where they taught (though considerably less 
so than in the decades following independence) and therefore were an important 
political constituency to support.
As a result of a combination of these various factors—national aspirations 
regarding Indonesia’s role in an expanding global community, the need for more 
education resources, and the realization that the system was not producing the 
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results it should—the various stakeholders concerned with teachers began to 
reach consensus on what to do next: an unusual “win-win” situation in the 
 process of educational reform.
Discussions about some kind of government regulation concerning the  welfare 
and protection of teachers started before the turn of the century and took several 
years (and a number of presidents and ministers of education) to come to 
 fruition. The various teacher associations in Indonesia argued strongly that the 
income and status of teachers—and therefore, the quality of their teaching—
were in such desperate straits that serious action was required. This conviction 
caused what was first proposed as a government regulation to be upgraded to a 
law to be approved by the Indonesian Parliament. It also led to the agreement 
that teacher salaries had to be doubled (an increase of 100 percent). But because 
such an increase, in effect, would have led to two streams of civil servant pay 
scales and, therefore, demands for equal increases for all civil servants, and 
because the associations argued that teaching needed to be considered a profes-
sion (like law and medicine), the proposal was made to identify the increase as a 
“professional allowance.” With the professional allowance, teacher income indeed 
became commensurate with that of doctors and lawyers (and even exceeded 
them,  especially given teachers’ low teaching load).5
At about the same time, within the Ministry of National Education, a new 
Directorate General for the Quality Improvement of Teachers and Education 
Personnel was created and given responsibility for virtually all aspects of the 
management of teachers, both in formal schools and in nonformal education 
programs, and at both primary and secondary levels of education. One of the 
Directorate General’s first acts was to develop a profile of the teacher population 
of Indonesia. This profile reinforced the view that teachers, in general, were badly 
paid, poorly motivated, inequitably deployed, increasingly disrespected by the 
communities they served, and with few opportunities for further training. The 
profile helped convince the ministry that any additional professional allowance 
had to focus not only on teacher welfare, but also on teacher quality, and 
 therefore on some process of certifying that teachers who were provided this 
allowance were, in fact, professional.
Finally, the newly elected Parliament contained a number of representatives 
who themselves had been teachers and therefore had experienced directly the 
results of low status and inadequate pay. Supported by their political parties and 
leaders who recognized the importance of teachers as a voting constituency and 
as local opinion leaders, they therefore enthusiastically supported the move for a 
comprehensive Teacher Law that would directly address the twin issues of 
 welfare and quality. (Rather late in the process, this officially became the Teacher 
and Lecturer Law to allow some coverage of university-level staff.) This 
 enthusiasm persisted even after the ministry showed what the likely budget 
would require for putting in place the structures and processes needed for the 
certification process and paying the allowance.
Thus, in the early 2000s, there was considerable consensus among the major 
education stakeholders of the country—the government (the Ministry of National 
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Education, the Ministry of Finance, and the National Planning Board), the 
 political parties and the Parliament, and teachers as represented by their various 
 associations—that what became known as the Teacher Law of 2005 was  necessary 
to clarify the roles, responsibilities, and desired competencies of  teachers and to 
identify the strategies needed to improve their quality and welfare.
Debate on the Law’s Provisions
Once the general framework of the Teacher Law was set, however, the consensus 
on its implementation began to fall apart among the stakeholders. A major issue 
in this regard was the means proposed to prove “competency” (after the gaining 
of a minimum four-year degree) for the purposes of certification and receipt of 
the professional allowance. The ministry, supported by a new National Education 
Standards Board, wished to assess the four core competencies ( professional, 
pedagogical, personal, and social) through both written tests and classroom 
observation.
The teacher associations, however, harking back to the original focus on 
 welfare, contended that the proposed competency tests were an assault on the 
fact that most candidates for certification had already earned a four-year degree 
and, in many cases, also had many years of experience accompanied by a range 
of in-service training activities. A majority in Parliament agreed with this opinion 
and therefore refused to provide funds to implement the competency tests. 
Instead, they agreed that proof of competency would be based only on the 
 submission of “portfolios” of achievement (such as personal references, 
 publications, certificates of attendance at in-service courses, and model lesson 
plans). Insistence by the ministry that some kind of competency assessment was 
essential in this process led to a compromise whereby those teachers whose 
portfolios were evaluated and approved by local teacher education institutions 
(selected and oriented by the ministry) would pass immediately to certification, 
while those who did not gain such approval would be required to undertake a 
90-hour training program and then be tested on its content—a test that was 
ultimately passed by most who took it. In other words, the process of certifying 
teachers (and thus of providing them a professional allowance equal to their base 
salary) was not strongly linked to demonstrated competencies in either subject 
content or pedagogical skill.
Implementation Issues
Early in the process of implementing the Teacher Law, and from a political 
economy perspective, a range of bureaucratic, political, and financial problems 
began to appear at both the national and local levels:
•	 The new directorate general responsible for the process was understaffed, and 
many of its officers were new to the process of implementing a major, 
 comprehensive, and largely untested reform. The management of such a 
 programmatically and bureaucratically complex process in a system known for 
administrative inefficiency was not easy—a task made even more difficult by 
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the sense of independence, nourished by the process of decentralization, felt 
by many district officials and principals who were reluctant to listen to the 
mandates of the central ministry in the absence of clear incentives.
•	 Detailed guidelines were therefore needed to try to ensure that district offices 
would follow the directions of the ministry.
•	 District education offices had no units comparable to the new directorate 
 general and, therefore, continued to handle teacher management and 
 development in a piecemeal and often uncoordinated fashion.
•	 The regulations determining which teachers in a given school or district would 
first enter the queue for certification (in theory, senior teachers with a  four-year 
degree) were not always followed, leading to charges of favoritism and 
 corruption both in schools and in district education offices.
•	 Reports emerged of fictitious and falsified portfolio documentation—for 
example, with sample lesson plans, upgrading certificates, and other  documents 
shared among applicants.
•	 Too few teacher education institutions involved in assessing the large number 
of portfolios, and in some cases, they were pressured into passing a much 
larger percentage of portfolios than the 20 percent the ministry had antici-
pated; not enough teachers, therefore, were seriously assessed in terms of their 
existing competencies.
•	 Because funding to be provided to the teacher education institutions for the 
portfolio assessment and the 90-hour training course was seriously delayed, 
what was meant to be a leisurely seven-month planning and implementation 
process had to be completed in two months. This truncated process led to the 
development of standard training modules (rather than modules tailored to fit 
profiles of teachers’ needs at different levels of competence); inefficient 
 training processes (for example, up to 25 parallel classes in one institution and 
a large percentage of time devoted to breaks and administrative tasks); and an 
almost 100 percent pass rate at the end of the training.
When the Teacher Law was passed in 2005, only about 15 percent of the 
government’s budget was devoted to education. The government recognized that 
the introduction of the professional allowance and a commitment to certify all 
teachers by 2015 would put significant pressure on the education budget. 
Despite evidence showing this impact, the pressure to improve the welfare of 
teachers meant that the provisions for the professional allowance remained. 
These budgetary pressures were partially relieved after 2008 when the 
 constitutional court ruled that the government was failing to meet its  constitutional 
obligation to spend 20 percent of its budget on education. Government 
 education spending increased significantly, and its share has remained above 
20 percent since 2009.
Early Challenges
In addition to these implementation problems, other, more subtle issues arose 
to complicate the process. Three years after the passing of the Teacher Law, 
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the Directorate General for Quality Improvement of Teachers and Education 
Personnel was dismantled, and different aspects of teacher management and 
development were again placed not only in different directorates but also in a 
new Board for Educational and Cultural Human Resources Development and 
Quality Assurance for Education. Partly as a result, the original intention of the 
reform to adapt its strategies to the particular needs of different regions of 
Indonesia, different districts, and even different teachers—adaptations such as 
greater variety, more local content, and more options in the 90-hour course—was 
never carried out.
In addition, these practical setbacks arose:
•	 The expectation that certified teachers would use a portion of their new 
 allowance for continuing professional development has rarely been fulfilled.
•	 Detailed regulations around a new mandate that every certified teacher teach 
a minimum of 24 period-hours per week (a rule hotly contested by teacher 
associations, which preferred 18 period-hours) were also only belatedly 
developed.
•	 Plans to implement other aspects of the reform focused more on quality 
 assurance of both the process and the products (such as more effective and 
merit-based procedures for the appointment of school principals and 
 supervisors and new and more rigorous mechanisms for induction, probation, 
and teacher appraisal) were either delayed or remained only central  government 
regulations not actively implemented down to the district level. Funds  available 
at the district level for continuing professional development of certified 
 teachers were therefore often unspent.
Worries about the impact of the Teacher Law on private schools and systems 
also arose. Although the law itself does not distinguish between “public” and 
“private,” priority for entry into the certification queue was usually given first to 
(a) public school teachers, who were much more likely to have both a civil 
 service post and financial support to obtain the four-year degree necessary for 
certification, and then (b) to temporary teachers with government contracts. It is 
therefore said that many of the best private school teachers moved to public 
schools, even as contract teachers, with the intention of eventually gaining a post 
and then certification.
Ultimately, however, doubts began to accumulate both about the integrity of 
the content and the fairness of the portfolio assessment procedure across teacher 
education institutions and about the efficacy of the 90-hour training program. 
This evidence was compelling and convinced the ministry, despite opposition 
from some teacher associations, that a test of actual competency before 
 certification was required. The ministry therefore eliminated the portfolio as a 
means to gain certification and developed both a Pre-Test of Teacher Competency 
(which determines whether a teacher remains in the certification queue) and a 
post-training Teacher Competency Test (to determine whether the teacher has 
achieved the desired competencies and thus is eligible for certification and 
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the professional allowance). Even in this process, however, political pressures 
(from teacher associations to find most teachers competent) and financial 
 exigencies (from the Ministry of Finance for the Ministry of Education and 
Culture6 to spend its budget for professional allowances) caused the ministry to 
set the  passing score at 30 percent for the competency pretest given in early 2012.
Impact of Decentralization
Another aspect of Indonesia’s political and economic environment that became 
important in the implementation of the Teacher Law was the strong policy of 
decentralization of authority and resources from the center to regional (district 
and municipal) governments and agencies. This decentralization policy, starting in 
2000, was expected to weaken the hierarchical, almost feudal attitudes that made 
Indonesia’s bureaucracy so unwieldy and often so unimaginative by increasing the 
efficiency of the system and making it more innovative and responsive to the 
needs of its constituencies and ultimate “clients.” However, by stopping much of 
the decentralization process at the district office level—where one office can be 
in charge of 1,000 schools or more—little reform or change, in fact, may happen 
at the level where it matters the most: the community and the school.
This decentralization process both (a) transferred substantial policy making 
and planning authority (and resources) from the central level down to the district 
level, and (b) moved implementation processes (and resources) from the 
 subdistrict level up to the district level—changes that resulted in much larger and 
much more powerful district-level offices. But the unclear and incomplete 
 division of labor among the different levels of the system and the lack of 
 management and technical skills in planning, budgeting, procurement, and 
accounting needed at lower levels of the system to take on more authority (and 
the willingness of the upper level to give up its authority) made decentralization 
a problematic process. Also, because decentralization took away most of the 
 central government’s carrots and sticks—which can be used to ensure that 
 decentralized entities still work within some kind of central framework—the 
pressure for district offices to do much more than merely send the reform 
 messages downward is limited.
Decentralization and the introduction of school grants led to increases in the 
size of the teaching force, increasing further the future costs of certification. The 
intergovernmental transfer system introduced to allocate resources across levels 
of governments included incentives to hire civil service teachers ( Cerdan-Infantes 
and Makarova 2013). Part of the overall fund transfer was determined by the size 
of the civil service establishment and local governments, with large civil services 
receiving more central funds. This led to an increase in teacher hiring, which has 
meant that student-teacher ratios have declined substantially since decentraliza-
tion began. Incentives to hire more teachers were also exacerbated by the large 
increase in school-hired teachers following the introduction of the school grants 
program in 2005. This program, School Operational Assistance (Bantuan 
Operasional Sekolah, or BOS), was launched nationally, and schools used these 
resources partly to hire more teachers. Between 2006 and 2010, an additional 
34 Indonesia as a Case Study for Comprehensive Teacher Reform
Teacher Reform in Indonesia • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-9829-6
260,000 teachers were recruited in this way in primary and junior secondary 
schools across Indonesia.
What decentralization did mandate was the popular election of district-level 
legislatures and district “regents” (chiefs) and the subsequent appointment by 
these regents of the heads of local government sectoral offices such as 
 education—appointments open to favoritism and manipulation rather than 
 reliance on experience and merit. Decentralization gave these heads of district 
education offices a mandate over processes such as the appointment of  subdistrict 
office heads and school principals (in one reported case, 120 principals were 
replaced at one time by new district education authorities); the request for and 
deployment of new teaching posts; and the prioritization of candidates for 
obtaining the four-year degree and, subsequently, entry into the certification 
process. And although the Teacher Law gives to district offices the right to 
 withhold the professional allowance from teachers who fail to meet given criteria 
of quality, this right is seldom exercised because of various local personal and 
political pressures.
Another objective of decentralization is a stronger voice in education deci-
sion making and budget oversight on the part of parents and the community 
through elected SCs, an essential component of a major program on school-
based  management (SBM; further described in box I.1). Despite some progress 
in this regard in districts and schools that consciously attempt to promote this 
process, local voices are generally not an important factor in issues around 
teacher reform. As a recent review of the SBM program concluded, “Parents 
generally had a small voice in school matters. Parents’ deferential attitudes 
toward school staff,  perceptions of the effective division of labor between 
school and home, and schools’ lack of outreach appear to prevent parents from 
effectively exercising their voice in school affairs. Parents are rarely part of final 
decisions on school matters” (Chen 2011).
Thus, both the economic impact of more resources available to local govern-
ments and the political impact of more power exercised by these governments 
have caused considerable concern about the fairness and propriety of a range of 
activities in the teacher management and development cycle, especially at the 
district and school level. As a result, the Teacher Law’s focus on longer-term, 
continuing quality improvement achieved through flexible, more adaptable, and 
individualized implementation has in some ways been lost because of (a) politi-
cal pressures for rapid certification and standardized treatment for all, and (b) 
economic pressures to quickly and completely spend the new funds moving into 
the education system.
More generally, perhaps, the focus on a “structural” rather than a “cultural” 
solution to the low status and competency levels of teachers—including a formal 
degree, portfolios and multiple-choice tests, standardized certification processes, 
and standardized content for quality improvement, all leading to formal 
 professional labeling and greater income—resulted, in some people’s view, in the 
downgrading of what in the past had actually been the basis for status: a strong 
commitment to and passion for teaching.
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conclusions
The Indonesian Teacher Law of 2005 is unusual in the comprehensiveness of its 
various components and of the institutions, mechanisms, strategies, and processes 
put in place to implement it. It is also unusual in the principal incentive designed 
to inspire it: the granting of status as a “professional” and, probably more 
 important, the large and unconditional increase in income provided upon gaining 
this status.
But the evolution of the Teacher Law of 2005 from its original  conceptualization 
to its current state of implementation is not unusual for major reforms. From 
larger macro-level political and economic considerations to more personal and 
institutional rivalries, a number of complications have arisen to delay or derail the 
implementation of various parts of the reform. These are well understood by 
Box 1.1 school-Based management in indonesia
As part of a broad decentralization of governance responsibilities to districts, the Indonesian 
government adopted school-based management (SBM) principles through regulations in the 
National Education Law of 2003. SBM is a form of education governance that grants 
 responsibilities and authority for individual school academic operations to principals,  teachers, 
and other local community-based stakeholders. The expectations are that local, and often 
shared, decision making will lead to more efficient and effective policies and programs aligned 
with local priorities, which in turn will lead to improved school performance and student 
achievement. Because of the limited scope of past research on the implementation and effects 
of SBM in Indonesia during its eight years of implementation, the Ministry of Education and 
Culture and the development partners expressed the need to undertake a study that aimed to 
(a) provide a nationwide quantitative and qualitative status report on the implementation of 
SBM, (b) identify factors associated with successful practices of SBM, and (c) assess the effects 
of SBM on student achievement.
The study was carried out in 2010 and 2011 and was based on face-to-face surveys of 
 principals, teachers, school committee (SC) members, and parents in 400 elementary schools; 
surveys of district staff in 54 districts; and case studies in a subsample of 40 schools (Chen 
2011). Although the study determined that in general the structures (such as SCs, district-level 
supervision, and teacher councils) and processes (such as SC elections and principal-teacher 
consultations) supportive of SBM were nominally in place, successful implementation of the 
SBM program—still, in the history of things, relatively young—would require greater clarity of 
the roles and responsibilities of the various administrative levels of the system, more capacity 
building of all the system’s actors, and a stronger commitment to its goals and objectives.
Based on the findings of the study and given the importance of SBM in the further 
 development of Indonesian education, recommendations for improving the implementation 
and the outcomes of SBM focused on three actions: (a) expanding principal, teacher, and SC 
member capacity to implement SBM; (b) increasing school staff ability to make managerial 
and instructional changes; and (c) developing district capacity to support schools and SBM.
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the Ministry of Education and Culture, and steps are being undertaken to resolve 
many of them. Whether these steps are successful will go a long way toward deter-
mining whether the lofty goals and aspirations of the Teacher Law are finally met.
With the context of this comprehensive reform now in place, the next chapter 
turns to the conceptual framework for quality education through reformed 
teacher management and development, which forms the basis for the remaining 
chapters of this book.
notes
 1. Pancasila is the official philosophical foundation of the Indonesian state. The term 
consists of two Old Javanese words (originally from Sanskrit): “pañca” meaning five, 
and “sīla” meaning principles. It comprises five principles held to be inseparable and 
interrelated: (a) belief in the one and only God; (b) just and civilized humanity; 
(c) the unity of Indonesia; (d) democracy guided by the inner wisdom in the 
 unanimity arising out of deliberations among representatives; and (e) social justice for 
all of the people of Indonesia.
 2. The World Conference on Education for All was held in Jomtien, Thailand, in 1990. 
From this conference, the World Declaration on Education for All (EFA) was 
adopted, and six goals were set for 2000. In 2000, the international community met 
again at the World Education Forum in Dakar, Senegal, and set further goals for 
achievement by 2015. The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) has the overall coordination and leadership role in the 
EFA effort, whose goals also contribute toward the global pursuit of the United 
Nations’ MDGs.
 3. For more information about the UNESCO-led EFA movement, see http://www 
.unesco.org/new/en/education/themes/leading-the-international-agenda/education-
for-all/. For more about the UN’s MDGs regarding achievement of universal primary 
education, see http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/education.shtml.
 4. The previous law governing the National Education System needed to be adjusted to 
implement the principles of the democratization of education. The Law on National 
Education System (2003) covers all aspects in the Indonesian education system, 
including its functions and aims; the rights and obligations of learners, parents, citizens, 
the community, and the government; the streams, levels, and types of education; the 
medium of instruction; compulsory education; national education standards; the 
 curriculum; the educators and education personnel; educational facilities and 
 equipment; financing of education; educational management; community participa-
tion in education; evaluation, accreditation, and certification; criteria for the establish-
ment of educational institutions; and supervision.
 5. According to one source, although beginning medical doctors and teachers receive 
almost the same base pay of over Rp 1,900,000 per month, the professional allowance 
for certified teachers (for teaching 24 period-hours or 18 hours per week) is  equivalent 
to this base pay, while for a doctor (working 40 hours per week), the professional 
allowance is Rp 325,000 (Sri 2011). The maximum allowance for senior doctors is 
Rp 1,400,000 and for senior teachers, Rp 4,100,000.
 6. At the time of the Teacher Law of 2005, the Ministry was named the Ministry of 
National Education. In 2011, its name changed to the Ministry of Education and 
Culture.
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Teachers as the Cornerstone of 
Educational Quality
A Definition of educational Quality
Available studies suggest that the main driver of the variation in student learning in 
school is the quality of the teachers …. Studies that take into account all of the 
available evidence on teacher effectiveness suggest that students placed with 
 high-performing teachers will progress three times as fast as those placed with 
 low-performing teachers.
—Sir Michael Barber and Mona Morshed, “How the World’s Best-Performing 
Schools Come Out on Top”
The evolution of the definition of quality in education has been a complex and 
nonlinear one. But in simplified terms, early definitions of quality focused on 
inputs and outputs. More schools and classrooms, more books and teachers, 
would inevitably lead not only to higher enrollments but also to higher 
 completion rates and greater achievement. When such logic did not always lead 
to the expected results, attention eventually turned to the “black box” in the 
middle—the quality of the teachers, the teaching-learning process, and the 
 curriculum it was meant to deliver—where the inputs were meant to be used in 
creative ways to produce the outcomes desired. Efforts were also focused on the 
“quality” of the children who entered school: were they healthy, well-nourished, 
motivated to learn, and ready for school? Still later, the school climate or 
 environment (what surrounded the “black box”) also became of interest. Was the 
school a physically healthy and psychosocially friendly and protective place to 
be—a sanctuary for children rather than a place with poor hygiene and unhealthy 
facilities, corporal punishment, peer bullying, and teacher indifference and 
even cruelty?
Even later, the larger environment of parents, families, and communities was 
included in the definition. Are families willing and able to be involved in making 
the school better and helping their children learn more? And is the school willing 
and able to accept their involvement? Is the larger community supportive 
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of—rather than dismissive of—the school? Is the school sensitive to and 
 supportive of the local community and its culture(s)?
Most recently, the nature and quality of school governance have become 
important. Do individual schools—through a collaborative partnership of school 
staff, parents, and the community—develop efficient school-based management 
mechanisms and procedures, including sensitive self-assessments of school 
 conditions (inputs, processes, outcomes) and forward-looking, innovative, and 
(ideally) adequately financed school improvement plans?
Such a comprehensive definition of quality was at the core of the Dakar 
Framework for Action for Education for All (EFA) of 2000 (UNESCO 2000).1 
It contained both a target and a strategy on quality:
•	 Target 6: Improving all aspects of the quality of EFA
•	 Strategy 8: Create safe, healthy, inclusive, and equitably resourced educational 
environments with clearly defined levels of achievement for all
The Dakar Framework also focused on 10 characteristics of educational 
quality:
•	 Healthy, well-nourished, and motivated students
•	 Well-motivated and professionally competent teachers
•	 Active learning techniques
•	 A relevant curriculum
•	 Adequate, environmentally friendly, and easily accessible facilities
•	 Healthy, safe, and protective learning environments
•	 Adequate evaluation of school environments, processes, and outcomes
•	 Participatory, school-based management
•	 Respect for and engagement with local communities and cultures
•	 Adequate and equitable financing
With this list, the definition of quality became truly comprehensive and 
 multidimensional. The definition included characteristics of the major actors 
(students, teachers, parents, the community); inputs (books, learning materials, 
facilities); processes (teaching and learning, school governance, monitoring and 
evaluation, financing); environments (of the classroom, the school, and the 
 surrounding community); and, ultimately, outcomes (enrollment, retention, 
completion, achievement).
Whatever the definition of “good” education has been—and particularly in any 
more comprehensive definition used today—the role of the teacher in providing 
an education of good quality is seen as ever more critical: “The quality of 
 education, in other words, cannot exceed the quality of its teachers” (Barber and 
Mourshed 2007, 16). It is the teacher who must use more student-centered, 
active teaching-learning techniques to deliver a relevant curriculum; who, often 
in the context of increasingly powerful school-based management, must promote 
community support for the school and demonstrate respect for and engagement 
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with local communities; who must demonstrate both good practice and strong 
ethical principles; and who must ultimately motivate students, ensure their 
health and safety, and help them learn what they want—and need—to learn. 
A strong, rigorous, merit-based teacher management and development system is 
therefore essential in creating the teachers who can fulfill this increasingly 
 important role.
A conceptual Framework for teacher Quality
Defining a Good Teacher
The comprehensive and multidimensional definition of quality provided above 
requires an equally comprehensive and multidimensional framework for teacher 
quality. But describing the nature and quality of a teaching force in any nation is 
a complex task; this is even truer in an education system as large and diverse as 
Indonesia’s. The logical place to start, of course, is with an assessment of 
its  quality: just how good are the teachers, how well do they teach, and what 
kinds of outcomes do they achieve for their students?
What constitutes effective teaching is a matter that psychologists, 
 sociologists, and educators have long deliberated with a general focus on 
which teaching strategies, techniques, and devices contribute most effectively 
to student  learning. Although there is often an attempt to simplify it, learning 
is a  complex and  contextual process. It requires specifics of which teaching 
methods, under which conditions, with which students, in which subject areas, 
and at which grade levels are essential to achieve effective learning 
(O’Neill 1988).
The quality of teachers and teaching can be conceptualized and measured in 
many ways.2 One approach focuses principally on teacher productivity, perhaps 
best assessed by general classroom performance and specific teacher practices. 
In recent decades, greater attention has been given to such practices, in part 
because of landmark studies that found classroom effects to be greater than 
school effects (see, for example, Sanders and Rivers 1996 and Scheerens 1992). 
One result has been that research related to effective teaching has been 
 expanding rapidly.
Process-Product Function
Teaching behavior and its relation to student achievement had traditionally 
been studied through what became known as “process-product” studies, in 
which teaching practices and behavior are statistically linked to student 
 outcomes to determine which practices or behaviors positively or negatively 
affect outcomes (Muijs and Reynolds 2002). But this process-product model 
is limited—seen as often too subjective, undertaken by principals or 
 supervisors rather than neutral assessors, sporadic, and unsystematic—and 
new models are emerging to replace it (Seidel and Shavelson 2007). Such 
models of teaching and learning have changed to emphasize cognitive and 
affective components. A critical reason for this shift is that, in the past decade, 
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teaching effectiveness research has concentrated on more global aspects 
of teaching and on analyzing teaching  patterns or regimes instead of single 
 teaching acts (Borko 2004).
In this shift, two distinct approaches have emerged. One approach has focused 
on large-scale surveys with sophisticated multilevel statistical models of students 
nested within classes nested within schools with extraneous variables controlled. 
This has increased statistical power in detecting effects (Raudenbush 2004; 
Rowan, Correnti, and Miller 2002). The second approach focuses on processes of 
learning in specific knowledge domains (Bereiter and Scardamalia 2003, 55–68; 
Greeno, Collins, and Resnick 1996). This approach typically involves  experimental 
or quasi-experimental studies of specific instructional approaches and how these 
approaches affect student learning.
In both of these approaches, student performance is often used as a more 
 easily measurable proxy of teacher effectiveness. An important feature of such 
measurement is that student learning is characterized as multidimensional, 
 making it quite distinct from the older process-product studies. Student 
 outcomes are often examined not only on cognitive outcomes but also on 
 affective and metacognitive outcomes (Snow and Lohman 1984). This view 
holds teaching to be the creation of a learning environment for students to 
undertake cognitive activities through which they can build knowledge and 
 reasoning capacity. This approach, of course, has its own challenges, especially at 
the primary school level where, over a number of years, students may experience 
a variety of different teachers. Furthermore, student performance in, say, 
 arithmetic is conditioned not only by a wide range of external factors (such as 
the student’s health and nutritional status, family background, prior experience 
in an early childhood development program, and the extent of exposure to the 
 language of instruction used in school) but also by many internal school factors 
beyond teacher quality, including the availability of texts and other materials, the 
language of instruction, and the physical and psychosocial environment of the 
school as a whole.
Assuming that such factors can be taken into account in any systematic 
 assessment, resulting student outcomes can be correlated with a number of 
policy indicators related to teacher management and development. For example, 
Rice (2003) identifies a number of these as follows:
•	 Teacher preparation programs and degrees. What is the structure of teacher 
 education in terms of the balance between practice and theory, what  percentage 
of teachers has how many years of formal preservice education, and what 
 percentage has attained the desired or required degree mandated by the 
Ministry of Education and Culture?
•	 Teacher experience. Experience includes both induction and mentoring in the 
early years of a teacher’s career and in-service training in later years.
•	 Subject matter credentials. These include, in both preservice and in-service 
 education, the extent to which teachers have taken coursework relevant to the 
subject area(s) they teach and the pedagogical skills needed to teach it.
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•	 Test scores. Knowledge may be not only measured by the teachers’ own test 
scores, especially the teacher’s literacy level or verbal abilities but also subject 
knowledge.
•	 Teacher certification. Ultimately, based on a mixture of some or all of the above, 
some kind of formal teacher certification is desirable (especially when 
 certification is in the subject that the teacher is assigned to teach).
Unfortunately, the literature on the impact of these policy indicators is not 
altogether clear. This is especially the case in regard to issues of qualification 
and certification—often used as a measure of teacher quality—and a great 
deal of research has been done examining educational levels (for example, a 
 four-year degree), degree types (for example, mathematics versus  mathematics 
education), and qualifications (for example, certification and training 
received). A study employing multiple years of the reading and mathematics 
assessments of the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) 
examined the relative contributions of teacher qualifications, other school 
inputs, and  student  characteristics to student achievement (Darling-Hammond 
2000). After  controlling for student poverty and student language  background, 
this study found that “measures of teacher preparation and certification were 
the strongest correlates of average student achievement in reading and 
 mathematics. The most strongly significant predictor of achievement was the 
proportion of  well-qualified teachers, defined as the proportion holding both 
full  certification and a major in the field being taught.”  Darling-Hammond 
and Berry (2006) also note that the less-advantaged students benefit most, 
stating, “Studies show that well-prepared and well-supported teachers are 
important for all students, but especially for students who come to school 
with greater needs.”
On the other hand, many other studies have found certification programs and 
other qualifications to be poor measures of teacher quality. Leigh (2007) argues 
that formal qualifications of teachers and other information frequently recorded 
on a database of teachers (for example, gender, age, degrees held, and  certification) 
seldom predict effectiveness in raising student achievement. Others (Wayne and 
Youngs 2003) agree, finding “little different in the average academic achievement 
impacts of certified, uncertified, and alternatively certified teachers” (as quoted 
in Kane, Rockoff, and Staiger 2008). Many such instances relate to the inability 
to use effective pedagogy; there is often a significant discordance between 
 knowledge of subject and ability to manage in the classroom. Clearly, aptitude 
and calling have a place in the teaching profession.
Teacher Knowledge and Classroom Behavior
A second way to conceptualize and measure teacher quality looks not at 
 outcomes but rather at what teachers should know and be able to do—essential 
knowledge and skills rather than outcomes. Research in this vein suggests that 
high-quality, effective teachers who can increase the academic achievement of 
their students tend to share many of the characteristics listed in table 2.1.
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This approach also recognizes that the role of a teacher involves a broad range 
of knowledge and skills. The teacher needs to have an in-depth understanding of 
the subject matter being taught and the requirements of the curriculum. The 
teacher also needs to understand child development (physical, cognitive and 
linguistic, social, and moral); appreciate factors that facilitate or inhibit learning; 
and have a good understanding of the context for learning, including both factors 
in the classroom (such as its climate) and factors in the home and community 
(such as their general support for the school). Also necessary is a good knowledge 
of instructional psychology, including theories of teaching and learning and 
methods of teaching that foster active learning and problem solving, facilitate 
group learning and constructive student interaction, and develop in children a 
love of reading and learning.
Beyond this knowledge base, the teacher needs a range of skills in the 
 following areas:
•	 Classroom management: planning lessons, organizing structured but  personalized 
learning experiences, delivering the required content in the  language of 
 instruction (and helping children weak in that language to gain this content), 
providing appropriate reinforcement, assessing what students learn, and being 
alert to children who show evidence of being at risk of failure
•	 School relationships and improvement: collaborating with colleagues in assessing 
the school’s status, developing school improvement plans, and building a 
 positive school climate
•	 School-community relationships: providing appropriate reports to parents and 
motivating their support of and involvement in school affairs
•	 Self-reflection and improvement: being able to reflect on their own teaching 
(including with their peers) and improve their performance accordingly
Such teaching skills—perhaps less easily measured but essential indicators 
of quality—have been among the major focuses of the reforms in Indonesia 
table 2.1 characteristics of Good teachers from international research
• Demonstrate commitment
• Have subject-specific knowledge and know their 
craft
• Love children
• Set an example of moral conduct
• Manage groups effectively
• Incorporate new technology
• Master multiple models of teaching and learning
• Adjust and improvise their practice
• Know their students as individuals
• Exchange ideas with other teachers
• Reflect on their practice
• Collaborate with other teachers
• Advance the profession of teaching
• Contribute to society at large
• Know their subject matter
• Use pedagogy appropriate for the content
• Use an appropriate language of instruction 
and have mastery of that language
• Create and sustain an effective learning 
environment
• Find out about and respond to the 
needs and interests of their students and 
communities
• Reflect on their teaching and children’s 
responses and change the learning 
environment as necessary
• Have a strong sense of ethics
• Are committed to teaching
• Care about their students
Source: OECD 2009. Source: Craig, Kraft, and Du Plessis 1998.
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and are addressed in different ways in most chapters of this book. For exam-
ple, many of the key skills have been built into the teaching-learning packages 
used by the Ministry of Education and Culture through the local teacher 
working groups, as discussed in chapter 3. The video study discussed in 
 chapter 5 also focuses clearly on the nature of the teaching-learning process 
and presents a pioneering in-depth analysis of secondary school mathematics 
teaching that directly links student outcomes with teacher knowledge and 
behaviors.
Also examined in this book are more general values and behaviors related to 
teacher quality, including professional commitment, ethical behavior, and—more 
concrete and measurable—absenteeism, the holding of second jobs, and 
 workload. The assumption that higher status and remuneration will somehow 
automatically lead to better outcomes in regard to such behaviors is subject to 
detailed analysis.
Such a plethora of desired knowledge, skills, and values makes imperative 
some set of professional competency standards. The standards also include 
 measures and methods to assess their achievement. These standards usually 
underpin training courses, assessment instruments, and accreditation 
 requirements as well as professional development courses. They should be (but 
seldom are) developed collaboratively by ministry staff, academics and teacher 
trainers, and representatives of professional teacher associations. Such standards 
have also been a major focus of the Teacher Law reforms and associated 
regulations.
Conceptual Framework for Quality Education: Managing and Developing 
Good Teachers
Countries that have succeeded in making teaching an attractive profession have 
often done so not just through pay, but by raising the status of teaching, offering 
real career prospects, and giving teachers responsibility as professionals and leaders 
of reform. This requires teacher education that helps teachers to become innovators 
and researchers in education, not just deliverers of the curriculum.
—Andreas Schleicher, Building a High-Quality Teaching Profession: Lessons from 
Around the World
Managing teachers—individually (both in a classroom and throughout a 
career) and collectively (as an entire cadre)—is a difficult enough task. Ensuring 
that they progressively develop in their profession, from first recruitment to final 
retirement, only adds to the complexity of the challenge facing ministries of 
education around the world. Meeting this challenge successfully requires a 
 comprehensive framework of teacher reform encompassing essential standards 
and competencies as well as the institutions, mechanisms, strategies, and 
 processes required to ensure that these competencies are achieved, assessed, 
continuously improved, and ultimately rewarded. Figure 2.1 reflects such 
a framework.
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The Political and Financial Context
Policy design and implementation is a complex, multi-directional, fragmented, and 
unpredictable process. A political economy lens broadens operational  considerations 
beyond technical solutions to include an emphasis on stakeholders, institutions, and 
processes by which policy reform is negotiated and played out in the policy arena 
…. A vital component of understanding context is the political dynamics of policy 
change—how reforms get tabled and why; how they are perceived; and who will 
support, oppose, or attempt to change the proposals which have been made.
—World Bank, “The Political Economy of Policy Reform: Issues and Implications 
for Policy Dialogue and Development Operations”
No education policy is perhaps more complex, multidirectional, fragmented, 
and unpredictable than that regarding teacher management and development. 
Teachers often represent a large percentage of the total civil service, and in 
many societies they play an important and influential role in the community 
as well as in the school. Thus, all of the various stages of teacher reform 
described below, both in general and in relation to Indonesia, must be analyzed 
in terms of the larger political context surrounding them—both the historical 
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context relevant to education (which has played an important role in the 
development of Indonesian education) and the current structure and nature of 
the government and the Ministry of Education and Culture that propose the 
reform, those who support and oppose it (and why), and those who win or 
lose from it.
Equally important is the financial context—on the national, local, and school 
levels as well as community support to education and the start-up and recurring 
costs of the reform itself—which helps determine what can be done, how 
quickly, and how rigorously. More and more middle-income countries, such as 
Indonesia, are finding additional resources to put into education, and the finan-
cial decisions they make about these resources, whether teachers or  infrastructure, 
preschools or universities, will have important long-term effects on the 
 development of their education systems.
Recruitment
A comprehensive framework for high-quality education requires attention to 
many different steps in the teacher management and development framework. 
Recruitment into teacher education institutions is the first step in the career of a 
new teacher, and countries are using an ever wider range of strategies to recruit 
higher-level candidates for the teaching profession. Higher pay, of course 
( competitive with other “professions”) helps, but many other strategies are also 
being applied, including the following (Barber and Mourshed 2007; 
World Bank 2008):
•	 Active recruitment campaigns, especially (a) among secondary school graduates 
with the highest achievement levels and, in some countries, “nontraditional” 
candidates (for example, mid-career professionals seeking a career change); 
and (b) among teachers of subjects (usually science and mathematics) and in 
regions (rural and remote) where shortages of good teachers are often the 
greatest
•	 Rigorous selection processes, based not only on graduation records and entrance 
examinations but also on the testing of subject knowledge, literacy, numeracy, 
and communication skills and interviews to assess motivation, personality, and 
 sensitivity to student needs—processes that can help prove to candidates 
and the larger public that teaching is, in fact, a high-status profession
•	 Financial incentives such as fee waivers, loans, and scholarships, perhaps biased 
toward underrepresented fields and teachers destined for difficult locations
•	 More flexible approaches to teacher education, such as part-time study and 
 distance education, especially for nontraditional candidates and those from 
usually underrepresented groups such as ethnic minorities, people with 
 disabilities, and males in preschool and primary education
•	 A clearly defined career path that holds out the possibility of both merit-based 
promotion and diverse opportunities within the system
•	 The prospect of ultimately being a “professional,” able to exercise responsibility, 
autonomy, and innovativeness in one’s daily work
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Preservice Teacher Education
Once the candidate is selected, the nature and quality of preservice teacher 
 education become paramount. There are many options for such education, 
including the following (Stevenson 2009c):
•	 A multiyear course (for example, four years leading to a bachelor’s degree in 
education) that integrates pedagogy, subject content, and practical teaching 
experience
•	 An “end-on” option that adds one or two years of professional training 
( pedagogy and practical experience) to a subject-matter university degree
•	 A double degree (a major and a minor) with additional training in education
•	 For mid-career professionals, a short course on pedagogy and practical 
 experience with continual supervision in school by the training institution
In all such programs, there are a number of essential, basic principles (Barber 
and Mourshed 2007; Schleicher 2011):
•	 Clear and concise profiles or standards outlining desired teacher competencies—
what teachers are expected to know and be able to do in specific subject 
areas—which can guide not only teacher education but also certification, 
 evaluation, professional development, and career advancement
•	 More innovative content in teacher education with emphases on such skills as 
personalized instruction based on the individual learner’s needs; reflective 
practice; and in-school, on-the-job research
•	 Training for special circumstances—for example, multigrade and double-subject 
teaching for small, remote schools; teaching in the students’ mother tongue; 
and teaching learners with disabilities and in (post-) emergency or conflict 
contexts
•	 Preparation of professionals in school settings, separate from the largely academic 
preparation in the training institution, thus finding a proper balance between 
theory and practice
Regarding the last point, it has become increasingly important to place 
 candidate teachers into classrooms as early as possible. This initial placement 
should not happen in the second semester of the last year, as is often the case, but 
as early as possible so that future teachers can both practice and improve the 
whole range of skills they need and clearly see the challenges (and rewards) of 
being a teacher (thereby perhaps weeding out those not committed enough to 
face the challenges).
The success of this professional component of preservice education depends 
on both (a) an effective partnership among the lecturers of the teacher education 
institution, the school coordinator of the professional experience, the supervising 
classroom teacher(s), and, of course, the candidate teacher; and (b) the use of a 
range of “real” schools for this professional experience, demonstrating good 
 practice in a number of often-challenging contexts rather than only in elite, often 
university-based laboratory schools (Stevenson 2009c).
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The role of assessment, both of teacher education institutions and of the 
newly educated teacher, has become especially critical. In many countries, such 
as Indonesia, which are moving aggressively toward a more systematic process of 
teacher certification, there have been increasingly greater demands on their 
teacher education institutions and a greater need for their formal accreditation. 
What standards should be used for such accreditation, and should there be 
 different levels of accreditation? Who should accredit? For what level(s) of 
 teaching and what subject content? Is there a maximum number of institutions 
that should receive accreditation, and what should be done to control what is 
often a mushrooming of such institutions, especially in remote areas of a country 
such as Indonesia? And how, using what criteria and mechanisms, will these 
institutions determine when a candidate teacher is adequately prepared for 
assignment to a school? When, how, and by whom is such an assessment made? 
And, ultimately, how serious is the system of assessment if it is not willing to 
“push out” candidates who are not qualified—or qualifiable?
Induction, Mentoring, and Probation
Getting new teachers into a school is only the first step in a career-long 
 program of professional development. In the best of worlds, an education 
 system attracts better candidates to become teachers—most likely through a 
combination of higher pay, higher status, and appeals to commit oneself to an 
honorable  profession—and, one way or another, provides them during their 
preservice  education with the basic knowledge, skills, and values needed to be 
good  teachers. But even if this initial education is soundly based in classroom 
experience, it is not easy to make the transition to being a full-time teacher 
responsible for the education of one or more classes of learners; being expected 
to fit in and work well with a team of strangers; and being accountable both 
up the system to the principal and supervisor or inspector and (more and more 
often) out of the  system to parents and the community. Facilitating this 
 transition, helping  teachers succeed at the beginning of their careers (and 
 easing out those who  cannot succeed), continuously enhancing teacher 
 motivation and improving teaching practice, and systematically assessing 
teacher performance for the sake of both their students’ learning and their 
own career progression—these are all essential components of continuing 
 professional development.
The processes of induction, mentoring, and probation should be linked 
 seamlessly to the teacher’s future professional development. These are especially 
important because “the learning curve during the first years of teaching is 
 particularly steep. Having support to confront this learning curve in a gradual but 
steady manner is important to build new teachers’ self-confidence, help them 
cope with the demands of the profession, and reduce drop-outs” (Stevenson 
2009b). Induction, well-implemented, is important for new teachers for several 
reasons: “familiarization with the responsibilities of teaching and the culture of 
the school in which they teach … increased competency through improvement 
of their professional skills in the classroom by learning from experienced teachers 
50 Teachers as the Cornerstone of Educational Quality
Teacher Reform in Indonesia • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-9829-6
in an authentic environment … assessment of their classroom performance to 
ensure they are effective in their duties as a teacher … [and] improved retention 
of teachers in the profession” (Stevenson 2009b).
A range of activities can be considered as induction, varying from the informal 
(a welcome by the principal) to the formal (mentoring, workshops, observation 
of model classes, and so on). However, a well-planned induction should at least 
include orientation to the school community; the provision of a systematic 
 program of formal instruction in areas such as curriculum content, teaching 
methods, classroom management and assessment, advice to students, and school 
policies; and mentoring by an experienced teacher.
Of course, the latter—mentoring—links into the other important part of early 
professional development: probation. Probation is in theory a trial period (often 
one year with the possibility of extension) when new teachers can be evaluated 
as to whether they are genuinely suited to teaching. In a sense, the evaluation 
concerns the extent to which the teacher has become successful in the practice 
of teaching. In other words, can the teacher be confirmed as a permanent civil 
servant? The tools of probation are several—all designed to assess whether the 
new teacher has met the required teaching standards—and can include written 
tests, classroom observation of content knowledge and teaching practice, the 
teacher’s classroom documentation, feedback from parents and students, 
 interviews, the assessment of the teacher’s relationships with other teachers and 
his or her general contributions to school activities and decision-making 
 processes, and so forth.
Certification
For permanent employment as a teacher, most school systems require teachers 
to hold certification. This is official recognition that the teacher has reached the 
standard endorsed by the education authorities and is a mark of the teacher’s 
competence in subject-matter knowledge and teaching methodology. It also 
 indicates that the teacher possesses the attitudes and personal characteristics 
necessary for the special relationships of trust and guidance he or she must 
have to effectively impart knowledge and skills to the young. Certification is 
usually based upon the academic achievement of teachers in their teaching 
subjects as well as their knowledge of child development and education. 
However, skill and expertise in the classroom delivery of effective learning 
experiences for students is also part of certification.
In making certification decisions, some authorities consider the academic 
qualifications provided by the university or college to the teacher on graduation 
but will accept the practical professional capability of the teacher only following 
a formal assessment by a school principal, usually during the probationary period. 
In this situation, the certification award is based on a balance between academic 
excellence as judged by the lecturers and teaching expertise as judged by the 
employer. This seems to be a worthwhile method of ensuring that only 
 well-rounded teachers with the best knowledge, skills, and attitudes are certified 
to educate children.
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Continuing Professional Development
Accompanying these early-career experiences and continuing beyond them, 
throughout a teacher’s career, is more focused continuing professional 
 development or in-service education. New and updated content knowledge, 
 curricula, and textbooks have to be mastered; existing skills have to be refined 
and new ones acquired in new teaching contexts and derived from new research 
learned; and new challenges facing teachers need to be met. These challenges, 
among others, include
•	 New roles for teachers in the context of decentralization and newly  empowered 
school committees;
•	 More diversified programs requiring more specialized skills;
•	 New kinds of learners with more diverse backgrounds and identities, different 
values and different ways of thinking and acting, and greater independence and 
open-mindedness; and
•	 New information and communication technologies (which students often 
master more quickly than their teachers) (Shaeffer, forthcoming).
The professional development needed to help teachers both improve what 
they currently do and meet the new demands thrust upon them can be carried 
out in several ways. Unfortunately, the most typical development programs are 
one-off seminars and in-service short courses that are often conducted, as in 
Indonesia, in cascade fashion (whereby each trainee in turn trains others) and the 
message received at the bottom of the cascade bears little resemblance to that 
delivered at the top. What is needed instead, and what teachers reportedly want, 
is both (a) training linked to some kind of longer-term qualification  process; and 
(b) more ongoing, school-based, research-focused training, practice, and feedback 
with adequate time, follow-up support, and involvement in  learning activities 
that are similar to those they will use with their students (Schleicher 2011, 21).
Much of this development, of course, is best done through effective teacher 
collaboration. “Teachers report relatively infrequent collaboration with  colleagues 
within the school, beyond a mere exchange of information and ideas; direct 
 professional collaboration to enhance student learning is rarer” (Schleicher 2011, 
23). Much of this collaboration can be promoted in schools through group- and 
inquiry-based collaboration, but in many systems with relatively small schools 
(as in Indonesia), school clusters—groups of schools in close geographical 
 proximity—can serve a useful function by promoting collaboration in what can 
become genuine learning communities. Teachers of the same grade or subject can 
meet regularly to share lesson plans and teaching practices, explore the use of 
new materials and media, and work through issues such as teaching children with 
special needs or in the mother tongue.
A further mechanism of professional development is distance learning. This is 
especially useful for teachers in distant or difficult contexts in which they cannot 
get to institution-based in-service programs and perhaps not even to cluster meet-
ings. Such distance learning ranges from radio- and television-based  programming 
52 Teachers as the Cornerstone of Educational Quality
Teacher Reform in Indonesia • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-9829-6
directed at the individual school and teacher to immense open universities 
 providing a range of distance-learning services to teachers  throughout the nation.
Teacher Appraisal and Career Development
A final component of continuing professional development relates to the 
appraisal of teachers’ performance, ideally linked to progression, promotion, and 
diversification in their careers. Such appraisal usually considers three aspects of 
professional competence (Stevenson 2009a):
•	 Professional knowledge and understanding—of their students, school, and 
 community; of the curriculum they are meant to deliver; and of the education 
system (and its policies and practices) of which they are a part.
•	 Professional skills and abilities—to plan and deliver coherent programs, in 
 well-managed classrooms, appropriate to their pupils’ needs and abilities; to 
use relevant media, teaching strategies, and resources; to work cooperatively 
with their colleagues, parents, and the community; to implement appropriate 
and fair assessment and reporting of student progress; and to systematically 
reflect on and improve one’s performance.
•	 Professional values and personal commitment—to promoting social justice and 
inclusion, to continuing professional learning and development, and to valuing 
and respecting the partners with whom they work.
Just as important as the competencies to be gained is the nature of the appraisal 
process itself. Whoever is involved in the appraisal (for example, the principal or 
supervisor) must work with the teacher at the beginning of the  process to identify 
individual goals and performance indicators; to review  progress midyear and later 
at an annual performance review; and to make  decisions regarding actions such as 
confirmation (or not) of probationary  teachers and the need for further develop-
ment and training in areas of weakness or areas for future growth.
Formal appraisal can also support a system’s merit-based progression 
(and  promotion) process. Goal setting, appropriate professional in-service 
 training, and advanced mentoring can improve teacher quality and motivation 
and also prepare teachers for accelerated professional progression, promotion, 
and future educational leadership.
One final point concerning teacher management and student achievement: a 
rapidly expanding body of research evaluates the effects of bonus payment 
schemes on teachers’ work. Bonus payment schemes, or pay-for-performance 
schemes, add to salaries in ways that are conditional on performance. Performance 
can be measured based on inputs (such as absenteeism levels) or outputs (such 
as student learning gains). It has been shown that pay-for-performance schemes 
can work in developing-country settings. (See Bruns, Filmer, and Patrinos 2011 
for a summary, or Muralidharan and Sundararaman 2011 for one of the most 
comprehensive studies on this topic to date.)
For example, individual teacher incentives work—and work better than 
group incentives—which, in turn, work better than unconditional block 
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grants to schools (Muralidharan and Sundararaman 2011). However, even 
though some literature shows that bonus payment schemes can work, there 
are perhaps  insurmountable difficulties associated with implementing such 
schemes in  real-world, whole-system contexts. Pfeffer and Sutton (2006, 
22–23) sum up the debate as follows: “It turns out that merit pay for teachers 
is an idea that is almost 100 years old and has been the subject of much 
research … that evidence shows that merit pay plans seldom last longer than 
five years and that merit pay  consistently fails to improve students’ 
performance.”
Another view is as follows: “In an influential article, Murnane and Cohen 
(1986) suggest that merit pay and education do not mix because the  complex 
work that teachers do is difficult to evaluate. Without clear measures and criteria 
for judging success, decisions about rewarding performance are, at best,  subjective 
and, at worst, unworkable. They also suggest that merit pay is problem-
atic because it raises the potential for dysfunctional (or, as they call it, opportu-
nistic) behavior: that is, teachers may end up focusing only on tasks that are 
rewarded by a merit pay plan at the expense of additional goals or tasks valued 
by the public (e.g., promoting citizenship, or reducing drug use or violence). 
Furthermore, at its worst, merit pay may have a  demoralizing and counterpro-
ductive effect on the work place, corroding teacher  collegiality by introducing 
competition. In sum, this is the view that there is something about the nature of 
teaching and schooling that makes the effective use of merit pay in public educa-
tion unlikely” (Goldhaber et  al. 2008).
Teacher Reform around the World
The literature on comprehensive teacher reform around the world, covering all 
aspects and stages of teacher management and development, is limited. The 
 literature that does exist, like the reforms themselves, is largely piecemeal in 
nature—some on incentives, some on preservice education, some on principal 
and supervisor training—which is why the reform in Indonesia and the analysis 
of it offered by this book are so potentially useful. The following are some of the 
issues addressed and lessons learned from this literature:
•	 Teacher status: “Successful countries have shown how a teaching profession 
that assumes a high level of responsibility and is well rewarded can attract 
some of the best graduates into a teaching career. Dramatically increasing the 
quality and prestige of a nation’s teaching corps is far from easy and cannot be 
done overnight. However, solutions include measures at recruitment stage, but 
more importantly involve transforming the teaching profession from within 
…. Above all, professional development needs to be integrated into both an 
individual teacher’s career and school and system changes. At the career level, 
in-service education, appraisal and reward need to be closely aligned. At the 
same time, learning that improves individual competencies and collaboration 
among teachers to produce better instruction in the classroom must go 
 hand-in-hand” (Schleicher 2011).
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•	 Recruitment: “The issue of teacher demand and supply is both complex and 
multi-dimensional, as it reflects several challenges: how to expand the pool of 
qualified teachers, how to address shortages in specific subjects, how to recruit 
teachers to the places where they are most needed, how to distribute teachers 
in equitable and efficient ways, and how to retain qualified teachers over time. 
Policy responses are needed at two levels. The first concerns the nature of the 
teaching profession itself and teachers’ work environment. Such policies seek 
to improve the profession’s general status and competitive position in the job 
market and are the focus of this paper. The second involves more targeted 
responses and incentives for particular types of teacher shortage, which 
 recognizes that that there is not a single labor market for teachers, but a set of 
them, distinguished by school type and characteristics, such as subject 
 specialization. Competitive compensation and other incentives, career 
 prospects and diversity, and giving teachers responsibility as professionals are 
important parts of strategies to attract the most talented teachers to the most 
challenging classrooms” (Schleicher 2011).
•	 Teacher education: “What teacher preparation programs are needed to prepare 
graduates who are ready to teach well in a 21st-century classroom? One of the 
key challenges for the teaching profession is to strengthen the ‘technical core’ 
of its professional practices, which requires the development of educational 
ecosystems that support the creation, accumulation and diffusion of this 
 professional knowledge. Such ecosystems need to draw on four sources: 
 innovation and knowledge inspired by science (research and evaluation); 
 innovation inspired by firms (entrepreneurial development of new products 
and services); innovation and knowledge inspired by practitioners (teachers, 
school heads); and innovation inspired by users (students, parents, 
 communities)” (Schleicher 2011).
•	 School autonomy: “School leaders can make a difference in school and  student 
performance if they are granted the autonomy to make important decisions. 
To do this effectively, they need to be able to adapt teaching  programs to 
local needs, promote teamwork among teachers, and engage in teacher mon-
itoring, evaluation and professional development. They need discretion in 
setting  strategic direction and must be able to develop school plans and 
goals and monitor progress, using data to improve practice. They also need 
to be able to influence teacher recruitment to improve the match between 
candidates and their school’s needs. Last but not least, leadership prepara-
tion and training are central, and building networks of schools to stimulate 
and spread innovation and to develop diverse curricula, extended services 
and professional support can bring substantial benefits” (Schleicher 2011).
•	 School leadership: “School leadership and particular school personnel practices 
may be a driving force in effective schooling. Not only are school leaders 
responsible for personnel practices, but recent prior work has highlighted the 
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importance of personnel practices and other organizational management 
 practices for distinguishing (if not causing) effective schools (Grissom and 
Loeb 2009; Horng, Klasik, and Loeb 2010). The results are also not surprising. 
Teachers strongly affect students’ educational opportunities. Higher perform-
ing schools seem better able to build a staff of strong teachers through differ-
ential retention of good teachers, through recruitment and hiring, and through 
providing supports for teacher  improvement … [and] more effective schools 
are doing all three. In addition, these schools appear to use their teaching 
resources more efficiently, not assigning new teachers to lower performing stu-
dents” (Loeb, Kalogrides, and Beteille 2011).
•	 Teacher appraisal: “Teacher appraisal and feedback has a positive impact on 
teachers … both to teachers personally and to the development of their 
 teaching. Positive impacts on job satisfaction and, to a lesser extent, job 
 security are important, given that the introduction of systems of teacher 
appraisal can be met with criticism and potential negative reactions,  especially 
where it is linked to accountability. Moreover … such systems contribute to 
school improvement. Numerous initiatives developed by  policy makers aim-
ing to lift school improvement have had teacher development at the core …. 
The school evaluative framework is often policy malleable so that not only 
can the strength of the evaluative framework be altered but also its focus. 
The criteria by which schools are evaluated and teachers are appraised and 
receive feedback should be aligned with the objectives of the system of 
school education. These  objectives may relate to aspects of student perfor-
mance, teacher development, specific teaching practices, the maintenance of 
specific standards and  procedures, and a variety of aspects of the work of 
teachers and school  principals. Aligning criteria for school evaluation with 
those for teacher appraisal and feedback would emphasize the importance of 
policy objectives at the school level and could give teachers and school prin-
cipals an incentive to meet such objectives” (OECD 2009).
•	 Focus on learning: In its groundbreaking study of learning in the best school 
systems in East Asia (Hong Kong SAR, China; Republic of Korea; Shanghai; 
and Singapore), the Grattan Institute shows that success in high- performing 
systems is not always the result of spending more money. These four  systems 
all focus on “things that are known to matter in the classroom, including a 
relentless, practical focus on learning, and the creation of a strong culture of 
teacher education, research, collaboration, mentoring, feedback and sus-
tained professional development. These are precisely the reforms that 
Australia and other Western countries are trying to embed” (Jensen 2012).
Finally, some of the most sensitive analysis of comprehensive (as opposed to 
piecemeal) educational reform derives from the work of Michael Fullan. In 
essence, he argues that “all really does mean all. You can’t solve the problem of 
whole-system reform through piecemeal efforts that try to get parts of the  system 
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improving in order to show the way. System reform does not, cannot work that 
way” (Fullan 2010, 5). On the one hand, this refers to whole-school reform—not 
one teacher being trained (or certified) at a time, which means pupils move from 
good to bad teachers and back again, but all teachers, with the school leadership, 
the parent-teacher association, and the community as a whole involved in the 
process. This focus on both the individual teacher and the  collective school com-
munity makes possible change that is essential in the school culture. “The obvious 
point is that the culture of the school, itself a collective capacity by definition, is 
more important, in fact essential for full success …. Thus, individual capacity 
thrives if it is integrated with strategies and experiences that foster collective 
capacity. There is no other way. The top-performing  countries have quality teach-
ers, but they have them in numbers—that is, the entire profession or virtually all 
teachers, not just a percentage of selectively rewarded ones” (Fullan 2010, 87).
But, significantly, Fullan is also talking about whole-system reform, which 
“involves all schools in the system getting better, including reducing the gap 
between high and low performers. Whole-system reform produces higher levels 
of education performance on important cognitive and social learning goals, and it 
does so while reducing the gap toward a more equal public education system” 
(Fullan 2010, 18).
Ultimately, therefore, change is systemic. In most contexts, “political 
 pressures combine with the segmented, uncoordinated nature of educational 
organizations to produce … a steady stream of episodic innovations— 
cooperative learning, effective schools research, classroom management, assess-
ment schemes, career ladders, peer coaching, etc., etc.—come and go. Not only 
do they fail to leave much of a trace, but they also leave teachers and the public 
with a growing  cynicism that innovation is marginal and politically motivated 
… [Rather] 1) reform must focus on the development and interrelationships 
of all the main components of the system simultaneously— curriculum, teach-
ing and teacher development, community, student support systems, and so on, 
and 2) reform must focus not just on structure, policy, and regulations but on 
deeper issues of the culture of the system” (Fullan and Miles 1992, 745–52).
notes
 1. The World Declaration on Education for All (EFA) was adopted in 1990 at a world 
conference in Jomtien, Thailand. In 2000, the international community met again at 
the World Education Forum in Dakar, Senegal, and set further goals for achievement 
by 2015. The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) has the overall coordination and leadership role in the EFA effort.
 2. Much of this analysis derives from Helen Craig (personal communication, April 18, 
2012).
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The Comprehensive Reform of 
Institutions, Mechanisms, 
Strategies, and Processes
Countries that have succeeded in making teaching an attractive profession have 
often done so not just through pay, but by raising the status of teaching, offering 
real career prospects, and giving teachers responsibility as professionals and leaders 
of reform. This requires teacher education that helps teachers to become innovators 
and researchers in education, not just deliverers of the curriculum.
—OECD (2011), Building a High-Quality Teaching Profession: Lessons from Around 
the World (2011)
the laws and regulations supporting teacher reform
Past attempts in Indonesia to deal with issues of teacher quality have had limited 
impact partly because they have been conceived and implemented in a  piecemeal 
fashion. Salary increases, higher training requirements, professional development 
courses, promotion opportunities, and other strategies, in themselves, have had 
only limited impact. Only the Teacher Law of 2005, with its emphasis on the 
certification of all teachers, has attempted to comprehensively address the issue of 
teacher quality improvement by linking a range of strategies to the powerful 
incentive of a significant increase in income. This reform has resulted in a period 
of fundamental change, with the whole teaching service being subject to new 
rules and regulations governing the conditions of teachers, including the following:
•	 Performance appraisal being linked to career progression
•	 Major educational institutions being subject to new standards and required to 
deliver new services such as four-year degrees and professional training 
courses
•	 Teachers being required to do continuing professional development
•	 Districts and schools being required to enforce new workload rules
c h A p t e r  3
60 The Comprehensive Reform of Institutions, Mechanisms, Strategies, and Processes
Teacher Reform in Indonesia • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-9829-6
The period since the enactment of the Teacher Law has therefore been one of 
constant pressure to change the education system to meet the changing require-
ments of a modern and dynamic Indonesian state. The law has been the spring-
board for this extensive change.
Most impressive (given the massive size and complexity of the Indonesian 
education system) has been the financial capacity and sustained energy required 
to transform a poorly paid and ineffectively managed teaching service. This 
 transformation has required an almost fearless determination to develop and 
implement procedures to deal with the system’s large numbers of districts, 
schools, and teachers. Over it all, certification has been adopted as a requirement 
for both in-service and preservice teachers and designed to act as a benchmark 
for all teachers, both government and nongovernment. It is intended to provide 
the community with a guarantee of the quality and professionalism of all  teachers, 
everywhere—their standard of training, their skills and capacity, and their ability 
to shape the next generation in a way that is agreeable and satisfying to the wider 
community.
The remarkable comprehensiveness of the reform in Indonesia regarding its 
systematic attempt to cover all institutions, mechanisms, strategies, and processes 
related to teachers from recruitment to retirement is evident in not only the 
2005 Teacher Law but also in a series of national and ministerial regulations 
(sometimes as annual updates) that outline, often in considerable detail, the 
 definitions and procedures to be followed in the implementation of the law. 
These are summarized in table 3.1 and further described in the pages that 
follow.
Setting Standards
An early essential step in the complex process of teacher reform was the 
 establishment of the National Education Standards Board in May 2004 to 
 provide a sound basis for the reform process. The board’s work consists of 
 establishing, monitoring, and evaluating standards in eight areas: graduate 
 competencies,  subject content, education processes, teaching personnel 
and  training,  infrastructure and facilities, management, education funding, and 
 educational assessment. Its standards and indicators for graduate teachers are 
based on the four core  competencies (professional, pedagogical, personal, and 
social)  mandated in the Teacher Law. They have been the basis for developing 
the competencies that now underpin the instruments used in the certification 
of teachers; the redesigned university training courses; university accreditation 
requirements; competency tests; statements of duties for supervisors, principals, 
and teachers; performance appraisal instruments; and other key elements of 
the reform.
The standards, as defined by Regulation 19/2009, create a unifying point 
for the reforms and ensure that the new training programs are designed to 
better meet international best practice. These standards were developed 
through the collection of data on national and international best practice, 
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table 3.1 teacher reform laws and regulations in indonesia, 2003–14
Key aspects of reform Government regulation Regulations for implementing the law Status of implementation
Law on the National Education System (2003)
Principles of implementation 
of education, national 
education standards, 
education legal entities, 
boards of education 
and school committees, 
teachers and educators 
as professionals, school 
accreditation, education 
funding at 20 percent 
of national and regional 
budgets, and education 
conducted in Indonesia by 
overseas institutions.
Government Regulation on the 
National Education Standards 
(2005)
Establishment of the National 
Education Standards Board. 
The eight national standards 
of education are graduate 
competencies, subject content, 
education processes, teaching 
personnel and training, 
infrastructure and facilities, 
management, education funding, 
and educational assessment.
Ministerial Regulation on Standards for School 
Supervisors (2005)
The ministerial regulations on the national 
education standards are used for educational 
planning and implementation. Because 
many schools have not reached the national 
standards, minimum service standards have 
been set as intermediate targets toward the 
national standards.
Ministerial Regulation on Standards for School 
Principals (2007)
Ministerial Regulation on Standards for Academic 
Qualifications and Competencies of Teachers (2007)
Ministerial Regulation on Standards for School 
Administration Staff (2008)
Ministerial Regulation on Standards for School 
Librarians (2008)
Ministerial Regulation on Standards for 
Academic Qualifications and Competencies of 
Counsellors (2008)
Government Regulation on the 
Management and Implementation 
of Education  (2010)
Educational management by 
government at all levels, the 
management of community-
based schools, types of education, 
international cooperation, the roles 
and responsibilities of teachers and 
education staff, the establishment 
of education institutions, and 
community involvement in 
education.
Ministerial Regulation on Minimum Service Standards 
for Basic Education in Districts/Cities (2010)
The minimum service standards are now being 
used to raise the quality of schools. District 
education budgets are to be used to reach 
the minimum service standards.
table continues next page
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table 3.1 teacher reform laws and regulations in indonesia, 2003–14 (continued)
Key aspects of reform Government regulation Regulations for implementing the law Status of implementation
Amendment to Government 
Regulation Number 17/2010 on the 
Management and Implementation 
of Education (2010)
Changes and additions to existing 
chapters and paragraphs of the 
Government Regulation.
School Operational Assistance program (Bantuan Operasional Sekolah, or BOS) 
Decree of the Minister of Home Affairs on Guidelines 
for the Management of the School Operational 
Assistance (2011)
Guidelines for the financing, implementation, 
and administration of the School Operational 
Assistance are issued annually. 
Ministerial Regulation on Technical Guidelines for the 
School Operational Assistance and its Financial 
Report for 2012 Fiscal Year (2011)
The technical guidelines are also annually 
issued.
Ministerial Decree on the Quality Assurance System for 
Education (2009)
The quality assurance system is a subsystem 
of the national education system and is 
used to improve the quality of all aspects in 
education.
Law on Teachers and Lecturers (2005)a
Principles of professionalism; 
protection of teachers 
through the regulation 
of all components of 
teacher reform, such as 
teacher qualification, 
competencies, and 
certification; rights 
and responsibilities; 
appointment, placement, 
transfer, and release; 
development; rewards; 
leave; and professional 
organizations.
Government Regulation on Teachers 
(2008)
Regulations on teacher competencies 
and certification, professional 
allowances, functional allowances, 
special allowances, allowances 
for non-civil-service teachers, 
rewards, promotion, the chance to 
participate in the development of 
education policy, teacher workload, 
appointment, placement, transfer, 
and sanctions. 
Teacher competencies and certification
Ministerial Decree on the Establishment of a 
Consortium for Teacher Certification (2007) 
This was first issued in 2007 and reissued in 
2009 and 2011.
Ministerial Regulation on the Certification of In-Service 
Teachers through Education Upgrading (2007)
Universities were appointed to conduct this 
educational program. Teachers can attend a 
two-semester program.
Joint Circular on the Certification of Religious Education 
Teachers and Madrasah Teachers (Ministry of 
Religious Affairs [MORA] and Ministry of National 
Education) (2007)
Religious education teachers in schools are to 
be certified through MORA.
Ministerial Regulation on the Certification of In-Service 
Teachers (2007)
This was first issued in 2007 and updated 
annually. The regulation issued in 2012 
mentioned that teachers had to pass an 
initial competency test before participating 
in the certification process. 
Ministerial Regulation on the Teachers’ Competency Test 
(2012)
Certified teachers have to be tested on their 
competencies for mapping and upgrading 
purposes.
table continues next page
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table 3.1 teacher reform laws and regulations in indonesia, 2003–14 (continued)
Key aspects of reform Government regulation Regulations for implementing the law Status of implementation
Teachers’ functional positions
Ministerial Regulation of the State Minister of 
Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform on Teacher 
Functional Positions and Credit Points (2009)
Career progression will be managed in regard 
to teachers’ functional positions, continuing 
professional development, criteria and 
components to be evaluated, credit points, 
appointment, and release.
Joint Regulation of the Minister of National Education 
and the Head of the Government Employment 
Agency on Implementation Guidelines for Teacher 
Functional Positions and Credit Points (2010)
Guidelines for teacher progression came into 
force on January 1, 2013.
Ministerial Regulation on Technical Guidelines for the 
Implementation of Functional Positions and Credit 
Points (2010)
Assessment of teacher performance 
according to the technical guidelines in this 
Ministerial Regulation became effective on 
January 1, 2013.
Ministerial Regulation of the Minister of Administrative 
and Bureaucratic Reform on School Supervisor 
Functional Positions and Credit Points (2010)
A career progression for school supervisors 
and related criteria are to be used for the 
recruitment of new school supervisors and 
the upgrading of existing ones. 
Joint Regulation of the Minister of National Education 
and the Head of the Government Employment 
Agency on the Implementation Guidelines for 
School Supervisor Functional Positions and 
Credit Points (2011)
Requirements to become school supervisors 
became effective on January 1, 2013. 
Requirements to become a member of the 
evaluation team will be effective on January 
1, 2014.
Ministerial Regulation on the Adjustment of Teacher 
Functional Positions (2010)
The adjustment and adaptation of previous 
teacher positions to new teacher 
functional positions was to be finished by 
December 2012.
table continues next page
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table 3.1 teacher reform laws and regulations in indonesia, 2003–14 (continued)
Key aspects of reform Government regulation Regulations for implementing the law Status of implementation
Induction of new teachers
Ministerial Regulation on an Induction Program for New 
Teachers (2010)
Guidelines have been developed for school 
principals, school supervisors, and senior 
teachers to conduct an induction program 
for new teachers. When new teachers pass 
the induction program, they can become 
permanent, fully paid government officials 
and are eligible for certification.
Teachers’ professional development
Ministerial Regulation on the Implementation of the 
Requirement of a Four-Year Degree in Education for 
In-Service Teachers (2008)
Recognition of prior learning (RPL) can be 
applied for existing teachers to upgrade 
themselves to a four-year degree in 
education up to a maximum of 65 percent 
of the total credit semesters that are needed 
for the degree. Several universities and 
study programs have been appointed to 
implement the RPL for in-service teachers.
Ministerial Regulation on the Teacher’s Competency 
Test (2012)
This test was conducted online and manually 
in August 2012. The results will be used as a 
basis for the teacher’s individual professional 
development.
Ministerial Regulation on the Assignment of Teachers as 
School/Madrasah Principals (2010)
Criteria for teachers to become school or 
madrasah principals are to be used for the 
selection process. The selected teachers have 
to undergo training, and when they pass the 
evaluation, they will get a certificate that will 
be listed in a database.
table continues next page
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table 3.1 teacher reform laws and regulations in indonesia, 2003–14 (continued)
Key aspects of reform Government regulation Regulations for implementing the law Status of implementation
Teacher training and upgrading
Ministerial Decree on the Appointment of Universities 
to Deliver a Four-Year Degree for In-Service Teacher 
Qualification Upgrading (2007)
This decree selected universities eligible to 
conduct four-year programs to qualify 
existing teachers for certification.
Ministerial Decree on the Appointment of Universities 
to Deliver a Pre-Service Four-Year Degree in Teaching 
for Elementary School Teachers (2009) 
This regulation selected universities to conduct 
a four-year degree program for elementary 
school teachers. Universities will be 
evaluated each year.
Ministerial Regulation on the Pre-Service Teacher 
Professional Education Program (2009)
This regulated the Teacher Professional 
Education program for those who want to 
become teachers.
Ministerial Decree on Appointment of Alpha 
Universities to Deliver In-Service Education for 
Teachers in 2010
This regulation selects universities to conduct 
in-service education for teachers in 2010 and 
determines a quota for each educational 
program. Universities will be evaluated every 
three years.
Efficiency of teachers
Joint Decree of the Minister of Education and Culture, 
the Minister of Administrative and Bureaucratic 
Reform, the Minister of Home Affairs, the Minister 
of Finance, and the Minister of Religious Affairs on 
the Structuring and Distribution of Civil Service 
Teachers (2011)
Effective January 2, 2012, districts and cities 
have the responsibility to map teacher 
distribution to know whether there is a 
surplus or shortage of teachers in each 
school and then take steps to redistribute 
teachers as needed.
Note: RPL = Recognition of prior learning.
a. Also commonly referred to as the Teacher Law of 2005.
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the inductive gathering of academic and practitioner opinion, and the testing 
of draft material in wider public forums to ensure that the standards finally 
adopted reflected the highest levels of practice. Once finalized, the developed 
standards were  mandated in a series of regulations and decrees (such as those 
listed in table 3.1) and  provide a blueprint for quality. Reference to the 
 incorporation of these standards in various instruments and processes used in 
the reform attests to the work of this board and the desire to align all 
 educational activity with the values and standards that represent the nation’s 
expectations of the education sector. However, as described in chapter 1, 
although the intention was to ensure consistent and high standards as implied 
in the Teacher Law, the use of suitable instruments for measuring teacher 
 competencies, and therefore ensuring quality, was met with opposition from 
teacher associations; therefore, their use was significantly compromised dur-
ing implementation.
Recruitment
Indonesia has not yet formally adopted all of the strategies available to attract 
more and better candidates to the teaching profession, including active 
 recruitment campaigns and rigorous selection processes (from, say, the top 20 
percent of a graduating secondary school class). But the country has adopted, or 
is experimenting with, several other strategies:
•	 Financial incentives such as fee waivers, loans, and scholarships
•	 More flexible approaches to teacher education such as part-time study and 
distance education
•	 A clearly defined career path
•	 The prospect (with the Teacher Law) of being considered a “professional”
As has been seen, the latter has been achieved by the doubling of teachers’ 
income through the provision of a professional allowance equal to a teacher’s 
base salary for all teachers meeting the four-year degree qualification followed by 
official certification. This allowance has definitely made teaching an attractive 
profession in Indonesia. Details of the impact of this allowance on recruitment 
are presented in chapter 4.
Training Pathways Available to Indonesian Teachers
Once the standards are set and new candidates attracted to the profession, 
Indonesia has a plethora of agencies involved in both preservice education 
and in-service teacher education or continuing professional development—
ranging from both traditional and open teacher education institutions to a 
variety of  in-service actors and to what is meant to be ongoing support 
through district education offices (further described in box 3.1). Before 
exploring in detail how these agencies have changed as a result of the 
Teacher Law, an overview of their scope and function is presented in 
table 3.2.
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table 3.2 Agencies involved in the preservice education and continuing professional 
Development of teachers in indonesia
Teacher education universities 
and institutions
Regular universities with a 
faculty for training teachers The Open University
a. Preservice training facilities
There are 12 public teacher 
education institutions and 
approximately 120 private 
ones. They provide study 
programs in the various 
teaching areas: primary 
teaching, secondary subject 
areas, early childhood, special 
education, and other areas.
There are approximately 270 
faculties for the training 
of teachers within regular 
universities, of which 19 
are public and the balance 
private. These faculties 
provide subject knowledge 
in the relevant teaching areas 
as well as practical classroom 
training for teachers.
The Open University, established in 
1984, is the traditional supplier 
of distance learning courses 
in Indonesia. It has a number 
of faculties, but the largest 
number of students enrolled are 
in-service teachers seeking to 
upgrade their qualifications.
These universities train the great 
bulk of preservice teachers. 
They have their origin in 
the early teachers colleges, 
which have subsequently 
been upgraded to university 
status on the condition 
they incorporate faculties 
for additional subjects and 
careers. In general, however, 
their main focus remains on 
teacher education. Since the 
Teacher Law, 23 universities 
have cooperated to introduce 
distance education programs, 
using a jointly prepared set 
of modules—representing 
the first competition with the 
Open University’s offerings. 
These operate similarly to 
the teacher education 
universities, except their focus 
is more clearly academic and 
draws on the full academic 
status of the university. These 
universities offer greater 
academic choice and the 
opportunity to more easily 
transfer between faculties 
in response to a change in 
career destination.
In 2009, over 485,000 of its 600,000 
students were in-service 
teachers upgrading to four-
year degree status. In-service 
teachers can receive RPL of up 
to 28 credits toward a complete 
degree of 145 credit points. The 
Open University sends learning 
materials to many teachers in 
printed form. However, it also 
provides learning materials 
through its website. The 
program has local workshops 
coordinated through its 36 
regional centers throughout 
Indonesia. 
Institute for Educational 
Quality and Assurance
Centers for the development 
and empowerment of teachers 
and education personnel Teacher working groups
b. Continuing professional development facilities
There are 33 quality assurance 
agencies—one in each 
province. They are closely 
linked with the Ministry 
of Education and Culture 
rather than the provincial 
authorities. Although in the 
past, these agencies have 
been heavily involved in 
teacher education at the 
local district level, in recent 
years their function has 
become largely related to 
the evaluation of programs 
and the quality assurance of 
schools.
There are 12 national subject 
training centers responsible 
for providing in-service 
training to teachers in 
specialized subjects, 
particularly at the secondary 
level. However, management 
courses and school 
leadership courses are also 
provided. Some adopt an 
entrepreneurial approach and 
run some fee-based courses 
for outside groups. 
Teacher working groups are 
organized by a cluster of 
schools in close proximity. They 
operate at the local level to 
provide a program of training 
activities for teachers and have 
been fostered in Indonesia 
for over 20 years. They are 
operated by a committee 
that identifies agreed-upon 
priorities for funding and a 
program of activities in teaching 
and learning. The groups may 
receive grant funds from the 
district or provincial level.
table continues next page
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table 3.2 Agencies involved in the preservice education and continuing professional 
Development of teachers in indonesia (continued)
Institute for Educational Quality 
and Assurance
Centres for the development 
and empowerment of teachers 
and education personnel Teacher working groups
In spite of their heavy programs 
of school visits to undertake 
quality assurance, these 
institutions have a residual 
role in teacher training—
particularly in management 
and consultancy roles—and 
are also facilitators for 
train-the-trainer programs.
One subject training center 
in Jogjakarta, for example, 
specializes in mathematics 
and offers training courses 
in subject content and 
pedagogy. This includes 
developing teaching 
resources and supplying 
materials to teacher working 
groups throughout Indonesia.
Separate working groups exist 
for teachers, principals, and 
school supervisors. Not all 
schools and teachers have 
access to such a working 
group. However, the number 
of active working groups has 
increased in recent years to 
around 35,000. They represent a 
relatively effective mechanism 
for channeling training to local 
schools.
Note: Although the agencies in this table have been categorized as mainly “preservice training” or “continuing professional 
development” facilities, some agencies offer elements of both. Ideally, the preservice institutes will also develop increasingly 
greater capacity for in-service training. RPL = Recognition of prior learning.
Box 3.1 District education Authorities
The district office is responsible for the schools and teachers under its management, ranging 
from 14 primary schools (in Anambas Island) to 1,986 in Garut and from 10 junior secondary 
schools in Asmat to 809 in Malang. Districts have an initiating and coordinating role in the 
training of teachers. In this regard, for example, they facilitate the establishment of local 
teacher working groups, identify key teachers from schools to receive training to act as consul-
tants and trainers in the rollout of national training programs, and conduct their own training 
programs using these trainers.
District officers are responsible for the administration and implementation of the certifica-
tion program within the district, and technical teams have been organized at the local level to 
plan, monitor, and report the progress of implementation to Ministry of Education and 
Culture agencies. The districts are also involved with socialization of the certification process 
to principals and teachers. In addition, district authorities collaborate with local universities 
regarding teacher education matters, provide scholarships for teacher upgrading, and iden-
tify areas of teacher shortage. The effectiveness of training programs usually depends heavily 
on the enthusiasm with which district authorities identify school and teacher needs and then 
support and follow up on training activities. The response of districts to training initiatives 
varies widely.
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Preservice Teacher Education
The significant increase in the number and quality of entrants to teacher educa-
tion institutions as a result of the enactment of the Teacher Law has given these 
institutions both new obligations and new challenges. In other words, new ways 
to strengthen the efficiency and effectiveness of preservice teacher education 
institutions in the context of implementing the Teacher Law have become essen-
tial. These approaches include effective delivery of a new four-year degree edu-
cational program for all elementary teachers (replacing the previous two-year 
diploma) as well as revision and upgrading of existing primary and secondary 
training courses to incorporate the newly mandated competencies and the adop-
tion of new teaching methodologies.
As a consequence, universities have had to change many of their practices. 
New competency-based curricula and methodologies are being introduced to 
improve the knowledge and skills of new teachers. Changed management struc-
tures and new resources have been identified to cater to the larger numbers of 
candidates staying longer in training. In short, a number of new challenges facing 
preservice teacher education institutions have arisen:
•	 The need for the better selection and retention of high-caliber candidates for 
teacher education
•	 The need for more coordinated planning to ensure that the number of teacher 
education graduates more closely meets the demand from schools and district 
authorities
•	 The need to improve the preparation of candidates to become more effective 
teachers
•	 The need to strengthen preservice institutions to become “after-sales” service 
centers to support improved classroom effectiveness of recently graduated 
students
These challenges have created an extensive agenda for the reform of preser-
vice teacher education. In essence, university-level preservice programs now 
need to prepare teachers for the latest curriculum at the national, provincial, or 
district levels and see this preparation as part of a lifetime of continuing profes-
sional development. Subject and pedagogy courses need to be closely linked to 
school curriculum competency standards and ensure that all graduates meet new 
performance standards for the teaching profession and are eligible for certifica-
tion. This agenda for reform includes the following aspects:
•	 Increased course time for practical classroom teaching, with coaching and 
mentoring by lecturers and, periodically, by experienced classroom teachers
•	 More extensive school-based experience, observation, tutoring, small-group assis-
tance, school-based action research, and collaboration during the  induction year
•	 Greater school-university collaboration by using more on-campus microteach-
ing to exhibit best practices
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•	 Closer cooperation between the universities and teacher working groups to 
ensure higher-quality experiences for both pre- and in-service teachers
•	 Employment of expert classroom teachers to supervise future teachers, assist 
in or teach courses in the preservice university programs, and collaborate on 
action research with university faculty
•	 Appropriate university infrastructure in terms of science and language 
 laboratories, curriculum development centers and libraries, and instructional 
technology including Internet connection
These new challenges require the universities to make significant changes, and 
grants have been made available to support preservice teacher education institu-
tions. The government’s BERMUTU (Better Education through Reformed 
Management and Universal Teacher Upgrading) program, supported by the 
World Bank, provided $25 million for reforming university-based teacher educa-
tion courses in light of the Teacher Law’s requirements and for strengthening the 
national accreditation agency for higher education, especially to accredit the 
newly established four-year preservice education programs for primary school 
teachers. By 2011, for example, 56 study programs (26 for the four-year primary 
teacher degree and 30 for junior secondary teachers) had participated in the 
accreditation incentive grants program to revise their programs and purchase 
resources to implement these innovations. In addition, the funding provided dis-
tance learning grants for a consortium of universities to develop and promote a 
distance learning initiative (Hybrid Learning for Indonesian Teachers [HYLITE])1; 
grants to support technological improvements at the Open University to enhance 
distance learning capacity; and scholarships for lecturers to update their knowl-
edge and skills in delivery of the new courses to upgrade in-service teachers. The 
government has reinforced this support by widening the number of universities 
involved to 90 and mandating that courses be competency-based.
The national accreditation agency for higher education also received funding 
to improve its capacity to assess the quality of the new courses and the ability of 
the universities to meet the new standards. The new standards, procedures, and 
instruments are covered in a series of eight manuals that relate data collection and 
analysis to the set of seven national standards shown in table 3.3. These docu-
ments can be found on the website of the accreditation agency.2 For each of these 
national standards, there are a number of items in the accreditation  instrument 
that require the assessors to explore the evidence the university can provide 
regarding implementation and outcomes for the program being accredited.
Universities are under some pressure to incorporate these new approaches if 
they wish to gain accreditation for their redesigned courses. For the new courses 
to be accredited, for example, universities should be able to provide evidence of 
new student-centered and interactive teaching methodologies; international best 
practice in teacher internship and practicum; actual school teaching experience by 
their lecturers; willingness and ability to recognize the prior learning of teachers 
upgrading their qualifications; and highly skilled lecturing staff to work with 
teachers, schools, and district staff in the assessment of teachers and the conduct 
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of training activities within schools. Whether the new courses have improved the 
quality of graduates or have resulted in higher student scores will be a project for 
the future.
An added complication in the reform of teacher education institutions is that 
their curriculum structures and content often work against the efficient and effec-
tive deployment of school staff. Within teacher education institutions, courses are 
organized into study programs for each teaching subject. Each study program 
consists of two main elements: (a) the knowledge content of the  particular subject 
adapted for the needs of teaching; and (b) the pedagogy appropriate to the teach-
ing of that subject (the latter is a relatively small component of only two to four 
months over four years). In this fairly self-contained structure, each study program 
is separate from the others with little interprogram exchange of either students or 
activities.
Such an arrangement has some inherent difficulties:
•	 The level of content is specific to teaching rather than to a corpus of academic 
knowledge so that there is little equivalence between, say, a mathematics course 
taken by an engineer and one taken by a teacher. A later career change for a 
teacher then becomes difficult, and, on a broader scale, limits the flexibility of 
the Indonesian labor force with a consequent cost to the whole economy.
•	 Although all teachers gain a “major” teaching subject from the study program 
in which they enroll, it is rare for teachers to have a “minor” or second teaching 
subject because they usually do not have the opportunity to study outside 
their particular study programs. This means that many secondary teachers who 
cannot gain sufficient teaching periods in the “major” subject they have been 
certified to teach are officially unable to teach a second “minor” subject to 
achieve the teaching load necessary to gain their professional allowance 
(24 period-hours per week). This limitation also unnecessarily increases the 
number of teachers a secondary school requires—yet another reason for the 
apparent overstaffing in some secondary schools.
table 3.3 national standards for indonesian University program Accreditation
Standards
Items for 
evaluation 
(no.)
Proportion 
of marks 
given (%)a
1. Vision, mission, goals, objectives, and strategy achievement 3 3.12
2. Governance, leadership, management, and quality assurance system 6 6.24
3. Students and graduates 17 15.60
4. Human resources 23 21.90
5. Curriculum, learning, and academic atmosphere 27 18.81
6. Finance, facilities and infrastructure, and information systems 16 15.64
7. Research, service or community service, and cooperation 8 18.78
Source: BAN-PT 2008.
a. “Proportion of marks given” represents the relative weight assigned to each standard. The percentages add up to more than 
100 due to rounding.
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Likewise, many small primary schools in Indonesia have a surplus of teachers 
because they receive teaching staff based on the number of classes they have 
rather than on the number of students. Other schools, however, do not meet this 
criterion, having perhaps only four teachers or fewer—a situation that will 
become more common as teacher distribution inequities are reduced. When 
schools are staffed more equitably on the basis of student enrollments, smaller 
schools will receive fewer teachers, which will require teachers to instruct stu-
dents in multigrade classes. Currently, however, most primary teachers are not 
trained for multigrade teaching. Universities will therefore need to ensure that 
their graduates have the skills to promote this form of class organization through 
their subject and pedagogical instruction.
Some teacher education institutions are attempting to resolve these problems 
of mismatch and provide other flexibilities in teacher education. Because 
 teachers at the secondary level are trained and certified in only one subject, prin-
cipals sometimes have difficulty obtaining a specialist teacher for some subject 
areas and must ask capable (but subject-untrained) teachers to teach classes 
outside their areas of expertise. This mismatch means students in that class are 
denied the expertise of a correctly trained teacher. Although regulations concern-
ing multigrade teaching and multisubject teaching have not been issued, some 
universities have found creative ways of solving the problem of teacher over 
supply as well as the mismatch between the teacher’s subject area and the sub-
ject they actually teach. The University of Surabaya, for example, trains such 
teachers at courses conducted during school vacations (see box 3.2).
Some universities offer innovative solutions to meet local needs, including a 
wide range of practical experiences to prepare teacher candidates for their teach-
ing careers. The University of Manado provides a model for active involvement 
in the training of local teachers (see box 3.3).
Although a renewed emphasis on practical classroom training is necessary to 
produce good teachers, it has been difficult to identify high-quality teachers in 
these schools to work alongside the trainees in improving their practical knowl-
edge and skills for classroom teaching. Furthermore, universities have not 
 budgeted for their lecturers to spend more time in the schools and classrooms 
supervising and guiding their trainees and supporting the mentors. Maintaining 
Box 3.2 Adopting new training Approaches
The city of Surabaya district government implemented a pilot (World Bank 2009a) to solve the 
 subject mismatch problem by enrolling teachers at the University of Surabaya or the Open 
University to improve their competencies in the other subjects they have been asked to teach 
but for which they have no training. The plan is that by 2015 there will be no further mismatch 
 problems. Currently, the university faculty has established a cooperative relationship with the 
local government and is obtaining the necessary equipment to improve the practical part of 
the subject instruction. Additional workshops will be held to raise the quality of instruction.
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productive and ongoing relationships with schools is also proving to be difficult 
to sustain because of the number of trainees to be placed and the longer time 
period they are expected to remain in the schools.
District scholarships for high-achieving graduates are seen to be an essential 
part of the larger strategy of teacher education reform. Schools in remote and 
disadvantaged areas are forced to hire temporary, often poorly trained, teachers 
to fill their vacancies. Some universities recognize that almost all districts face 
some challenges in terms of appointing the appropriately trained teacher to the 
appropriate vacancy. One university has reported that it will focus its postgradu-
ate professional training course on teachers prepared to serve in remote areas. 
A number of other universities have signed memoranda of understanding with 
their local district offices to ensure they provide local government scholarships 
for selected students. These teachers are then guaranteed a position in those 
 districts on graduation. This approach is most used for secondary subject areas, 
particularly in shortfall areas such as science and mathematics. These scholar-
ships can reduce the mismatch caused when teachers are employed for a subject 
vacancy for which they are not qualified. The benefits of coordination at the 
district level are highlighted in box 3.4.
Box 3.3 the University of manado’s “in-service, on-service” program model
The University of Manado has been helping many teachers to upgrade their training. To 
 support this government policy, it has developed an “in-service, on-service program” that 
started in 2009. This is an integrated program that caters to both preservice and in-service 
teachers. The university trains preservice teachers Mondays through Thursdays and trains 
in-service teachers on Fridays and Saturdays. The preservice teachers (third-semester  students) 
will take the school positions of those teachers who go to campus on Fridays and Saturdays. 
This, in turn, will create an opportunity for them to gain teaching experience.
This program is particularly worthwhile for several reasons:
• In-service teachers have a chance to upgrade their knowledge (supporting the certification 
process).
• Schools welcome the practicing students.
• Many students from remote areas are willing to be assigned to teach in their own areas.
• Students are exposed to real situations (from the early period of their study) and know what 
schools need.
• Students and lecturers develop the learning model together, encouraging action research.
The university does not provide financial assistance for the practicing students because of 
financial constraints. However, it lets the students pick schools in their hometown areas. In 
addition, to support the monitoring of practical training, the university has budgeted funds to 
cover the transport costs of staff lecturers who supervise these practicum students in more-
distant locations. This is an imaginative response to the need to find regular and longer-term 
placements in schools to implement the policies of the new training program.
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The Postgraduate Professional Teacher Training Course
International experience has shown that a postgraduate focus on pedagogy will 
enable greater flexibility in student entry to teaching. By providing a one-year 
professional teacher education course as an “add-on” diploma to a regular three-
year or four-year degree in a teaching subject, universities can increase the 
options available for candidates who may seek a future career change. This model 
is often offered as an alternative to a four-year “integrated” degree.
The great benefit of the “3+1 year” model is that it enables greater flexibility 
for students than would a straight four-year teacher education degree at an 
Indonesian university. For example, it enables subject graduates to make a last-
minute decision to opt for a teaching career if they can apply for and be accepted 
into the postgraduate training course. In addition, it may also facilitate the entry 
of mature graduates making a mid-life career change from another profession into 
teaching if they already have a relevant subject degree. Provided the  enrollment 
opportunity into the postgraduate course remains open in this  manner, a great 
deal more flexibility will exist to enable movement into and out of teaching as a 
career. This movement will enrich the experience of the teaching workforce and 
enhance the exposure of students to a wider range of teacher backgrounds.
In Indonesia, the Teacher Law requires that a postgraduate course of profes-
sional study and classroom practice be undertaken by all teachers seeking 
 certification. This course is of one year’s duration for secondary teachers and six 
months for primary teachers and is in addition to the four-year teacher education 
degree course taken by all. The course is designed to focus on interactive, 
 student-centered teaching methodologies, with 60 percent of the course time 
being spent in classrooms involved in practical classroom work (watching and 
analyzing the lessons of master teachers, preparing and conducting lessons pre-
pared by the trainee, and so on). However, in addition to providing effective 
Box 3.4 coordination between Districts, Universities, and schools
Close coordination between district offices, teacher education institutions, and schools has 
important benefits. District offices first need to work more closely with their schools and local 
universities to identify the district’s teacher profile to match the schools’ demand for teachers 
(particularly subject specialist teachers) with the supply available from the universities. Such a 
profile, constantly updated, can map teachers according to academic qualifications and 
schools’ need for teachers at each educational level. This is especially true in preparing 
 teachers to teach dual  subjects in secondary schools in remote areas.
As teachers retire or resign, further vacancies arise, transfers occur, and new hiring takes 
place. One district  conducts an annual district workshop to plan teacher appointments for 
each level of school and each subject area, incorporating known retiring teachers as well. This 
process addresses the problem of overstaffing in some schools and the shortage of teachers in 
other schools to ensure more efficient personnel deployment and resource use.
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training, the postgraduate course is also meant to be used as a filter to restrict the 
number of candidates being employed in teaching to ensure that only the most 
highly skilled teachers enter the profession in the future. By reducing the number 
of teacher graduates currently entering the profession, the course will also help 
to ensure that the supply of graduates more closely matches the demand for new 
teachers.
Selection for enrollment will involve a more rigorous testing regime—clearly 
a move in the right direction. However, by coming at the end of the four-year 
teacher education degree, the test does not effectively manage the number 
 entering the education profession in the first place, and thus does little to 
improve  efficiency of resource use by teacher education institutions.
Teacher candidates for the new postgraduate professional year must have 
already completed their four-year degrees. In 2012 the quota for this professional 
training was 3,000 degree graduates. Most openings will be filled by newly 
 graduated teachers. Because of the incentive of the professional allowance, 
 competition for these limited places has been vigorous. Priority entry to the 
postgraduate course advances a teacher in the queue for employment and the 
opportunity to gain the professional allowance.
Regulation 8/2009 governs the introduction of this postgraduate professional 
course. A team from the Directorate General of Higher Education ensures that 
the teacher education institutions meet the following conditions before receiving 
approval to give this course:
•	 In curriculum, a course of subject-specific pedagogy and a field experience 
program for each study program
•	 In human resources, a permanent faculty of two with PhDs and four with 
master’s degrees for each program
•	 In infrastructure, the necessary specialist equipment and materials
•	 An improvement program for all instructional activities
•	 An organized partnership program with schools
•	 A professional postgraduate course for every study program, although an 
 organizing university may arrange shared programs
•	 A regular Directorate General of Higher Education evaluation of programs 
with reapproval necessary after three years
Of particular importance in the conduct of the postgraduate professional 
training program is the need for universities to build closer links with schools, 
which reinforces the more general mandate for all teacher education institutions 
to do so. The key feature of this regulation is the requirement that students 
undertake the largest part of their pedagogical training and practice under super-
vision in the classroom.
The program has four core areas:
•	 Content in at least two teaching subject areas
•	 Teaching methodologies that are both generalist and subject-oriented
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•	 Foundations of education, including child psychology and stages of child 
growth
•	 Professional practice in the classroom
Regulation 8/2009 particularly emphasizes practice teaching or a professional 
experience component that should be carried out in a number of schools, includ-
ing a variety of observations and practice opportunities with an experienced 
teacher or lecturer mentor. The trainee should also have one or two blocks of 
teaching, each for a number of weeks, to teach a defined topic from the curricu-
lum, using a range of methods, and to gain experience in testing students and 
analyzing their scores to judge their progress and their reaction to different meth-
odologies. Reflection time should be included so that student teachers can con-
sider the responses to their teaching and can also have a debriefing session with 
their mentors.
The final advantage of the professional postgraduate program has been to 
ensure the more equitable distribution of teachers. In spite of its teacher surplus, 
Indonesia has a continual shortage of teachers in rural and isolated areas. 
Inadequate teacher provision in remote, border, and disadvantaged areas was 
recognized by the Teacher Law, which provided a generous locality allowance 
(equal to the professional allowance) to attract teachers to these areas. Other 
incentives such as subsidized housing, payment of travel expenses, and longer 
vacations have also been tried but without much success. Figure 3.1 indicates 
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Source: Rustad 2012.
Note: The Ministry of Education and Culture defines “remote areas” as frontier, outer islands, and disadvantaged areas 
(Terdepan, Terluar, Tertinggal, or 3T). The ministry maintains a list of districts that fit these criteria. “Remote” is the inclusive term 
most often used to describe these areas.
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the number of vacancies in the defined remote and border areas that were to be 
addressed in 2011–12. Twelve universities have been approved to commence a 
series of strategies, using access to the postgraduate professional training year as 
an incentive.
Priority to undertake the postgraduate professional course has therefore been 
given to teachers prepared to accept appointment to a school in a remote locality, 
a border zone, or a rural area. On their return, they are awarded a scholarship to 
complete postgraduate professional training and can then immediately undertake 
certification. This process not only helps remote schools to fill their vacancies 
with up-to-date and specially selected graduates but also ensures that teachers 
have a unique opportunity to practice in a special type of school. Clearly, the 
Ministry of Education and Culture is using this kind of teacher placement 
 strategy to address the issue of staff shortages in remote areas (see box 3.5).
Induction, Mentoring, and Probation
One of the most important reforms emerging from the Teacher Law is the devel-
opment of a school-based (or local working group-based) induction program for 
beginning teachers. This policy is meant to link the beginning teacher induction 
program and the school’s classroom assessment report with the certification 
 process and completion of the probationary period.
Currently, a teacher, like any other member of the civil service, has a one-year 
probationary period (with a possibility of having an extension to two years) after 
joining a school staff and commencing his or her teaching career. Traditionally, 
any civil servant, including teachers, must complete induction training in civics 
and administrative routines through the district government. However, it is also 
important to prove to the authorities that the teacher meets the chosen profes-
sion’s required standards (both in subject knowledge and classroom pedagogy). 
Box 3.5 the sm-3t program for Frontier, outermost, and Disadvantaged Areas
In January 2012 the Ministry of Education and Culture reported that it had recently dispatched 
nearly 3,000 fresh graduate teachers on a one-year teaching assignment in frontier, outer 
islands, and disadvantaged areas (Terdepan, Terluar, Tertinggal, or 3T) under the “Education 
Bachelor’s” program (Sarjana Mendidik, or SM) in 3T areas. This program is in line with the gov-
ernment’s concentrated effort this year to expand education access in 3T locations in East 
Nusa Tenggara, Aceh, Papua, Maluku, and Kalimantan.
Demand for teachers in the 3T areas reaches 6,000 people annually, which the government 
attempts to meet by redistributing 3,000 in-service teachers and supplying 3,000 preservice 
teachers through the SM-3T program. The SM-3T is not a teacher recruitment program, but it 
offers fresh graduates of teacher education institutions the opportunity to gain firsthand 
experience in teaching before continuing with their professional postgraduate teacher educa-
tion. There was a strong demand to enter the SM-3T program: a total of 7,000 graduates 
applied for the assignment.
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The government intends to defer certification until the end of the teacher’s 
probationary year, when the principal’s report can also be incorporated into the 
process and be sent to the university for inclusion in the certification and proba-
tionary process. This gives a better balance between the university’s view and the 
employer’s view of the overall ability of the prospective teacher. It also retains 
some of the links from the previous year between the practice teaching and the 
university lecturer’s teaching.
The teacher induction process became mandated through Regulation 27/2010. 
This marks an important point for the quality of Indonesia’s teaching profession 
because it acknowledges that a beginning teacher requires closer supervision, 
mentoring, and guidance in the workplace than other teachers to successfully 
make the transition from university training to the school workplace.
It has been recognized that such an induction and probation program is best 
delivered by principals able to take a true leadership role within the school. After 
mentoring and monitoring the new teacher during the probationary year, the 
principal can undertake a classroom performance assessment of the beginning 
teacher before writing a report on the teacher’s work. To help complete this task, 
the government’s BERMUTU program made funding available for a professional 
development program to strengthen the capacity of principals and supervisors. 
Twelve modules were developed for school principals and supervisors to mentor 
beginning teachers and to assess them at the end of their first year. The material 
emphasizes the adoption of an important new duty for the principal—that of 
school instructional leader—which requires all principals with beginning teach-
ers to take an active role in the professional development of those teachers. The 
materials also include classroom video lessons to be shown and discussed in 
workshops with the principal that also constitute an instrument for the assess-
ment of beginning teachers at the end of their probation.
This teaching resource is critical for building the capacity of school instruc-
tional leaders and underlines part of the professional duty of principals as set out 
in Regulation 28/2010 on the role of the principal. The knowledge and skills 
gained by a principal through the use of this course material with his or her 
beginning teachers will have application right across the school into other class-
rooms and will assert the right and duty of the principal to enter classrooms and 
take an active part in the improved performance of all teachers, including those 
who are underperforming. By June 2011, the modules had been prepared and 
trialed to support the induction procedure, and training materials had been 
developed to socialize the process. Core teams have also been trained at the 
national and district levels to support this reform. Training will be largely through 
the supervisors’ and principals’ working groups.
This reform has closed a gap in Indonesian in-service training. Preservice 
 university teacher education has a strong focus on subject matter and educa-
tion theory with only a small component of face-to-face teaching practice in 
schools and classrooms. The new requirement that principals and supervisors 
adopt a more active role in mentoring new teachers in the classroom during 
the probationary year is an important new reform. By inducting beginning 
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teachers into their new school role, the principal is providing the first compre-
hensive training of the teacher within the intensive, everyday environment of 
the school and classroom. This is a critical step in the training of teachers 
because they are, for the first time, under pressure to prepare and present les-
sons while controlling students in the class. It would be unfortunate if teachers 
finished their  probationary year and were confirmed as civil servants before the 
employer’s representatives (the principals) could confirm their efficiency and 
effectiveness.
Continuing Professional Development
The Teacher Law had a dramatic impact on the quantity of teachers undertaking 
in-service training. With 65 percent of the country’s 2.7 million teachers not 
meeting the new minimum of a four-year degree academic requirement, the 
process of in-service upgrading has been the starting point for reform. In fact, it 
represents the area with the greatest potential for improving the quality of in-
service teachers. This is an area where a range of training options and other useful 
initiatives is now becoming available, including the following:
•	 An expanded role for the Open University, whose enrollment of external 
 students doubled by  about 300,000 in-service students almost overnight
•	 Adoption of distance learning modes by a limited number of education 
 faculties of the teacher education institutions
•	 Learning modules for use at the local level through the school cluster teacher 
working groups
•	 Recognition of prior learning (RPL)
•	 University accreditation of local cluster-based training
Distance Education Reforms
The Open University is the traditional supplier of distance learning in Indonesia, 
as further described in box 3.6. The ability of the Open University to rapidly 
expand its capacity to supply upgrade training for in-service teachers has made a 
significant contribution to the certification process. As figure 3.2 indicates, in 
2009 over 485,000 in-service teachers were enrolled. Enrollment in the four-year 
degree in primary teaching and the degree in early childhood education 
 constituted 86 percent of all students of the university.
The Open University has provided learning materials to teachers in printed 
form throughout Indonesia, and it conducts over 14,000 local workshops for in-
service teachers, which are coordinated by its 36 regional centers. Additional 
support materials and e-resources have recently become available through its 
website, Guru Pintar (Clever Teacher) Online.3
Another open and distance learning approach—the first time distance learn-
ing strategies were used in Indonesia outside of the Open University—is the 
innovative HYLITE training mode, which has also been used to increase the 
capacity of regular universities to provide distance learning. With the increased 
demand from teachers seeking to upgrade their qualifications, the government 
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established a trial program using regular universities in 2007. A consortium of 
13 universities was commissioned to create a program to support primary teach-
ers seeking to upgrade their  qualifications to a four-year degree for certification. 
Grant funding supplied by the BERMUTU program was used to develop these 
materials, and 23 universities agreed to adopt the program. This new four-year 
Box 3.6 Using the open University’s experience with Distance learning materials
Materials developed for distance learning are quite different from those meant for the 
 traditional learning process. Open and distance learning (ODL) materials need to be more 
engaging and encourage learners to use them. To achieve that goal, developers of ODL materi-
als need to have specific knowledge, skills, and experience. In this regard, the Open University’s 
learning materials for the four-year degree for in-service teachers are well designed according 
to ODL instructional design principles.
Indonesia’s Open University has significantly more experience in developing ODL materials 
than the regular teacher education institutions that have more recently entered the field under 
the HYLITE program. From interviews with the Open University’s rector and staff, it is clear that 
it receives feedback from its users and continues to develop its staff’s capacity in instructional 
design. This experience could usefully be shared with other universities in  supporting the 
development of ODL materials in Indonesia and making them more instructionally effective.
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degree expanded existing  teachers’ access to upgrading opportunities through 
provision of instructional materials and packages for 32 courses. These comprised 
audiovisual materials, printed booklets, a web-based format, additional test items, 
sets of assignments and other online initiations, and tutorial plans and materials.
This change in government policy created a new mode of study for teachers 
seeking to upgrade and has established the principle that regular universities can 
deliver distance instruction. By the end of 2010, over 7,000 incumbent teachers 
had used this avenue to upgrade (Directorate General of Higher Education 
2011).
Recognition of Prior Learning
As part of the reform process, the principle of RPL has been introduced for 
in-service teachers who enroll for upgrading (see box 3.7). Many teachers 
 needing academic upgrading to a four-year degree may already be effective 
Box 3.7 international experience with recognition of prior learning
The theoretical benefits of recognition of prior learning (RPL) make it an attractive policy 
option in a number of countries. However, practical implementation has often proved difficult, 
and take-up has frequently been lower than anticipated. According to the City and Guilds 
Centre for Skills Development in London, countries have encountered the following  challenges 
in implementing RPL (Sims 2010):
• Lack of demand from learners who, even when eligible for RPL, prefer the conventional 
learning process and the social interactions that accompany it
• Lack of awareness of the process
• Perception that RPL is an ”easy option” not valued by stakeholders
• Complexity of the process, which requires a sophisticated understanding of subject unit 
structures and may end up being mired in heavy bureaucracy
• Difficulty that many students have in gathering evidence acceptable to the institution
The core requirement for successful RPL is an established framework of credit, qualifica-
tions, and occupational standards. The support of stakeholders and efforts to raise awareness 
among universities and candidates are necessary, as is a fairly rigorous assessment process to 
ensure quality. Clear, jargon-free information is also essential. There should be minimal 
 difficulty in accessing the process and substantial support from the university to help practitio-
ners and candidates through the process.
If RPL is seen as a tool for skill identification and capacity building, it is argued, the emphasis 
should lie even more on using it as a way to bring individuals into further education and 
 training. Such an outcome may, however, require a change in culture and mind-set. In a 
 number of RPL initiatives in developing countries, outcomes were linked to occupational 
 standards rather than curricular structures, leading to a lack of connectivity with further 
 education and a mind-set that receipt of a certificate of recognition is an end rather than a 
means to further development.
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teachers with a depth of workplace experience. It was recognized that, as in other 
education systems, such knowledge and skills could be assessed to count toward 
their degrees. RPL was therefore included under the banner of in-service teacher 
upgrading, and universities received the authority to determine how much 
advanced standing to give for in-service teachers enrolling for training. Accordingly, 
a policy and instruments for RPL were developed and trialed in 2008. All 
81  universities appointed to offer upgrade courses for underqualified teachers 
were also approved to offer RPL. In 2009, implementation commenced. The 
Open University was excluded from this regulation because the process is not a 
new one for that institution.
The Open University has adopted a straightforward approach to RPL 
based on a simple formula taking into account a teacher’s educational level 
at point of entry, additional in-service training received, and the number of 
years’ experience as a teacher. It is difficult to judge how successful this 
 formula is in determining the quality of the candidate upon entry. However, 
up to 28 credit points toward a degree of 145 credit points can be awarded 
for this work.
Although the number of teachers awarded RPL has increased significantly, the 
relatively slow uptake by the universities has been a cause for concern. They may 
remain resistant to the idea of gaining the four-year degree through in-service 
training at regular universities; thus, the overwhelming majority of upgrading 
in-service teachers are enrolled at the Open University. In addition, the slow 
uptake may be due to the following factors:
•	 Refusal of some district education offices to permit their teachers to leave 
their classes for an extended period
•	 Lack of partnerships between many of the appointed universities and local 
districts, rendering their programs inaccessible for many teachers
•	 Teachers’ failure to receive the allocated subsidy from the provincial office 
because of the limited quota and the provincial policy to prioritize enrollment 
at the Open University
•	 Failure of many districts in general to allocate subsidies for in-service teachers 
to upgrade their qualifications
Thus, despite progress in the socialization and implementation of the RPL and 
its procedures, only about 35,000 teachers have gained access to such recognition 
through regular universities (Ministry of Education and Culture 2011a).
Establishment of a quality assurance system for RPL will increase confidence 
in this reform. To date, university practices to calculate the levels of RPL to be 
awarded have varied considerably. The Ministry of Education and Culture is 
aware of a growing lack of rigor in the procedures being used in some universities 
and is taking steps to carefully audit how procedures are being applied to ensure 
that standards are maintained. Although it is understandable for universities to 
resist the adoption of practices they believe will lower standards, the justification 
for offering RPL is quite sound and is a common international practice. 
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It saves time and money and also avoids the needless repetition of material that 
late entrants to academic courses often experience.
Cluster-Based Working Groups
Teacher working groups (KKGs and MGMPs)4 have been recognized as “the 
most viable and accessible avenue for most teachers to receive continuing 
 professional development” (Ministry of Education and Culture 2011a). They 
have played an integral role in supporting teachers in training and professional 
development activities for over 20 years and provide a forum for teachers to 
discuss teaching problems and work cooperatively to undertake common tasks 
such as curriculum development, the creation of teaching aids, and the design of 
test items as well as more advanced activities such as lesson study and classroom 
action research. However, support for these groups has varied over the years, and 
although many are still active and productive, a large number have become 
 inactive or fail to provide effective support for career development. They often 
wax and wane in importance in the local education community, depending upon 
the support of the district and subdistrict education offices or the interest of 
teachers.
With the surge of training generated by the Teacher Law reforms, however, 
the teacher working group has been seen as providing a model method of 
 delivering in-service training at the local level. This model required attempts to 
reactivate and strengthen these groups. Although the Ministry of Education and 
Culture began a revitalization process through a block grant program in 2005, 
funding for this process has been supplemented from other sources in selected 
districts (such as the government’s BERMUTU program, which is supported by 
the World Bank) with the intention of using the groups to support teachers for 
upgrading, certification, and professional development activities. In 2005, the 
status of working groups was also not well understood, and thus the World Bank 
undertook a comprehensive study (World Bank 2009b). The 2007 report5 
described the groups’ activities, confirmed their potential benefits, and identified 
the characteristics of a model working group.
The study produced a number of important findings regarding the profile of 
an effective working group—for example, confirming the following central 
 features of the best working groups:
•	 Sizes of approximately 6–10 schools for a KKG (cluster of primary schools) 
and 10–12 schools for an MGMP (cluster of subject-based secondary teachers 
from a group of high schools)
•	 Biweekly working meetings (approximately 16 meetings per year)
•	 Financial and technical support and frequent visits from the district education 
staff, supervisors, and principals
•	 Focused meetings that last approximately four hours
•	 Small-group work
•	 Nearly full attendance by all teachers in the school cluster working group
•	 Office-bearers consisting of at least a chair, a secretary, and a treasurer
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•	 A focus on providing core activities such as the development of syllabi and 
lesson planning, discussions of subject matter, the development and practice of 
active and innovative teaching methods, the design of teaching aids, and stu-
dent testing and achievement
A second study conducted in 2010 was undertaken by the Ministry of 
National Education using a sample of 30 of the 75 BERMUTU project districts 
(Ministry of Education and Culture 2011b). It estimated that 267,000 teachers 
were participating in a total of 6,155 working groups under BERMUTU. On this 
basis, it can be estimated that there are well over 60,000 working groups in 
Indonesia. This is a massive structure through which to deliver teacher in-service 
training and is probably the most significant avenue through which teachers 
receive their continuing professional development—particularly in rural and 
remote areas where teachers’ access to professional training is limited. Figure 3.3 
looks at the key activities conducted by working groups in 2007 and again 
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in 2010; an “ideal model” of an effective working group appears in the center as 
a comparison.
The first column shows the range of teacher professional development activi-
ties and their relative importance as identified in the 2007 World Bank study of 
45 districts (World Bank 2009b). From this study, it was possible to postulate a 
theoretical or “ideal” model of how a teacher working group should operate—in 
particular, what sort of teacher education a group should deliver to local teachers. 
In terms of teacher effectiveness and improvement, the “training” element was 
considered the most critical one to examine. The consensus was that the chief 
function of working groups should be one of training—not just in terms of the 
amount of training but also in terms of the quality of subject content and 
 methodology. The graph shows a training component in working group activities 
of 10 percent in 2007 when the preferred level was postulated to be 45 percent 
(that is, a difference of 35 percentage points at the cost of “socialization and 
 dissemination” and writing “test items”).
By the time of the 2010 ministry study, the actual figure for training had 
grown from 10 percent in 2007 to 38 percent in 2010 (Ministry of Education 
and Culture 2011b). In addition, the types of training activities were more 
diverse and classroom-focused. The data mentioned “learning models, teaching 
aids, and classroom action research,” so the quality of what was undertaken 
 during this larger slice of working group time was more classroom- and teaching-
focused. This additional time came from reductions in the proportion of time 
spent developing “test items” (reduced from 40 percent to 15 percent) and in 
“socialization and dissemination” of administrative and routine circulars (reduced 
from 20 percent to 3 percent).
Although there was only a small district overlap in these two studies, the 
working group activities indeed appear to have been reoriented. This change is 
in two directions: (a) a significant growth in the time spent in training activities, 
and (b) an improvement in the nature and quality of activities on which that 
time was spent. This is good news for those involved in educational reform 
because the local school working groups represent a critical strategy for bringing 
in- service training to the grassroots and into schools where the greatest improve-
ment in teacher quality is desired (see box 3.8).
Teacher working groups depend heavily on the availability of resource people. 
These are usually provided by universities, provincial institutes for quality 
 assurance, Centres for the Development and Empowerment of Teachers and 
Education Personnel in subject areas, expert teachers from district schools, and 
sometimes private consultants. In general, however, the number of such facilita-
tors is small, and funding for payment to them is scarce.
Teacher Appraisal and Career Development
Teacher Appraisal
As part of the teacher reforms, the ministry has also begun to implement some 
changes to the teacher accountability system. The focus is on a revision to the 
teacher performance appraisal scheme and a stronger link to the professional 
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Box 3.8 impact of teacher Working Groups
There is some evidence that teacher working groups are effective in increasing knowledge lev-
els of teachers. Teachers in working groups receiving a direct grant under the BERMUTU pro-
gram show a significant improvement in cognitive and pedagogical ability. A ministry study of 
a sample of 1,015 teachers, drawn from working groups in the 75 BERMUTU districts, showed 
that some improvement in teachers’ abilities had occurred (Ministry of Education and Culture 
2011b).
Generally, the same teachers were tested twice: at baseline (2010) and at midline (2011) of 
a three-stage study. The tests used contained linked (anchor) items, which means that a small 
percentage of questions were the same in both baseline and midline tests. This methodology 
can be used to construct test scores that are comparable over time. From figure B3.8.1, it is 
possible to conclude that the sample teachers improved in 2011 over 2010, in both cognitive 
and pedagogical ability.
All regular primary-school working groups in the BERMUTU program received a direct 
grant through the provincial quality assurance agency of $5,200 (or $5,500 for junior second-
ary groups) over the three years of the program that had elapsed at that time. This funding was 
conditional on adhering to the program guidelines, which meant expenditures were to be 
directed toward the purchase of learning materials and activities associated with modules of 
work provided by the program. These modules predominantly focused on class action 
research, lesson study, active learning, group work, and other effective classroom methodolo-
gies. A further requirement was that each working group would meet 16 times each year 
( fortnightly) to conduct activities—a more intensive pattern than in the past. As figure B3.8.1 
shows, while there was some gain in cognitive (subject) ability, the larger gain was in 
 pedagogical (teaching method) ability. This finding is in line with the reorientation of 
 working group activities toward syllabus development, lesson study, and training.
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development system. The implementation of an annual performance appraisal 
scheme will ensure that school principals and supervisors take an active part in 
the work and performance of each teacher. Through an annual review of a 
teacher’s work in relation to the knowledge and skills he or she is required to 
demonstrate and the standards mandated by the Teacher Law, a principal can 
identify the weaknesses of a teacher’s performance and require that the necessary 
professional development take place.
With scores from the performance appraisal instrument linked to a teacher’s 
salary increment and future progression, teachers will have a strong incentive to 
undertake the necessary development coursework recommended for improve-
ment. Furthermore, if this performance is a component of future promotion 
opportunities, the cycle is complete and an integrated framework is established. 
Teachers who are identified as underperforming will receive support but also 
face  sanctions for nonperformance. The teacher’s clear link to accountability for 
work productivity is thus established.
It is therefore critical to develop an integrated framework to sustain and con-
tinually enhance the quality and accountability of teachers after they have been 
certified. This is being achieved by
•	 Reforming existing policies, procedures, and instruments for performance 
appraisal and for progression and promotion
•	 Linking incentives created under the Teacher Law to career advancement
•	 Clarifying lines of accountability between principals and supervisors and their 
teachers
In this context, a recent ministerial memorandum has promoted the principle 
of integrated training, which involves providing courses through the cooperation 
The findings concerning the effectiveness of teacher working groups are significant for 
policy makers. Although the working-group structure has been in place for many years as a 
meeting point for teachers to exchange ideas, it is not sufficient to simply leave them on their 
own without guidance if real teacher improvement is to take place. The groups do need some 
regular funding, and they do need a structured program of improvement to implement. Such 
a program should be clearly focused on subject content framed within a comprehensive 
 program of classroom lesson improvement. Furthermore, through the working group, the 
roles of teachers, principals, and supervisors also need to be aligned. Regular scheduling of 
meetings should be a requirement for funding (perhaps 16 sessions per year), and auditing 
should be rigorous. However, this audit must be of two kinds: first, it must record details of the 
teachers’ classroom products, including lesson implementation and improvement; and  second 
(and only second), it should require financial records and receipts of funds expended. If done 
systematically, the training available at the local level can be shown to have a significant 
impact on teacher ability.
Box 3.8 impact of teacher Working Groups (continued)
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of a number of education and training agencies acting together. In this case, the 
ministry has brokered an agreement among universities, the provincial Institutes 
for Educational Quality Assurance, and the subject-focused Centres for the 
Development and Empowerment of Teachers and Education Personnel, and a 
memorandum of understanding has been signed and funding provided for the 
development of additional accredited teacher education modules to be delivered 
jointly by these agencies. It has been agreed that these will form part of the con-
tinuing professional development requirement for all teachers set out in the 
Teacher Law and will be linked to teacher performance appraisal for the calcula-
tion of credit points for progression and salary increments. This integrated frame-
work now links the key elements shown in figure 3.4. This diagram shows the 
elements that will govern the performance cycle for all teachers. It consists of 
three basic processes:
•	 Competency tests completed as part of certification and at subsequent times to 
determine the competency levels being achieved by teachers and being applied 
in the classroom
•	 Performance appraisal for all education professionals that is annual, evidence-
based, and criterion-referenced
•	 Continuing professional development based on identified teacher and school 
needs
For example, a teacher failing the competency test must undertake a course 
of basic training available in the continuing professional development circle 
before he or she can undertake performance appraisal. Should the appraisal 
Figure 3.4 An integrated Framework to sustain teacher Quality and Accountability after 
certification in indonesia
Competency test
Continuing professional
development
Performance appraisal
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reveal further weaknesses in the teacher’s work, a specific remedial course must 
be undertaken as part of continuing professional development. However, a 
teacher shown to be performing at the minimum standard or better will progress 
to an improved salary and the opportunity for promotion.
The management of performance and career progression of all education 
 personnel is, therefore, now governed by structures and procedures based on a 
comprehensive legislative framework. The reforms have resulted in a revised 
operational and functional framework supported by legislation specifying the 
competency requirements of teachers and counselors.6 This framework includes 
specific core competencies required for increased levels of responsibility as well 
as additional competencies related to career stages. Teachers will thus have 
 ongoing, career-long incentives that provide the motivation for improvement 
upon which modern education systems function.
The Ministry of Education and Culture is currently preparing an online 
teacher assessment recording system to measure the subject content knowledge 
and classroom performance of teachers.7 This e-system will record the data from 
each teacher’s performance appraisal and competency test results into a specially 
designed computer database. The information will be used to develop individual 
teacher profiles in the legislated competencies and will enable management to 
measure progress toward their achievement. These data will enable the targeted 
planning of continuing professional development programs for teachers from the 
individual to the national level of demand. Teachers, principals, and district 
authorities will have access to this information. It is intended that this database 
be an invaluable tool to help teachers make professional decisions about their 
annual professional development plans.
Career Development
The ultimate goal of this cycle, of course, is a new career development and salary 
framework based on the achievement of required competencies and successful 
continuing professional development. As a result of negotiations between the 
Ministry of National Education and the Ministry of Administrative Reform, a 
new career framework was agreed on and formalized in Regulation 16/2009. 
This regulation clusters the many salary increments defined for the Indonesian 
civil service into four major career levels (five levels with the inclusion of teacher 
induction). This is a particularly significant reform because the teacher-specific 
framework it adopts differs from the overall civil service pay scale.
Policy makers have agreed that at each annual teacher performance appraisal, 
a total credit-point score will be calculated for each teacher. The score achieved 
will vary according to how well a teacher performs on each dimension of the 
instrument. Every two years, a teacher will have these scores matched against 
the salary scale and a decision made about progression to the next increment. 
In the final step of implementation of this project, principals will be able to 
enter the scores by computer and transfer the data to the district level.
The performance appraisal instrument will refer to the professional develop-
ment activities undertaken by the teacher. Many professional development 
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modules have already been developed. Others will be prepared. A framework is 
being developed to incorporate all these modules and to ensure they are graded 
according to the types of professional development required at different levels of 
a teacher’s career. The various themes for training are as follows:
•	 Induction: Beginning teachers who need support from developed modules
•	 Novice Teacher (Guru Pertama): Teachers just starting out who need material 
to focus on competency development
•	 Junior Teacher (Guru Muda): More experienced teachers seeking material to 
focus on improvements in student performance and school management
•	 Senior Teacher (Guru Madya): Associate teachers needing material to focus on 
the development of the school
•	 Master Teacher (Guru Utama): Senior teachers needing material on school 
leadership and teacher development
With appropriate legislation, this process could lead to a full performance-
related pay scheme. For example, teacher certification could be linked in future 
reforms to specific professional levels rather than the current practice of one-off 
certification qualifying a teacher for a lifelong entitlement to a professional 
allowance. If such a route is taken, it would move the whole teacher performance 
management process closer to the goal of linking incentives to career 
advancement.
In implementing this system, particular attention is being given to building 
the capacity of the personnel needed to complete key tasks, including the 
following:
•	 Management of teacher performance appraisal and continuing professional 
development by the district education office
•	 Management and use of databases by relevant users
•	 Training to implement the control and support system including school super-
visors, provincial staff, and the outside monitoring agencies to be involved
•	 Training of personnel at national Centres for the Development and 
Empowerment of Teachers and Education Personnel to produce, deliver, and 
train in the use of distance learning materials to be provided to local teacher 
working groups and schools
•	 Further development of the professional working groups for supervisors, 
 principals, and teachers to deliver the needs-based modular continuing profes-
sional development program
•	 Inclusion of preparatory training to deliver programs for induction, teacher 
performance appraisal, and continuing professional development in the 
 professional development programs of supervisors and principals
These are complex and ambitious reforms requiring negotiation with a 
 number of agencies, professional bodies, and teacher associations. Principals and 
supervisors, for example, have only recently been involved in making professional 
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judgments and preparing reports on the competency of their teachers. The 
 performance appraisal process will require them to regularly enter this sensitive 
field, which some consider to be “culturally inappropriate.” Although some 
 training has been given, there is need for ongoing work in this area to build 
 confidence and enhance their role as instructional leaders in schools. The 
 associations will also need assurance that principals and supervisors are acting in 
a  supportive role and on developmental activities to improve the quality of 
teaching. The methods of dealing with underperforming teachers will be 
 particularly important.
This point is important: when certification of teachers is complete, the contin-
ued motivation of teachers to improve quality will depend heavily on the teacher 
management structures in place and the quality of leadership at the local level—
of the district education offices, of principals, and of supervisors. In the past, 
particularly since decentralization, the quality of leadership at this level has been 
poor and often tainted by patronage or reflective more of administrative function 
than genuine educational leadership. This state of affairs must change if teacher 
quality is to improve. Two recent regulations8 define the future competencies 
demanded by these positions and establish a list of requirements for them, 
including civil service level, maximum age limit, a competency test based on the 
standards of specialized training, and a selection test. However, there is no 
 mention of selection on merit. Since the promulgation of these decrees, a major 
training course for principals has been developed and a specialist unit established 
to visit districts to train principals and supervisors who, if successful, will be 
“licensed” to practice. These actions will create a pool of eligible candidates from 
which district education authorities can draw when they wish to fill a vacancy.
Selection for these key positions should be based on ability to undertake 
 educational leadership at the local level. The need to improve teacher quality 
means that principals and supervisors must be skilled in direct classroom 
 assessment of teachers and the identification and support of poorly performing 
teachers. They must undertake an instructional leadership role in teaching meth-
odologies and pedagogy, including student-centered teaching, classroom manage-
ment, and student achievement measurement. Although both of these positions 
will require some administrative responsibility, great time must be devoted 
toward their leadership roles in curriculum development and management. 
School supervisors, in particular, should take a significant role in the training of 
principals in educational management, including mentoring and coaching their 
decision making and supporting their school leadership on a day-to-day basis. 
Part of their commitment must be to facilitate the work of teacher working 
groups management committees in providing continuing professional develop-
ment programs for schools. Only the direct involvement of principals and 
 supervisors in the observation and improvement of teaching in the classroom will 
sustain continued development of teacher competency.
Principals. Although many principals in Indonesia are well educated and capa-
ble, their training and knowledge of school management is often inadequate 
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for modern requirements. Most principals simply implement education policy 
and administrative requirements as a matter of routine without the knowledge 
and skills of an instructional leader. Often their professional development as 
school leaders consists of little more than a briefing on policy documents 
issued by the district office. They are poorly paid and have little authority over 
the teachers they supervise. Consequently, few adopt a proactive supervisory 
and developmental role toward their teaching staffs. They are often selected 
following an examination or are simply nominated by a district education offi-
cer. They are rarely selected by a formal merit process and receive little training 
for the task.
Ministerial Regulation 44/2002 mandated school-based management in 
Indonesia, which placed educational management firmly in the school with the 
principal as the key decision maker. The commencement of the School 
Operational Assistance funding program in 2005 placed resources at the school 
level to facilitate this decision making. Principals now have an effective role in a 
range of areas including school planning, curriculum development, school 
finance and budgeting, staff management, and community involvement. The 
principal thus has a key responsibility at the center of a devolved system where 
school-based management is the expectation. Principals in Indonesia now need 
greater skill in more effectively managing these processes.
In time, it is anticipated that school principals will take a more active role in 
the management of their schools in terms of the effectiveness of their personnel, 
efficient use of financial resources, and their accountability for student results 
and achievements to parents and the wider community. Principals will also 
become instructional leaders taking a positive role in the improvement of the 
quality of instruction at their school, and this improvement will be reflected in 
improved student scores.
School Supervisors. The school supervisor (pengawas) employed by the district 
office to visit schools provides an accountability link between the school princi-
pal and the district officers. When visiting schools, supervisors may have a range 
of tasks, such as collecting and analyzing reports and providing information about 
curriculum implementation and school effectiveness to the district office. 
Unfortunately, following the decentralization of education administration, the 
nature of the role now varies widely from district to district and usually focuses 
more on administrative issues than on the improvement of the classroom perfor-
mance of teachers. A recent review of the capacity of the school supervisor 
concluded as follows: “School principals, teachers and school committee mem-
bers regard the position of school supervisor as a low status position rather than 
an attractive career pathway. School supervisors reported that they have limited 
access to training and development opportunities” (Australia-Indonesia Basic 
Education Project 2007).
However, there is considerable potential in this position: a well-trained school 
supervisor can be a significant change agent operating across a cluster of, say, 
10–15 schools. Freed of many administrative tasks and equipped with the 
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knowledge and skills of a modern instructional leader, a school supervisor can 
effectively mentor and coach principals and arrange workshops and seminars for 
teachers in the new methodologies during visits to each school. This role is a 
significant one and needs continual strengthening through training and the selec-
tion of capable officers with good qualifications and extensive experience.
Ministerial Decree 12 of March 28, 2007, recognizes the potential in this posi-
tion for reorienting the face of Indonesian education. It defines the competencies 
required of school supervisors in six dimensions: personal competence, manage-
rial supervision competence, academic supervision competence, education evalu-
ation competence, research and development competence, and social competence. 
But the review mentioned above identified a large number of deficiencies in the 
knowledge and skill of school supervisors to undertake the newly defined tasks, 
as shown in figure 3.5.
This summary of qualitative data shows the extent to which principals and 
teachers agreed or disagreed with the proposition that school supervisors pos-
sess competency in each of the six dimensions. The small percentage of those 
in agreement indicates the generally low perception of school supervisor com-
petencies reported in interviews and focus group discussion. Clearly, this 
 creates a considerable agenda for the professional development of school 
supervisors.
Data from the Directorate of Basic Education Educational Personnel 
Development indicate an increasingly aging school supervisor workforce, with 
35 percent of the 21,627 school supervisors in the government system reaching 
retirement age within the next five years. Within the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs (MORA), 67 percent of the 7,060 school supervisors will retire in the 
next five years. The extent of imminent retirement presents an important 
Figure 3.5 perception of school supervisor competencies in indonesia, 2007
Source: Australia-Indonesia Basic Education Project 2007.
Note: Ministerial Decree 12 of March 28, 2007, defined the six dimensions of competencies required of school supervisors, shown on the x-axis. 
A sample of principals and teachers from all provinces were asked whether they agreed or disagreed that their own school supervisors possessed 
each dimension of competency.
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opportunity to replace over 40 percent of all school supervisors over the next 
five years and  create a new elite workforce of these key personnel to drive 
 educational improvement in schools and districts. Box 3.9 discusses one such 
effort that reflects the intention of district authorities to drive improvement in 
teacher quality.
conclusions
In the long run, the reforms being promoted in the teacher career cycle—from 
attracting better recruits to ensuring that they know their subjects well and can 
teach them effectively through better and more school-based training—are most 
important in developing a cadre of teachers who deserve both professional 
 certification and the rewards that come with it. To the extent these reforms are 
implemented successfully, of course, less time and fewer resources will need to 
be devoted to “catch-up” in-service training, and more time and more resources 
can be used for more systematic, career-long continuing professional 
development.
Although many ministerial reforms have been introduced to improve 
the system of teacher management, a major factor in their implementation 
and final success is the proper recruitment and selection process for the 
posts that can help ensure adequate attention to quality—namely, principals 
and supervisors. Mechanisms are now being piloted to guarantee that this 
process is based on merit and competence instead of political or personal 
favoritism.
Box 3.9 selecting supervisors in Karawang District
The new district head of education at Karawang intends to improve the quality of his school 
supervisors (who each manage 10 schools) to establish them as “quality advisers” to lead the 
district’s teacher quality improvement program. School supervisors are to form a cadre of 
experienced educational leaders to help teachers and principals to improve the standard of 
teaching in schools and hence lift student achievement scores. His plan is to select from a pool 
of school principals who have had eight years (two four-year terms) of successful experience in 
managing a school and have returned to the classroom for two years. This selection strategy is 
based on the need to have school leadership experience as well as a classroom-teaching 
“refresher experience.”
The district head’s intent is clear: he recognizes the need to focus closely on improvement 
in classroom teaching as the essential core of teacher quality and improvement. However, in 
discussion he spoke of his uncertainty about how to select the type of school supervisor who 
could successfully undertake such a task. Although these personnel can face special training 
and competency tests, at the final point of selection they rarely face an interview or go through 
a serious merit process in which a panel deliberates over matching the best person from a 
number of applicants for the position.
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The preservice education and continuing professional development needed to 
make these reforms succeed has also involved significant policy changes for the 
institutions providing this training, particularly the following:
•	 The closer linking of teacher education institutions with schools and district 
offices
•	 The introduction of limited distance-mode training by regular universities
•	 The authority for universities to facilitate training through new rules for RPL
These policy changes are essential for the ongoing professional development 
of the new generation of teachers and will also have a wider impact on university 
operations of the future.
But there are two critical caveats: First, this comprehensive and systematic 
teacher management and development process is based on the assumption 
that teachers begin with some minimum level of competence and a certain 
degree of motivation: to teach and to help their students learn. Earlier 
 chapters have described the sometimes indifferent attitude of teachers (many 
of whom, given their seniority, are now certified), whose priorities, according 
to the exigencies of the time, were obedience and loyalty up the system rather 
than proactive service to their students and out to the larger community. 
Ensuring that the postcertification quality assurance process works for them 
as well as for the new generation of teachers mentioned above is a major 
challenge.
Second—and equally challenging—is the need, as Fullan (2010) maintains, 
to focus not only on individual capacity building (as the current preservice, 
 induction, probation, certification, professional development, and teacher 
appraisal process does) but also on whole-school, collective capacity  building. 
This is where the new roles for the principal, supported by the supervisor, 
become so essential in the process of reprofessionalizing teaching.
notes
 1. HYLITE is a distance learning program prepared by a consortium of 13 universities 
for use by 23 universities to train underqualified primary school teachers.
 2. Further details can be found on the accreditation agency’s website: http://ban-pt 
.kemdiknas.go/id.
 3. http://gurupintar.ut.ac.id.
 4. These working groups include Kelompok Kerja Guru (KKGs), which are clusters of 
primary schools, and Musyawarah Guru Mata Pelajaran (MGMPs), which are clusters 
of subject-based secondary teachers from a group of high schools.
 5. An initial exploratory report was undertaken by the World Bank in 2007 and 
 unpublished. A second report (World Bank 2009b)—which was more extensive and 
 undertaken by the Centre for Assessment in the Ministry of Education and Culture—
enabled comparisons in some dimensions with the data from the 2007 study.
 6. Ministry of Administrative Reform, PermenMenpan 16/2009, Chapter 3.
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 7. For more information, see the Ministry of Education and Culture website: http://
ekinerjaguru.org/.
 8. Ministerial Regulation on Standards for School Supervisors (2005) and Ministerial 
Regulation on Standards for School Principals (2007).
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The Impact of the Reform on Teacher 
Quality and Student Outcomes
the certification tool: A Quality Assurance mechanism and a potential 
Way to improve learning
Over the last decade, many developing countries have embarked on large educa-
tional reforms aimed at rapidly expanding the supply of education, achieving equity 
in the provision of education, and significantly improving the quality of education. 
Some of these reforms have been far-reaching, transforming the budget priorities of 
many countries …. A number of developments have served as catalysts for reform.
—Erwin R. Tiongson,
“Education Policy Reforms,” in Analyzing the Distributional Impact of Reforms (2005)
The Teacher Law of 2005 shaped a major proportion of the Indonesian teacher 
reforms of the past decade. The law aimed to address a wide range of teacher 
quality issues simultaneously. Most of the evidence provided in this chapter is 
used to discuss the impact of a key component of the law: the teacher certifica-
tion program. The label of “professional” gained by certification and the associ-
ated professional allowance were meant, in part, to improve teachers’ welfare 
and increase their status and recognition.
Teachers with a four-year university degree or with a high rank in the civil 
service (rank IV) or very senior teachers qualify for certification. Since the 
start of the program, the government has admitted 200,000–300,000 (quali-
fied) teachers into the certification process each year. The eligibility conditions 
for certification were meant eventually to ensure that all teachers in the sys-
tem had minimum levels of defined competencies. Since the program started, 
teachers have passed through the certification process either through an 
assessment of a portfolio of past experiences and training or through 90 hours 
of additional training. Overall passing rates of this process have been high, at 
around 95 percent.
c h A p t e r  4
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The financial implications of the program are, of course, enormous. The 
teacher wage bill, already the largest expense of the Ministry of Education and 
Culture, will approximately double over the years to come (Cerdan-Infantes and 
Makarova, 2013). The question is whether this is money well spent. This chapter, 
therefore, discusses some of the impacts of certification on the quality of learning 
in Indonesia.
The analysis can provide important information to policy makers in countries 
with conditions similar to those in Indonesia. A number of developing countries 
combine high economic growth rates with relatively poor performance of the 
education system as a whole. Such conditions mean that, in the years ahead, 
governments will be able to budget increasing amounts for quality improvements 
to the education system.
The current teacher certification process in Indonesia can improve the quality 
of teaching in the country through three different channels: 
•	 The attraction channel. The professional allowance makes the teaching profes-
sion considerably more attractive (and competitive). This results in better-
qualified high school graduates entering teacher education institutions across 
the country. The attraction channel applies to high school graduates who are 
confronted with the choice to become a teacher or to choose another career. 
The higher salaries and status now given to teachers should increase the 
 relative attractiveness of the teaching profession. High school graduates who 
might have opted for careers in engineering or business in the absence of 
 certification might now be persuaded to choose teaching careers. 
•	 The upgrading channel. Teachers who do not qualify for certification normally 
need to acquire a four-year degree. In this process of upgrading, teachers 
acquire skills that improve their capacities as teachers. The upgrading channel 
applies to in-service teachers who do not yet qualify for certification. Such 
teachers must normally enroll in courses to upgrade their academic qualifica-
tions to the four-year postsecondary degree level. Certification and the related 
professional allowance provide a strong financial incentive to upgrade these 
qualifications. At the start of the certification program, 84 percent of the 
 primary school teachers and 40 percent of the junior secondary school  teachers 
did not qualify for certification (Ragatz 2010). This large group of teachers is 
expected to upgrade to the four-year degree level. Because this mechanism 
applies to most in-service teachers, the aggregate effect of the certification 
program, channeled through academic upgrading, is potentially large. 
•	 The behavioral channel. Certification implies increased recognition and a 
 doubling of income, which motivate teachers to become more productive in 
their profession. The behavioral channel applies to all teachers who become 
professionally certified and receive the professional allowance. The allowance 
is permanent and not conditional on subsequent performance in the classroom 
except for the requirement to teach 24 period-hours per week. Teachers who 
are certified, therefore, have few explicit financial incentives to change their 
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teaching practices. But teachers might feel a moral obligation to invest more 
effort in their work and be absent less often. At the same time, their need to 
take second jobs decreases, which means that teachers have more time in a day 
for professional work such as classroom preparation and participation in 
teacher working groups. 
Whether certification in its current form has positive effects on teacher 
 quality and student learning outcomes depends on the potency of these three 
channels. Separating the different channels for analysis will aid in the discussion 
of the effects of certification.
the Attraction channel: certification, recruitment, and 
the Attractiveness of the teaching profession
This section discusses the effects of certification on prospective teachers—that is, 
on high school graduates who might or might not choose a career in teaching. 
Depending on the nature and rigor of the selection mechanisms used in  accepting 
these graduates, higher demand could translate into better quality if higher- 
ability graduates are selected over those with lower ability.
Figure 4.1, panel a, shows that the number of students enrolled in education 
programs in universities in the country increased fivefold in the years following 
the Teacher Law—from 200,000 in 2005 to over 1 million in 2010. The regained 
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
a. Percentage of university students enrolled 
in education programs
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Year
Figure 4.1 enrollments of higher education students in indonesia, 2005–10
figure continues next page
100 The Impact of the Reform on Teacher Quality and Student Outcomes
Teacher Reform in Indonesia • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-9829-6
attractiveness of the profession is more clearly visualized by the increase in the 
percentage of students enrolled in education programs, as shown in figure 4.1, 
panel b. The percentage increased from 15 percent before the Teacher Law to 
almost 30 percent in 2008. The 1 million enrolled in education programs in 2010 
are recent high school graduates and exclude the approximately 500,000 in-
service teachers enrolled in the Open University. Certification seems to have 
significantly increased the attractiveness of the profession.
One of the intended results of the certification program was that a more 
attractive teaching profession would increase the quality of teacher intake 
because higher-caliber high school graduates would want to become teachers. 
There are indications that, at least for some specific teacher education  institutions, 
the demand for vacancies has increased and that in some cases the quality of the 
intake has gone up over time.
Figure 4.2 compares the attractiveness of education study programs with pro-
grams that are similar but are not for training to become a teacher across 15 
universities in Indonesia. English language education, for example, received many 
more applicants than just English language and literature, and the number of 
applicants has been increasing at a faster rate. The same is true for mathematics 
and mathematics education. From 2005 to 2009, the number of applicants for 
mathematics education programs increased by 100 percent. The figure indicates 
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that these universities could have been more selective in enrolling the best can-
didates out of the increased pool of applications. Whether this has  happened and 
whether it has increased the average quality of the accepted  applicants, however, 
depends largely on whether the group of graduates applying to the college 
includes enough high-caliber candidates.
More competition for places is expected to have led to higher quality of those 
accepted. Figure 4.3 traces the average scores for the senior high school national 
exit examination for three different graduation cohorts (2006, 2008, and 2009). 
It compares the average scores of a sample of primary teacher candidates from 
15 universities (the same 15 as used for the construction of figure 4.2) with the 
average scores of the total exiting population of senior high school students in 
the country. The first observation is that the average score of primary-school 
teacher candidates is higher than the national average. The second observation is 
that the scores of the new cohorts of teacher candidates tend to increase at a 
faster rate than the national average. If this trend continues, it could eventually 
lead to improvements in the quality of the future teaching service.
Teacher education institutions became more attractive in the five-year period 
leading up to 2010–11. The supply, however, has kept pace with the increase in 
demand, which has limited the beneficial effects of competition. As indicated in 
figure 4.1, the number of applicants who gained a position in a teacher education 
program saw a manifold increase.
The supply of and demand for vacancies in education study programs have 
increased to the point that an oversupply of newly graduated, highly motivated, 
and aspiring teachers is a relevant concern. Such an oversupply would present a 
new problem: even if the quality of new intake is higher on average, it does not 
necessarily mean that the best students eventually get the jobs. Indeed, finding 
jobs as (certified) teachers might be difficult in a situation where the number of 
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new teachers entering the market greatly exceeds the demand for teachers from 
schools. With around 3 million teachers currently active in the system, roughly 
100,000 will retire each year.1 With around 1 million students enrolled in preser-
vice education programs today, it is expected that, for the years to come, about 
250,000 new teachers will enter the labor market each year. Not all of these will 
be able to find jobs as teachers. 
The disconnect between demand and supply in the labor market for teachers 
creates another concern about the quality of the teachers who finally end up 
being hired. Hiring procedures in Indonesia are not always efficient or based on 
merit, and it is not evident that systems are in place to guarantee that the best 
candidate will get the job. A second-order effect of the impending oversupply 
may be that current high-caliber candidates internalize this situation in their 
decision making and opt out of teaching careers—not because they do not want 
to become teachers but because they are uncertain about whether they will 
find jobs.
The system needs amendments to curb these unintended consequences of the 
certification program. Competition can be increased by requiring universities 
to produce the right number of graduates to meet labor market demands and 
by calling a halt to the proliferation of private universities of dubious quality. 
Policy makers are aware of this changing scenario, and commencing in 2013 
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the government has set an annual quota of 40,000 teacher candidates to enroll 
at private and state universities. This decision is intended to ensure that the num-
ber of student teachers admitted each year will match the number of teachers 
expected to retire four years later (when the cohort is graduating). In the past 
and in the near future, however, the inflow of new teachers to the system has 
exceeded and will exceed the outflow due to retirement.
Individual teachers deal with this situation by often approaching schools 
directly and applying informally with their curricula vitae. The school then 
employs these extra teachers using school funding (salaries paid for such teachers 
are often quite low), after which the teachers often attempt to gain greater 
 permanency (for example, by seeking civil service status). This loose manage-
ment of extra teachers by schools and district authorities is a major reason for the 
constant oversupply of teachers in the Indonesian school system. 
The net results of these inefficiencies are clearly visible in table 4.1. The 
 number of primary school teachers has increased by over 30 percent in five years. 
The increase in the number of teachers has outpaced the increase in the number 
of students over that same period (Cerdan-Infantes and Makarova 2013). Only 
much stricter regulation of teacher graduates and hiring will help balance the 
oversupply of teachers found in Indonesia—an issue to be examined further in 
chapter 6.
the Upgrading channel: certification as a Financial incentive for 
Academic Upgrading
Teachers with a university four-year degree and with high rank in the civil service 
as well as very senior teachers qualify for certification. Because rank and seniority 
are not easily manipulated by individual teachers, those without these qualifica-
tions should normally obtain their four-year degrees. The prospect of receiving 
the professional allowance is a strong financial incentive to acquire this degree. 
The Open University—the traditional supplier of distance learning courses for 
upgrading teachers’ knowledge and skills—reports on its website to have close to 
500,000 teachers actively enrolled to upgrade their academic qualifications to 
the required level. In the process of upgrading to the four-year degree level, 
teachers’ knowledge and pedagogical skills should increase. The extent to which 
this happens is ultimately an empirical question. 
Figure 4.4 reports increases in the percentage of teachers with a four-year 
degree based on the teacher census of the Unique Identifier for Educators and 
Education Personnel (Nomor Unik Pendidik dan Tenaga Kependidikan, or 
NUPTK). The rising percentages suggest that the professional allowance had 
important effects by encouraging unqualified teachers to upgrade academic 
qualifications. From other data sources, such as the recent 2011 Village Potential 
Statistics (PODES) school facility census, even higher percentages emerge. Based 
on calculations from PODES, close to 44 percent of primary school teachers 
 currently have a four-year degree.2 These are important changes to the situation 
preceding the Teacher Law and are quite likely directly attributable to 
104 
table 4.1 number and education of primary school teachers in indonesia, 2006 and 2011
Untrained
1-year postsecondary 
diploma
2-year postsecondary 
diploma
3-year postsecondary 
diploma
4-year academic diploma 
or 4-year degree Master’s degree Doctorate Total
2006 414,310 11,673 586,709 24,431 209,798 1,198 4 1,248,123
2011 388,454 11,647 449,720 211,406 578,111 5,579 8 1,644,925
Change (no.) −25,856 −26 −136,989 186,975 368,313 4,381 4 396,802
Change (%) −6 0 −23 765 176 366 100 32
Sources: Based on 2006 SIMPTK/NUPTK and 2011 NUPTK teacher census.
Note: Teachers of Islamic schools are not included in these figures. SIMPTK = Management Information System for Educators and Education Personnel. NUPTK = Unique Identifiers for Educators and 
Education Personnel.
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the financial incentives internal to the certification program. In some cases the 
upgrading was made possible through central, provincial, and district govern-
ment scholarships.
This wave of academic upgrading has only recently started, and many teachers 
are, in one form or another, still in the middle of the process. Thus, the full scale 
of the effects of this academic upgrading should only appear over the years to 
come. The ultimate test, perhaps, will be to continuously monitor the changes in 
Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) and Trends in International 
Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) scores: does a massive increase in the 
number of teachers with an academic diploma lead to simultaneous increases in 
the students’ PISA and TIMSS scores? 
To date, there do not appear to be any improvements that are systematic 
across all subjects, at least not in Indonesia’s PISA scores (see figure 4.5). Given 
uncertainty about whether Indonesia will continue to participate in cross- 
country comparison studies such as PISA and TIMSS, it would be useful for 
Indonesia to set up its own system for monitoring student achievement gains 
over time and across geographical areas. The current national examinations given 
at the end of grades 6, 9, and 12 are inadequate for this purpose.
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The upgrading mechanism is likely to have the largest impact in primary 
schools because at the time of the Teacher Law in 2005, only about 40 percent 
of primary school teachers qualified for certification (mostly because of rank or 
age). Seventy percent of the junior secondary school teachers qualified in 
2005/06, mainly because a four-year degree was already required before the 
introduction of the law. Figure 4.6 shows the percentage of teachers who 
 qualified for certification at the start of the program and the criteria on which 
this qualification was based. 
Further evidence on the effects on schools of teacher upgrading can be 
 provided through a database collected by the government in partnership with 
the World Bank. The study sample comprised 240 public primary schools and 
120 public junior secondary schools—representative of approximately 40  percent 
of the public primary and junior secondary schools in Indonesia. All core-subject 
teachers3 and all students in these schools were administered a multiple-choice 
subject matter test. Furthermore, all core-subject teachers were interviewed. The 
data collection was repeated three times: a baseline was held in November 2009, 
a midline in April 2011, and an endline in April 2012 (the latter not yet available 
for analysis). The study has an experimental component that is used to evaluate 
the certification process and the effects of unconditional teacher salary increases 
on teacher performance. These results are presented in the next section about the 
behavioral channel (See the Introduction and De Ree et al. 2012 for a more 
detailed description of this study).
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The survey data confirm that academic upgrading is continuing on a massive 
scale. Only a small fraction of teachers with a four-year degree report to be fur-
ther upgrading their academic qualifications, as shown in figure 4.7. Around 30 
percent of the few teachers who qualify for certification based on the civil service 
rank or seniority still try to upgrade academic qualifications, although they do not 
strictly need to in order to be qualified for certification. The vast majority of the 
unqualified teachers (70 percent), however, are actively engaged in the upgrading 
process. These data show clearly that teachers take the incentives provided by 
the certification program seriously. The financial incentives for academic upgrad-
ing seem to work.
The potential for quality improvements through academic upgrading are 
enormous, but they are not automatic. Most teachers who upgrade to the four-
year degree level already have a two-year postsecondary diploma. These teachers 
therefore really “upgrade” rather than start a full-fledged four-year academic 
program. Upgrading typically happens remotely through the Open University 
but also, more and more, through other higher-education institutions accredited 
to offer the four-year degree program in education. 
The quality of the Indonesian universities is highly variable. Figure 4.8 shows 
that primary school teachers both with and without four-year degrees do rather 
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poorly on the subject matter test that was part of the data collection for the 
impact assessment study discussed briefly above. The tests were designed by the 
government’s Centre of Educational Assessment and were explicitly designed to 
measure competencies deemed necessary for effective teaching. Teachers with 
degrees perform somewhat better than teachers without degrees.4 (Whether 
these data differ according to the grade being taught is discussed in box 4.1.) 
These differences are smaller than expected and suggest that teachers, on aver-
age, do not gain enough extra knowledge from obtaining a degree. A minimum 
Box 4.1 teacher education and competency by Grade
An interesting aside from the data on teacher background (with or without a four-year degree 
and subject matter competency) relates to how these data differ according to the grade being 
taught. One could argue that, given the importance of ensuring a strong foundation for learn-
ing in the early grades of primary school (especially for children who have not had a preschool 
experience), it would be essential for principals to assign highly qualified teachers to those 
grades. Figure B4.1.1 shows the data from the impact assessment study broken down by grade.
Figure B4.1.1 primary school teacher Qualifications and test scores in indonesia, by Grade 
level taught
Source: Calculations based on subject matter test information from the teacher 
certification impact assessment study.
Note: The green bars indicate the average standardized subject matter test score (right 
y-axis) of all teachers in a given grade level regardless of degree or certification status. The 
teacher certification impact study included 1,714 primary school teachers from a sample 
of 240 public primary schools in Indonesia.
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amount of subject matter knowledge is a prerequisite for being an effective 
teacher. This knowledge deficit may, therefore, appear to present a challenge for 
the future.
One question regarding teacher knowledge is whether teachers who received 
their four-year degrees in a more full-time, preservice, perhaps residential setting 
(say, before the Teacher Law was passed) have more knowledge and skill than 
teachers who have earned their degrees over a longer period of time, at a distance, 
or more recently (through the greater number of institutions now accredited to 
provide the degree). On the one hand, perhaps the online distance learning 
methods prevalent today; the considerable amount of the required curriculum 
gaining recognition as prior learning; and the mushrooming of new, smaller, and 
private (even if accredited) institutions offering the four-year degree add up to a 
less rigorous approach to obtaining the four-year degree and therefore to less 
impact on teacher content knowledge, pedagogical skills, and student outcomes. 
On the other hand, it could be argued that teachers with more recent, presum-
ably up-to-date content and more explicitly child-centered methods would 
perform better than those trained a decade or more ago in a more traditional 
style. The survey information is not sufficiently informative to support either one 
of these theories.
The authors did, however, investigate whether teachers who actively partici-
pated in the upgrading process between the baseline and midline data 
 collections gained more knowledge than those who did not. The group of 
teachers who acquired a four-year degree between baseline and midline and 
those who report to be actively in the process of upgrading were compared to 
the rest. At baseline in November 2009, the upgraders scored lower than the 
others. But after two years of actively engaging in the upgrading process, they 
scored higher than the others. The relative increase, however, is relatively small 
and not  statistically significant, which confirms the pattern previously observed 
in figure 4.8.
On the whole, therefore, having a four-year degree is an imperfect marker for 
subject matter knowledge of teachers. Many teachers without a four-year degree 
The percentage of teachers in grades 1–3 holding a four-year degree is considerably lower 
than that of the teachers in grades 4–6. More important, the standardized scores for the 
 subject matter test show dramatic differences—much lower for the teachers of the early 
grades than for those of the upper grades. In a system where a relatively small percentage of 
grade 1 entering teachers have had preschool experience and where later student  achievement 
(for example, in the PISA and TIMSS studies) is of great concern, the fact that the teachers with 
least subject matter mastery are assigned to the youngest pupils should encourage both the 
Ministry of Education and Culture (in terms of national policy) and individual principals (in 
terms of teacher assignments) to reconsider how they can guarantee a high quality of teachers 
in the grades that need them most.
Box 4.1 teacher education and competency by Grade (continued)
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do very well on these subject matter tests. At the same time, a fair number of 
teachers with a four-year degree do extremely poorly. This fact can be used as an 
argument against using objective indicators such as formal degrees as the primary 
basis for admission to the certification process. Whether academic degrees are 
useful indicators of trainable competencies such as subject matter knowledge 
depends in part on the quality of the universities. Distinguishing high-quality 
teachers from low-quality teachers on all levels of competency is even more 
 challenging; the huge variability in quality among teachers is typically not easily 
explained by observable indicators such as academic qualifications or experience 
(Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain 2005).
Primary school teachers with a four-year degree have more subject 
 knowledge than those who do not, and some of that seems to be due to their 
 education. The differences, however, are not large, perhaps suggesting that the 
process of academic upgrading is not leading to the large increases in teacher 
quality that Indonesia needs to catch up with economically more developed 
nations. 
The evidence provided in figure 4.8 is only part of the story, however. As the 
literature suggests, there is much variation in teacher quality related to student 
learning outcomes that is not easily explained. Figure 4.8 focuses only on the 
subject matter knowledge of teachers. Teachers, however, might acquire a variety 
of pedagogical skills when undertaking the upgrading process. 
It is not straightforward to evaluate whether academic upgrading leads to 
improvements in student learning outcomes and by how much. Experimental or 
quasi-experimental evidence on the effects of teachers’ academic upgrading on 
student learning outcomes are not available for Indonesia. However, some evi-
dence does shed light on the issue. 
Teacher academic qualifications and student learning gains are positively 
related, even after controlling for teachers’ subject matter knowledge. Figure 4.9 
estimates the additional learning gains of having a teacher with a four-year 
degree. It attempts to answer the question: do students of teachers with four-year 
degrees progress faster? The answer is affirmative.
Learning gains here are an estimated 0.15 standard deviations higher for 
 students with a teacher with a four-year degree. This “four-year degree” effect can 
be broken down into a subject matter component (0.05 standard deviations) and 
an additional effect (0.10). The analysis suggests that teachers with academic 
degrees are better teachers, not only because they score (slightly) higher on 
 subject matter tests but also because they have additional skills such as 
 pedagogical skills. 
It should be realized that the evidence presented in figure 4.9 shows correla-
tions that are not necessarily causal. Teachers with a four-year academic degree 
have students that do better for a variety of reasons, only one of which may be 
that these teachers are truly better teachers. A similar correlation can be found if 
students from better socioeconomic backgrounds are sent to schools with a 
higher proportion of teachers with four-year degrees. Also, higher ability and 
greater motivation make some teachers more likely to obtain a four-year degree. 
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As a consequence, teachers with a degree perhaps are not better because they 
have a degree, but rather because they are more motivated and capable to begin 
with. More in-depth research is needed to make any final claims about whether 
academic upgrading works and, consequently, how well it works. We cannot be 
certain, therefore, whether this finding can be used to project the effects of aca-
demic upgrading into the future. But if all teachers who upgrade to the four-year 
degree level would improve learning outcomes by 0.15 standard deviations, the 
total effects of upgrading will indeed be substantial.
Another notable fact of figure 4.9 is that the 4 percentage point difference in 
teacher test scores between teachers with and without four-year degrees (see 
figure 4.8) is associated with a 0.05 standard deviation increase in learning gains. 
That such (apparently) small differences in teachers’ subject knowledge are 
associated with fairly substantial student learning gains indicates that teachers’ 
subject matter knowledge is important. The subject matter component shown 
in the figure is smaller than the additional, unexplained effect because 
 differences in subject knowledge for teachers with and without degrees are 
really quite small. From a policy point of view, the findings suggest that 
large learning gains can be achieved by attempting to increase subject  knowledge 
among teachers.
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the Behavioral channel: impact of the certification process and the 
professional Allowance as shown from a randomized Field experiment
One of the well-established results of the recent empirical literature on teacher 
effectiveness is that there are very good and very bad teachers in a population: 
teachers matter! There is much less certainty, however, about what makes for a 
good or a bad teacher. Rivken, Hanushek, and Kain (2005) find, for example, that 
formal certificates, degrees, experience, and so forth explain little of the variation 
in teacher quality. This finding suggests that whereas some teachers are better in 
delivering a message than others, this skill is not easily acquired from either 
teacher education institutions or experience. Whether money matters depends in 
large part on whether there is some dormant “unused” potential that can be real-
ized if additional incentives appear. In other words, one argument is that teachers 
could do better, but they hold back because they are not paid enough.
This chapter presents experimental evidence on the effects of certification 
(and the associated professional allowance) through the behavioral channel—
that is, the effects of certification through changes in motivation or behavior of 
qualified in-service teachers. The analysis basically evaluates the effects of 
 doubling a teacher’s income, although certified teachers would have also success-
fully passed a portfolio assessment or graduated from a 90-hour training course. 
This is the first empirical study that attempts to evaluate the relationship 
between permanent, unconditional pay increases and teacher productivity using 
experimental methods. The experimental nature of the study means that there 
can be high levels of confidence in the findings presented here. (See De Ree et al. 
[2012] for more details on the methodology and findings.) Furthermore, the 
study is unique in that it evaluates the effects of a real-world program that is a 
very expensive one in the context of Indonesia. 
At the moment teachers become certified, neither the continuation of the 
certified status nor the payment of the professional allowance is conditional on 
subsequent performance. This evaluation, therefore, complements a rapidly 
expanding body of research that evaluates the effects of bonus payment or pay-
for-performance schemes. These schemes link pay levels explicitly to the 
 performance of teachers. Teacher performance can be measured based on inputs 
(such as low teacher absenteeism levels) or outputs (such as high student 
 learning gains). As discussed earlier, it has been shown in some developing-
country  settings that pay-for-performance schemes can work but also that there 
are  perhaps insurmountable difficulties associated with implementing such 
schemes in real-world contexts.5
The Indonesian teacher salary system leaves little room for explicitly reward-
ing top performers individually. Indonesia is, in that respect, not very different 
from many other countries in the world. Salary levels are determined based on 
academic degrees and seniority. Moreover, the current design of Indonesia’s 
 certification program does not allow for merit-based rewards. It is largely true 
that the most experienced and best-educated teachers entered the certification 
process first, but eventually all teachers must be certified by 2015.
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This experimental evaluation is relevant for at least two reasons: First, uncon-
ditional salary increases are much easier to implement than pay-for-performance 
schemes. This is especially true in developing countries where monitoring 
 systems to operate functional pay-for-performance schemes are generally not 
well established. Indeed, Indonesia’s certification program is currently being 
rolled out across the country and, by 2011, had certified about 1 million teachers. 
Second, there is no experimental evidence on the effects of large, permanent, and 
unconditional salary increases on teacher performance (as measured by student 
learning outcomes).
As mentioned earlier, there has been an evolution in the procedure for gaining 
certification—from an original option of portfolio assessment (for those who failed 
to enroll in a 90-hour training program) to the current situation where almost all 
candidates go through (and rarely fail) the 90-hour course. Figure 4.10 illustrates 
the pathways to certification and the number of teachers using these pathways.
The income for certified teachers practically doubled as a result of certifica-
tion. Based on findings from the teacher certification impact study, close to 100 
percent of teachers who entered the certification process in a given year had been 
certified in the next. Around 30 percent of teachers reported having received 
payment of the professional allowance one year after entering the certification 
procedure. Two years after entering the certification quota, all teachers had 
received the allowance. Baseline data were collected before certifying the teach-
ers who were targeted by the intervention but after they enrolled in the quota. 
At midline, all teachers who entered the 2009 quota (which includes the teach-
ers who were targeted by the intervention) were certified and were paid.
Money Affects Teacher Behavior
The survey also found that because of certification, teachers rely less on second 
jobs and have fewer difficulties financially supporting their households. 
Figure 4.11 presents the effects of certification on teacher characteristics.6 
Overall, the livelihoods of teachers have improved. Certification can lead to a 27 
Number of teachers certified, 2006–11
Certified through a
succesful portfolio
assessment
Certified through
graduation from PLPG
Direct certification
340,543
678,812
1,469
Figure 4.10 pathways to certification of teachers in indonesia, 2006–11
Source: Data provided by an Indonesian Ministry of Education and Culture official in 2012.
Note: PLPG = Education and Training for the Teaching Profession (Pendidikan dan Latihan Profesi Guru), which 
is the 90-hour training program for in-service teachers to gain certification.
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percentage point decrease in the likelihood of teachers holding a second job 
because the professional allowance decreases the need to rely on such jobs to 
supplement income. This income effect is also reflected in a decrease in the 
number of teachers who report problems financially supporting their  households. 
However, there is no evidence that certification makes teachers more likely to 
participate in teacher working groups, teach more hours, or self-report to be 
absent7 less often.
The first two bars present the effects of certification on teacher subject knowl-
edge. As part of the study, teachers were tested on their subject matter  knowledge 
with a multiple-choice test. Subject matter tests are, admittedly, an incomplete 
measure of teachers’ overall competencies, although they do measure subject 
matter knowledge that is a prerequisite but not sufficient for overall teacher 
quality. Certification has not caused any measurable changes to these scores. The 
certification process and the payment of the professional allowance do not make 
teachers more knowledgeable. This finding is hardly a surprise; however, it does 
indicate that the 90-hour training, which was part of the certification procedure 
for many teachers, is perhaps not quite sufficient to bring the competence of 
teachers to the next level.
Changes in Time on Task
To be eligible to receive the professional allowance, teachers must teach a 
 minimum of 24 period-hours. This regulation should force teachers who teach 
less to find employment in other (nearby) schools. But given the current 
 oversupply of teachers in the system, it might not be easy to find these additional 
hours. It was assumed that the 24-hour workload rule would help to push 
 surplus teachers out of the system. Because the pressure on teachers to adhere to 
the 24-hour rule is much higher in treatment schools than in the control schools, 
it would be expected that the former teachers would teach more hours. This 
appears not to be the case. 
Figure 4.11 effects of certification on selected teacher characteristics in indonesia, 2009–11
Source: De Ree et al. 2012.
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The idea that the 24-hour rule has not worked as planned can also be inferred 
following trends in student-teacher ratios. Although there have been weak 
increases in student-teacher ratios in junior secondary schools since 2006, there 
is still a steady decrease in primary schools. Thus, the implementation of the 
24-hour workload rule has not led to the desired improvement in efficiency in 
the use of teachers, although figure 4.12 suggests that the rule has worked better 
with junior secondary schools. 
Recent changes in regulations are expected to have additional beneficial 
effects. For example, the recently introduced restrictions on team teaching will 
now prevent schools from simply appointing two teachers to single classes and 
double-counting teaching hours just to build teacher workloads up to the 
24-hour minimum workload to ensure that teachers receive the professional 
allowance. It seems unlikely, however, that the 24-hour rule alone can solve the 
problem with teacher oversupply in the country. (See chapter 6 for further 
 discussion of this issue.)
No Apparent Changes in Learning Outcomes
Professional certification increases the well-being of teachers, but does it also 
benefit students? Figure 4.13 presents the estimates of the effects of certifying 
teachers on the learning outcomes of their students. There is no evidence that 
certification makes teachers teach better, at least not in ways that are measurable 
through student test scores. The effects shown are well within the boundaries 
for statistical significance. The first column relates to the effects of certifying 
a  primary school class teacher on student learning outcomes in primary school. 
The second to fifth columns present the effects of certifying a subject teacher in 
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Figure 4.12 student-teacher ratios in indonesia, by school level, 1995–2010
Source: Ministry of National Education Statistical Yearbook.
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Box 4.2 the effectiveness of the certification process
The results of the randomized field experiment discussed above indicate that the actual 
process of certification (either through a portfolio assessment or after passing the 90-hour 
training course) and the doubling of income do not lead to learning improvements in the 
classroom. 
A 90-hour training course is possibly not sufficiently intensive to lead to significant 
changes. A study by the ministry assessed the capacities of teachers graduating from this 
90-hour  training course (Ministry of National Education 2010). The analysis does not provide 
a definitive before-and-after comparison to assess quality improvements. It does make 
box continues next page
junior secondary school on student learning gains in the specified subject.8 
Overall, the experimental evidence presented in figure 4.13 shows that the 
 certification process and the payment of the professional allowance do not 
 benefit student learning. (Box 4.2 describes the results of another empirical 
investigation that draws similar conclusions.)
In summary, fewer certified teachers have second jobs, and fewer worry about 
providing adequate financial support to their families, but these changes in 
behavior have not led to significant improvements in teacher productivity. With 
regard to the broader picture, the conclusion is that the greatest impact of 
 certification is expected from the academic upgrading of teachers who did not 
yet qualify before the law was passed and from the higher quality of new inflow. 
Variability in the quality of the upgrading courses and the apparently large 
increases in supply of seats in university programs in education, however, also 
limit the potential effectiveness of these channels. 
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Box 4.2 the effectiveness of the certification process (continued)
some  judgments about whether teachers who graduate from the course really meet the 
minimum standards along the lines of the four competencies spelled out in the Teacher 
Law:  professional, pedagogical, personal, and social.
This face-to-face course—supposedly with 30 hours of theory and 60 hours of practice 
(but with many hours taken over by rest breaks and administrative matters)—provides a peer-
teaching experience as well as observation and feedback on teaching skills demonstrated by 
participants. The curriculum follows the competency requirements of the Teacher Law and is 
based on a child-centered, active learning model. Instructors are university-trained with 
 minimum qualifications of a master’s degree and at least 10 years of teaching experience. 
There is a separate curriculum for each category of teacher. The course is structured around 
the four competencies mandated by the Teacher Law.
The basic curriculum of the 90-hour program requires participants to complete 90 
hours (in 50-minute lessons) as specified in the guidelines. This includes general content, 
subject  content, and a written test consisting of a pretest and a posttest. In the learning 
process, instructors use multimedia and follow the principles of active, creative, joyful, and 
effective learning. In practice, participants are trained using case analysis, group discus-
sion, and peer teaching (three days continuously with the instructor acting as a supervi-
sor). The learning approach adopted is intended to stimulate participants into discovering 
their potential as teachers and to become sensitive to new problems. This interaction 
results in a two-way  learning process (geared both for the more active participants who 
might raise an issue and to the less active who may find a solution to a problem by 
themselves).
The 90-hour course is therefore focused on both professional (subject) and pedagogical 
(methodology) competencies. Personal and social competencies are integrated into the other 
activities, which are assessed continuously throughout the duration of the course. The 
 assessment at the end of the course is based on four components: (a) 35 percent from written 
examination; (b) 40 percent from practicum (teaching); (c) 10 percent from participation; and 
(d) 15 percent from peer teaching. Scores from the four areas form 75 percent of the final 
determination toward certification. The remaining 25 percent is the score originally obtained 
in the portfolio assessment, if applicable. The final test verifies that the participating teacher 
has met the standards in the four competency areas as referred to in the Teacher Law and 
subsequent regulations. 
In 2010 a qualitative study was undertaken to explore the impact of the 90-hour course on 
teacher knowledge and skills (Ministry of National Education 2010). The course was already 
being taken by approximately 50 percent of the applicants, and it became important to 
 identify whether the course: (a) increased the competency and performance of teachers, 
(b)  established a pattern of regular developmental activities to be taken by teachers, and 
(c)   identified potential strategies that could be used to enhance the professional skills of 
teachers.
Instruments to gather data were based on the standards established in the four 
 competency domains. In the study, two major areas were assessed: (a) subject knowledge 
box continues next page
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with a  competency test, and (b) classroom performance through completion of a question-
naire on the teacher’s work by the principal. A score of 1–4 (very incompetent [1], incompe-
tent [2], competent [3], and very competent [4]) was given for each item. Figure B4.2.1 was 
prepared from the data collected to illustrate the levels of proficiency of the professional 
and pedagogical competencies of the sample of teachers measured.
In general, the scores suggest that most primary school teachers had less than optimal 
training results in terms of both professional and pedagogical competence. More than 
90   percent of the teachers who passed the 90-hour training course were classified as “very 
incompetent” in the pedagogical domain. Scores were also inadequate for professional 
 capacities (that is, subject knowledge), but they were considered better than the pedagogy 
scores. Competency scores for personal and social competencies were higher and generally 
not below standard.
In regard to junior secondary school teachers, the test results showed that most had less 
than optimal training in terms of both professional and pedagogical competence. This is an 
important finding and an indication that the desired level of support needs to be much higher 
than the current structure provides.
Box 4.2 the effectiveness of the certification process (continued)
Figure B4.2.1 ratings of professional and pedagogical competence of teachers after 
training in indonesia, 2010
Source: Ministry of National Education 2010.
Note: The teachers assessed had completed a 90-hour training course required for certification. “Professional” 
competence refers to subject knowledge. “Pedagogical” competence refers to teaching methods.
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conclusions
Certification sets minimum quality standards and provides recognition and 
higher levels of pay for teachers who adhere to these standards. In the case of 
Indonesia, because of the instruments used for the certification, the certification 
program has had a number of different consequences: The attractiveness of the 
teaching profession has increased. More high school graduates apply for places in 
the country’s teacher education institutions, and there is some indication that the 
increased competitiveness has also led to increased quality of the candidates 
enrolled. At the same time, however, universities providing teacher education 
have responded to market forces, leading to an increased intake of new students. 
This process might further contribute to the general oversupply of teachers in 
the country and dampen the beneficial effects on the average quality of the 
intake. 
Impact of Certification: The Evidence
Certification has provided the financial incentive for teachers to upgrade to the 
four-year degree level, which applies to most of the teachers currently active in 
the system. Although academic upgrading of the majority of the teaching forces 
should, at least intuitively, lead to important increases in student learning gains, 
the evidence provided in this chapter shows that such a result is not automatic. 
For example, teachers with degrees do not display much higher levels of subject 
matter knowledge than teachers without degrees. But, at the same time, there are 
correlations between student learning gains and academic degrees of teachers 
that cannot be explained solely by subject matter knowledge differences between 
teachers with and without degrees: teachers with degrees seem to be better 
teachers for reasons other than their subject matter knowledge. 
The general conclusion drawn from the evidence, perhaps somewhat prema-
turely, is that the process of academic upgrading itself (currently happening at a 
massive scale) does not automatically translate into substantial steps forward in 
terms of the quality of teaching. This conclusion implies that the universities 
supplying these degrees should be rigorously controlled in terms of the quality 
of the training they provide and properly accredited when they do.
The law mandates that all Indonesian teachers must be certified by 2015.9 All 
of them therefore go through the certification process and receive the profes-
sional allowance at some point in their careers. This chapter has discussed experi-
mental evidence on the effects of certifying teachers and doubling their income. 
The certification tool used at the beginning of the reform fell short of measuring 
competence; as a result, a number of teachers who lacked minimum subject 
knowledge and pedagogical skills received double income but did not improve 
the outcomes of their students. However, teachers did respond to their new 
 status by refusing second jobs and by being much less likely to have financial 
difficulties. Teachers’ welfare and well-being have improved. 
There is no evidence that the certification procedure and the increased levels 
of pay have led to better performance in the classroom. It seems that there is no 
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dormant, unused potential that can be activated by paying teachers more money. 
This finding is not surprising, given that there are no clear theoretical reasons for 
why salary increases that are not conditional on classroom performance or fur-
ther professional development would lead to better performance. It is also not 
surprising given the earlier analysis of the civil service mentality of many (mostly 
older) teachers who have focused for many years more on “educating” their 
 students than on “teaching” them.
All evidence combined suggests that efforts must be made to closely monitor 
the upgrading process and make sure that academic upgrading, which currently 
happens at a massive scale, is of high quality. At the same time, the increased 
popularity of the teaching profession among young high school graduates should 
be used to select the best among the pool of applicants rather than to increase 
the levels of intake.
Improving the Rules of the Game
The Indonesian government realizes the huge benefits the certification program 
could have in improving the quality of the system. Despite the pressure of 
 various interest groups such as the teacher associations, the Ministry of Education 
and Culture has made changes to the system that are likely to improve it. 
Whereas the first batches of teachers passed the certification process only 
through an assessment of a portfolio of past training and professional experience, 
later batches had to pass a 90-hour training program to become certified. The 
latest batch, which entered the certification quota in 2012, also needed to pass 
an entrance examination for this 90-hour training. (Even though close to 
90  percent of the enrollees passed this test, it implied an additional selection on 
quality.)
notes
 1. The 100,000 is a rough estimate, and it may differ from year to year. With 3 million 
teachers in the system, and with an average length of service of 30 years, the number 
of retirees is estimated at 100,000 per year. Because of the skewed distribution of age 
in the population of teachers, however, retirement figures over the next 10 years are 
likely to be higher than 100,000 per year. 
 2. The difference between the NUPTK and the PODES school census is perhaps due to 
imperfect updating of the NUPTK census, which was established in 2006 as SIMPTK 
(Management Information System for Educators and Education Personnel, Sistem 
Informasi Manajemen Pendidik dan Tenaga Kependidikan). The figures of 2006 are 
therefore perhaps more likely to be accurate than the later ones. The increase from 
2010 to 2011 may also be partly attributed to administrative data updates. 
 3. Core-subject teachers are class teachers in primary schools and Indonesian language, 
English language, mathematics, and science (biology and physics) teachers in junior 
secondary schools.
 4. Note, however, that the difference in test scores is statistically significant at the 
1  percent level, and, even though the 4 percentage point difference seems small, it still 
amounts to about 0.3 standard deviations in the population. 
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 5. There are theoretical reasons to believe that pay explicitly tied to performance would 
work better than pay that is not (in which case the financial incentive to perform is 
lacking). The practical implementation of pay-for-performance schemes in the real 
world, however, is not straightforward at all. The main concern is whether measures 
of “value added”—that is, average learning gains of students of a particular teacher—
are sufficiently accurate measures of teacher performance (see, for example, Guarino, 
Reckdase, and Wooldridge [2011]).  Also, difficulties with practical implementation 
are one likely reason why pay-for-performance schemes are not adopted on a large 
scale.
 6. The empirical specification used to obtain the results of figure 4.12 is one in which 
the outcome variable of interest (for example, a dummy variable of having a second 
job) is regressed on the baseline value, a full set of district dummy variables, and a 
dummy variable that indicates whether a teacher is certified or not. To account for 
nonrandom selection, the certification dummy is instrumented with the random 
 treatment indicator that measures whether a school is in the treatment or the control 
group. The procedure obtains so-called local average treatment effects. This measures 
the average effect of certification on the group of teachers that was granted 
 preferential access to the certification process in 2009. It can be seen as the effect of 
certification on those teachers who would normally enter the certification quota in 
2010 or later. A final note is that, for observations that did not have baseline values 
(new teachers or teachers who were absent at baseline), the baseline scores are set to 
zero. Included is an additional dummy variable that is marked as “one” if baseline 
scores are missing. Similar effects are found, however, if the model is run on a 
 balanced panel—that is, only on those observations for which there are baseline and 
midline observations. See De Ree et al. (2012) for more details.
 7. A more generally accepted way of measuring absenteeism is by doing surprise visits. 
This was not done in this study. 
 8. The teacher survey and the information on the answer sheets of students were used 
to match teachers to students. The results presented in figure B4.2.1 were obtained 
using an empirical model similar to that used for the results of figure 4.12. The 
 midline score of students was regressed on the baseline score, a full set of district dum-
mies, and a dummy variable that indicates whether the student had a certified teacher 
over the past year. This indicator was instrumented with a dummy variable indicating 
whether the student’s school was treatment or control. Here, also, baseline values 
were set to zero if they were not available (for example, for first-grade students at 
midline, there are no baseline scores). This procedure was accounted for by  including 
a dummy variable that is “one” if baseline scores are not available. 
 9. In fact, in the current regulation, all civil servants and all government-hired contract 
teachers should be certified by 2015. School-hired contract teachers who are not 
explicitly recognized by the district government are not eligible for certification even 
if they have a four-year postsecondary degree. 
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Looking Inside the Classroom 
Black Box
teacher classroom practice
The teacher reform effort has a strong focus on increasing teacher qualifications 
by requiring the attainment of both a four-year degree and certification. These 
qualifications are, of course, not the end goal but are instead part of a chain. 
Qualifications are expected to subsequently improve what takes place in the 
classroom, which should in turn lead to improved student learning outcomes. 
The certification study, elaborated in chapter 4, explored the “bookends” to 
determine how qualifications are related to learning outcomes. It found no dif-
ference between the learning outcomes of students taught by certified teachers 
and those taught by uncertified teachers. However, students taught by teachers 
with four-year degrees did have better learning outcomes than those with teach-
ers having lower degrees—and the effect is quite large. The study further identi-
fied a “teacher knowledge” component as measured through teacher competency 
tests, which helps to partially explain the contribution made by four-year-degree 
teachers.
This chapter extends the certification study analysis by exploring the “in 
between”—the black box—of what takes place in the classroom through a video 
study of 8th-grade mathematics classrooms that participated in the Trends in 
International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS). When looking at the 
same “bookends” dimensions used in the certification study, the findings are strik-
ingly similar: The students of certified teachers did not have better learning 
outcomes than students of uncertified teachers. There was also no difference 
between certified and uncertified teachers in their subject matter and pedagogy 
assessment scores. Educational level, on the other hand, did have a positive rela-
tionship with student outcomes. Teacher knowledge—in both subject matter and 
pedagogy—stood out as having a particularly strong relationship with, and a large 
effect on, student learning outcomes. Teacher degree type was also explored, and 
a striking difference emerged between the outcomes of students taught by teach-
ers holding a mathematics education degree and students of teachers with a pure 
c h A p t e r  5
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mathematics degree. Although the pure-mathematics-degree teachers tended to 
have slightly higher subject matter scores on the teacher assessment, when it 
came to student outcomes, students with teachers having a mathematics 
 education degree actually performed better than those with teachers having a 
pure mathematics degree.
Although the video study can provide insights on qualifications, its true power 
comes through its comprehensive information on classroom process. Videos of 
200 teachers working in classrooms were coded in great detail with multiple 
 layers of teaching practices. These practices were then analyzed and linked with 
the critical dimensions identified in the certification study. When looking at the 
certification study dimensions through the lens of teaching practices, some telling 
results emerged in the areas of certified versus uncertified teachers, teachers with 
a four-year degree, and teachers with higher knowledge as measured through 
assessments.
By analyzing the use and frequency of teaching practices and relating them to 
student learning outcomes, further insights were gained on which practices tend 
to be related to better learning. Some results confirm what would be expected, 
but there were also some surprising results that tend to contradict some well-
known teaching-learning theories.
With a two-phase design involving nationally representative samples for each 
year, the video study was designed to examine not only what teaching practices 
were used but also how the use of those practices changed between 2007 and 
2011. Although some changes in teaching practices appear to be related to the 
teacher reforms, it seems that other factors beyond the teacher reforms are hav-
ing greater influence on teaching practices—in particular, an increased emphasis 
on the national examination and changes in school resources.
methodology and Analytical Approach
The Indonesia TIMSS Video Study uses detailed coding of videotaped lessons of 
200 teachers to provide insights on classroom activities in terms of time spent, 
frequency, sequencing, and quality of delivery. The fact that the study examined 
TIMSS participants provided unique benefits in terms of nationally representa-
tive  sampling; extensive student, teacher, and school background surveys; and 
 student assessment results. The coding of the videos followed the coding 
 structure developed for the 1999 TIMSS Video Study (Hiebert et al. 2003). This 
was beneficial not only in providing a high-quality, proven coding scheme but 
also in providing a context for a comparison of Indonesia’s results with those of 
other countries.
A mixed-methods approach involving both quantitative and qualitative analy-
sis was used. The quantitative analysis used advanced forms of multilevel and 
value-added modeling. The qualitative analysis used case studies of relatively 
high-impact teachers to provide in-depth insights on specific practices and also 
to explore two factors seen as driving teaching practices: teacher mathematical 
beliefs and mathematical knowledge in teaching.
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The data collection took place in two phases (2007 and 2011),1 allowing for 
exploration of changes that had taken place since the beginning of the teacher 
reform. The TIMSS rigorous sampling approach provided nationally representa-
tive samples for each year. That the video study is based on these samples 
allowed for general snapshots of teaching practices to be created for each year.2
Multilevel and value-added concepts were used in the analysis of the relation-
ships between teaching practices and student learning outcomes. The multilevel 
model used advanced techniques developed by the Centre for Multilevel 
Modeling and included students nested within classes nested within provinces. 
The value-added approach relied on measurement of student learning over the 
8th-grade year by using a pretest at the beginning of the 8th-grade year and a 
posttest at the end.3 The pretest provides a baseline of the level of knowledge for 
students as they enter the year, and the posttest provides an exit level of 
knowledge.
Findings: Use of practices and relation to student learning
Teaching practices were examined from various angles to understand their 
 frequency of use, how the practices relate to student learning outcomes, and how 
the teacher reforms and other factors may be influencing trends in practices.
The first step in the analysis below examines categorizations of teaching 
 practices in relation to the following questions:
•	 In looking at the teaching practices for the full, nationally representative 
 samples of teachers in 2007 and 2011, are there any changes where teachers 
are using certain practices more or less frequently?
•	 Is there a statistically significant positive or negative relationship between 
practices and student learning outcomes?
If there were, in fact, changes in the use of specific teaching practices between 
2007 and 2011, an additional two questions were asked:
•	 Would the changes be considered positive or negative from the perspective of 
student learning outcomes?
•	 What might have caused these changes from the perspective of policies, 
 training, demographics, or some other factor?
The relationship between teaching practices and student learning outcomes is 
presented through two models (as summarized in table 5.1): The first is a 
 regression that includes 30 background variables on student, student home, 
 classroom, school, and community characteristics. The second is the same 
 regression as the first but also includes multiple teacher background characteris-
tics (such as experience, gender, whether the teacher is a civil servant, degree 
type, and so on) as well as variables that could be seen as indicators of quality, 
including teacher competency scores, educational level, and certification. 
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When looking at teaching practices, the first model can generally be interpreted 
as how the practices relate to student learning when not taking teacher-related 
factors into account. The second can be interpreted as how practices relate to 
student learning with teacher background and quality aspects taken into account.
As an example for comparing the two models, teachers holding a mathematics 
education degree tend to use the expositional teaching approach less than 
 teachers holding pure mathematics degrees. In the first regression, this informa-
tion would not be captured and would give the relationship of exposition to 
student learning outcomes without considering which teachers use it. The second 
model, on the other hand, takes the teacher degree (and other teacher variables) 
into consideration so it captures the relationship between exposition and student 
learning outcomes while controlling for teacher degree and other teacher 
 variables. By controlling for these variables, the teaching practice can be thought 
of as applying across teachers of various backgrounds. Both provide interesting 
 perspectives, and although the second model would generally be considered 
more relevant because it provides the relationship across all teachers, the first 
gives an important contrast when thinking about teaching practices and what 
role teachers’ background and quality play in the use of the teaching practice.
The relationship of teaching practices to student outcomes, however, must be 
interpreted with caution. The analysis identifies statistically significant  relationships 
based on the frequency and extent of use for given practices. Any statistically 
significant relationship that emerges is an important signal of how practices relate 
to student outcomes but should not be oversimplified or misinterpreted to 
 provide a right way of teaching. Below are some important points to keep in mind 
regarding what is measured and the pitfalls to avoid in interpretation:
•	 It is important to measure not only the amount of time spent for a given practice but 
also the quality of how the teacher conducts the practice. A practice may emerge 
as having a positive relationship with student learning based on overall 
 frequency and extent of use, but individual teachers may use the practice 
effectively or ineffectively.
•	 Each lesson requires a unique set of practices. There is no optimal formula to 
apply to all lessons; in fact, particularly effective teachers are able to vary their 
table 5.1 two models to examine the relationships between teaching practices and 
student outcomes
Model Variables Logic behind model
Base regression Key home, student, school, and 
classroom variables but not 
including teacher background 
and quality variables
Shows a picture of the relationship of teaching 
techniques with student learning, without 
accounting for teacher dimensions
Regression with 
teacher variables
Same variables as in the base 
regression but also including 
a small set of teacher 
background and quality 
variables
Shows how the results of the base regression 
change when teacher background and 
quality aspects are controlled for, therefore 
giving a picture of the relation of practices 
across teachers
Looking Inside the Classroom Black Box 129
Teacher Reform in Indonesia • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-9829-6 
practices according to the material and the needs of the students within a 
given lesson.
•	 Context is important. The regressions take into account many contextual  factors 
in an attempt to determine effects across various contexts, but the results 
 certainly should not be interpreted to indicate a standardized approach to 
mathematics teaching.4
•	 The teaching practices are typically measured as proportions within a given 
 category. A negative relationship should not necessarily be interpreted as being 
a bad practice. It could possibly indicate that relatively too much of the 
 proportional time tends to be allocated to the practice.
•	 For any category, teachers typically use multiple practices rather than just one. In 
looking for the relationship of a practice to student learning outcomes, the 
interpretation is not whether teachers do or do not use a practice but rather to 
what extent the practice is used.
Keeping these important points in mind, the results still create an overall 
 picture of practices and trends and thus provide critical insights into what takes 
place in Indonesia’s mathematics classrooms and how practices relate to student 
learning outcomes. In relating these practices to student learning, many statisti-
cally significant results are obtained, giving insights into the teaching-learning 
process and how it might be improved.
Lesson Structure: Time Spent on Mathematics
In what could be considered the foundational layer of classroom time allocation, 
all lesson time was first categorized as being either mathematical, mathematical 
organization, or nonmathematical in nature. The theoretical heart of this layer is 
based on research related to time on task that has its roots in Carroll’s “A Model 
of School Learning” (Carroll 1963) and has been one of the most widely dis-
cussed concepts in the education community since the 1970s. Mathematical 
time also represents what has been called Academic Learning Time (ALT),5 
which represents when learning takes place. Mathematical organization time 
may be effective and necessary for setting up a learning situation but could be 
detrimental if not conducted efficiently or if it breaks the rhythm of learning. 
Although some nonmathematical time may not be avoidable, it clearly takes 
away from learning time and may also be an indicator of classroom management 
and behavior issues (for example, Doyle 1990; Kounin 1970; Wragg 1993).
The teaching practices in the Lesson Structure category have the following 
definitions:
•	 Mathematical: Time spent on mathematical content presented either through 
a mathematical problem or outside the context of a problem
•	 Mathematical organization: Time devoted to preparing materials or discussing 
information related to mathematics but not qualifying as mathematical work
•	 Nonmathematical: Time devoted to nonmathematical content such as taking 
roll call, prayer time, disciplining a student while other students wait, or 
 listening to school announcements on a public-address system
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Comparison between 2007 and 2011
Teachers spent less time on mathematics and more time on mathematical orga-
nization. The data from 2007 to 2011 indicate (as shown in figure 5.1) that the 
proportion of classroom time spent on mathematics fell from 89 percent to 
86 percent while mathematical organization time increased from 8 percent to 10 
percent and that these changes were statistically significant. Nonmathematical 
time increased slightly, but the change was not significant.
Although not specifically intended for mathematics classrooms, the Stallings 
benchmarks for effective time use indicate that instruction time should make up 
at least 85 percent of class time while classroom management should be 
15  percent or less, and off-task time should be 0 percent (Stallings and Knight 
2003). Indonesia’s instructional time (mathematics time) is just above the 
benchmark, but off-task time (nonmathematics time), while low, is considered 
something to be eliminated in the benchmark.
Relationship to Student Learning Outcomes
The relationship of these time categories to student learning outcomes was 
examined starting with a base regression controlling for student, classroom, 
school, and community characteristics and then with a second regression that 
also included teacher background and quality characteristics. As shown in 
 figure 5.2, mathematical time had a positive relationship with student outcomes 
while nonmathematical time had a negative relationship. As would be predicted 
in time-on-task theory, students in classrooms with a higher proportion of time 
spent on mathematics tended to have higher learning outcomes, while classes 
with higher share of time spent on nonmathematical tasks tended to have lower 
outcomes. Mathematical organization did not have a statistically significant 
 relationship to learning outcomes.
The coefficients indicate that a percentile increase in the proportion of time 
spent on mathematics is related to an increase in student test scores by 
Figure 5.1 proportions of lesson structure practices in indonesia timss video study of 
mathematics classes, 2007 and 2011
Note: Changes in mathematical time and mathematical organization time were statistically significant. TIMSS = Trends in 
International Mathematics and Science Study. “Mathematical” time refers to time spent on mathematical content. 
“Nonmathematical” time refers to time spent on materials preparation or discussing information related to mathematics but 
not qualifying as mathematical work. “Mathematical organization” refers to time spent on nonmathematical contents such as 
roll call, school announcements, or other administration.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
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0.56 percentage points while an increase of a percentile point in the proportion 
of nonmathematical time is related to a decrease of 0.83 percentage points. An 
alternative way to look at the relationship is by using standardized coefficients, 
which allow for easier comparison with other variables examined in this chapter. 
The standardized coefficients indicate that a 1.0 standard deviation increase in 
mathematical time is related to a 0.30 standard deviation increase in student test 
scores, while a 1.0 standard deviation increase in nonmathematical time is related 
to a 0.18 standard deviation decrease. Both of these changes are large in compari-
son with other teaching practices.
The trend of decreased time spent on mathematics is of concern because, in 
line with expectations based on theory, mathematical time should have a positive 
relationship with student outcomes. Nonmathematical time tends to have the 
strong negative relationship with student outcomes, but the change between 
2007 and 2011 of this variable (from 3 percent to 4 percent) is not statistically 
significant and represents a small proportion of lesson time; the highest propor-
tion in the sample was 11 percent.
Although the result of time on task having a positive relationship and time off 
task having a negative relationship is not surprising, it drives home an important 
fundamental point: that teaching requires management of time, and the trend 
Figure 5.2 relationship of lesson structure teaching practices to student learning outcomes in indonesia 
timss video study of mathematics classes, 2007–11
Note: Full regression results can be found in appendix A at the end of this book. TIMSS = Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study. 
“Mathematical” time refers to time spent on mathematical content. “Nonmathematical” time refers to time spent on materials preparation or 
discussing information related to mathematics but not qualifying as mathematical work. “Mathematical organization” refers to time spent on 
nonmathematical contents such as roll call, school announcements, or other administration.
Coefficients 0.25 0.56 –0.68 –0.75 0.08 0.06
Standard coefficients 0.17 0.30 –0.18 –0.18 0.06 0.07
–4
–3
–2
–1
0
1
2
3
4
Mathematical Nonmathematical Mathematical
organization
D
ir
ec
tio
n 
an
d 
le
ve
l o
f s
ta
tis
tic
al
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
ce
Regression without teacher variables Regression with teacher variables
Th
re
sh
ol
ds
 o
f s
ta
tis
tic
al
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
ce
1% 5% 10%
132 Looking Inside the Classroom Black Box
Teacher Reform in Indonesia • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-9829-6
toward less mathematical time, while not dramatic, should raise a flag. The other 
seven countries in the 1999 TIMSS study all had at least 95 percent of classroom 
time allocated to mathematics, and no country had more than 1 percent of time 
on nonmathematics (Hiebert et al. 2003, 39).
Time on task extends to the breakdown of mathematical time into problem 
and nonproblem time. Indonesia’s results showed a decrease in problem time 
from 76 percent in 2007 to 67 percent in 2011, but lessons with a higher 
proportion of problem time tended to have a positive relationship with stu-
dent learning outcomes. Teachers also have increased the proportion of math-
ematical time used for the introduction of new material from 46  percent in 
2007 to 58 percent in 2011 while reducing practice time from 39 percent to 
26 percent. The reason for the decrease may be related to the increased avail-
ability of textbooks and to greater ease in giving practice work as homework 
rather than using class time. Teachers now seem to be using that time instead 
to introduce new material,  possibly allowing for the coverage of more topics 
and material. Interviewed teachers also spoke of the curriculum being spread 
thin, meaning it is difficult to get through all the topics expected to be cov-
ered over the course of the year. This may be a contributing factor to teachers’ 
rebalancing to use time for the  introduction of new material.6 These examples 
of changing time indicate that  classroom resources and  influences, such as the 
curriculum, can alter the composition of time on task and teaching practices.
Teaching Approaches
The teaching approaches used in classroom activities can also play an important 
role in how students learn. Various models of teaching approaches have been 
developed, with a progressive (socioconstructive) versus traditional (behaviorist) 
model often used to distinguish between ways of teaching (for example, Dewey 
1938; Handal 2003). The teacher’s conception of role is also an important factor, 
with Kuhs and Ball (1986) defining categories of (a) instructor (for skill mastery), 
(b) explainer (for conceptual understanding), and (c) facilitator (for confident 
problem solving).
In the coded approaches used in the video study, exposition (or lecturing) 
encompasses an approach that is highly prevalent in many countries and is often 
associated with traditional or teacher-centered learning where student 
 participation is limited.7 Discussion becomes more student-centered with 
 dialogue between the teacher and students, while problem solving, practical work, 
and investigation are approaches that revolve more around mathematical 
 problems and tend to encourage more student-centered learning.
The practices in the Teaching Approaches category have the following 
definitions:
•	 Exposition: Time when the teacher lectures while students listen and answer 
closed questions (with no discussion)
•	 Discussion: Time when the teacher and student(s) discuss their own ideas 
about mathematics
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•	 Problem solving: Time when the teacher provides a problem or situation as a 
basis to discuss ideas in mathematics
•	 Practical work: Time when equipment or situations in the real world are used 
to explore ideas in mathematics
•	 Investigation: Time when students explore the issues (problems) in various 
mathematical situations 
Comparison between 2007 and 2011
Compared with 2007, Indonesian teachers in 2011 tended to use much more 
exposition while discussion, practical work, and investigation all decreased, as 
shown in figure 5.3. This result is somewhat surprising in that the practices 
taught in many recent government programs (for example, through the national 
mathematics training organization and in teacher working groups) generally 
encourage teachers to use less exposition and more student-centered learning.
The mathematics experts involved in the study have proposed various 
 theories as to why this trend occurred, including the possibility that certification 
is influencing teachers to be more teacher-centered, either through the pride 
they may feel by being certified (that is, as “professionals”) or through a greater 
sense of obligation. This theory did not bear out in further analysis where 
 certified teachers were not found to be any more likely to use exposition. 
Another possibility is that teachers consider exposition to be an easier or more 
direct method to prepare students for the national examination. This and other 
possible reasons for this trend are continuing to be explored.
Relationship to Student Learning Outcomes
In examining the relationship between teaching approaches used and student 
learning outcomes, some striking differences emerged, as shown in figure 5.4. 
Exposition had a negative relationship to learning outcomes and surpassed the 
statistical threshold. Investigation, practical work, and problem solving all had 
positive tendencies, with investigation and problem solving both reaching thresh-
olds of statistical significance.8 These three approaches tended to involve a 
Figure 5.3 time spent on Different teaching Approaches in indonesia timss video study of 
mathematics classes, 2007 and 2011
Note: The changes between 2007 and 2011 are statistically significant for discussion, exposition, and investigation. 
TIMSS = Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
2011
2007
Amount of class time, percentage
Investigation Problem solvingExpositionDiscussion Practical work
134 Looking Inside the Classroom Black Box
Teacher Reform in Indonesia • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-9829-6
mathematical problem focus and tended to encourage active student  engagement 
and participation.
The trend in teaching practices, in combination with the evidence of their 
relationship to student learning outcomes, raises some flags. Exposition had a 
large negative relationship, yet it increased significantly in use from 2007 to 
2011. On the other hand, the techniques of investigation and practical work, 
which had positive relationships, were decreasing in use (although practical work 
never reaches the 5 percent threshold of statistical significance). Exposition and 
problem solving, the two approaches with increases, could often be used as a way 
of “teaching to the test,” whereas investigation and practical work could lead to 
greater understanding but require a more indirect approach to getting students 
to be able to answer typical national examination questions.
Public (Whole Class) Interaction Time by Participants
Mathematical time was divided into public time (when the whole class partici-
pates in a task) and private time (when students are broken up into groups or do 
individual seatwork). In 2011, the allocation was 64 percent whole-class time 
and 36 percent group or seatwork time. There was no statistically significant 
relationship between the proportions of these categories and student learning 
outcomes, but a further breakdown of the interaction uncovered interesting 
results in terms of changes from 2007 to 2011 and in how those changes relate 
to student learning outcomes.
Figure 5.4 relationship of teaching Approach practices to student learning outcomes in indonesia timss 
video study of mathematics classes, 2007–11
Note: Full regression results can be found in appendix B at the end of this book. TIMSS = Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study.
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Whole-class time was further broken down into the types of interaction by the 
participants. The division of whole-class time into teacher-only, teacher-student, 
and student-only interaction is closely linked with traditional versus progressive 
teaching approaches. Teacher-only interaction is considered traditional whereas 
teacher-student and student-only interactions are often associated with progres-
sive and student-centered learning. These divisions also relate to the teacher’s 
conception of his or her role as instructor (for skill mastery), explainer (for con-
ceptual understanding), or facilitator (for confident problem solving) (Kuhs and 
Ball 1986).
The practices in the Public Interaction Participants category have these 
definitions:
•	 Teacher interaction: Time when the teacher leads the class and presents to all 
students
•	 Teacher and student interaction: Time when a presentation is made by both the 
teacher and students (in intervals), intended for all students
•	 Student interaction: Time when a presentation is made by a student or students, 
intended for the teacher and all students
Comparison between 2007 and 2011
Within the public or whole-class interaction, there was much more teacher-only 
time in 2011 than in 2007. This time typically involved expositional or lecture 
activities. Student involvement in the form of teacher-student interaction fell 
dramatically, as shown in figure 5.5.
Relationship to Student Learning Outcomes
The standout feature of the different types of public whole-class interaction was 
the positive relationship of student learning outcomes with participation 
involving both teacher and students, as figure 5.6 shows. In contrast, activities 
that are teacher-only or student-only had negative, but not statistically signifi-
cant, relationships to student outcomes.
Figure 5.5 public (Whole class) interaction time by participants in indonesia timss video 
study of mathematics classes, 2007 and 2011
Note: The changes between 2007 and 2011 are statistically significant for “Public: teacher only” and “Public: teacher 
and student.” “Public” time refers to time when the interaction, regardless of the participants, is intended for the 
whole class.
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As will be shown later when looking at private interaction, a similar pattern 
emerged: activities that are student-only tend to have a negative relationship to 
student learning while teacher-student activities have a positive relationship. This 
pattern may indicate the importance of teachers being actively involved, even in 
student-led activities, to monitor, speak to, and encourage students. On the other 
hand, teacher-centered activities tended to be negative in relationship to learning.
The trend of decreasing teacher-student interaction goes against the practices 
reportedly encouraged by the Ministry of Education and Culture in its training 
and teacher working group activities.9 Combining this trend with the fact that 
teacher-student interaction time has a positive relationship to student learning 
outcomes raises some concerns as well as questions as to why such interaction 
might be declining. As mentioned earlier, one possible explanation suggested by 
teachers and policy makers is that certification may indirectly encourage teachers 
to use more teacher-centered learning approaches because of a sense of pride and 
self-importance or even of obligation to earn their increased income.
The Context and Language of Problems and their Solutions
Problems can be presented in a variety of ways in terms of the context presented, 
the language used, and the method used to solve them. Real-world problems 
may provide a contextual understanding of how mathematical concepts relate to 
actual situations. Application of mathematical concepts to situations may also 
require more advanced cognitive thinking relative to problems presented in 
mathematical language. The use of mathematical language and symbols at times 
is associated with rote learning, but it can also be required for advanced and 
complex mathematical problems.
Figure 5.6 relationship of public interaction categories to student learning outcomes in indonesia timss 
video study of mathematics classes, 2007–11
Notes: Full regression results can be found in appendix C at the end of this book. TIMSS = Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study.
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Similarly, problems may be considered routine or nonroutine, with the latter 
generally considered as requiring more advanced cognitive thinking. Routine 
problems can be solved directly through formulas, whereas nonroutine problems 
cannot be solved with a usual procedure but instead require a nonroutine 
strategy.
Generally, the application of mathematics to real-world problems and the use 
of nonroutine problem solutions tend to be seen as involving more higher-order 
thinking and requiring a deeper understanding of mathematics. This is not to say 
that problems in the context of mathematical language and symbols and 
 problems that can be solved with a routine approach are inferior; indeed, they 
are necessary. Still, many advocates of progressive learning tend to promote real-
world contexts and nonroutine problem solving.
The terms used in the Problem Context category have these definitions:
•	 Real world: Time spent on mathematical problems presented within a real-life 
context
•	 Mathematical language: Time spent on problems presented only with 
 mathematical language and symbols
The terms used in the Problem Solution category have these definitions:
•	 Routine: Time spent on a problem that can be solved directly, using a formula, 
definition, or proposition
•	 Nonroutine: Time spent on problems that cannot be solved with a usual 
 procedure (directly using a formula, definition, or proposition) but instead 
must be solved using a nonroutine strategy
The terms used in the Problem Nature category have these definitions:
•	 Open: Time spent on problems or questions where there is more than one 
 correct answer
•	 Closed: Time spent on problems or questions where there is only one possible 
answer
Comparison between 2007 and 2011
In 2011, mathematical problems overwhelmingly involved mathematical lan-
guage and symbols, and there was an increase in the amount of time during 
which mathematical language and symbols were used—from 89 percent in 2007 
to 93 percent in 2011, as shown in figure 5.7. A likely explanation for the 
decrease in problems involving real-world contexts is that there had been a push 
for contextual teaching and learning (CTL) starting in the late 1990s, but it was 
promoted less in recent years. The change, therefore, possibly reflects a fading out 
of the CTL approach. Still, it is surprising to see how unbalanced the mix of 
problem contexts is, with the use of real-world contexts making up a very small 
proportion of the total.
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Teachers tended to present and spend time on problems that could be solved 
in a routine manner rather than through a nonroutine approach; this proportion 
increased between 2007 and 2011, as shown in figure 5.8. The fact that only 4 
percent of problem time was spent on nonroutine approaches is of concern, 
particularly because nonroutine problem solving is typically considered to be 
related to higher-order thinking.
Teachers also overwhelmingly used problems and asked questions that were 
closed in nature. Only 3 percent of time spent involved open problems and 
 questions, as shown in figure 5.9.
Relationship to Student Learning Outcomes
Surprisingly, problems within the context of mathematical language and 
 problems solved through routine procedures had a positive relationship with 
student outcomes. The results shown in figure 5.10 combine the three separate 
categorizations of approaches to mathematical problems and questioning. On 
the left is the mathematical language versus real-world contexts; in the center is 
Figure 5.7 contextual language Used during problem time in indonesia timss video study 
of mathematics classes, 2007 and 2011
Notes: The changes between 2007 and 2011 are statistically significant for both the “mathematical language” and “real world” 
problem contexts. TIMSS = Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study.
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Figure 5.8 Use of routine vs. nonroutine Approaches to problems in indonesia timss video 
study of mathematics classes, 2007 and 2011
Note: The changes between 2007 and 2011 are statistically significant for routine and nonroutine. TIMSS = Trends in 
International Mathematics and Science Study. “Routine” refers to problems that can be solved directly using a formula, 
definition, or proposition. “Nonroutine” refers to problems that cannot be solved with a usual procedure (directly using a 
formula, definition, or proposition) but instead must be solved using a nonroutine strategy.
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routine versus nonroutine problem solving; and on the right is the open versus 
closed nature of problems and questioning. The results indicate that there was a 
strong positive relationship to learning outcomes for both mathematical language 
and nonroutine problem solving, while the real-world contexts and routine 
 practices had a negative relationship. The use of open approaches also had a 
 positive relationship with student learning outcomes.
Figure 5.10 relationship of problem-solving Approach categories to student learning outcomes in 
indonesia timss video study of mathematics classes, 2007–11
Note: The practices with the dotted lines are the same, mirrored values as the corresponding practices above but with negative values. Full 
regression results can be found in appendix D at the end of this book. TIMSS = Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study. “Routine” 
refers to problem solving using a formula, definition, or proposition. “Nonroutine” refers to problem solving instead using a nonroutine strategy. 
“Open” refers to problems for which there is more than one correct answer. “Closed” refers to problems for which there is only one possible correct 
answer.
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classes, 2007 and 2011
Notes: The changes between 2007 and 2011 are not statistically significant for open and closed. TIMSS = Trends in 
International Mathematics and Science Study. “Open” refers to problems for which there is more than one correct answer. 
“Closed” refers to problems for which there is only one possible correct answer.
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The results vary in terms of statistical significance depending on whether the 
regression includes the teacher variables. In the case of mathematical language 
and real-world contexts, the results become statistically significant only when 
the teacher background and quality variables are included. On the other hand, 
the routine versus nonroutine and the closed versus open distinctions are statisti-
cally significant when no teacher variables are included but are no longer signifi-
cant when teacher variables are added. One interpretation is that the nonroutine 
and open practices are rarely used and typically only the “higher-quality” teachers 
use them, so once this is taken into account, the practices no longer become 
statistically significant. The mathematical language and real-world contexts, on 
the other hand, may be used by a mix of teachers, but once the background and 
qualities are taken into account, it appears that the use of mathematical language 
and symbols in problems has a positive relationship across teacher background 
and quality.
These problem context and approach categories bring up interesting aspects 
related to testing, what is truly being measured, and how teachers might change 
their teaching practices to better help their students succeed in high-stakes 
assessments such as Indonesia’s national examination (in this case, held at the end 
of grade 9). Teachers seem to have moved toward more routine, formulaic, and 
possibly rote learning approaches, and these actions could be considered “teach-
ing to the test.” The increase in mathematical language and the use of routine 
approaches and closed problems and questions may have to do with an increased 
emphasis on performing well on the national examination, where questions 
 typically require a routine approach in their solution.
There was a positive relationship between teachers’ self-reported influence of 
the national examination and their use of routine problems and mathematical 
language contexts. Teachers were asked whether the national examination influ-
enced their teaching. Those who said they were more influenced also tended to 
use routine problems, closed problems, and mathematical language contexts—
evidence that these practices could be seen by teachers as being more  effective 
or efficient in preparing students for the national examination. In  addition, the 
percentage of teachers who said they were influenced by the national  examination 
increased from 70 percent to 75 percent between 2007 and 2011, which indi-
cates the national examination is increasingly influencing how teachers prepare 
and implement their lessons.
This finding raises an important contradiction: many educationalists argue 
that the teaching approach encapsulated in these routine, closed, and 
 formulaic techniques does not promote true understanding of mathematics. 
Still, if teachers are “teaching to the test” and these approaches tend to help 
students score better (as at least the mathematical language relationship with 
student outcomes indicates), is it a wise strategy? Could it, in fact, lead to 
 better  learning, albeit more through a mechanistic, rote-learning approach? 
The results regarding nonroutine and open approaches are an indication that 
the less mechanistic approach could, in fact, lead to better learning, but it is 
used infrequently.
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impact of the reforms
In light of the results presented in the previous section on the frequency and use 
of teaching practices as well as their relationship to student learning outcomes, 
the practices can now be seen in the context of teacher reform. This section 
explores key elements of teacher reform, including the cornerstone aspects of 
certification and the requirement that all teachers obtain a four-year degree. 
Regarding the latter, a special focus is also placed on teachers who did not have 
a four-year degree at the start of the reform (2005) but subsequently upgraded 
to a four-year degree.
Teacher Certification
As elaborated in chapter 4, the certification process itself did not have an impact 
on altering teaching performance as measured through student learning out-
comes. The video study had similar results: there was no statistically significant 
difference between student learning outcomes for certified and uncertified teach-
ers, and there was also no statistically significant difference in the certified and 
uncertified teachers’ assessment scores. But differences may still emerge related to 
their teaching. In the 2011 sample, 53 percent of teachers were certified, provid-
ing a nice balance of certified and uncertified teachers for comparative purposes.
The teaching practices of certified and uncertified teachers may differ because 
of either teacher motivation or fundamental underlying differences between the 
two groups. Certified teachers may alter their teaching practices because of 
higher motivation from the increased salary, an increased sense of status, or an 
increased sense of obligation. They might also dedicate more time to teaching 
because of not having a second job, which could conceivably lead to changes in 
the way teachers plan and execute their lessons. In this section, the teaching 
practices of certified teachers are compared with those of uncertified teachers to 
determine whether any differences can be seen.
The queuing process of teachers for the certification process is important to 
take into account when analyzing certified and uncertified teachers. Teachers 
were selected first based primarily on age and years of experience. Civil servant 
teachers also received priority. These and other important background character-
istics of teachers and the contextual characteristics of their working environment 
were controlled for in the analysis.
Teaching Practice Comparison
In looking at teaching practices, the striking feature is the lack of statistically 
significant differences between certified and uncertified teachers. Figure 5.11 
shows results where the teaching practices of interest were placed (one at a time) 
into a regression model that controlled for multiple contextual variables. Only 
one difference emerged: certified teachers tended to use more public (whole-
class) interaction and less private (group and seatwork) interaction. As 
 demonstrated in the previous section, there is no statistically significant 
 relationship between these practices and student learning outcomes.
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The results coincide with the certification study findings, giving further 
 evidence that certification did not have an impact on teaching practices and 
behavior. This lack of difference is not particularly surprising. Almost every 
teacher who went through the certification process obtained it, so there was no 
separation of teachers during the process in terms of quality criteria.10 Although 
approximately two-thirds of the teachers took an additional 90-hour course, such 
training would be highly unlikely to alter teaching practices in any measurable 
way. The certification study found that certified teachers were less likely to hold 
a second job, but it did not identify any other differences in teacher behavior such 
as teaching hours, absenteeism, or student outcomes. The video study accords 
with those results by further indicating no discernible differences in practices.
Teacher Education
The requirement that all teachers obtain a four-year degree by 2015 is based on 
the assumption that the teachers with a higher level of education will be more 
effective teachers. This section explores how a teacher’s education relates to 
student learning outcomes. To meet the four-year-degree requirement, many 
existing teachers who had less than a four-year degree upgraded through 
 additional in-service training. The section therefore explores how teachers who 
have upgraded to a four-year degree compare with teachers who obtained the 
degree directly through preservice training.
The video study sample in 2011 is made up almost completely of teachers 
who have already obtained a four-year degree, so it unfortunately doesn’t lend 
Figure 5.11 Differences in teaching practices of certified teachers vs. Uncertified teachers in indonesia 
timss video study of mathematics classes, 2007–11
Note: Bars that pass the 5 percent threshold are considered to be statistically significant. Full regression results can be found in appendix E at the 
end of this book. TIMSS = Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study.
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itself well to analyzing differences between teachers who have met this critical 
threshold requirement for certification and those who have not. Still, the study 
obtained results similar to those of the certification study: students taught by 
teachers with a four-year degree tended to have higher learning outcomes. Such 
students tended to have posttest scores nearly 4 percentage points higher than 
those of students taught by teachers with less than a four-year degree after con-
trolling for multiple background factors and the students’ pretest scores. Because 
the average score on the posttest was only 34 percent, the 4-point difference is 
quite large and can be interpreted to represent a difference of nearly 12 percent 
relative to the average score.
Relationship of Degree Type to Student Learning Outcomes
One of the components of the teacher reform in Indonesia was the requirement 
that teachers hold a degree in the subject they teach. There was concern that 
many teachers were teaching subjects different from those of their training 
degrees and that the mismatch could potentially be harmful if teachers did not 
have sufficient subject competence. Teachers undergoing certification could 
obtain certification only in a single subject and were expected to teach only that 
subject.
One of the more striking results of the study is the difference in student 
learning outcomes of teachers holding a mathematics education degree com-
pared with those holding a pure mathematics degree. Students of both teachers 
holding mathematics education and pure mathematics degrees had positive 
learning outcomes on average, but students taught by teachers having a math-
ematics education degree tended to perform relatively better. Students of teach-
ers who held a mathematics education degree on average scored 1.3 percentage 
points lower on the pretest than those with teachers holding mathematics 
degrees but scored 1.3 percent higher on the posttest, showing bigger gains. 
Figure 5.12 highlights the contrast, with student learning outcomes of those 
taught by teachers with a degree in mathematics education having a positive 
and statistically significant relationship while teachers with degrees in pure 
mathematics having a strongly negative relationship to learning outcomes. It is 
important to emphasize that this negative relationship is relative to teachers 
who did not have a pure mathematics degree and does not indicate that stu-
dents had negative learning outcomes. Their progress in learning was just 
 relatively less.
Surprisingly, students with teachers lacking any formal mathematics training 
did not have lower student outcomes. Such nonmathematics teachers made up 
only 8 percent of the sample and held a diverse range of degrees in subjects 
including economics, Indonesian, chemistry, and even religion. Their results 
tended to be positive but did not reach statistical significance. It is not known 
what sort of training they received over their careers to possibly support their 
knowledge of mathematics, but the results at least do not indicate that their 
teaching is worse for lack of a mathematics focus in their degrees, as is feared in 
the case of mismatch.
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In interpreting the regression coefficient for the teacher degree type and 
its relation to student posttest scores, the students having a teacher with a 
 mathematics education degree tended to have posttest scores that were 
3  percentage points higher after controlling for multiple background factors 
and the students’ pretest scores.11
It is important to note that this result should not be oversimplified to  conclude 
that only teachers with mathematics education degrees should be hired. In fact, 
teachers with pure mathematics degrees do tend to have important foundational 
skills and can be very effective teachers. What is important about this result is 
that it may provide insights into how training can support teacher development. 
The result may be capturing important pedagogical skills that the teachers with 
mathematics education degrees obtain through their degree work. Ensuring that 
teachers with pure mathematics degrees receive similar additional pedagogical 
training could have a positive impact. It may also  capture differences in the way 
the degree courses teach mathematics, with the mathematics degree teachers 
learning how to solve problems whereas  mathematics education degree courses 
tend to approach problems within the context of teaching mathematical con-
cepts and problem-solving approaches to students.
Figure 5.12 relationship of teacher Degree to student learning outcomes in indonesia timss video study 
of mathematics classes, 2007–11
Note: Full regression results can be found in appendix F at the end of this book. TIMSS = Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study.
Coefficients 0.02 0.03 (0.03) (0.04) 0.01 (0.00)
Standard coefficients 0.09 0.13 (0.12) (0.15) 0.01 (0.00)
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Teaching Practice Comparison
The difference between teachers holding mathematics education degrees and those 
holding pure mathematics degrees is one of the biggest distinguishing factors in 
terms of the types of teaching practices employed. As is shown in figure 5.13, 
teachers with mathematics education degrees tended to generally use the  practices 
that are positively related with student learning outcomes. They tended to use a 
teaching approach of investigation, problem solving, and discussion more often 
than exposition, which has a strong negative relationship with student learning.
Questioning (as box 5.1 discusses further) was also an important distinguish-
ing factor: Mathematics education teachers used questioning much more 
 frequently and with various techniques including question-and-answer and 
 rhetorical questioning. They also tended to do more private interaction teaching 
(group and individual seatwork) than public (whole-class) teaching and tended 
to do more monitoring of student activities.
It is not always the case that the techniques used more often by mathematics 
education teachers than mathematics-only degree teachers had a positive 
 relationship with student outcomes. For example, they tended to do more 
teacher-only public interaction and less teacher-student public interaction. Real-
world contexts in working on mathematical problems were also used more often 
by mathematics education teachers, and mathematical language and symbols 
(which have a positive relationship with learning), less often.
Figure 5.13 practices of teachers with mathematics education Degrees vs. those with pure mathematics or 
nonmathematics Degrees in indonesia timss video study of mathematics classes, 2007–11
Note: Full regression results can be found in appendix G at the end of this book. TIMSS = Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study.
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Teacher Knowledge
Teacher competency testing is an important recent inclusion in the certification 
process. In 2012, such testing was introduced into the process; teachers falling 
below the passing mark are not allowed to become certified and must reapply 
the following year. Whereas virtually all teachers were able to obtain certification 
in the previous process, the new process truly has the possibility of distinguishing 
between higher- and lower-quality teachers from a competency standpoint.
But is competency testing a valid way of determining higher- and lower-
quality teachers, and will it make a difference in terms of improving student 
learning outcomes? This section presents an analysis that indicates a strong 
 relationship between teacher knowledge and student learning outcomes and also 
indicates that teachers with greater knowledge use different practices than 
 teachers with less knowledge.
Relationship of Teacher Knowledge to Student Learning Outcomes
Of all factors explored, teacher knowledge had the strongest relationship to 
 student learning outcomes. The results indicate that both subject matter 
 knowledge and pedagogical knowledge, in almost all cases, were well above the 
generally accepted 5 percent statistical significance threshold and typically above 
Box 5.1 the Use of Questioning from the perspective of the teacher’s Goals
Questioning can be a powerful instrument in a mathematics teacher’s repertoire of teaching 
practices and can serve various purposes in defining the dynamics of the classroom and devel-
oping student learning. Through interviews and the observation of case study teachers in the 
video study, an interesting picture emerged of how teachers conceive of and use questioning. 
Teachers said that they used questioning to check understanding (majority), keep the  students’ 
attention, direct the students’ attention, and understand what students are thinking. They also 
explained that they called on individual students as a way of building their self-confidence, 
although some teachers at times used it as a punishment for not paying attention. Ainley 
(1988) developed a framework of questioning based on the teacher’s goals by which  questions 
were categorized in the following way:
• Pseudo questions: to establish an acceptable behavior or a social contract with students
• Testing questions: to find out whether students respond correctly
• Genuine questions: to seek information (thus, teachers do not know the answers to these 
types of questions)
• Direct or provoking questions: to provoke students’ thinking by making new connections or 
clarifying existing ones and by exploring new areas of mathematical knowledge
In Indonesia’s classrooms, the use of pseudo and testing questions dominated, but the 
 relatively effective teachers would more frequently use genuine questions and direct or 
 provoking questions. The latter is considered to be particularly effective at encouraging 
higher-order thinking.
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Figure 5.14 relationship between teacher Knowledge and student learning in indonesia timss video 
study of mathematics classes, 2007–11
Note: Full regression results can be found in appendix H at the end of this book. TIMSS = Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study.
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the 1 percent significance threshold (see figure 5.14). The significance levels 
tended to drop when including teacher background variables such as educational 
level and experience, likely indicating that other teacher characteristics also play 
an important role in student learning.
Teacher subject knowledge tended to have a stronger relationship with stu-
dent learning than did pedagogical knowledge. This may, in part, be due to the 
measurements themselves, with subject matter knowledge lending itself well to 
a test whereas pedagogical knowledge is much more difficult to measure through 
a written test.12 Still, the fact that pedagogical knowledge also tended to have 
strong results indicates its important role in learning outcomes.
In interpreting the regression coefficient for the degree and its relation to 
student posttest scores, a percentage point increase on a teacher’s assessment 
score is related to a 0.17 percentage point increase in a student’s posttest score 
after controlling for multiple background factors and the student’s pretest 
score. Teacher assessment scores ranged from 7 percent to 75 percent, with an 
average score of 48 percent. For example, a 10-percentage-point higher teacher 
assessment score resulted in a student’s posttest score being 1.7 percentage 
points higher. Again, because the average score on the posttest was only 34 
percent, the 1.7 percentage point difference represents a difference of 5 percent 
relative to the average score. (Similar but lower coefficients were found when 
looking at the subject and pedagogy score in relation to students’ posttest score, 
with a 0.14 and 0.10 percentage point increase, respectively.) The  standardized 
coefficients indicate that a 1.0 standard deviation increase in teacher  assessment 
scores is related to a 0.23 standard deviation increase in student test scores.
148 Looking Inside the Classroom Black Box
Teacher Reform in Indonesia • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-9829-6
Teaching Practice Comparison
The strong relationship between teacher knowledge and student learning indi-
cates that teachers with more knowledge tended to teach more effectively, but 
can this knowledge be communicated through the teaching practices employed 
in the classroom? When dividing teachers into high and low knowledge groups 
and then comparing the groups’ frequency and approach in teaching practices, 
certain differences emerged as is shown in figure 5.15: Teachers with greater 
knowledge tended to use mathematical language rather than real-world contexts. 
They also tended to use questioning techniques, such as question-and-answer, 
rhetorical, and true-false questioning, more often. In terms of teaching strategy, 
they tended to use the investigative technique more.13 All other teaching prac-
tices were not statistically significant.
The differences in teaching practices may reflect greater confidence with 
mathematics among teachers with greater knowledge. Teachers’ use of problems 
with mathematical language may indicate a fluency in mathematics. The much 
Figure 5.15 relationship between teaching practices and teacher Knowledge (Assessment score 
percentage) in indonesia timss video study of mathematics classes, 2007–11
Note: Bars that pass the 5 percent threshold are considered to be statistically significant. Full regression results can be found in appendix I at the 
end of this book. TIMSS = Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study.
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greater use of questioning could possibly be related to greater confidence in 
 dialogue with students, whereas teachers with less knowledge might shy away 
from questioning because it could lead to unexpected challenges. Finally, the 
teaching approaches of investigation (statistically significant) and discussion 
(positive but not quite statistically significant) may require a higher comfort level 
and fluency in mathematics depending on how they are used.
What is somewhat surprising is that students whose teachers have greater 
knowledge tended to do much better, but the teaching practices are not so drasti-
cally different. This likely indicates that the more knowledgeable teachers were 
more effective in using the same practices. For example, two teachers could 
conduct a review of previous material, but teachers with greater knowledge may 
tend to be more effective because they give clearer explanations and can spot and 
correct student errors and misconceptions and other factors because they have a 
better grasp of mathematics and pedagogical concepts.
conclusions
In examining teaching practices in a sample of Indonesia’s 8th-grade mathemat-
ics classrooms, important findings emerged that have implications for the teacher 
reform process and how the quality of teachers can be improved over time. Key 
aspects of certification and the four-year degree requirement were explored in 
the context of what takes place in the classroom and how they relate to student 
learning outcomes.
Qualifications Comparisons
The video study had results that were strikingly similar to the findings of the 
certification study when examining teacher qualifications and their relation to 
student learning outcomes.
The students of certified teachers did not have better student learning 
 outcomes than students of uncertified teachers. This seems to indicate that 
teachers were not improved through the certification process itself. It also under-
scores the fact that the process did not separate higher-quality teachers from 
lower-quality ones; this is self-evident because virtually all teachers passed the 
certification process.
There was also no difference in the subject matter and pedagogy assess-
ment scores of certified and uncertified teachers. Certification could have 
conceivably improved teacher competency in subject matter and pedagogy 
through the  additional training received by teachers in the certification 
training course (for those who did not directly pass the portfolio process). 
Certified teachers also generally tended to participate in a greater number of 
training courses, possibly to strengthen their portfolios. But the fact that 
there is no statistically significant difference in the competency test scores 
of certified teachers is a further indication that the certification process itself 
has not boosted competency and has also not been separating out teachers 
in terms of quality. With the introduction of teacher competency testing as 
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part of the certification process, however, this could change—especially if 
the testing and certification processes are carried out more rigorously than 
in the past.
Educational level, on the other hand, did have a positive relationship with 
student outcomes. The requirement that all teachers obtain a four-year degree 
may lead to a significant improvement in the quality of the teacher workforce 
over time.
A strong relationship exists between teacher knowledge—in both subject 
matter and pedagogy—and student learning outcomes. This result is particularly 
important. There are concerns about the quality of four-year degrees offered by 
many universities across Indonesia. That the competency test scores had such a 
strong relationship with student outcomes underscores the importance of includ-
ing it as part of the certification process. Requiring teachers to meet a minimum 
threshold of skills and knowledge would likely have a significant impact on 
improving the teacher workforce over the long term, both by pushing teachers 
to improve their skills and by rewarding teachers who demonstrate higher 
quality.
Interesting differences also emerged by teacher degree type—comparing 
teachers holding mathematics education degrees with those holding pure math-
ematics degrees. The pure-mathematics-degree teachers tended to have higher 
subject matter scores on the teacher competency assessment, but when it came 
to student outcomes, students of teachers having a mathematics education 
degree performed better than those whose teachers had a pure mathematics 
degree. This result should not be interpreted to mean that teachers should be 
required to hold an education-oriented degree but rather that those coming into 
the system with a noneducation degree are likely to require pedagogical training. 
This could be given in the extra year of training now required for all wanting to 
become a teacher.
Teaching Practices Comparisons
When looking at the certification study dimensions through the lens of teach-
ing practices, some telling results emerged. Of particular relevance was that 
the teaching practices of certified teachers did not differ from practices used 
by uncertified teachers.14 This finding builds on the evidence that there is no 
difference in student learning outcomes of certified teachers and extends 
 further to indicate that certification also appears to have no impact from the 
perspective of changing practices used in the classroom. It indicates that 
 certification itself, even with increased income, doesn’t appear to alter the way 
teachers teach. This can be seen in two ways: after certification, (a) teaching 
practices do not change, and (b) the quality of the practices used (which could 
have arisen through increased motivation and preparation) also does not 
change.
On the other hand, striking differences emerged in the teaching practices of 
teachers with greater subject and pedagogical knowledge (relative to those 
with less knowledge) and in the practices of teachers holding mathematical 
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education degrees (relative to those with pure mathematics degrees). Both 
groups tended to more frequently use practices that correlated with higher 
learning outcomes.
Practices in Relation to Student Learning Outcomes
Some insights were gained on the extent to which specific practices were used, 
the trend in the use of these practices between 2007 and 2011, and how the 
practices related to student learning.
In the area of teaching approaches, teachers often used exposition (lecturing) 
in the classroom, and this tended to have a negative relationship with student 
outcomes, while other techniques such as investigation, practical work, and 
 problem solving had a positive relationship. Student participation also emerged 
as an important differentiator. Teacher-centered activities tended to have a 
 negative relationship with learning outcomes whereas active participation of 
students in learning activities tended to be positive. But interestingly, when 
those activities were student-only, they appeared to be less effective than those 
with teacher-student involvement. Time on task was also clearly important, and 
students with teachers who spent more time on mathematics and who used 
more problem time than nonproblem time tended to have better learning 
outcomes.
The change in practices between 2007 and 2011 also provided interesting 
insights. In terms of approach, teachers tended to use more exposition and less 
discussion and investigation in 2011. Teachers were also spending more time on 
new material and less time on practice. Teachers’ time on task appears to have 
gone in the opposite direction from what would be hoped, with less time 
 dedicated to mathematics and less of that mathematics time involving 
 mathematical problems. Teachers also tended to use more mathematical  language 
and routine approaches.
Although some teacher reform factors appear to be related to more teachers 
having a four-year degree, certification itself does not appear to be driving change 
in the classroom. It actually appears that other factors beyond the teacher 
reforms are having greater influence on teaching practices. Of particular 
 importance is the increased emphasis on the national examination, which 
appears to lead teachers to use practices that better prepare students for the 
examination. This could be seen as positive or negative. With more “teaching to 
the test,”  students may be learning to answer questions rather than gaining true 
mathematical understanding. Still, techniques such as focusing on mathematical 
language and formulas as opposed to real-world contexts did have a positive 
relationship with student test scores.
The video study highlights the important relationship between what takes 
place in the classroom and student learning outcomes. It also highlights the fact 
that teaching practices evolve over time and that multiple system and cultural 
influences contribute to this evolution. The teacher reform is contributing to this 
evolution, although not always as intended and not working in isolation from 
other influential factors.
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notes
 1. Different teachers and students participated in each phase, so the two-phase approach 
should not be seen as providing panel data.
 2. By summarizing the practices of the full sample of teachers, a “lesson signature” of 
Indonesian 8th-grade mathematics teachers in general was obtained.
 3. Although the study uses TIMSS student test results in some analyses, this measure 
provides only a snapshot of student achievement levels as they finish the 8th-grade 
year. For in-depth analysis of the relationship of teaching practices to student learning 
outcomes, an additional component of pre- and posttesting was added in the 2011 
phase. Only the 2011 data were used for analyses involving student learning outcomes 
because pre- and posttesting are critical for properly measuring student learning 
 progress within the 8th-grade year.
 4. The effects of practices across contexts will be explored in great detail in the 
 forthcoming full video study, but because of space constraints much of the detail 
 cannot be presented in this chapter.
 5. Academic Learning Time (ALT) is defined by Berliner (1990) as that part of allocated 
time in a subject matter area (physical education, science, or mathematics, for 
 example) in which a student is engaged successfully in the activities or with the 
 materials to which he or she is exposed and in which those activities and materials are 
related to educational outcomes that are valued (Berliner 1987; Fisher et al. 1980).
 6. Full results for these layers are not shown because of space constraints.
 7. At the same time, it is important to note that just because students are not 
actively participating through dialogue does not necessarily indicate a lack of 
engagement because students could still be actively thinking about and working 
on problems.
 8. It is important to note that although investigation shows up as having a strong positive 
relationship, it was used by only three teachers in the sample, so the results should be 
interpreted with caution.
 9. Examples of practices encouraged can be found in the ministry’s teacher training 
branches and in documentation and learning modules distributed to teacher working 
groups for use in professional development. Student-centered learning and increased 
student participation are encouraged, while teacher-centered and rote learning tend to 
be discouraged.
 10. The queuing criteria, such as experience and educational level, did mean that differ-
ences do exist between certified and uncertified teachers, but these factors were 
controlled for in the analysis.
 11. As noted earlier, students of teachers with mathematics education degrees started out 
with lower pretest scores, so the 3 percentage point difference is based on their rela-
tive improvement.
 12. A great deal of caution should be used in assessing a teacher through a pedagogy 
examination because a teacher’s pedagogical effectiveness is not about knowing facts 
about teaching methods that can be reduced to a question in a multiple-choice exami-
nation. The video study is specifically intended to explore how teachers use their 
pedagogical knowledge “in the moment.” Still, the fact that such a strong relationship 
exists between the pedagogy score and student learning indicates that the test is, in 
fact, capturing some aspect of the teachers’ knowledge and appears to provide a proxy 
for what they do in the classroom.
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 13. There is an issue with using this variable in that only three teachers actually used the 
investigative technique, so any positive or negative relationship may be inaccurate 
because it was used so infrequently and by so few teachers.
 14. One difference did emerge: certified teachers tended to have more whole-class inter-
action and less seatwork and group work interaction. These practices do not have a 
statistically significant relationship to student outcomes.
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The Impact of the Reforms on the 
Efficiency and Equity of Public 
Spending
introduction
Progress in education in Indonesia over the past 15 years has been driven by 
significant increases in public spending. Since 2001, government education 
spending has doubled in real terms, and in 2009 approximately 4 percent of gross 
domestic product was devoted to the sector. These large increases in public 
spending have come about through the achievement of a constitutional obliga-
tion to devote a fifth of the government budget to education.
A significant proportion of the increased government investment in education 
has financed the teacher reforms outlined in previous chapters. Most notably, the 
2005 Teacher Law introduced a professional allowance for certification and 
incentives for working in remote areas that have added significant commitments 
to government spending. As a way of balancing the increases in the education 
budget from rising teacher compensation, the government introduced measures 
to improve the efficiency of teacher use. For example, the Teacher Law requires 
teachers to teach for a minimum of 24 period-hours per week, and school staff-
ing standards were revised to address the low national student-teacher ratios for 
basic education.
The purpose of this chapter is to assess the effect of these reforms on the 
efficiency and equity of teacher supply and distribution. The key message that 
arises from this assessment is that improvements in teacher pay have placed a 
significant additional burden on the government budget while reforms designed 
to improve efficiency and equity have had limited impact.
Many of the issues addressed in this chapter are relevant for other countries 
in the region and beyond. Countries, such as Indonesia, that have experienced 
relatively high and stable rates of growth have been able to—or have the poten-
tial to—rapidly increase their investments in education. Insights from Indonesia’s 
c h A p t e r  6
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experience of using these additional resources can provide valuable lessons for 
countries aiming to improve educational quality.
Getting the right number of competent teachers equitably distributed across 
all schools, regardless of their location, is a challenge faced by all countries. In 
Indonesia, these challenges are particularly acute given its geographical and 
socioeconomic diversity. Rapid rates of urbanization across the world are also 
shifting the demand for schools and teachers from rural and remote areas to 
towns and cities without neglecting the need to keep good teachers in less-
developed parts of the country where they are often needed the most. Managing 
this shift in a cost-effective way is becoming an increasingly pressing problem in 
many countries in Europe and Asia. The analysis presented in this chapter 
 highlights how these trends have affected school size and teacher demand in 
Indonesia.
To assess the effect of reforms on teacher pay and management, the next 
 section outlines the specific aspects of the reform process that were designed to 
tackle some of the perceived inadequacies in teacher pay and the significant 
inefficiencies in teacher hiring and deployment systems. This is followed by a 
section that explores the effects of these reforms, and the final section offers 
some conclusions.
What reforms Were introduced?
Prior to the Teacher Law, the perceived low quality of the Indonesian education 
system was seen to be associated with low teacher motivation because of low 
relative rates of pay. As previous chapters have discussed, a professional  allowance 
was introduced as the result of teachers being certified.
The Teacher Law also attempted to tackle the inefficiencies in teacher 
 deployment by making certification conditional on a 24 period-hour teaching 
week. In many schools, particularly at the junior secondary level, teachers taught 
for a relatively limited amount of the working week. At the secondary level, 
teachers officially can teach only one subject; for many, teaching 24 hours in the 
same school is difficult because of the limited number of classes and the number 
of hours devoted to each subject in the curriculum. For example, the current 
curriculum suggests approximately four hours of teaching on mathematics, 
English, Bahasa Indonesia, the natural sciences, and social sciences per week for 
each grade. For a teacher certified to teach only one subject and teaching in a 
school with only one class in each grade—often the case for small, often isolated 
schools—it is only possible to teach a maximum of 12 hours. This has, in some 
cases, improved efficiency in teacher deployment because those unable to 
achieve 24 hours of teaching in their own school have fulfilled the criteria by 
teaching in more than one school.
Remote-area allowances were also introduced as part of the Teacher Law to 
address both the overall shortage of teachers and the poor educational back-
ground of existing teachers in these areas. These initial reforms have been supple-
mented with scholarships and upgrading programs for teachers already working 
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in these areas. For example, as described in chapter 3, a program for graduate 
teachers to work in remote areas was introduced in 2011. The program promises 
scholarships for postgraduate professional training (a requirement for certifica-
tion) if recipients are willing to move back to remote areas to teach for at least a 
year. Currently about 5,000 teachers are participating in this program.
Central and district hiring of non-civil-service (non-Pegawai Negeri Sipil 
[PNS]) teachers was also frozen in 2005, and a process of converting existing 
non-PNS teachers to civil servants began (Ragatz 2010). This was in part a 
response to low educational quality and the generally lower levels of education 
that non-PNS teachers had. At the same time, the School Operational Assistance 
(Bantuan Operasional Sekolah [BOS]) program was introduced that provided all 
primary and junior secondary schools with grants for operational spending. As 
much as 30 percent of these grants were used to finance non-PNS hiring (Ragatz 
2010). Recognizing that this was contributing to the overstaffing of schools, the 
government introduced in 2011 a 20 percent ceiling on teacher payments from 
BOS funds.
At the same time, a number of other reforms also had an impact on the effi-
ciency of the teaching force. Since 2007, staffing standards have been introduced 
not only to ensure that schools are adequately staffed but also to identify schools 
with surplus teachers who could potentially be moved to schools without 
enough teachers. The most recent set of regulations (issued as a joint decree by 
all central ministries with responsibility for teacher hiring and deployment in 
2011) aimed to improve the distribution of teachers and tackle the incentives for 
overhiring.
the impacts of reform
Effects on Teacher Supply
Ensuring that the teaching profession attracts some of the brightest school gradu-
ates into preservice education is crucial for the quality of any education system. 
To do this, the teaching profession has to be attractive compared with other simi-
lar jobs in terms of remuneration, working conditions, and job satisfaction. In 
many of the best-performing countries, selection processes for teacher education 
ensure that only appropriate individuals are selected for teacher education and 
that intakes match with teacher needs. For example, in Singapore, only one in 
five applicants for teacher education programs is offered a place, but almost all 
of those graduating enter the teaching profession (Ragatz 2010).
In Indonesia, the increased salary of teachers brought about through certifica-
tion has made teaching an attractive profession. Wages for noncertified teachers 
with a four-year degree are similar to nonteachers with the same qualifications, 
as shown in figure 6.1. However, certified teachers earn substantially more than 
other individuals with similar levels of education. In fact, certified teachers can 
earn approximately twice as much as individuals with similar qualifications. 
Although these wage increases have not led to significant improvements in 
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teacher behavior and student learning outcomes, there is some evidence to sug-
gest that high wages have begun to attract somewhat better candidates into 
teacher education programs (see chapter 3).
Although increases in teacher pay have raised the quality of student intakes in 
preservice education institutions, there is a significant mismatch between the 
numbers graduating from colleges and teacher need. Chapter 4 showed that in 
2011 there were approximately 500,000 students currently training to be teach-
ers. Given the limited need for new teachers over the next few years (see the 
next section, “Effects on the Efficiency of Teacher Use”), it is unclear how this 
magnitude of newly qualified teachers will enter the current teaching profession. 
They could possibly replace existing teachers who do not have the required 
qualifications to teach under the new law. However, almost all of these in-service 
teachers (approximately 500,000) are currently upgrading their qualifications to 
ensure that they comply with the new qualification requirements. Because many 
of these teachers are non-PNS teachers, the political consequences of replacing 
non-PNS teachers with newly qualified graduates would be significant.
Effects on Public Spending
Reforms to improve teacher quality, outlined in earlier chapters, have placed and 
will continue to place significant pressure on the education budget. In  particular, 
the teacher professional allowance paid to teachers who become certified effec-
tively doubles the basic pay of teachers’ salaries. With over 2 million teachers 
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currently teaching in primary and junior secondary schools across Indonesia, the 
resources necessary to implement the certification program fully are enormous.
The reforms have been largely financed by increases in government investment 
in education and the fulfillment in 2009 of the constitutional obligation to devote 
20 percent of the public budget to education. Between 2001 and 2009, govern-
ment spending on education increased by 120 percent in real terms (see figure 
6.2). Increases in the education budget have been most rapid since the introduc-
tion of the certification program. Between 2006 and 2010, the overall education 
budget increased in real terms by 47 percent or Rp 66 trillion ($6 billion).
Implications of Increased Teacher Recruitment, Certification, and Salaries
A significant proportion of the increased public investment in education has 
been devoted to hiring more teachers and increasing their pay through the 
 certification program. Between 2006 and 2010, an additional 450,000 teachers 
were recruited, and by 2010 approximately 30 percent of all teachers had been 
 certified.1 Approximately 60 percent of the increased resources going to educa-
tion between 2006–08 and 2009 were absorbed by teacher salaries and 
 allowances (Cerdan-Infantes and Makarova 2013). In 2011, the  professional 
allowance associated with certification cost Rp 23 trillion or 9  percent of the 
overall education budget.
Until recently, the large proportion of non-PNS teachers has constrained the 
budgetary impact of the reform. Teacher salaries combined with the number of 
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students a typical teacher teaches are key drivers of the costs of education provi-
sion. Indonesia’s low student-teacher ratios and higher salaries resulting from 
teacher certification imply that a large proportion of the education budget is 
devoted to paying teachers. However, 30 percent of the primary and secondary 
school teaching force is made up of non-PNS teachers who earn significantly 
less than their civil service counterparts. This limits overall salary expenditures 
and is a key factor in explaining Indonesia’s relatively low share of teacher sala-
ries in overall government education spending compared with other countries 
(see  figure 6.3).
Certifying the remaining 1.7 million teachers (70 percent of the total) by 
2015 will have enormous budgetary implications.2 With the current pay scale 
and information on all teachers currently teaching in primary and junior second-
ary, it is possible to estimate the total cost of certification.3 Using this approach, 
it is estimated that the provision of the existing professional allowance associated 
with only the certification of all primary and junior secondary school teachers 
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Sources: UIS 2010; Indonesia data based on Cerdan-Infantes and Makarova 2013.
a. Indonesia’s salary expenditure includes salary subsidies from certification and payment for contract 
teachers under School Operational Assistance (Bantuan Operasional Sekolah, or BOS) in addition to civil 
servant salaries.
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would cost approximately Rp 68 trillion ($7 billion in constant 2012 prices).4 
Combining this with estimates of salaries and allowances suggests that the total 
salary bill for these teachers would rise in real terms to Rp 139 trillion 
($16  billion), a 43 percent increase over the estimated 2012 salary bill.
In 2005, when the Teacher Law was introduced, the budgetary impact was 
even larger. At that time, the constitutional obligation to spend 20 percent of the 
budget on education had not been met, and the education budget had grown by 
only 37 percent in real terms between 2000 and 2005. Questions about the 
affordability of the program were raised at the time of its introduction. However, 
the strength of the demands of the teacher associations (supported by many 
parliamentarians) to raise teacher income appears to have trumped issues of the 
future affordability of the program.
Budgetary Trade-offs from Increased Certification Costs
There are substantial trade-offs associated with the increases in salary spending 
that result from certifying all teachers. Government medium-term budget 
 projections show that overall government spending is estimated to grow by 
approximately 3 percent in real terms between 2012 and 2015 (World Bank 
2012a). This projection also suggests that the education budget will increase only 
marginally over the next few years if it is assumed that the share of government 
 spending going to education remains constant at 20 percent.
Certifying all eligible primary and junior secondary school teachers by 2015 
will absorb approximately 41 percent of the total education budget in 2015 
compared with 32 percent in 2012. If nonsalary spending in basic education is 
maintained at its 2012 level, this would imply that basic education would absorb 
64 percent of the budget in 2015 compared with approximately 56 percent in 
2012. This increased spending would require cutbacks in other levels of educa-
tion. The remaining budget for other educational levels, after all civil service 
 teachers were certified, would be Rp 113 trillion ($11.8 billion) in 2015, down 
from Rp 135 trillion ($14.1 billion) in 2012 (figure 6.4).5
The rising cost of the certification program will continue to limit investments 
in other areas crucial for improving educational quality. So far, the certification 
program has not had a significant impact on teacher quality and student learning 
outcomes. Improving other factors associated with teacher quality has the 
 potential to deliver bigger impacts on student learning outcomes. For example, 
weaknesses in preservice and in-service teacher education, ongoing professional 
development, and incentive systems have all been highlighted as factors associ-
ated with low teacher quality. Improvements in these areas would likely have 
significant payoffs, but the costs of the ongoing certification program will limit 
the resources available to make these additional investments.
The future costs of certification will also threaten other government  objectives 
in the education sector. For example, the government plans to expand early child-
hood education programs, including kindergartens, and to mandate that compul-
sory education should include the three years of senior secondary education. 
Conservative estimates suggest that the additional public costs of expanding 
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senior secondary access in this way would be Rp 15 trillion ($1.5  billion), equiva-
lent to 26 percent of the overall cost of the basic education certification program 
(Cerdan-Infantes and Makarova 2013). It is unclear where these resources will 
come from, given the costs of the certification  program and the limited prospects 
for education receiving more than 20 percent of the government budget in the 
near future.
More broadly, the costs of the certification program will slow the shift of 
spending from basic to postbasic education seen in other rapidly developing 
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middle-income countries. The budget projections show that the share of the 
budget going to basic education will increase as more teachers become certified. 
Indonesia already spends a relatively high share of its public education spending 
on basic education and significantly more than other countries in the region (see 
figure 6.5). As in these countries, Indonesia will need to start investing more 
heavily in both preschool and postbasic education if it is to provide the skilled 
labor force necessary to improve productivity and continue its impressive record 
of economic growth.
Capping Unsustainable Certification Costs, Finding Savings
Government plans to convert all non-PNS teachers to civil servants are finan-
cially unsustainable given current budget projections.6 Approximately Rp 68 tril-
lion ($5 billion) would be needed to certify and convert all existing non-PNS 
teachers to civil servants.7 Taking the certification and conversion of non-PNS 
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teachers to civil servants of all primary and junior secondary school teachers 
together would imply that 89 percent of the total education budget in 2015 
would need to be devoted to basic education (as previously shown in  figure 6.4). 
Given the commitments outside of basic education, this level of spending is 
completely unsustainable.
Improving the use of teachers and raising student-teacher ratios hold out the 
prospect of lessening the budgetary impact of certification. Simple simulations 
demonstrate the significant savings that could be realized by raising student-
teacher ratios. Figure 6.6 shows the overall salary and certification costs for 
teachers eligible for certification at different student-teacher ratios.
The first bar shows the costs of salaries and professional allowances if all these 
teachers were certified at current student-teacher ratios. The subsequent bars 
show the effect of modest increases in the student-teacher ratio on the cost of 
certifying all teachers. If the student-teacher ratio increased to 22 to 1—
Indonesia’s level in the early 2000s—the salary and certification costs would be 
Rp 102 trillion ($10.6 billion) or 21 percent less than the costs estimated at cur-
rent student-teacher ratios. Comparing this figure with the budget projections 
outlined earlier in the chapter shows that this increase in the student-teacher 
ratio would mean that basic education absorbs a slightly smaller share of overall 
educational resources in 2015. This shift would leave more resources available 
for other access and quality investments. Clearly, raising student-teacher ratios to 
these levels requires reducing the overall teaching force in basic education and 
adjusting staffing standards to improve the efficiency of teacher use.
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Effects on the Efficiency of Teacher Use
Changes to the staffing standards introduced in the aftermath of the Teacher Law 
have not addressed the overstaffing issue. Teacher numbers have continued to rise 
at a faster rate than the student population at the primary level, and  student-teacher 
ratios have declined from 19 to 1 when reforms were introduced in 2005 to around 
17 to 1 in 2010 (Cerdan-Infantes and Makarova 2013). At the junior secondary 
level, student-teacher ratios have risen since the introduction of the teacher 
reforms, which may be largely due to the faster enrollment expansion in this subsector.
Too Many Teachers, Unequally Distributed
Overall, Indonesia continues to have some of the lowest student-teacher ratios in 
the world (see figure 6.7). While some other countries have seen student-teacher 
ratios decline significantly over the past five years, those ratios started out at 
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much higher levels and the declines are much more likely to be associated with 
improvements in quality. For example, between 2007 and 2010, the junior 
 secondary student-teacher ratio in Cambodia declined from 31 to 1 to 24 to 1.
Estimates of the size of the teaching force needed to fulfill the new staffing 
standards show that there are too many teachers (both civil service teachers and 
non-PNS) currently in the system. Comparing existing staffing levels with the 
standards for student-teacher ratios laid out in the latest joint decree on teacher 
management shows that there is a surplus of approximately 100,000 primary 
school teachers, equivalent to 7 percent of the current teaching force. At the 
junior secondary level, there are approximately 30,000 surplus teachers, equiva-
lent to 6 percent of the teaching force.8 But although there are too many teachers 
in the system, their unequal distribution means that many schools still have 
fewer teachers than they need.
Although there are more teachers in the national teaching force than required 
under existing staffing norms, implementing these standards fully would not lead 
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2010 (continued)
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to significant improvements in teacher efficiency. Despite some gains in effi-
ciency at the junior secondary level, existing staffing standards limit the extent 
to which student-teacher ratios can rise further. For example, based on 2010 
enrollment, fulfillment of the joint decree staffing standards would increase the 
student-teacher ratio at the primary and junior secondary levels by only one 
student. These changes are unlikely to improve the efficiency of overall teacher 
use significantly.
The 24-hour rule for teachers has not had a significant impact on the size of 
the teaching force so far. A recent study showed that approximately half of all 
primary and junior secondary school teachers’ workloads fell below the 24 
period-hour minimum for certification (Ragatz 2010). A much larger proportion 
of junior secondary school teachers (71 percent) fell below the threshold than 
primary school teachers (30 percent) (Ragatz 2010). As more teachers seek cer-
tification, a greater proportion of teachers will need to teach a minimum of 24 
period-hours a week. It is possible that this will reduce the overall need for teach-
ers and address some of the overstaffing issues. Although this result will rely on 
strong enforcement of the 24-hour rule, it also has the potential to affect learning 
quality. Evidence suggests that teachers are complying with the law by teaching 
in more than one school. The increased travel time and burden on teachers of 
teaching in different schools may have negative effects on learning. The impact 
evaluation study, however, does not reveal any systematic effects of certification 
on teaching hours (as shown in chapter 4, figure 4.12).
Reliance on Small Schools Increases Inefficiency
Staffing standards for small schools are a key contributor to the low student-
teacher ratios in primary and junior secondary schools. Indonesia is not alone in 
facing the challenge of providing an adequate learning environment in schools 
serving relatively few children. In much of Eastern Europe, where population 
levels are declining, and in countries such as China, where massive urban migra-
tion has shrunk enrollment in rural schools, traditional class-based teacher alloca-
tions have increased the costs of education provision. Approximately a third of 
Indonesia’s primary schools have fewer than 120 students (see table 6.1). These 
table 6.1 primary and Junior secondary school size in indonesia, 2010
Primary Junior secondary
Average student enrollment per school 173 261
% of schools with fewer than 150 students 48 40
Average students per learning group 16 25
% of schools with fewer than 120 students 34 33
Average students per learning group 13 23
% of schools with fewer than 90 students 19 25
Average students per learning group 10 20
Source: World Bank 2012b.
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schools commonly have one learning group for each grade, and under current 
staffing norms this would require a total of eight teachers: six class-based  teachers 
in addition to sports and religion teachers (and, in some cases, a principal as well). 
Staffing levels of this kind result in low student-teacher ratios. Schools with 
fewer than 120 students have a maximum student-teacher ratio of 15 to 1, and 
for schools with fewer than 90 students, the ratio falls to 11 to 1. Similar issues 
exist in junior secondary schools because all schools are required to have a 
 subject teacher for each of the 11 curriculum subjects. Staffing small schools at 
these levels clearly has a downward impact on national student-teacher ratios 
and the overall efficiency of the education system.
The large number of small schools is commonly explained by the low popula-
tion density of many areas in Indonesia. Where areas are sparsely populated, the 
size of schools can be limited because the number of potential students in any 
school’s catchment area can be small. One way of looking at this is to compare 
the proportion of small schools in a province with its population density (see 
figure 6.8). This shows that schools tend to be smaller in provinces with sparser 
populations, but the relationship is weak.9 For example, 64 percent of all primary 
schools have fewer than 120 students in East Kalimantan where population 
 density is very low (64 people per square kilometer). However, in South Sumatra, 
the proportion of small schools is much lower despite only having a slightly higher 
population density than East Kalimantan (86 people per square kilometer).
However, some of the most densely populated provinces have large numbers 
of small schools and relatively low student-teacher ratios. For example, 39 per-
cent of the primary schools in East Java have fewer than 120 students despite 
being densely populated (that is, a population density of 828 people per square 
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kilometer). Given that 14 percent of teachers and 21 percent of all primary 
school students are located in East Java, raising teacher efficiency by increasing 
the size of schools in this province could have significant national payoffs.
Additional efforts to address staffing issues in small schools have not been 
implemented on a national scale. For example, multigrade teaching has been used 
successfully in other countries to tackle staffing issues in small schools (Little 
2006). In Indonesia, multigrade teaching is already practiced in a very small 
number of primary schools, and training for teachers in this approach is available 
from a number of sources (World Bank 2010). However, these pilot programs 
have not been successfully expanded and have not begun to address the signifi-
cant inefficiencies associated with the staffing of small schools.
At the junior secondary level, dual subject-based teaching also has the poten-
tial to improve the efficiency of staffing in small schools. Current staffing norms 
require junior secondary schools to have one teacher for each subject, and teach-
ers can only be accredited in a single subject. In small schools where class sizes 
are small, these standards result in low student-teacher ratios. They also make it 
difficult for teachers to fulfill their commitment to teach 24 period-hours each 
week. Informally, dual subject teaching takes place, but reforms to preservice 
education courses’ certification criteria to make teaching in more than one 
 subject acceptable have not yet been planned or implemented.
Effects on Composition of Teaching Force
Although recent reforms have failed to tackle significantly the overstaffing of 
schools, they have affected the composition of the primary school teaching force. 
Between 2006 and 2010, a large number of teachers hired at the district level 
were converted to civil servants. Coupled with temporary freezes on  recruitment, 
the number of civil service teachers has remained relatively unchanged since 
2006.
Increase in Temporary Contract Teachers
However, the increased hiring of teachers at the school level has meant that total 
teacher numbers have continued to rise (see figure 6.9). For example, between 
2006 and 2010, the number of school-hired temporary primary school teachers 
(Guru Tidak Tetap, or GTT) increased from 175,000 to 475,000; they now 
 represent nearly 30 percent of all primary school teachers. The School 
Operational Assistance program, introduced in 2005, has contributed to these 
increases. In 2011, schools used approximately a fifth of the school grants 
received under the program to hire teachers.
Teacher hiring at the school level is not governed by existing regulations 
 outlining the required qualifications and experience that civil service teachers 
require. This omission of school-hired teachers circumvents any attempt by 
 central and local governments to achieve a more efficient teaching force. 
Although there is little evidence of the criteria used for school hiring, it is 
 possible that factors apart from teaching competency are used that result in 
weaker candidates being employed. On the whole, non-PNS teachers are less 
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qualified and experienced than civil service teachers. For example, in 2010, 24 
percent of primary school non-PNS teachers had qualifications at the four-year 
degree level or above compared with 29 percent of civil service teachers 
(NUPTK 2010).
The large number of non-PNS teachers in Indonesian schools is also common 
in other countries such as Cambodia, China, India, Nepal, Nicaragua, Pakistan, 
and Sri Lanka (Duthilleul 2005; Fyfe 2007). Contract or temporary teachers have 
been employed in these countries for a range of reasons. In some countries, they 
are seen to provide a cheap or cost-effective way of extending access to education. 
For example, in West Africa, much of the recent expansion in primary school 
access has been facilitated by the hiring of contract teachers (UNESCO 2009). In 
other countries, contract teachers have been an effective way of  tackling teacher 
deployment issues by recruiting from the local population in hard-to-reach areas. 
In India, many states have recruited contract teachers from marginalized com-
munities, thus increasing the teaching force in areas where civil service teachers 
are generally unwilling to work (Govinda and Josephine 2005). Contract teachers 
have also been seen as a way of addressing weaknesses in the mechanisms used to 
hold civil service teachers accountable. In particular, short-term contracts con-
trolled by lower levels of government, the school, or school committees are seen 
to provide stronger incentives and better monitoring of teacher performance.
International evidence on the impact contract teachers have on teacher perfor-
mance is mixed. Although the evidence base remains small and concentrated in 
only a few countries, a review of recent evaluations using randomized,  controlled 
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trials and matching methodologies showed that in some countries contract teach-
ers were less often absent than civil service teachers and their  students learned 
more (Bruns, Filmer, and Patrinos 2011). In other countries, contract teachers 
were more likely to be absent, and their effect on learning was not uniform.
Although comparisons between civil service and contract teachers are illumi-
nating, these two types of teachers are not usually alternatives for each other. 
Many teachers accept the lower wages and poorer working conditions of contract 
teaching because it is the first step to securing a civil service job. It is unlikely in 
these cases that introducing contract teaching on a wider scale would be sustain-
able over the longer term. A study in India showed that differences in learning 
outcomes between contract and civil service teachers narrowed as the number of 
contracts received by the contract teacher increased (Goyal and Pandey 2009).
Mixed Evidence on the Impact of Contract Teachers
In Indonesia, the recruitment of non-PNS teachers has contributed to the poor 
distribution and overstaffing of the basic education system. The large number 
of school-hired and temporary non-PNS teachers is only partly driven by filling 
vacant civil service posts. Schools with shortages of civil service teachers tend 
to hire more non-PNS teachers, but many small schools with adequate civil 
service teachers also hire non-PNS teachers from their own funds. For example, 
in 2010, over 80 percent of primary schools with adequate or surplus numbers 
of civil service teachers employed non-PNS teachers. Approximately 30 percent 
of all non-PNS teachers were teaching in these schools. Non-PNS teachers are 
also not heavily concentrated among the more remote and poorer areas of 
Indonesia. For example, approximately 6 percent of all non-PNS teachers teach 
in remote areas of Indonesia compared with 4 percent of civil service teachers.
In a similar way to the international literature, evidence on the impact of non-
PNS teachers in Indonesia is mixed. A recent cross-sectional study suggested that 
the share of non-PNS teachers is positively related to learning outcomes (Chen 
2011). However, there does not seem to be a clear difference in absenteeism 
levels between civil service and non-PNS teachers. On the one hand, a national 
survey on teacher absenteeism found that non-PNS teachers were more likely to 
be absent than their civil service counterparts (Usman and Suryadarma 2004). 
On the other hand, more recent work in the poorer and more remote Papua 
province shows that non-PNS teachers are less likely to be absent than civil 
 service teachers (UNCEN et al. 2012).
The Teacher Law and the requirement for all teachers to have a four-year 
degree are having a significant impact on non-PNS teachers. Approximately 
three-quarters of all primary school non-PNS teachers, or 400,000 teachers, will 
need to upgrade their qualifications to a four-year degree to continue to teach 
and become eligible for certification. Upgrading is occurring on a massive scale, 
with approximately 500,000 in-service teachers enrolling in distance learning 
courses. However, non-PNS teachers are not eligible for the same professional 
allowances, and this will add to growing pressure from teacher associations for 
these teachers to become civil servants.
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Incentives and Corruption in Civil Service Teacher Recruitment
Despite the slowdown in civil service hiring, with the introduction of decentral-
ization in 2001, the teacher recruitment process for local governments included 
significant incentives for overhiring civil service teachers. Intergovernmental 
resource transfers are partly determined by the size of a local government’s 
 payroll. Districts with larger numbers of civil servants receive more from the 
transfer system. It has been estimated that central government transfers cover 
approximately 75 percent of the salary of an additional civil service teacher. This, 
in effect, subsidizes local governments’ costs for additional teachers and creates 
incentives for increased hiring.
The process of establishing new civil service teaching posts also contributes to 
incentives for overhiring. Decisions on the establishment of new posts in each 
district are made at the central level by the Ministry of Administrative and 
Bureaucratic Reform (MenPAN) and the Ministry of Finance based on requests 
from local governments. Quotas are set annually by considering local govern-
ment requests for additional staff and the current budget situation. The actual 
process within MenPAN of determining quotas remains unclear (Kluyskens and 
Firdaus 2009). However, the process usually results in provincial and district 
governments receiving fewer posts every year than they requested. This creates 
incentives for local governments to exaggerate their actual needs, knowing that 
they will only receive a fraction of their initial request.
The political economy of local governance also creates incentives for local 
governments to seek to raise the number of civil service teachers. A recent sym-
posium held at the Ministry of Education and Culture concluded that the 
appointment of teachers is “characterized by corruption, lack of transparency, 
primordial regionalism, and co-opted by the political interests of the ruling 
authorities” and that “many teachers are not appointed in accordance with the 
requirements of the minimum standards of teacher competencies” (Ministry of 
Education and Culture 2012).
A number of studies have shown that it is common for payments to be made 
to obtain access to civil service jobs. A study conducted in 2004 interviewed 60 
civil servants in two districts in Nusa Tenggara Barat and found that payment for 
jobs was commonplace (Kristiansen and Ramli 2006). Civil servants reported 
paying Rp 24 million on average in 2004 (Rp 41 million in 2012 prices) to obtain 
a position—equivalent to about one year’s basic pay for a primary or junior sec-
ondary teacher.10 The study also found that payment for posts had increased 
since decentralization reforms were implemented. Although payment for civil 
service positions appears to be common, it is not uniform across districts. A 
2005/06 study found that in seven of the eight districts surveyed, nongovern-
ment respondents reported the necessity to pay for civil service positions 
although the amount of the payment varied significantly. In the remaining dis-
trict, Solok in West Sumatra, no payments were thought to be needed to gain 
access to the civil service (Von Luebke 2009).
For the individual, paying for a post provides access to a stable income and a 
number of nonmonetary benefits that are often unavailable outside of the civil 
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service. On the other side of the transaction, payments for civil service positions 
do not just benefit those allocating the posts. They are frequently part of 
 revenue-generating schemes that support political activity at the local and 
national levels. Positions are also sometimes allocated as rewards for political 
 support or part of the payoff for broader local political settlements. This has 
become more commonplace with the election of district regents who then 
appoint the heads of government offices such as education—who in turn have 
considerable  influence in personnel issues in the district. The upshot of these 
recruitment practices is that a larger civil service often serves a number of per-
sonal and  political objectives at the local level.
Recruitment practices can also have consequences for the quality of the 
national teaching force. Once in the civil service, teachers have the opportunity 
to recoup payments made to obtain their jobs by, for example, charging informal 
fees at school or obtaining side payments from school suppliers (Rosser, Joshi, 
and Edwin 2011). These practices can have negative impacts for education 
because they divert resources intended for improving access and quality. In 
 addition, where payments are required for positions, it is rare for only the best 
qualified candidates to gain employment. This can have the effect of reducing 
the overall quality of the national teaching force.
If existing recruitment processes are left unchanged, some of the longer-term 
positive effects of the certification program will be reduced. As previous chapters 
have shown, increased teacher pay is attracting more and perhaps better students 
into teacher education. However, current recruitment practices imply that merit 
is only one factor in determining who gets a teaching position, and it is therefore 
unclear whether the more-able new graduates will enter the profession. 
Furthermore, the significant increase in the supply of new teachers and the 
 limited projected need for additional teachers are likely to raise the cost of 
obtaining a civil service teaching post and may deter the abler students from 
entering the profession.
Effects on Teacher Distribution
Many countries face enormous challenges in allocating teachers across schools in 
a fair and transparent way (Mulkeen 2009; UNESCO 2009). Frequently, weak-
nesses in teacher distribution lead to very different learning environments for 
children in different areas. For example, in many countries, children in remote 
areas and from poor households often face a double disadvantage in their school 
careers: school infrastructure tends to be in a poorer state, and the teaching force 
is less qualified and experienced relative to schools in more affluent areas.
Indonesian Teacher Allocation: Widespread Inequality
The distribution of teachers across schools in Indonesia is unequal and has not 
improved significantly as a result of reform efforts over the past 10 years. In 
2005, a survey using the existing entitlement formula showed that 55 percent of 
primary schools in Indonesia were overstaffed and 34 percent understaffed 
(Ragatz 2010). Analysis using data from 2010 and the latest staffing standards 
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show that 30 percent of primary schools remain understaffed, and 59 percent 
remain overstaffed (World Bank 2012b).
The scale of redistribution necessary to allocate teachers more equally is large. 
If local governments redistributed existing teachers to fulfill the latest standards, 
approximately 343,000 primary and junior secondary school teachers (17 per-
cent of the total workforce) would need to be transferred. Most of this redistribu-
tion would involve moving teachers within the same districts. However, 
approximately 66,000 teachers would need to be moved from districts with 
surplus teachers to deficit districts in the same province (see figure 6.10). After 
transfers within and across districts, approximately 37,000 teachers could trans-
fer from districts in one province to fill deficits in other provinces to further 
improve teacher redistribution.
Formal and Informal Mechanisms for Transfers, with Mixed Results
Existing mechanisms that govern cross-border redeployment are not sufficient to 
deal with the scale of transfer needed to improve the distribution of teachers. 
Transfers across districts and provinces tend to be done on an ad hoc basis and 
rely on individual teachers identifying openings in one district or school and each 
district initially agreeing to a transfer. When transfers are agreed on, the budget 
for the salaries of transferring teachers is moved to the receiving district or prov-
ince. It seems unlikely that districts and provinces would be willing to lose a 
teacher and the associated resources to effect a transfer (Kluyskens and Firdaus 
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
140,000
160,000
180,000
Primary Junior secondary
N
um
be
r o
f t
ea
ch
er
s
Number of existing teachers to move within districts
Number of existing teachers to move between districts in same province
Number of existing teachers to move across provinces
Figure 6.10 teacher redistribution necessary to comply with staffing standards in 
indonesian primary and Junior secondary schools, 2010
Sources: World Bank 2012b.
Note: The estimates show the number of teachers currently in schools with excess teachers (according to the 
joint decree) that could be transferred to take up teaching in schools with staffing deficits. Class-based, sports, 
and local content teachers are included in the estimates. The estimates include both civil service and 
non-civil-service teachers. Madrassahs are not included in these estimates.
The Impact of the Reforms on the Efficiency and Equity of Public Spending 175
Teacher Reform in Indonesia • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-9829-6 
2009). These relatively informal mechanisms for redistribution are therefore 
unlikely to be sufficient for the large redistribution required to achieve a more 
equitable distribution of teachers nationally.
The Teacher Law also introduced a remote area allowance to encourage teach-
ers to teach in remote areas and improve their motivation. In 2012, approxi-
mately 53,000 teachers received the allowance. However, many of the teachers 
who are currently receiving the allowance were already working in remote areas, 
and so the extent to which it has attracted new teachers to these areas is unclear. 
In some areas, enlightened local governments have used these allowances to 
enforce redistribution, without which this remote allowance may not have a 
major effect on the distribution of teachers.
Despite the limited coverage of incentives of this kind, they have the potential 
to improve teacher distribution. A 2008 study in four districts showed that in 
one, absenteeism rates for teachers receiving the allowance were lower, but in the 
remaining districts, differences were either small or absenteeism was higher for 
teachers receiving the allowance (SMERU Research Institute 2010). In a more 
recent study conducted in Papua in 2011, absenteeism rates for teachers receiv-
ing incentives for teaching in remote areas were lower compared with other 
teachers (UNCEN et al. 2012). However, the study also noted that the coverage 
and targeting of the remote area allowance were weak and that this resulted in 
many teachers not receiving the support they needed to teach in remote areas. 
These results suggest that incentives introduced as part of the Teacher Law need 
to be strengthened to maximize their impact on the distribution of teachers.
Recruiting teachers from local communities may also be an effective strategy 
for improving teacher distribution. Teachers who move to remote and hard-to-
reach areas can face significant challenges in finding accommodation, enrolling 
their children in school, and generally assimilating to local life. These challenges 
can be reduced if teachers are recruited from the local community. However, the 
poor state of education in remote areas frequently means that the number of 
individuals with the requisite qualifications is limited. Some local governments 
have begun to address these constraints by providing scholarships to local youth 
to train as teachers on the condition that they return and teach in their own com-
munity. A similar program, introduced by the central government, is also 
 supporting the professional development of teachers in remote areas. These 
 initiatives provide an alternative strategy to providing incentives for teachers to 
move to remote areas.
Differences in the educational qualifications of teachers between provinces 
and districts still remain significant despite the reforms that have taken place. A 
teacher’s educational background provides only a partial proxy for teaching com-
petency, but data from 2010 show that there are still large disparities across 
provinces and districts (see figure 6.11). Just over 20 percent of teachers in 
Kalimantan Barat Province have a four-year degree compared with 60 percent in 
Jakarta. Although it may be difficult to move existing teachers, it is possible that 
the distribution can be improved over time by allocating newly qualified teachers 
to areas and schools with the greatest need, as further discussed in box 6.1.
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Figure 6.11 percentage of indonesian teachers with a Four-Year Degree, by province, 2010
Source: Cerdan-Infantes and Makarova 2013.
Note: Includes all teachers from TK (Kindergarten) to SMU (Senior Secondary). The box plot graph shows the distribution of districts within each 
province in terms of the percentage of teachers with at least a four-year degree. The box represents the difference between the districts at the 
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Box 6.1 District initiatives to improve teacher Distribution
A successful program was introduced in Gorontalo district in 2006. The local government 
introduced a policy to employ only those teachers who agreed to be posted to schools that 
required that particular teacher’s skill set. Teachers also agreed, through an eight-year contract 
with the local government, to be redeployed with the  changing staffing needs of schools 
within the district (Kluyskens, Rawlinson, and Ragatz 2007). This policy allowed new teachers 
to be deployed to schools with the greatest need while also giving the local education office 
the flexibility to move teachers according to changing needs.
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conclusions
Large-scale teacher reforms have been introduced over the past decade to 
improve the quality of teaching in Indonesia. A key component of these reforms 
has been an increase in pay for certified teachers. While previous chapters have 
shown that the short-run impact of certification on teacher behavior and student 
learning has been limited, the current chapter shows that its impact on the 
 education budget has and will continue to be enormous. Failure to address the 
 rapidly rising costs of certification will result in the crowding out of spending in 
other areas necessary to improve educational quality and further expand access. 
Therefore, efforts to improve teacher management will be key to tackling the 
growing wage bill.
Reforms to manage the overstaffing and low student-teacher ratios that 
 characterize the Indonesian education system have been less successful. The 
chapter has shown that student-teacher ratios—a good indicator of the efficiency 
of teacher use—are very low in Indonesia compared with other countries. Efforts 
to improve staffing standards and the introduction of the 24-hour rule have not, 
up until now, led to significant improvements in these ratios. At the primary 
level, student-teacher ratios have continued to decline over the decade.
The failure to improve teacher management is only partly connected with 
how staffing standards have been implemented. Although many schools are not 
staffed according to current standards, this chapter shows that even if these stan-
dards were implemented fully, student-teacher ratios would not increase signifi-
cantly. A number of structural issues limit the ability of staffing standards to 
improve efficiency. In particular, standards have yet to tackle staffing issues in the 
large number of small schools in Indonesia. Potential solutions to staffing small 
schools—such as multigrade and dual or cluster-based teaching—have not been 
introduced on a national scale. These structural issues are only likely to intensify 
as Indonesia continues to urbanize.
The distribution of teachers has also not improved significantly over the past 
10 years. Despite increases in the overall number of teachers, many schools still 
have fewer teachers than they need while others have too many. Clearly, some 
local governments and schools choose to employ more teachers than the mini-
mum set out in staffing standards. However, this raises serious issues about equity 
when some urban schools are better staffed than more remote schools in the 
same district. The finding that better and more qualified teachers tend to teach 
in urban areas reinforces these inequalities.
The political economy of teacher hiring and distribution is also important in 
explaining the current situation. The current overstaffing of schools and the low 
student-teacher ratios are not driven by the lack of a detailed diagnosis of the 
problem; the issues covered in this chapter have been well documented in stud-
ies commissioned prior to the reforms. It is likely that some of the increased 
teacher hiring in recent years has been the result of the national 20 percent 
budgetary commitment to education. Local governments and schools, with few 
alternatives, have hired teachers as a way of fulfilling these spending 
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commitments. At the local level, teacher hiring and transfer decisions are also 
highly political, and there are many benefits to hiring teachers as well as agreeing 
to teacher demands to stay in urban and better-connected areas. Addressing these 
issues will be vital if the efficiency of teacher management is to be improved.
It is important to recognize that improvements to the current distribution of 
teachers will take time to implement. However, a number of trends present 
opportunities to improve teacher management over the medium term. 
Government plans for further expansion of both kindergartens and secondary 
education will require more teachers, and this provides an opportunity to 
 redeploy existing teachers to teach in these new schools. Reductions in the 
 teaching force resulting from retirement also present opportunities to improve 
efficiency. In the next five years, approximately 10 percent (150,000 primary and 
30,000 junior secondary school teachers) of the teaching force will reach retire-
ment age. This represents a large opportunity to adjust the size of the teaching 
force without having to resort to the reassignment of teachers across levels.
Education is central to Indonesia’s ambitious plans to accelerate economic 
growth and reduce poverty. If these plans are to be achieved, the education 
 system needs to provide broader access to educational opportunities and improve 
the quality of existing provision. The government has signaled its commitment 
to achieving these goals by earmarking 20 percent of the national budget to 
 education. However, significant inefficiencies exist that, left unchecked, will 
severely constrain future improvements in educational quality and access. 
Teacher oversupply and the very low student-teacher ratios that result are a key 
determinant of existing inefficiency. Tackling these inefficiencies through 
improved teacher management is vital if national goals for education and 
 accelerated economic growth are to be realized.
notes
 1. This data are from NUPTK (2010) and include teachers from kindergarten to senior 
secondary. It excludes teachers in the madrassah system.
 2. Currently school-hired temporary teachers (Guru Tidak Tetap, or GTT) are not 
 eligible for the certification program. In 2010 there were approximately 900,000 
teachers of this type teaching between kindergarten and senior secondary. These 
teachers are included in the 1.7 million teachers reported as being noncertified.
 3. These estimates assume that the professional allowance associated with certification is 
equivalent to the basic pay of a civil service teacher and Rp 1.5 million per month for 
a non-civil-service permanent private school teacher (Guru Tetap Yayasan, or GTY).
 4. These estimates exclude the certification of madrassah teachers.
 5. The projected 2015 figures exclude the conversion of non-civil-service teachers to 
civil service teachers.
 6. Current certification guidelines exclude school-hired contract teachers, who make up 
approximately 30 percent of the teaching force at the primary and secondary level.
 7. This expense includes the increased cost of the professional allowance associated with 
certification that contract teachers would receive upon conversion.
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 8. These figures are used to demonstrate the magnitude of the oversupply. They are 
based on 2010 data for all teachers (both civil service and non-civil-service) and do 
not take account of subject mismatches. For example, at primary schools, there are 
approximately 165,000 surplus class-based teachers, but there are shortages of sports 
teachers that reduce the overall surplus. See Cerdan-Infantes and Makarova (2013) 
for more details.
 9. A similar weak relationship holds when the density and proportion of small schools 
are analyzed at the district level.
 10. The study found that teachers as a subgroup of the civil service paid a similar amount 
for their posts as the average, based on data from NUPTK (2010) and the 2012 civil 
service salary scale.
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Conclusions and Recommendations
the teacher law: taking measure
Teachers in Indonesia do not cast themselves in the role of change agent; they do 
not even audition for the part.
—Christopher Bjork, Indonesian Education: Teachers, Schools, and Central 
Bureaucracy (2005)
The Indonesian Teacher Law of 2005 was a landmark in many ways. In one 
sweep of legislation, it confirmed teaching as a “profession” equivalent to other 
professions, dramatically increasing the income of teachers to be commensu-
rate with, or exceed, that of lawyers or doctors. It attempted to reverse a 
decades-long decline in the status of teaching and put in place a massive 
scheme of academic qualification and formal certification that has had an 
impact on every aspect of the education system, at all levels of government. It 
mandated a wide range of other reforms focusing on the entire teacher man-
agement and development system of the Ministry of Education and Culture.1 
And it committed the government to increasingly large financial outlays to 
reward professional certification, which may have serious implications for the 
ability of the education budget to further expand the system or improve its 
quality.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the law’s various stakeholders and support-
ers have paid so much attention to its impact on the structure, mechanisms, 
strategies, processes, and ultimate outcomes of the Indonesian education system. 
The Ministry of Education and Culture itself, of course, is attentive because the 
effectiveness of the Teacher Law’s implementation directly reflects on the effi-
ciency and professionalism of the ministry. The national Parliament, the Ministry 
of Finance, and the National Planning and Development Board worry about the 
added value to the education system and its “clients”—the learners—from the 
large investment now being paid to certified teachers. The teachers’ associations, 
especially the largest and most official (the Teachers’ Association of the Republic 
of Indonesia) are concerned not only about the welfare and status of their 
c h A p t e r  7
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individual members but also about the extent to which they have genuinely 
earned and will remain worthy of the title of “professional.” And such worthiness 
will ultimately be assessed, of course, by the learners themselves, their parents, 
their future employers, and the larger society.2
Implementation of such a reform, however, is a political process that in 
Indonesia involves almost 3 million teachers (or as one political analyst put it, 
at least 30 million votes, given the minimal estimate that each teacher can 
each affect 10 votes from family members). As a result, media coverage of the 
reform has focused on teachers’ rights and welfare (for example, late payment 
of the professional allowance or administrative charges levied on the allow-
ance by district offices) and has lost sight of the original aim of making teach-
ers (once again) professionals. Elevating the public debate beyond that of 
solely teacher welfare to that of the quality of schooling for students has been 
a challenge for the Ministry of Education and Culture. But as empirical evi-
dence surfaced in this regard, it has helped to embolden the ministry to take 
more stringent measures to ensure that the original intentions of the law are 
achieved.
This book has documented the interplay in the reform process between the 
political context and evidence-based policy making and has drawn useful lessons 
for other emerging nations. The key lesson is that teacher reform is a very long-
term and iterative process where compromises appropriate to the political and 
economic context of the time will likely have to be made. However, over time, 
with the support of empirical evidence and renewed commitment from the 
ministry, adjustments to reform efforts can be made, as in Indonesia, that may go 
a long way toward a much more faithful implementation of the reform’s original 
intentions.
So what has worked, and what has not—and why? Organized around the 
conceptual framework for teacher reform (figure 7.1, as previously shown in 
chapter 2), the lessons drawn here resonate with the international literature.
Financial and political economy Factors
For a variety of reasons related to the political economy of the time, the mere fact 
of certification and the consequent doubling of teacher income have not achieved 
what was expected—better teaching and better learning. Certification was meant 
to be based on a minimum academic qualification (a four-year degree) and 
 mastery of the teacher’s subject and its required pedagogy; the assumption was 
that this would be translated into different teacher behaviors and better student 
outcomes. The logic of this process, however, was distorted in several ways:
•	 The selection of teachers for the early rounds of certification was based largely 
on seniority rather than merit and thus gave preference either to those whose 
four-year degrees were already many years old or to the large cohort of  teachers 
employed during the expansion of the system in the 1970s and 1980s with 
low academic qualification, low motivation, and little training (either then or 
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subsequently) who either did not need the four-year degree because of their 
age and seniority or got the degree in a piecemeal fashion. Many, therefore, 
began the certification process with low mastery of the required competencies. 
(Others, anecdotally, also got into the certification queue through political and 
personal favoritism or outright bribery.)
•	 Many of these same teachers, as the analysis in chapter 1 showed, had begun 
their careers in an era when accountability (and loyalty) to the central govern-
ment and identification with the civil service took precedence over account-
ability to their students and identification as a member of the teaching 
profession. Working for decades in such a bureaucratic environment—and the 
school cultures this engendered—did little to make them able or eager to 
become agents of change.
•	 The first method of measuring competency, the portfolio, did little to demon-
strate either subject knowledge or pedagogical skill. The questionable manner 
through which the portfolios were often assembled, and the rather inconsis-
tent way in which they were evaluated, did little to assure that the required 
competencies had, in fact, been mastered.
Figure 7.1 conceptual Framework for Quality education
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•	 The remedial measure to a failed portfolio—the 90-hour course—was helpful 
but, given its short length and the fact that it was largely standardized across 
all teachers rather than responsive to individual needs, could not make up for 
the low levels of competency of the participating teachers.
The result was that the quality of the certification process as a whole was not 
as good as originally intended (that is, based on tested mastery of specific skills 
and knowledge and adapted to the needs of individual teachers) so that there is 
now virtually no evidence of differences between certified and uncertified teach-
ers in their competencies or in their impact on student learning outcomes.
This result is consistent with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) Teaching and Learning International Survey (TALIS) 
finding that key aspects of teaching and learning that have been shown to 
improve learning include (a) teachers’ content knowledge; (b) teachers’ 
 pedagogical knowledge (both general and specific to their subject); (c) teaching 
practices that focus on clear and well-structured lessons supported by effective 
classroom management; (d) individualized instruction; and (e) active profes-
sional collaboration including classroom observations, team teaching, and 
 constructive feedback (Schleicher 2011).
For countries therefore considering a blanket increase in teacher pay, the bar 
to gain this increase has to be set to ensure that teachers are tested for competen-
cies known to be necessary for a good teacher and to ensure that low-performing 
teachers do not remain in the profession. This outcome requires that politicians 
and senior decision makers take a firmer stand in supporting the efforts of 
 ministries of education to enforce higher standards, implement more effective 
competency assessment, and redeploy or dismiss teachers who cannot meet the 
required competencies.
From a financial perspective, Indonesia increased its education budget 120 
percent between 2001 and 2009, but significant inequity remains, starting with 
the inequitable distribution as well as the overall oversupply of teachers.
The costs of extending the certification program to all civil service teachers 
and other eligible contract or temporary teachers is associated with significant 
trade-offs. Estimates suggest that spending on teacher compensation will need 
to absorb a much larger share of the available public education resources. This 
means that spending in other areas of the education budget will need to be 
reduced. For example, the certification program is likely to limit resources to 
(a) increase access to early childhood and postbasic education, and (b) invest 
in other quality-improving strategies. This book has also shown that convert-
ing non-civil-service (Pegawai Negeri Sipil [PNS]) teachers to civil servants 
and certifying them will be unsustainable given current budgetary 
projections.
To reduce the budgetary impact of the certification program, the inefficiencies 
associated with teacher hiring and deployment need to be addressed. Indonesia’s 
student-teacher ratios are already low by international standards and, at the pri-
mary level, are continuing to fall. This book has shown that even relatively small 
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increases in student-teacher ratios could realize significant budget savings while 
having limited impact on quality. Serious attention must therefore be paid soon 
to significantly restricting intake to teacher educational institutions and new hir-
ing at all levels; removing incentives for overhiring at school and district levels; 
enforcing the policies and bearing the expense of moving teachers from teacher-
surplus to teacher-deficit schools and districts; and moving underperforming 
teachers elsewhere in (or out of) the civil service system. Attention will also need 
to be paid to staffing standards in small schools, which are a key driver of low 
student-teacher ratios.
recruitment Advances and challenges
It can be argued that the expectation around certification for the senior cohort 
of existing teachers (that is, given 25 years of teaching, limited preservice educa-
tion, a school culture that encouraged civil servant obedience rather than 
 pedagogic innovation, and few opportunities for further development) was 
 overoptimistic, especially in the absence of any systematic postcertification 
 follow-up. But the incentive of both professional status and professional pay is now 
attracting more (and sometimes better-quality) candidates into teacher education at 
the expense of other fields. So although the professional allowance has had little 
impact on the quality of current teacher competence or student outcomes, it 
may produce a better cadre of teachers in the future if the rapid growth of low-
quality teacher education institutions is controlled, if minimum competency 
standards are enforced at all stages of teacher management and development—
and, of course, if qualified graduates have (merit-based) access to a teaching job 
upon graduation.
Preservice Education
The attraction of certification has led to an increase in the number of teachers who 
have achieved the required minimum of a four-year degree. This, as opposed to just 
the fact of certification, can lead to greater mastery by a graduate teacher of 
relevant subject knowledge, which can then be directly correlated with student 
achievement: the more the teachers know, the more is transmitted successfully 
to their students. Likewise, at least in the sample of 8th-grade mathematics stud-
ies in the context of the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study 
(TIMSS), teachers with mathematics education degrees (as opposed to those 
with pure mathematics degrees) have adequate knowledge of their subject but 
also demonstrate more useful teaching practices such as investigation and prob-
lem solving. This finding supports the Teacher Law in its definition of teacher 
quality as depending on both subject knowledge and pedagogy. The increase in 
enrollment for four-year degrees by practicing teachers at the Open University 
(and at other teacher education institutions with distance learning programs) 
could be a good sign, therefore, that higher-quality teachers will be entering the 
certification queue in the future—if the quality of these upgrading four-year 
programs can be assured.
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For countries setting new standards for their teaching forces, and depending 
on the structure of the education system, a four-year degree could be a useful 
benchmark. However, there has to be careful accreditation of teacher education 
institutions to ensure they test graduates for subject matter and pedagogical 
competencies as well as other necessary characteristics of a good teacher. In 
Singapore, for example, to put the focus on student learning, the National 
Institute of Education (the sole provider of initial teacher education) cut subjects 
such as history and philosophy of education from its undergraduate teacher 
education syllabus because these subjects were not leading to noticeable 
increases in student learning. More emphasis was instead placed on practical 
classroom teaching with a strong focus on subject content; for example, mathe-
matics teachers should graduate with the same mathematics content knowledge 
as straight mathematics graduates. In the Republic of Korea, preservice institu-
tions are rated, and those with an A-rating receive substantial financial bonuses. 
Courses with a D-rating must reduce their student numbers by 50 percent the 
following year. In addition, graduates must sit for examinations before they 
become teachers.
Induction, Mentoring, Probation, and Certification
In many education systems, these stages in a teacher’s career are quite distinct. 
However, in Indonesia their precise sequence in the process of teacher manage-
ment and development remains unclear—thus their combination here in one 
critical stage of this process. For practicing teachers who enter the certification 
queue (with the four-year degree) and then get certified either via a portfolio or 
(as is currently the case) following the 90-hour training course, there is no induc-
tion, mentoring, and probation. They were teachers before certification, and they 
are (supposedly more “professional”) teachers after certification. And there is no 
postcertification process in place (except regular and routine appraisals)—such 
as a new round of mentoring and probation or regular recertification—to ensure 
that they are now acting as professionals or, in other words, teaching better.
New entrants to teacher education institutions must do the following:
•	 Pass the coursework to obtain the four-year degree (granted by the 
institution)
•	 Pass the newly mandated postgraduate, classroom-focused course of profes-
sional study (six months for primary school teachers, one year for secondary 
teachers)
•	 Gain an authorized teaching post (as opposed to being hired on a school 
contract)
•	 Pass a one-year probation (through what is meant to be a systematic process of 
induction and mentoring)
The last is meant to be based both on the teacher’s previous academic record 
and on the principal’s report of the new teacher’s competence, efficiency, and 
effectiveness. The probation is completed when the teacher education institution 
Conclusions and Recommendations 187
Teacher Reform in Indonesia • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-9829-6 
finally certifies the new teacher—which, if accepted by the ministry, will lead to 
provision of the professional allowance.
This whole process is largely still intention, although the regulations are in 
place and the necessary guidelines and formats have been developed and, in some 
cases, piloted for wider use throughout the system. What is essential here is the 
combination of institution- and employer-based assessment. Because many 
teacher educators have had little experience in actual school teaching (especially 
at the primary level) and often have little competence in the kind of dynamic, 
interactive, child-centered pedagogy meant to be used in schools, assessment 
based solely on one’s academic, institutional record is simply not adequate. Thus, 
it is also important that principals and supervisors join in the assessment leading 
to certification through well-planned induction and mentoring to ensure that 
new teachers not only have good knowledge of their subject(s) and relevant 
methodologies but also, even more essentially, have excellent skills in pedagogy. 
This should be proven through probationary teaching for at least a year with a 
full load of classroom hours—and perhaps, even evidence of strong dedication to 
the profession of teaching.
But useful induction processes and good mentoring and appraisal skills on the 
part of school principals and district supervisors do not just happen by them-
selves. It is therefore essential in Indonesia—and in other countries undertaking 
comprehensive teacher reforms—to lay out clearly what a useful process of 
induction looks like and what kinds of mentoring skills (and training to produce 
them) are needed by principals and supervisors to ensure that the final certifica-
tion of teachers (unconditionally and for life in Indonesia) is based on adequate 
knowledge, skills, and motivation. Shanghai offers one good example of an induc-
tion process whereby mentors and mentees regularly observe each other’s lessons 
and observe demonstration lessons together. There, mentoring focuses on core 
teaching skills, such as diagnosing student learning, and teachers are trained in 
classroom and lesson observation by colleagues as part of the professional 
culture.
Continuing Professional Development
The original intention of the Teacher Law was to put in place a framework of effective 
policies and procedures that would both assure the quality of the process and its 
products and encourage continuing professional development. Putting in place such 
a framework is, in fact, essential both for new teachers (by enforcing minimum 
competency standards at all stages of their management and development) and 
for older, already certified teachers (by putting in place a postcertification process 
that can try to assure that many of the new “professionals” gain, maintain, and 
enhance the competencies they never really mastered in the first place). In other 
words, it is essential to try to rectify the weaknesses in the implementation pro-
cess of the Teacher Law by quickly putting in place the essential parts of a quality 
assurance and professional development framework.
Among these elements, the teacher working groups are already in place and 
apparently performing effectively. Research has shown that this decades-old but 
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often neglected mechanism is expanding in reach, in the relevance of its  activities, 
and in the improvement of its members’ cognitive and pedagogical abilities. It is 
interesting to note that although this particularly effective method of in-service 
training was not related to certification and teachers do not receive  double 
income as a result of participation, there has been a significant increase in 
 membership in, and benefits gained from, these groups.
But other parts of this quality assurance framework also need be to put in 
place—and probably should have been established at the start of the Teacher 
Law (and the certification process) rather than several years later. These missing 
elements include the following:
•	 More rigorously accredited teacher education institutions, charged with both 
(a) the preservice preparation of candidates as teachers and their certification 
and (b) the in-service work of continuing professional development
•	 A cadre of principals selected on merit, specifically trained for their work 
(both administrative and academic); deployed to where they are needed most; 
and focused on the essential teacher management and development tasks of 
early induction, mentoring, probation, and ongoing teacher development
•	 A cadre of supervisors, likewise chosen on merit and trained for their work, in 
a post of enhanced responsibility for the system’s effective functioning and 
therefore of a higher status to match this responsibility
•	 A supportive, nonpoliticized district education office (backed up by a similarly 
nonpoliticized district regent) with a specific unit focused on continuing pro-
fessional development, quality assurance, and the unified servicing of all 
aspects of teacher management and development
Teacher Appraisal and Career Development
What this whole process of teacher management and development ultimately 
leads to is a systematic teacher appraisal process linked not only to ongoing pro-
fessional development but also to the regular and accelerated progression and 
promotion of teachers through the education system. The last is especially 
important. All teachers should be held accountable through an annual perfor-
mance appraisal mechanism for the quality of their work, and principals and 
supervisors must likewise be held accountable through the district authorities for 
the manner in which this mechanism of quality assurance is applied. Those meet-
ing or exceeding the required standards should be guided through further stages 
of professional and perhaps administrative training, leading to promotions within 
the teaching career structure or into more administrative, supervisory positions. 
In other words, for further quality enhancement, good teachers should not 
always get promoted out of classrooms but rather become master teachers and 
mentors for more classrooms. This kind of career development implies that rather 
than providing blanket increases for all teachers regardless of performance, the 
teacher career structure should eventually reward high performers with addi-
tional responsibilities and higher salaries that encourage them to remain in 
teaching.
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On the other hand, those unable to maintain the required standards must be 
compelled to undertake some kind of intensive program of professional improve-
ment (for example, related to subject mastery, pedagogic competence, or both) 
and then be assessed as to their improvement. Based on the result, decisions need 
to be made about their future as teachers. The system must divest itself of under-
performing teachers (as it is often most eager to do with underperforming 
 students!) who are unable or unwilling to improve their performance—perhaps 
redeploying them to another part of the civil service or even dismissing them. 
Either way, it is critical for some form of sanction to be applied to noncompliant 
personnel.
specific recommendations for indonesia
The above conclusions and recommendations should be relevant to any educa-
tion system attempting to reform its teacher management and development 
system. But for Indonesia, given that the reform process still has a long way to go 
and that there are large numbers of certified as well as uncertified teachers not 
meeting competency standards, the following specific recommendations are 
provided.
For New Teachers
•	 Ensure that the intake of teacher candidates across all teacher education insti-
tutions is linked to the likely number of teachers required by the system—by 
level and subject—when each cohort graduates.
•	 Ensure that the hiring of new teachers is based on merit. It will do nothing for 
the credibility of the ministry if bright, motivated new graduates emerge from 
teacher education with little chance of getting a teaching post—unless,  perhaps, 
they pay for it.
•	 Ensure that essential competencies in subject matter and pedagogy underlie all 
aspects of the preservice education program.
•	 Require that the graduates of these preservice programs pass the compe-
tency test (that is, for subject matter and pedagogy) required for certifica-
tion at an appropriate passing grade. Again, the credibility of the ministry is 
at stake if most of those who pass the test do so with a grade of, say, only 
50 percent.
•	 Ensure that appropriate induction, mentoring, and probation processes are 
in place at the school level, based on the required competencies, and 
supervised by the principal and supervisor, preferably so that final certifi-
cation is based on both the candidate teacher’s academic record and class-
room performance.
For Teachers Not Yet Certified
•	 Monitor (a) the methods used for uncertified teachers to apply for entry into 
a four-year degree program (for example the Open University or HYLITE3); 
(b) the quality of the four-year program (for example, its basis on the essential 
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competencies for subject matter and pedagogical competencies); and (c) the 
awarding of the degree (for example, at an appropriate passing grade).
•	 Establish structured, well-monitored, and supervised in-service training focus-
ing on classroom needs (specifically subject mastery and pedagogical 
techniques).
For Certified Teachers
•	 Implement rapidly and effectively the full range of quality assurance and con-
tinuing professional development mechanisms to further enhance the compe-
tency and professionalism of certified teachers. These mechanisms include the 
teacher working groups, well-chosen and well-trained principals and supervi-
sors able and willing to monitor and improve the performance of certified 
teachers, and continuing teacher appraisal linked to further career 
advancement.
•	 Encourage or mandate the expenditure of a certain percentage of a teacher’s 
professional allowance for continuing professional development activities.
•	 Establish some system of ensuring that teachers master the required compe-
tencies at ever higher levels of achievement during their careers—for exam-
ple, putting even newly certified teachers on probation and through a process 
of further mentoring, requiring some kind of recertification or confirmation 
of certification every five years (perhaps with a higher passing grade), and so 
forth.
•	 Establish and implement procedures for underperforming teachers, including 
both (a) additional support, supervision, and training; and (b) if needed, rede-
ployment or dismissal.
teaching as a vocation and the school as a learning community
Indonesian teachers are rooted in environments that have not historically promoted 
the behaviors and attitudes that lie at the core of recently adopted education 
reforms. … Indonesian civil service culture … promotes values and behaviors that 
are fundamentally at odds with the new role of the teacher that the government is 
currently promoting. The civil service system is structured to reward individuals 
who display loyalty and obedience (Bjork 2005, 84, 96).
A final lesson is related to teacher development. Even comprehensive, expensive 
reforms concerning teacher management and development will not work if 
teachers don’t have the intrinsic motivation to be a teacher. Teachers who are 
passionate about teaching are likely to teach better than those who just want to 
get paid more or those who follow only the required upgrading programs and 
certification processes. The Teacher Law has included personality among the four 
required competencies for teachers. This is important for the teacher recruitment 
process in Indonesia given the opportunity it now has, with a surplus of teacher 
applicants, to be more selective in this process and to admit to the profession 
Conclusions and Recommendations 191
Teacher Reform in Indonesia • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-9829-6 
only those who want to treat teaching as a genuine vocation. Based on interna-
tional literature (Jensen et al. 2012), people change behavior if they have a pur-
pose to believe in, if their role models act consistently, if they have the skills and 
capacity for the new behavior, and if reinforcement systems such as performance 
measures are consistent. If the first of these—purpose—is absent, any behavioral 
change resulting from the other three may well be superficial at best. And for 
teachers accustomed to seeing themselves as civil servants first and teachers sec-
ond, enhancing their motivation will take more than the label “professional” and 
an increase in their income.
This is where the concept of whole-school reform toward a learning com-
munity becomes so essential. Any reforms adopted “must facilitate the devel-
opment of a culture of continuous professional improvement for all teachers 
and the concept that every school is a ‘learning community’ with students, 
teachers, and the wider community enhancing their knowledge and skills 
through activities generated in the school” (World Bank 2009, 202). In such a 
learning community, for example, having a good mentor for a new teacher is 
not enough; what is needed is working in a school with an integrated, collective 
professional culture. Fullan (2010, 101) quotes Byrk et al. (2010) in listing five 
key factors for such a collective solution: “(1) school leadership (the principal) 
as driver who works with teachers, students, parents, and the community to 
build, in turn, four other interrelated focuses and supports—(2) parent and 
community ties, (3) professional capacity of staff (including focused work ori-
entation), (4) a student-centered learning climate, and (5) instructional focus 
and guidance.”
Fullan goes on to quote a survey done by Yarrow (2009) that resulted in three 
categories of teachers: (a) the disheartened (in the survey, 40 percent), who get 
little support and are concerned about working conditions and student behavior; 
(b) the idealists (23 percent), who became teachers to help students and think 
that good teachers can lead all students to learn and that they have had an impact 
on their students; and (c) the contented (37 percent), who report excellent work-
ing conditions in better schools and also think they have helped their more-
advantaged students to learn. Fullan argues that the task is to “hearten” the 
disheartened, not through individualistic incentives such as pay for performance 
but rather through incentives that focus on the collective. He lists 11 (Fullan 
2010, 83–84):
•	 Good salaries
•	 Decent surroundings
•	 Positive climate
•	 Strong induction
•	 Extensive professional learning
•	 Opportunity to work with and learn from others
•	 Supportive, even assertive, leadership about the agenda
•	 Helpful feedback
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•	 Reasonable class size
•	 Long-term collective agreements (that is, career stability)
•	 Realizable moral purpose
Other than the incentive of “reasonable class size” (which, in the case of 
Indonesia, might be unreasonably small), the Teacher Law of 2005 and the com-
prehensive standards and regulations that have supported it cover most of this 
list. The salaries and the career stability came first, for quite understandable 
reasons given the political economy of the time, but this has led now to serious 
challenges in realizing the rest of the items on the list, including the following:
•	 How to guarantee “decent surroundings” for all educational institutions when 
so much of the education budget is going to an oversized and now well- 
compensated cohort of teachers
•	 How to ensure that the “learning” is actually both extensive and professional 
when the pressure is to certify as many teachers as possible in the time 
 mandated by the law
•	 How to effectively put in place the other postcertification, quality assurance 
incentives on the list—strong induction, opportunity to work with and learn 
from others, supportive leadership about the agenda, and getting helpful 
feedback
•	 Perhaps most challenging, how to create in schools a “positive climate” and in 
teachers a “realizable moral purpose” when historically these were not the 
 priorities of the education system
The Government of Indonesia, through its Teacher Law, has undertaken the 
immense and complicated task of essentially trying to reprofessionalize a 
 deprofessionalized occupation. Whether it succeeds will go a long way toward 
determining the response of Indonesia to the national and global challenges it is 
facing in the new century.
notes
 1. Until 2011, the Ministry was called the Ministry of National Education.
 2. Anecdotal evidence is mixed in this regard, with some certified teachers reportedly 
using their allowances to purchase reference books and laptops to support their work 
and others hiring assistants to teach their classes, going into debt to buy cars, and even 
losing the respect of parents because they appear to be less professional, despite their 
higher income, than before certification.
 3. HYLITE is the Hybrid Learning for Indonesian Teachers program, further discussed 
in chapter 3.
references
Bjork, C. 2005. Indonesian Education: Teachers, Schools, and Central Bureaucracy. London: 
Routledge.
Conclusions and Recommendations 193
Teacher Reform in Indonesia • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-9829-6 
Byrk, A., P. B. Sebring, E. Allensworth, S. Luppescu, and J. Q. Easton. 2010. Organizing 
Schools for Improvement: Lessons from Chicago. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Fullan, M. 2010. All Systems Go: The Change Imperative for Whole System Reform. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Corwin.
Jensen, B., A. Hunter, J. Sonnemann, and T. Burns. 2012. Catching Up: Learning from the 
Best School Systems in East Asia. Report 2012-3, Grattan Institute, Melbourne, 
Australia. (accessed February 27, 2013) http://grattan.edu.au/static/files 
/ assets/00d8aaf4/130_report_learning_from_the_best_detail.pdf.
Schleicher, A. 2011. Building a High-Quality Teaching Profession: Lessons from around the 
World. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
World Bank. 2009. “Teacher Certification in Indonesia: A Strategy for Teaching Quality 
Improvement.” Background paper, Ministry of National Education and World Bank, 
Jakarta.
Yarrow, A. 2009. “State of Mind: America’s Teaching Corps.” Education Week 29 (8): 
21–23.

   195 Teacher Reform in Indonesia • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-9829-6 
Appendixes

Appendixes 197
Teacher Reform in Indonesia • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-9829-6 
Appendix A
Coefficient and z-statistic data for figure 5.2: Relationship of Lesson Structure 
Teaching Practices with Student Learning Outcomes.
Variables shaded gray below were used in creating the figure.
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Mathematics 0.251 0.557
1.22 (2.55)**
Nonmathematics −0.682 −0.753
(−2.43)** (−3.09)***
Mathematics 
organization 0.075 0.065
0.25 1.05
Student pretest score 0.529 0.541 0.527 0.540 0.530 0.545
(21.04)*** (20.63)*** (20.99)*** (20.71)*** (21.11)*** (20.86)***
Student age −0.001 −0.003 −0.001 −0.003 −0.001 −0.003
−0.18 −0.86 −0.2 −0.9 −0.16 −0.83
Hours homework/week 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006
(1.69)* (1.68)* 1.64 1.63 (1.7)* (1.69)*
Student  job hours/week 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
0.33 −0.18 0.33 −0.2 0.35 −0.16
Student sports hours/week 0.000 0.001 −0.001 0.001 −0.001 0.001
−0.18 0.22 −0.2 0.19 −0.18 0.21
Student reads hours week 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003
0.77 0.99 0.8 1.04 0.78 0.99
Student has dictionary at 
home 0.008 0.005 0.007 0.004 0.008 0.005
0.88 0.57 0.84 0.48 0.88 0.58
Student has computer at 
home 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.007
1.09 1.03 1.11 0.99 1.1 1.04
Student’s mom education 
level −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−0.73 −0.74 −0.72 −0.77 −0.74 −0.77
Student hours tutoring/
week −0.001 −0.002 −0.001 −0.002 −0.001 −0.002
−0.8 −1.32 −0.88 −1.49 −0.81 −1.31
Teacher female 0.006 0.002 −0.004
0.31 0.12 −0.2
Teacher civil servant −0.005 −0.009 −0.004
−0.15 −0.31 −0.13
Teacher school-hired −0.017 −0.017 −0.019
−0.68 −0.69 −0.73
Teacher math satisfaction 
level 0.003 −0.006 0.009
0.2 −0.44 0.61
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Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Teacher attends working 
group −0.016 −0.007 −0.007
−0.83 −0.42 −0.36
Teacher maths education 
degree 0.026 0.026 0.024
1.66 (1.78)* 1.55
Teacher experience years 0.002 0.003 0.002
(2.07)** (2.39)** 1.67
Teacher 4-year degree 0.052 0.038 0.035
1.51 1.22 1
Teacher certified −0.018 −0.014 −0.021
−0.95 −0.79 −1.09
Teacher assessment score 0.219 0.177 0.185
(2.24)** (1.95)* (1.87)*
Class size (number of 
students) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.17 −0.13 0.23 0.05 0.21 −0.08
School private 0.015 0.020 0.012 0.016 0.017 0.020
0.73 0.66 0.6 0.54 0.84 0.64
School religious −0.009 0.016 0.004 0.023 −0.013 0.004
−0.43 0.78 0.17 1.24 −0.64 0.22
School size (number of 
students) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1.52 0.39 1.6 0.56 (1.7)* 0.79
School materials shortage −0.009 0.009 −0.009 0.009 −0.009 0.008
−1.16 1.05 −1.18 1.24 −1.12 0.98
School building deficiency 0.007 0.003 0.009 0.004 0.007 0.003
0.87 0.44 1.12 0.63 0.9 0.42
School library deficiency −0.012 −0.012 −0.011 −0.012 −0.013 −0.010
−1.38 −1.43 −1.3 −1.52 −1.41 −1.27
Frequency students skip 
class −0.008 −0.015 −0.006 −0.010 −0.006 −0.012
−0.63 −1.42 −0.46 −1 −0.5 −1.12
Frequency students skip 
class −0.025 −0.028 −0.032 −0.038 −0.028 −0.030
(−1.78)* (−2.13)** (−2.34)** (−3.04)*** (−1.98)** (−2.27)**
Frequency students late 0.009 0.023 0.012 0.025 0.009 0.021
1.24 (3.07)*** 1.63 (3.58)*** 1.17 (2.9)***
Frequency bullying −0.004 0.004 −0.003 0.003 −0.005 0.001
−0.25 0.31 −0.25 0.26 −0.39 0.1
Community size −0.002 0.008 −0.005 0.005 −0.001 0.006
−0.24 1.11 −0.63 0.72 −0.19 0.76
Community poor (%) −0.010 −0.016 −0.007 −0.014 −0.008 −0.015
−1.19 (−2.02)** −0.88 (−1.83)* −0.91 (−1.86)*
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Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Community affluent (%) −0.008 −0.007 −0.006 −0.008 −0.009 −0.008
−1.07 −0.9 −0.76 −1.02 −1.23 −1.05
Constant 0.209 −0.012 0.255 0.140 0.227 0.079
1.54 −0.08 (3.15)*** 1.41 (2.66)** 0.78
Random effects parameters 
Level 1: Student level 
estimate 0.0111 0.0109 0.0111 0.0109 0.0111 0.0109
Standard error 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004
Level 2: Classroom level 
estimate 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109
Standard error 0.0006 0.0004 0.0005 0.0003 0.0006 0.0004
Level 3: Region level 
estimate 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109
Standard error 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Note: Robust z-statistics in parentheses. Regressions are multi-level models run with MLwIN.
Significance level: * = 10 percent, ** = 5 percent, *** = 1 percent.
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Coefficient and z-statistic data for figure 5.4: Relationship of Teaching Approach Practices to Student Learning Outcomes.
Variables shaded gray below were used in creating the figure.
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Discussion −0.054 −0.101
−1.17 (−1.97)**
Exposition −0.068 −0.096
(−2.01)** −1.54
Investigation 0.223 0.230
(2.06)** (2.04)**
Practical work 0.068 0.054
(2.15)** 1.59
Problem solving 0.026 0.040
0.68 0.84
Student pre-test score 0.530 0.543 0.531 0.544 0.530 0.545 0.530 0.542 0.530 0.544
(21.09)*** (20.84)*** (21.2)*** (20.88)*** (21.13)*** (20.96)*** (21.11)*** (20.75)*** (21.09)*** (20.85)***
Student age −0.001 −0.003 0.000 −0.003 0.000 −0.003 −0.001 −0.003 −0.001 −0.003
−0.17 −0.83 −0.11 −0.78 −0.11 −0.76 −0.23 −0.88 −0.15 −0.79
Hours homework/week 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
1.67 1.64 (1.69)* (1.7)a 1.67 (1.68)* (1.69)* (1.68)* (1.68)* (1.68)*
Student  job hours/week 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
0.33 −0.16 0.34 −0.18 0.37 −0.14 0.33 −0.16 0.33 −0.18
Student sports hours/week 0.000 0.001 −0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 −0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001
−0.16 0.21 −0.2 0.2 −0.15 0.27 −0.19 0.2 −0.18 0.21
Student reads hours week 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003
0.76 0.99 0.78 1.00 0.75 0.96 0.78 1.00 0.77 0.99
Student has dictionary at home 0.007 0.004 0.008 0.005 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.005 0.008 0.005
0.86 0.52 0.89 0.59 0.87 0.59 0.85 0.56 0.88 0.58
Student has computer at home 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007
1.09 1.08 1.07 1.01 1.10 1.06 1.05 1.02 1.10 1.04
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Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Student’s mom education level −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−0.75 −0.77 −0.73 −0.74 −0.70 −0.74 −0.73 −0.73 −0.74 −0.77
Student hours tutoring/week −0.001 −0.002 −0.001 −0.002 −0.001 −0.002 −0.001 −0.002 −0.001 −0.002
−0.82 −1.33 −0.82 −1.30 −0.74 −1.19 −0.91 −1.36 −0.79 −1.28
Teacher female −0.010 0.007 −0.003 0.001 0.001
−0.54 0.41 −0.2 0.06 0.07
Teacher civil servant 0.004 −0.009 0.002 −0.001 −0.006
0.11 −0.27 0.08 −0.03 −0.2
Teacher school-hired −0.011 −0.019 −0.013 −0.016 −0.018
−0.43 −0.74 −0.54 −0.63 −0.7
Teacher math satisfaction level 0.010 0.005 0.003 0.010 0.005
0.7 0.32 0.2 0.67 0.35
Teacher attends working group −0.014 −0.017 −0.011 −0.015 −0.014
−0.77 −0.9 −0.63 −0.79 −0.72
Teacher maths education degree 0.033 0.017 0.020 0.024 0.025
(2.02)** 1.01 1.28 1.56 1.58
Teacher experience years 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002
(2.12)** (2.21)** (2.32)** (1.97)** (2.02)**
Teacher 4-year degree 0.045 0.050 0.048 0.041 0.048
1.38 1.52 1.53 1.26 1.45
Teacher certified −0.025 −0.019 −0.022 −0.018 −0.022
−1.28 −0.97 −1.17 −0.94 −1.12
Teacher assessment score 0.181 0.224 0.145 0.224 0.201
(1.88)* (2.34)** 1.51 (2.3)** (2.08)**
Class size (number of students) 0.000 −0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 −0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.10 −0.41 0.49 0.13 −0.18 −0.59 0.29 −0.03 0.23 −0.10
School private 0.016 0.030 0.010 0.015 0.025 0.037 0.019 0.025 0.014 0.017
0.80 0.95 0.51 0.49 1.19 1.20 0.92 0.79 0.62 0.53
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Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
School religious −0.010 0.011 −0.010 0.011 −0.015 −0.001 −0.009 0.011 −0.011 0.011
−0.51 0.58 −0.51 0.56 −0.76 −0.03 −0.43 0.56 −0.53 0.57
School size (number of students) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1.62 0.82 1.28 0.34 (2.13)** 1.47 1.55 0.51 1.45 0.50
School materials shortage −0.011 0.005 −0.007 0.010 −0.007 0.009 −0.008 0.009 −0.010 0.008
−1.30 0.61 −0.83 1.26 −0.86 1.13 −1.01 1.08 −1.17 0.96
School building deficiency 0.008 0.002 0.007 0.005 0.004 0.000 0.009 0.004 0.007 0.003
1.02 0.31 0.95 0.61 0.49 −0.01 1.17 0.52 0.88 0.45
School library deficiency −0.013 −0.010 −0.011 −0.011 −0.008 −0.005 −0.012 −0.011 −0.013 −0.011
−1.44 −1.23 −1.23 −1.43 −0.92 −0.64 −1.33 −1.37 −1.42 −1.40
Frequency students skip class −0.009 −0.016 −0.008 −0.015 −0.012 −0.017 −0.008 −0.014 −0.008 −0.015
−0.71 −1.53 −0.67 −1.36 −0.97 −1.62 −0.62 −1.32 −0.62 −1.37
Frequency students skip class −0.025 −0.024 −0.024 −0.029 −0.025 −0.028 −0.027 −0.028 −0.025 −0.027
(−1.84)* (−1.88)* (−1.8)* (−2.24)** (−1.82)* (−2.27)** (−2.01)** (−2.16)** (−1.77)* (−2.1)**
Frequency students late 0.009 0.020 0.008 0.020 0.009 0.019 0.007 0.020 0.009 0.022
1.18 (2.69)*** 1.11 (2.76)*** 1.23 (2.73)*** 0.91 (2.62)** 1.24 (3)***
Frequency bullying −0.005 0.006 −0.002 0.000 −0.007 −0.002 0.001 0.005 −0.005 0.001
−0.37 0.45 −0.16 0.03 −0.52 −0.15 0.05 0.40 −0.35 0.11
Community size −0.002 0.007 −0.003 0.007 −0.005 0.003 −0.003 0.007 −0.002 0.008
−0.29 0.92 −0.39 1.02 −0.64 0.36 −0.37 0.93 −0.20 1.06
Community poor (%) −0.008 −0.012 −0.016 −0.017 −0.008 −0.012 −0.014 −0.017 −0.010 −0.015
−0.94 −1.55 (−1.8)* (−2.21)** −0.97 −1.57 −1.59 (−2.1)** −1.17 (−1.92)*
Community affluent (%) −0.008 −0.005 −0.013 −0.011 −0.011 −0.011 −0.011 −0.008 −0.009 −0.008
−1.13 −0.66 (−1.71)* −1.35 −1.43 −1.43 −1.54 −1.01 −1.17 −1.01
Constant 0.255 0.068 0.293 0.120 0.253 0.110 0.248 0.070 0.241 0.076
(3.07)*** 0.67 (3.43)*** 1.15 (3.1)*** 1.10 (3.04)*** 0.69 (2.9)*** 0.75
Appendix B (continued)
table continues next page
 
203
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Random effects parameters
Level 1: Student level estimate 0.0111 0.0109 0.0111 0.0109 0.0111 0.0109 0.0111 0.0109 0.0111 0.0109
Standard error 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004
Level 2: Classroom level estimate 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109
Standard error 0.0006 0.0004 0.0005 0.0004 0.0005 0.0004 0.0005 0.0004 0.0006 0.0004
Level 3: Region level estimate 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109
Standard error 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Note: Robust z-statistics in parentheses. Regressions are multi-level models run with MLwIN.
Significance level: * = 10 percent, ** = 5 percent, *** = 1 percent.
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Appendix c
Coefficient and z-statistic data for figure 5.6: Relationship of Public Interaction 
Categories to Student Learning Outcomes.
Variables shaded gray below were used in creating the figure.
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Teacher only −0.064 −0.089
−0.94 (−1.89)*
Teacher and students 0.091 0.153
(1.71)* (2.5)**
Students only −0.170 −0.086
(−2.04)** −0.99
Student pretest score 0.529 0.542 0.527 0.539 0.527 0.544
(21.06)*** (20.76)*** (20.9)*** (20.53)*** (20.92)*** (20.82)***
Student age −0.001 −0.003 −0.001 −0.003 −0.001 −0.003
−0.18 −0.91 −0.22 −0.92 −0.2 −0.84
Hours homework/week 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
(1.69)* 1.67 (1.7)* (1.71)* (1.72)* (1.68)*
Student  job hours/week 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
0.33 −0.15 0.33 −0.15 0.34 −0.17
Student sports hours/
week 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 −0.001 0.001
−0.18 0.2 −0.17 0.21 −0.21 0.21
Student reads hours week 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003
0.76 0.96 0.73 0.93 0.76 0.99
Student has dictionary at 
home 0.008 0.005 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.005
0.88 0.57 0.87 0.53 0.86 0.59
Student has computer at 
home 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007
1.09 1.04 1.05 0.95 1.02 1.04
Student’s mom education 
level −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−0.73 −0.75 −0.78 −0.82 −0.71 −0.75
Student hours tutoring/
week −0.001 −0.002 −0.001 −0.002 −0.001 −0.002
−0.81 −1.41 −0.87 −1.41 −0.79 −1.31
Teacher female 0.000 0.000 0.001
−0.01 −0.02 0.07
Teacher civil servant −0.003 0.016 −0.006
−0.1 0.48 −0.17
Teacher school-hired −0.018 −0.014 −0.018
−0.69 −0.56 −0.71
Teacher math satisfaction 
level 0.008 0.008 0.007
0.51 0.56 0.46
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Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Teacher attends working 
group −0.015 −0.017 −0.012
−0.81 −0.9 −0.66
Teacher maths education 
degree 0.028 0.033 0.025
(1.81)* (2.08)** 1.59
Teacher experience years 0.002 0.002 0.002
(1.94)* (2.07)** (1.91)*
Teacher 4-year degree 0.037 0.037 0.044
1.14 1.14 1.33
Teacher certified −0.018 −0.021 −0.020
−0.95 −1.1 −1.01
Teacher assessment score 0.227 0.204 0.208
(2.37)** (2.17)** (2.12)**
Class size (number of 
students) 0.000 −0.001 0.000 −0.001 0.001 0.000
0.12 −0.52 −0.13 −0.63 0.4 −0.14
School private 0.017 0.024 0.019 0.042 0.013 0.019
0.79 0.79 0.92 1.31 0.64 0.61
School religious −0.011 0.009 −0.009 0.012 −0.009 0.010
−0.53 0.47 −0.42 0.64 −0.46 0.5
School size (number of 
students) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1.58 0.87 (1.79)* 0.82 0.81 0.61
School materials shortage −0.010 0.008 −0.011 0.005 −0.007 0.008
−1.16 0.95 −1.33 0.6 −0.86 1.02
School building deficiency 0.007 0.005 0.009 0.004 0.005 0.003
0.88 0.72 1.05 0.56 0.61 0.44
School library deficiency −0.013 −0.011 −0.012 −0.009 −0.012 −0.011
−1.4 −1.42 −1.41 −1.17 −1.42 −1.37
Frequency students skip 
class −0.007 −0.010 −0.006 −0.010 −0.008 −0.014
−0.56 −0.95 −0.45 −0.97 −0.64 −1.28
Frequency students skip 
class −0.026 −0.029 −0.026 −0.029 −0.030 −0.028
(−1.84)* (−2.23)** (−1.9)* (−2.27)** (−2.15)** (−2.15)**
Frequency students late 0.009 0.023 0.009 0.020 0.007 0.022
1.22 (3.18)*** 1.28 (2.84)*** 0.94 (2.94)***
Frequency bullying −0.005 −0.004 −0.007 0.001 −0.001 0.002
−0.34 −0.32 −0.52 0.09 −0.05 0.13
Community size −0.001 0.010 0.000 0.009 0.005 0.008
−0.17 1.29 −0.03 1.24 0.64 1.01
Community poor (%) −0.010 −0.015 −0.011 −0.017 −0.012 −0.015
−1.12 (−1.92)* −1.24 (−2.22)** −1.43 (−1.92)*
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Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Community affluent (%) −0.009 −0.007 −0.009 −0.009 −0.004 −0.008
−1.15 −0.94 −1.25 −1.1 −0.48 −0.95
Constant 0.251 0.133 0.254 0.086 0.231 0.078
(2.77)*** 1.25 (3.06)*** 0.86 (2.72)*** 0.77
Random effects parameters
Level 1: Student level 
estimate 0.0111 0.0109 0.0111 0.0109 0.0111 0.0109
Standard error 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004
Level 2: Classroom level 
estimate 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109
Standard error 0.0006 0.0004 0.0006 0.0004 0.0006 0.0004
Level 3: Region level 
estimate 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109
Standard error 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000
Note: Robust z-statistics in parentheses. Regressions are multi-level models run with MLwIN.
Significance level: * = 10 percent, ** = 5 percent, *** = 1 percent.
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Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Mathematical language 0.105 0.115
1.58 (2.1)**
Real world −0.105 −0.115
−1.58 (−2.1)**
Routine −0.114 −0.085
(−2.01)** −1.48
Nonroutine 0.114 0.085
(2.01)** 1.48
Open 0.155 0.120
(2.38)** (1.98)**
Closed −0.155 −0.120
(−2.38)** (−1.98)**
Student pretest score 0.537 0.551 0.537 0.551 0.540 0.549 0.540 0.549 0.537 0.547 0.537 0.547
(20.54)*** (20.22)*** (20.54)*** (20.22)*** (20.64)*** (20.1)*** (20.64)*** (20.1)*** (21.27)*** (20.75)*** (21.27)*** (20.75)***
Student age 0.001 −0.001 0.001 −0.001 0.001 −0.001 0.001 −0.001 0.000 −0.003 0.000 −0.003
0.34 −0.35 0.34 −0.35 0.32 −0.31 0.32 −0.31 −0.02 −0.68 −0.02 −0.68
Hours homework/week 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
1.18 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.22 1.17 1.22 1.17 (1.75)* (1.72)* (1.75)* (1.72)*
Student  job hours/week 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000
1.21 0.71 1.21 0.71 1.13 0.70 1.13 0.70 0.65 0.14 0.65 0.14
Student sports hours/
week −0.002 −0.001 −0.002 −0.001 −0.002 0.000 −0.002 0.000 −0.001 0.000 −0.001 0.000
−0.58 −0.17 −0.58 −0.17 −0.55 −0.15 −0.55 −0.15 −0.41 0.02 −0.41 0.02
table continues next page
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Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Student reads hours 
week 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
0.90 1.17 0.90 1.17 0.89 1.16 0.89 1.16 0.83 1.06 0.83 1.06
Student has dictionary 
at home 0.013 0.010 0.013 0.010 0.013 0.009 0.013 0.009 0.008 0.006 0.008 0.006
1.38 1.08 1.38 1.08 1.42 1.03 1.42 1.03 0.91 0.66 0.91 0.66
Student has computer 
at home 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
1.36 1.21 1.36 1.21 1.37 1.21 1.37 1.21 1.10 1.06 1.10 1.06
Student’s mom 
education level 0.000 −0.001 0.000 −0.001 0.000 −0.001 0.000 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−0.38 −0.41 −0.38 −0.41 −0.40 −0.42 −0.40 −0.42 −0.70 −0.78 −0.70 −0.78
Student hours tutoring/
week −0.001 −0.002 −0.001 −0.002 −0.001 −0.002 −0.001 −0.002 −0.001 −0.002 −0.001 −0.002
−0.51 −1.16 −0.51 −1.16 −0.54 −1.27 −0.54 −1.27 −0.72 −1.30 −0.72 −1.30
Teacher female −0.004 −0.004 −0.006 −0.006 0.003 0.003
−0.20 −0.20 −0.29 −0.29 0.17 0.17
Teacher civil servant −0.040 −0.040 −0.023 −0.023 −0.006 −0.006
−0.83 −0.83 −0.47 −0.47 −0.19 −0.19
Teacher school-hired −0.045 −0.045 −0.037 −0.037 −0.021 −0.021
−1.50 −1.50 −1.20 −1.20 −0.79 −0.79
Teacher math 
satisfaction level 0.003 0.003 0.009 0.009 0.006 0.006
0.19 0.19 0.53 0.53 0.39 0.39
Teacher attends working 
group −0.025 −0.025 −0.024 −0.024 −0.015 −0.015
−1.26 −1.26 −1.15 −1.15 −0.80 −0.80
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Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Teacher maths 
education degree 0.033 0.033 0.027 0.027 0.023 0.023
(1.71)* (1.71)* 1.38 1.38 1.42 1.42
Teacher experience 
years 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(2.28)** (2.28)** (1.81)* (1.81)* (1.73)* (1.73)*
Teacher 4-year degree 0.058 0.058 0.055 0.055 0.044 0.044
1.65 1.65 1.56 1.56 1.33 1.33
Teacher certified −0.016 −0.016 −0.013 −0.013 −0.014 −0.014
−0.70 −0.70 −0.59 −0.59 −0.64 −0.64
Teacher assessment 
score 0.152 0.152 0.187 0.187 0.205 0.205
1.43 1.43 (1.84)* (1.84)* (2.12)** (2.12)**
Class size (number of 
students) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
0.52 0.44 0.52 0.44 0.44 0.42 0.44 0.42 0.77 0.23 0.77 0.23
School private 0.008 −0.015 0.008 −0.015 0.016 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.017 0.021 0.017 0.021
0.34 −0.32 0.34 −0.32 0.76 −0.01 0.76 −0.01 0.85 0.66 0.85 0.66
School religious 0.006 0.030 0.006 0.030 0.002 0.024 0.002 0.024 −0.002 0.012 −0.002 0.012
0.25 1.42 0.25 1.42 0.09 1.14 0.09 1.14 −0.08 0.61 −0.08 0.61
School size (number of 
students) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1.05 −0.19 1.05 −0.19 0.95 −0.03 0.95 −0.03 1.29 0.32 1.29 0.32
School materials 
shortage −0.012 0.002 −0.012 0.002 −0.010 0.003 −0.010 0.003 −0.010 0.007 −0.010 0.007
−1.36 0.26 −1.36 0.26 −1.17 0.32 −1.17 0.32 −1.23 0.86 −1.23 0.86
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Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
School building 
deficiency 0.009 0.004 0.009 0.004 0.009 0.005 0.009 0.005 0.011 0.005 0.011 0.005
1.08 0.51 1.08 0.51 1.04 0.55 1.04 0.55 1.43 0.64 1.43 0.64
School library deficiency −0.012 −0.011 −0.012 −0.011 −0.008 −0.009 −0.008 −0.009 −0.010 −0.010 −0.010 −0.010
−1.21 −1.24 −1.21 −1.24 −0.79 −0.97 −0.79 −0.97 −1.16 −1.24 −1.16 −1.24
Frequency students skip 
class −0.014 −0.021 −0.014 −0.021 −0.013 −0.017 −0.013 −0.017 −0.012 −0.015 −0.012 −0.015
−1.06 (−1.77)* −1.06 (−1.77)* −0.99 −1.50 −0.99 −1.50 −0.96 −1.41 −0.96 −1.41
Frequency students skip 
class −0.018 −0.016 −0.018 −0.016 −0.021 −0.025 −0.021 −0.025 −0.025 −0.029 −0.025 −0.029
−1.13 −1.08 −1.13 −1.08 −1.41 −1.57 −1.41 −1.57 (−1.92)* (−2.22)** (−1.92)* (−2.22)**
Frequency students late 0.009 0.024 0.009 0.024 0.008 0.026 0.008 0.026 0.010 0.022 0.010 0.022
1.20 (3.19)*** 1.20 (3.19)*** 1.11 (3.39)*** 1.11 (3.39)*** 1.38 (2.96)*** 1.38 (2.96)***
Frequency bullying 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.009 0.004 0.008 0.004 0.008 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.003
0.01 0.67 0.01 0.67 0.24 0.58 0.24 0.58 0.10 0.23 0.10 0.23
Community size −0.004 0.004 −0.004 0.004 −0.003 0.003 −0.003 0.003 −0.004 0.008 −0.004 0.008
−0.51 0.52 −0.51 0.52 −0.32 0.32 −0.32 0.32 −0.51 1.03 −0.51 1.03
Community poor (%) −0.008 −0.013 −0.008 −0.013 −0.010 −0.014 −0.010 −0.014 −0.012 −0.014 −0.012 −0.014
−0.84 −1.39 −0.84 −1.39 −1.12 −1.46 −1.12 −1.46 −1.48 (−1.8)* −1.48 (−1.8)*
Community affluent (%) −0.005 −0.004 −0.005 −0.004 −0.004 −0.005 −0.004 −0.005 −0.009 −0.007 −0.009 −0.007
−0.58 −0.46 −0.58 −0.46 −0.52 −0.50 −0.52 −0.50 −1.28 −0.91 −1.28 −0.91
Constant 0.111 0.025 0.186 0.072 0.275 −0.024 0.167 0.048 0.198 0.062 0.352 0.062
1.11 0.23 (2.03)** 0.66 (2.58)** −0.19 (1.85)* 0.46 (2.35)** 0.60 (3.36)*** 0.48
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Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Random effects parameters
Level 1: Student level 
estimate 0.0111 0.0109 0.0111 0.0109 0.0111 0.0109 0.0111 0.0109 0.0111 0.0109 0.0111 0.0109
Standard error 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004
Level 2: Classroom level 
estimate 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109
Standard error 0.0006 0.0004 0.0006 0.0004 0.0006 0.0004 0.0006 0.0004 0.0005 0.0004 0.0005 0.0004
Level 3: Region level 
estimate 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109
Standard error 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Note: Robust z-statistics in parentheses. Regressions are multi-level models run with MLwIN.
Significance level: * = 10 percent, ** = 5 percent, *** = 1 percent.
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Appendix e
Coefficient and t-statistic data for figure 5.11: Differences in Teaching Practices of Certified 
Teachers vs. Uncertified Teachers.
Variables Shaded gray below were used in creating the figure.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28)
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Teaching practice 
variable (listed 
in columns 
above) −1.14 0.956 1.036 0.321 0.032 −0.189 0.313 −0.642 0.642 −0.141 0.361 −0.129 −0.225 0.207 −0.668 0.008 −0.053 −0.402 0.402 −0.556 0.556 −0.402 0.402 0.006 0.005 −2.246 0.486 −0.486
−1.57 0.61 1.34 0.99 0.18 −0.95 0.45 (2.25)** (2.25)** −0.53 0.99 −0.41 −0.62 0.85 −1.27 0.04 −0.18 −0.85 0.85 −1.59 1.59 −0.85 0.85 0.83 0.42 −0.50 1.44 −1.44
Student age 0.015 0.013 0.011 0.014 0.009 0.009 0.011 0.013 0.013 0.005 0.002 0.011 0.012 0.01 0.007 0.01 0.009 0.012 0.012 0.002 0.002 0.012 0.012 0.009 0.01 0.009 0.005 0.005
0.82 0.69 0.63 0.78 0.51 0.53 0.64 0.74 0.74 0.29 0.12 0.61 0.69 0.57 0.38 0.55 0.52 0.64 0.64 0.12 0.12 0.64 0.64 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.27 0.27
Hours homework/
week −0.018 −0.02 −0.02 −0.019 −0.022 −0.02 −0.022 −0.014 −0.014 −0.022 −0.02 −0.021 −0.023 −0.021 −0.021 −0.022 −0.022 −0.019 −0.019 −0.023 −0.023 −0.019 −0.019 −0.02 −0.02 −0.019 −0.026 −0.026
−1.65 (1.99)* (1.78)* (1.78)* (1.99)* (1.86)* (2.00)** −1.49 −1.49 (2.02)** (1.88)* (1.92)* (2.16)** (2.01)** (1.95)* (1.98)* (1.99)* (1.80)* (1.80)* (2.20)** (2.20)** (1.80)* (1.80)* (1.89)* (1.89)* (1.91)* (2.41)** (2.41)**
Student  job hours/
week −0.016 −0.018 −0.017 −0.02 −0.019 −0.02 −0.02 −0.016 −0.016 −0.019 −0.018 −0.019 −0.019 −0.018 −0.02 −0.019 −0.019 −0.018 −0.018 −0.021 −0.021 −0.018 −0.018 −0.018 −0.017 −0.017 −0.018 −0.018
(1.92)* (2.20)** (2.01)** (2.51)** (2.29)** (2.38)** (2.44)** (2.12)** (2.12)** (2.31)** (2.30)** (2.27)** (2.23)** (2.25)** (2.38)** (2.32)** (2.29)** (2.28)** (2.28)** (2.78)*** (2.78)*** (2.28)** (2.28)** (2.12)** (2.12)** (2.05)** (2.19)** (2.19)**
Student sports 
hours/week −0.002 −0.004 −0.002 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004 −0.006 −0.006 −0.004 −0.004 −0.003 −0.002 −0.002 −0.006 −0.004 −0.004 −0.001 −0.001 0 0 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 0 0.002 0.002
−0.26 −0.45 −0.25 −0.42 −0.43 −0.46 −0.39 −0.67 −0.67 −0.46 −0.45 −0.38 −0.23 −0.25 −0.73 −0.42 −0.41 −0.06 −0.06 −0.02 −0.02 −0.06 −0.06 −0.12 −0.09 −0.02 0.22 0.22
Student reads hours 
week 0.035 0.035 0.036 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.036 0.03 0.03 0.035 0.034 0.035 0.035 0.034 0.037 0.036 0.035 0.039 0.039 0.036 0.036 0.039 0.039 0.038 0.039 0.038 0.038 0.038
(2.79)*** (2.83)*** (2.81)*** (2.78)*** (2.82)*** (2.78)*** (2.89)*** (2.73)*** (2.73)*** (2.82)*** (2.76)*** (2.81)*** (2.81)*** (2.84)*** (2.96)*** (2.82)*** (2.90)*** (3.23)*** (3.23)*** (2.87)*** (2.87)*** (3.23)*** (3.23)*** (3.14)*** (3.18)*** (3.13)*** (3.10)*** (3.10)***
Student has 
dictionary at 
home −0.004 −0.007 −0.006 −0.007 −0.008 −0.005 −0.007 0.001 0.001 −0.01 −0.01 −0.007 −0.012 −0.008 −0.008 −0.008 −0.008 −0.02 −0.02 −0.036 −0.036 −0.02 −0.02 −0.025 −0.026 −0.026 −0.034 −0.034
−0.12 −0.19 −0.16 −0.21 −0.21 −0.13 −0.18 0.02 0.02 −0.27 −0.28 −0.20 −0.34 −0.21 −0.23 −0.23 −0.23 −0.59 −0.59 −0.99 −0.99 −0.59 −0.59 −0.69 −0.72 −0.69 −1.10 −1.10
Student has 
computer at 
home 0.034 0.035 0.034 0.028 0.034 0.029 0.034 0.027 0.027 0.037 0.032 0.031 0.037 0.036 0.034 0.035 0.035 0.031 0.031 0.039 0.039 0.031 0.031 0.028 0.03 0.032 0.032 0.032
1.36 1.37 1.36 1.20 1.36 1.10 1.30 1.08 1.08 1.52 1.19 1.21 1.51 1.38 1.35 1.37 1.36 1.11 1.11 1.39 1.39 1.11 1.11 1.01 1.06 1.14 1.39 1.39
Student’s mom 
education level 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.005
0.93 0.81 0.86 0.67 0.85 0.95 0.71 0.72 0.72 0.76 0.61 0.72 0.70 0.92 0.71 0.79 0.87 0.37 0.37 0.16 0.16 0.37 0.37 0.46 0.43 0.43 0.92 0.92
Student hours 
tutoring/week −0.002 −0.004 −0.003 −0.005 −0.005 −0.005 −0.005 −0.005 −0.005 −0.006 −0.007 −0.004 −0.006 −0.004 −0.006 −0.005 −0.005 −0.012 −0.012 −0.014 −0.014 −0.012 −0.012 −0.012 −0.012 −0.013 −0.009 −0.009
−0.25 −0.52 −0.48 −0.65 −0.67 −0.71 −0.60 −0.69 −0.69 −0.88 −0.90 −0.59 −0.73 −0.59 −0.76 −0.66 −0.66 −1.62 −1.62 (1.99)* (1.99)* −1.62 −1.62 (1.77)* (1.80)* (1.87)* −1.42 −1.42
Teacher female −0.019 0.009 −0.021 −0.017 0.006 −0.002 0.003 0.031 0.031 0.001 −0.011 0.003 −0.014 0.001 0.013 0.005 0.008 0.061 0.061 0.047 0.047 0.061 0.061 0.043 0.048 0.056 0.028 0.028
−0.18 0.08 −0.19 −0.16 0.05 −0.02 0.03 0.29 0.29 0.01 −0.10 0.03 −0.12 0.01 0.12 0.04 0.07 0.55 0.55 0.43 0.43 0.55 0.55 0.40 0.44 0.52 0.27 0.27
Teacher civil servant 0.268 0.285 0.24 0.255 0.265 0.268 0.228 0.376 0.376 0.226 0.242 0.284 0.259 0.308 0.253 0.26 0.268 0.309 0.309 0.177 0.177 0.309 0.309 0.333 0.328 0.317 0.295 0.295
1.32 1.25 1.17 1.18 1.21 1.29 0.95 (1.78)* (1.78)* 0.96 1.15 1.26 1.23 1.45 1.18 1.22 1.21 1.30 1.30 0.78 0.78 1.30 1.30 1.43 1.41 1.32 1.24 1.24
Teacher school-
hired −0.109 −0.093 −0.118 −0.14 −0.096 −0.094 −0.108 −0.069 −0.069 −0.115 −0.117 −0.094 −0.087 −0.084 −0.107 −0.101 −0.1 −0.086 −0.086 −0.057 −0.057 −0.086 −0.086 −0.073 −0.068 −0.045 −0.024 −0.024
−0.76 −0.63 −0.80 −0.91 −0.63 −0.66 −0.72 −0.48 −0.48 −0.75 −0.80 −0.63 −0.57 −0.56 −0.73 −0.69 −0.68 −0.53 −0.53 −0.38 −0.38 −0.53 −0.53 −0.46 −0.43 −0.29 −0.17 −0.17
Teacher math 
satisfaction 
level 0.021 0.027 0.011 0.03 0.02 0.026 0.013 −0.01 −0.01 0.026 0.035 0.018 0.023 0.011 0.028 0.02 0.022 0.042 0.042 0.057 0.057 0.042 0.042 0.067 0.054 0.039 0.035 0.035
0.28 0.37 0.16 0.41 0.27 0.36 0.19 −0.14 −0.14 0.37 0.49 0.25 0.32 0.15 0.38 0.24 0.28 0.56 0.56 0.75 0.75 0.56 0.56 0.71 0.57 0.52 0.53 0.53
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Appendix e
Coefficient and t-statistic data for figure 5.11: Differences in Teaching Practices of Certified 
Teachers vs. Uncertified Teachers.
Variables Shaded gray below were used in creating the figure.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28)
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Teaching practice 
variable (listed 
in columns 
above) −1.14 0.956 1.036 0.321 0.032 −0.189 0.313 −0.642 0.642 −0.141 0.361 −0.129 −0.225 0.207 −0.668 0.008 −0.053 −0.402 0.402 −0.556 0.556 −0.402 0.402 0.006 0.005 −2.246 0.486 −0.486
−1.57 0.61 1.34 0.99 0.18 −0.95 0.45 (2.25)** (2.25)** −0.53 0.99 −0.41 −0.62 0.85 −1.27 0.04 −0.18 −0.85 0.85 −1.59 1.59 −0.85 0.85 0.83 0.42 −0.50 1.44 −1.44
Student age 0.015 0.013 0.011 0.014 0.009 0.009 0.011 0.013 0.013 0.005 0.002 0.011 0.012 0.01 0.007 0.01 0.009 0.012 0.012 0.002 0.002 0.012 0.012 0.009 0.01 0.009 0.005 0.005
0.82 0.69 0.63 0.78 0.51 0.53 0.64 0.74 0.74 0.29 0.12 0.61 0.69 0.57 0.38 0.55 0.52 0.64 0.64 0.12 0.12 0.64 0.64 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.27 0.27
Hours homework/
week −0.018 −0.02 −0.02 −0.019 −0.022 −0.02 −0.022 −0.014 −0.014 −0.022 −0.02 −0.021 −0.023 −0.021 −0.021 −0.022 −0.022 −0.019 −0.019 −0.023 −0.023 −0.019 −0.019 −0.02 −0.02 −0.019 −0.026 −0.026
−1.65 (1.99)* (1.78)* (1.78)* (1.99)* (1.86)* (2.00)** −1.49 −1.49 (2.02)** (1.88)* (1.92)* (2.16)** (2.01)** (1.95)* (1.98)* (1.99)* (1.80)* (1.80)* (2.20)** (2.20)** (1.80)* (1.80)* (1.89)* (1.89)* (1.91)* (2.41)** (2.41)**
Student  job hours/
week −0.016 −0.018 −0.017 −0.02 −0.019 −0.02 −0.02 −0.016 −0.016 −0.019 −0.018 −0.019 −0.019 −0.018 −0.02 −0.019 −0.019 −0.018 −0.018 −0.021 −0.021 −0.018 −0.018 −0.018 −0.017 −0.017 −0.018 −0.018
(1.92)* (2.20)** (2.01)** (2.51)** (2.29)** (2.38)** (2.44)** (2.12)** (2.12)** (2.31)** (2.30)** (2.27)** (2.23)** (2.25)** (2.38)** (2.32)** (2.29)** (2.28)** (2.28)** (2.78)*** (2.78)*** (2.28)** (2.28)** (2.12)** (2.12)** (2.05)** (2.19)** (2.19)**
Student sports 
hours/week −0.002 −0.004 −0.002 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004 −0.006 −0.006 −0.004 −0.004 −0.003 −0.002 −0.002 −0.006 −0.004 −0.004 −0.001 −0.001 0 0 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 0 0.002 0.002
−0.26 −0.45 −0.25 −0.42 −0.43 −0.46 −0.39 −0.67 −0.67 −0.46 −0.45 −0.38 −0.23 −0.25 −0.73 −0.42 −0.41 −0.06 −0.06 −0.02 −0.02 −0.06 −0.06 −0.12 −0.09 −0.02 0.22 0.22
Student reads hours 
week 0.035 0.035 0.036 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.036 0.03 0.03 0.035 0.034 0.035 0.035 0.034 0.037 0.036 0.035 0.039 0.039 0.036 0.036 0.039 0.039 0.038 0.039 0.038 0.038 0.038
(2.79)*** (2.83)*** (2.81)*** (2.78)*** (2.82)*** (2.78)*** (2.89)*** (2.73)*** (2.73)*** (2.82)*** (2.76)*** (2.81)*** (2.81)*** (2.84)*** (2.96)*** (2.82)*** (2.90)*** (3.23)*** (3.23)*** (2.87)*** (2.87)*** (3.23)*** (3.23)*** (3.14)*** (3.18)*** (3.13)*** (3.10)*** (3.10)***
Student has 
dictionary at 
home −0.004 −0.007 −0.006 −0.007 −0.008 −0.005 −0.007 0.001 0.001 −0.01 −0.01 −0.007 −0.012 −0.008 −0.008 −0.008 −0.008 −0.02 −0.02 −0.036 −0.036 −0.02 −0.02 −0.025 −0.026 −0.026 −0.034 −0.034
−0.12 −0.19 −0.16 −0.21 −0.21 −0.13 −0.18 0.02 0.02 −0.27 −0.28 −0.20 −0.34 −0.21 −0.23 −0.23 −0.23 −0.59 −0.59 −0.99 −0.99 −0.59 −0.59 −0.69 −0.72 −0.69 −1.10 −1.10
Student has 
computer at 
home 0.034 0.035 0.034 0.028 0.034 0.029 0.034 0.027 0.027 0.037 0.032 0.031 0.037 0.036 0.034 0.035 0.035 0.031 0.031 0.039 0.039 0.031 0.031 0.028 0.03 0.032 0.032 0.032
1.36 1.37 1.36 1.20 1.36 1.10 1.30 1.08 1.08 1.52 1.19 1.21 1.51 1.38 1.35 1.37 1.36 1.11 1.11 1.39 1.39 1.11 1.11 1.01 1.06 1.14 1.39 1.39
Student’s mom 
education level 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.005
0.93 0.81 0.86 0.67 0.85 0.95 0.71 0.72 0.72 0.76 0.61 0.72 0.70 0.92 0.71 0.79 0.87 0.37 0.37 0.16 0.16 0.37 0.37 0.46 0.43 0.43 0.92 0.92
Student hours 
tutoring/week −0.002 −0.004 −0.003 −0.005 −0.005 −0.005 −0.005 −0.005 −0.005 −0.006 −0.007 −0.004 −0.006 −0.004 −0.006 −0.005 −0.005 −0.012 −0.012 −0.014 −0.014 −0.012 −0.012 −0.012 −0.012 −0.013 −0.009 −0.009
−0.25 −0.52 −0.48 −0.65 −0.67 −0.71 −0.60 −0.69 −0.69 −0.88 −0.90 −0.59 −0.73 −0.59 −0.76 −0.66 −0.66 −1.62 −1.62 (1.99)* (1.99)* −1.62 −1.62 (1.77)* (1.80)* (1.87)* −1.42 −1.42
Teacher female −0.019 0.009 −0.021 −0.017 0.006 −0.002 0.003 0.031 0.031 0.001 −0.011 0.003 −0.014 0.001 0.013 0.005 0.008 0.061 0.061 0.047 0.047 0.061 0.061 0.043 0.048 0.056 0.028 0.028
−0.18 0.08 −0.19 −0.16 0.05 −0.02 0.03 0.29 0.29 0.01 −0.10 0.03 −0.12 0.01 0.12 0.04 0.07 0.55 0.55 0.43 0.43 0.55 0.55 0.40 0.44 0.52 0.27 0.27
Teacher civil servant 0.268 0.285 0.24 0.255 0.265 0.268 0.228 0.376 0.376 0.226 0.242 0.284 0.259 0.308 0.253 0.26 0.268 0.309 0.309 0.177 0.177 0.309 0.309 0.333 0.328 0.317 0.295 0.295
1.32 1.25 1.17 1.18 1.21 1.29 0.95 (1.78)* (1.78)* 0.96 1.15 1.26 1.23 1.45 1.18 1.22 1.21 1.30 1.30 0.78 0.78 1.30 1.30 1.43 1.41 1.32 1.24 1.24
Teacher school-
hired −0.109 −0.093 −0.118 −0.14 −0.096 −0.094 −0.108 −0.069 −0.069 −0.115 −0.117 −0.094 −0.087 −0.084 −0.107 −0.101 −0.1 −0.086 −0.086 −0.057 −0.057 −0.086 −0.086 −0.073 −0.068 −0.045 −0.024 −0.024
−0.76 −0.63 −0.80 −0.91 −0.63 −0.66 −0.72 −0.48 −0.48 −0.75 −0.80 −0.63 −0.57 −0.56 −0.73 −0.69 −0.68 −0.53 −0.53 −0.38 −0.38 −0.53 −0.53 −0.46 −0.43 −0.29 −0.17 −0.17
Teacher math 
satisfaction 
level 0.021 0.027 0.011 0.03 0.02 0.026 0.013 −0.01 −0.01 0.026 0.035 0.018 0.023 0.011 0.028 0.02 0.022 0.042 0.042 0.057 0.057 0.042 0.042 0.067 0.054 0.039 0.035 0.035
0.28 0.37 0.16 0.41 0.27 0.36 0.19 −0.14 −0.14 0.37 0.49 0.25 0.32 0.15 0.38 0.24 0.28 0.56 0.56 0.75 0.75 0.56 0.56 0.71 0.57 0.52 0.53 0.53
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28)
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Teacher attends 
working group 0.072 0.057 0.083 0.07 0.069 0.083 0.077 0.111 0.111 0.064 0.062 0.068 0.06 0.071 0.067 0.067 0.066 0.118 0.118 0.139 0.139 0.118 0.118 0.125 0.13 0.135 0.104 0.104
0.63 0.48 0.72 0.60 0.58 0.71 0.65 0.92 0.92 0.56 0.55 0.58 0.52 0.59 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.93 0.93 1.27 1.27 0.93 0.93 1.02 1.06 1.12 0.86 0.86
Teacher maths 
education 
degree 0.064 0.042 0.068 0.064 0.045 0.037 0.033 0.137 0.137 0.06 0.079 0.047 0.064 0.088 0.066 0.047 0.052 0.01 0.01 −0.039 −0.039 0.01 0.01 −0.012 −0.007 0 0.078 0.078
0.58 0.40 0.62 0.58 0.41 0.33 0.29 1.37 1.37 0.58 0.74 0.43 0.59 0.80 0.61 0.43 0.49 0.09 0.09 −0.39 −0.39 0.09 0.09 −0.11 −0.07 0.00 0.79 0.79
Teacher experience 
years 0.018 0.02 0.018 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.019 0.019 0.02 0.02 0.019 0.02 0.018 0.019 0.02 0.02 0.019 0.019 0.021 0.021 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.024 0.024
(2.57)** (2.73)*** (2.54)** (2.70)*** (2.70)*** (2.73)*** (2.70)*** (2.60)** (2.60)** (2.76)*** (2.75)*** (2.69)*** (2.72)*** (2.35)** (2.49)** (2.72)*** (2.67)*** (2.38)** (2.38)** (3.02)*** (3.02)*** (2.38)** (2.38)** (2.39)** (2.40)** (2.45)** (3.29)*** (3.29)***
Teacher 4-year 
degree 0.533 0.569 0.548 0.578 0.575 0.554 0.569 0.552 0.552 0.586 0.574 0.57 0.585 0.552 0.566 0.578 0.57 0.584 0.584 0.635 0.635 0.584 0.584 0.599 0.6 0.621 0.554 0.554
(3.69)*** (4.01)*** (3.85)*** (4.41)*** (4.18)*** (4.03)*** (4.21)*** (4.15)*** (4.15)*** (4.22)*** (4.36)*** (4.12)*** (4.27)*** (3.86)*** (4.20)*** (4.24)*** (3.88)*** (3.83)*** (3.83)*** (4.73)*** (4.73)*** (3.83)*** (3.83)*** (4.14)*** (4.16)*** (3.81)*** (3.79)*** (3.79)***
Teacher assessment 
score −0.226 −0.259 −0.203 −0.285 −0.231 −0.241 −0.257 −0.249 −0.249 −0.212 −0.235 −0.26 −0.215 −0.2 −0.164 −0.235 −0.224 −0.19 −0.19 0.048 0.048 −0.19 −0.19 −0.207 −0.184 −0.12 −0.145 −0.145
−0.50 −0.56 −0.45 −0.61 −0.50 −0.53 −0.56 −0.56 −0.56 −0.44 −0.49 −0.56 −0.46 −0.44 −0.35 −0.49 −0.49 −0.41 −0.41 0.10 0.10 −0.41 −0.41 −0.44 −0.39 −0.23 −0.33 −0.33
Student pretest 
score −0.005 −0.02 −0.044 −0.039 −0.053 −0.049 −0.058 −0.02 −0.02 −0.056 −0.094 −0.064 −0.068 −0.042 −0.02 −0.054 −0.059 0.002 0.002 −0.062 −0.062 0.002 0.002 −0.016 −0.018 −0.013 −0.126 −0.126
−0.02 −0.09 −0.19 −0.17 −0.22 −0.21 −0.24 −0.09 −0.09 −0.24 −0.39 −0.27 −0.28 −0.18 −0.09 −0.23 −0.26 0.01 0.01 −0.26 −0.26 0.01 0.01 −0.07 −0.08 −0.06 −0.55 −0.55
Class size (number 
of students) −0.007 −0.006 −0.008 −0.005 −0.007 −0.007 −0.007 −0.007 −0.007 −0.008 −0.009 −0.007 −0.008 −0.007 −0.006 −0.007 −0.007 −0.019 −0.019 −0.018 −0.018 −0.019 −0.019 −0.019 −0.019 −0.018 −0.016 −0.016
−0.70 −0.62 −0.77 −0.52 −0.69 −0.64 −0.65 −0.71 −0.71 −0.80 −0.88 −0.64 −0.76 −0.75 −0.52 −0.67 −0.63 (2.12)** (2.12)** (2.14)** (2.14)** (2.12)** (2.12)** (2.18)** (2.12)** (2.06)** (1.84)* (1.84)*
School private 0.097 0.124 0.087 0.105 0.121 0.135 0.081 0.239 0.239 0.101 0.114 0.124 0.106 0.157 0.081 0.113 0.125 0.133 0.133 0.087 0.087 0.133 0.133 0.142 0.144 0.154 0.131 0.131
0.53 0.62 0.47 0.53 0.61 0.70 0.39 1.23 1.23 0.52 0.62 0.64 0.56 0.83 0.42 0.59 0.60 0.59 0.59 0.44 0.44 0.59 0.59 0.66 0.67 0.71 0.60 0.60
School religious 0.142 0.187 0.185 0.233 0.217 0.214 0.214 0.229 0.229 0.228 0.235 0.217 0.223 0.222 0.239 0.219 0.219 0.195 0.195 0.156 0.156 0.195 0.195 0.184 0.185 0.19 0.194 0.194
1.04 1.35 1.37 (1.67)* 1.64 1.66 1.56 (1.70)* (1.70)* (1.71)* (1.85)* 1.64 (1.69)* 1.65 (1.78)* 1.66 1.65 1.28 1.28 1.09 1.09 1.28 1.28 1.24 1.23 1.28 1.49 1.49
School size (number 
of students) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(1.79)* −1.65 (1.85)* −1.62 (1.75)* (1.74)* (1.75)* (1.78)* (1.78)* (1.80)* (1.89)* −1.60 (1.71)* (1.74)* −1.35 (1.72)* (1.74)* (2.76)*** (2.76)*** (3.15)*** (3.15)*** (2.76)*** (2.76)*** (2.78)*** (2.81)*** (2.90)*** (2.35)** (2.35)**
School materials 
shortage 0.003 −0.007 −0.001 −0.029 −0.006 0 −0.014 −0.02 −0.02 −0.017 −0.025 −0.009 −0.01 −0.011 −0.015 −0.01 −0.009 0.011 0.011 0.031 0.031 0.011 0.011 0.007 0.008 0.015 0.007 0.007
0.05 −0.11 −0.02 −0.39 −0.08 −0.01 −0.22 −0.30 −0.30 −0.26 −0.42 −0.14 −0.15 −0.17 −0.23 −0.15 −0.14 0.17 0.17 0.52 0.52 0.17 0.17 0.12 0.14 0.23 0.11 0.11
School building 
deficiency −0.077 −0.065 −0.074 −0.062 −0.065 −0.067 −0.061 −0.084 −0.084 −0.058 −0.063 −0.069 −0.066 −0.075 −0.052 −0.064 −0.065 −0.088 −0.088 −0.094 −0.094 −0.088 −0.088 −0.082 −0.083 −0.085 −0.089 −0.089
−1.54 −1.32 −1.50 −1.29 −1.33 −1.37 −1.22 (1.76)* (1.76)* −1.08 −1.28 −1.30 −1.40 −1.61 −1.03 −1.28 −1.32 (1.75)* (1.75)* (1.99)* (1.99)* (1.75)* (1.75)* −1.67 (1.69)* (1.74)* (1.92)* (1.92)*
School library 
deficiency 0.018 0.024 0.017 0.026 0.024 0.024 0.017 0.014 0.014 0.02 0.024 0.027 0.024 0.023 0.014 0.023 0.024 −0.026 −0.026 −0.011 −0.011 −0.026 −0.026 −0.016 −0.02 −0.018 −0.011 −0.011
0.31 0.43 0.30 0.45 0.43 0.42 0.29 0.25 0.25 0.34 0.44 0.48 0.42 0.41 0.24 0.41 0.42 −0.48 −0.48 −0.22 −0.22 −0.48 −0.48 −0.30 −0.35 −0.33 −0.21 −0.21
Frequency students 
skip class 0.026 0.032 0.02 0.035 0.024 0.019 0.026 0.004 0.004 0.038 0.047 0.023 0.029 0.019 0.034 0.026 0.025 0.039 0.039 −0.002 −0.002 0.039 0.039 0.018 0.016 0.012 0.052 0.052
0.33 0.39 0.26 0.43 0.29 0.23 0.32 0.05 0.05 0.48 0.59 0.29 0.36 0.24 0.42 0.33 0.31 0.48 0.48 −0.03 −0.03 0.48 0.48 0.24 0.21 0.17 0.67 0.67
Frequency students 
late −0.062 −0.059 −0.056 −0.056 −0.054 −0.053 −0.052 −0.044 −0.044 −0.052 −0.051 −0.055 −0.054 −0.049 −0.053 −0.054 −0.055 −0.029 −0.029 −0.01 −0.01 −0.029 −0.029 −0.021 −0.022 −0.027 −0.038 −0.038
(1.70)* −1.62 −1.59 −1.51 −1.46 −1.42 −1.41 −1.20 −1.20 −1.38 −1.39 −1.49 −1.48 −1.33 −1.43 −1.44 −1.47 −0.79 −0.79 −0.27 −0.27 −0.79 −0.79 −0.56 −0.60 −0.68 −1.07 −1.07
Frequency bullying 0.089 0.097 0.089 0.096 0.098 0.107 0.098 0.142 0.142 0.082 0.095 0.109 0.101 0.103 0.11 0.097 0.098 0.078 0.078 0.084 0.084 0.078 0.078 0.073 0.075 0.076 0.095 0.095
1.00 1.08 0.99 1.07 1.08 1.21 1.11 1.54 1.54 0.82 1.05 1.16 1.14 1.13 1.19 1.08 1.07 0.86 0.86 0.91 0.91 0.86 0.86 0.80 0.81 0.81 1.12 1.12
Community size −0.021 −0.01 −0.023 −0.013 −0.012 −0.008 −0.01 0.008 0.008 −0.01 −0.014 −0.016 −0.013 −0.012 −0.001 −0.013 −0.015 −0.03 −0.03 0.002 0.002 −0.03 −0.03 −0.037 −0.034 −0.026 −0.031 −0.031
−0.45 −0.21 −0.48 −0.26 −0.26 −0.16 −0.21 0.17 0.17 −0.21 −0.31 −0.32 −0.28 −0.25 −0.02 −0.28 −0.30 −0.56 −0.56 0.04 0.04 −0.56 −0.56 −0.70 −0.63 −0.45 −0.58 −0.58
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Teacher attends 
working group 0.072 0.057 0.083 0.07 0.069 0.083 0.077 0.111 0.111 0.064 0.062 0.068 0.06 0.071 0.067 0.067 0.066 0.118 0.118 0.139 0.139 0.118 0.118 0.125 0.13 0.135 0.104 0.104
0.63 0.48 0.72 0.60 0.58 0.71 0.65 0.92 0.92 0.56 0.55 0.58 0.52 0.59 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.93 0.93 1.27 1.27 0.93 0.93 1.02 1.06 1.12 0.86 0.86
Teacher maths 
education 
degree 0.064 0.042 0.068 0.064 0.045 0.037 0.033 0.137 0.137 0.06 0.079 0.047 0.064 0.088 0.066 0.047 0.052 0.01 0.01 −0.039 −0.039 0.01 0.01 −0.012 −0.007 0 0.078 0.078
0.58 0.40 0.62 0.58 0.41 0.33 0.29 1.37 1.37 0.58 0.74 0.43 0.59 0.80 0.61 0.43 0.49 0.09 0.09 −0.39 −0.39 0.09 0.09 −0.11 −0.07 0.00 0.79 0.79
Teacher experience 
years 0.018 0.02 0.018 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.019 0.019 0.02 0.02 0.019 0.02 0.018 0.019 0.02 0.02 0.019 0.019 0.021 0.021 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.024 0.024
(2.57)** (2.73)*** (2.54)** (2.70)*** (2.70)*** (2.73)*** (2.70)*** (2.60)** (2.60)** (2.76)*** (2.75)*** (2.69)*** (2.72)*** (2.35)** (2.49)** (2.72)*** (2.67)*** (2.38)** (2.38)** (3.02)*** (3.02)*** (2.38)** (2.38)** (2.39)** (2.40)** (2.45)** (3.29)*** (3.29)***
Teacher 4-year 
degree 0.533 0.569 0.548 0.578 0.575 0.554 0.569 0.552 0.552 0.586 0.574 0.57 0.585 0.552 0.566 0.578 0.57 0.584 0.584 0.635 0.635 0.584 0.584 0.599 0.6 0.621 0.554 0.554
(3.69)*** (4.01)*** (3.85)*** (4.41)*** (4.18)*** (4.03)*** (4.21)*** (4.15)*** (4.15)*** (4.22)*** (4.36)*** (4.12)*** (4.27)*** (3.86)*** (4.20)*** (4.24)*** (3.88)*** (3.83)*** (3.83)*** (4.73)*** (4.73)*** (3.83)*** (3.83)*** (4.14)*** (4.16)*** (3.81)*** (3.79)*** (3.79)***
Teacher assessment 
score −0.226 −0.259 −0.203 −0.285 −0.231 −0.241 −0.257 −0.249 −0.249 −0.212 −0.235 −0.26 −0.215 −0.2 −0.164 −0.235 −0.224 −0.19 −0.19 0.048 0.048 −0.19 −0.19 −0.207 −0.184 −0.12 −0.145 −0.145
−0.50 −0.56 −0.45 −0.61 −0.50 −0.53 −0.56 −0.56 −0.56 −0.44 −0.49 −0.56 −0.46 −0.44 −0.35 −0.49 −0.49 −0.41 −0.41 0.10 0.10 −0.41 −0.41 −0.44 −0.39 −0.23 −0.33 −0.33
Student pretest 
score −0.005 −0.02 −0.044 −0.039 −0.053 −0.049 −0.058 −0.02 −0.02 −0.056 −0.094 −0.064 −0.068 −0.042 −0.02 −0.054 −0.059 0.002 0.002 −0.062 −0.062 0.002 0.002 −0.016 −0.018 −0.013 −0.126 −0.126
−0.02 −0.09 −0.19 −0.17 −0.22 −0.21 −0.24 −0.09 −0.09 −0.24 −0.39 −0.27 −0.28 −0.18 −0.09 −0.23 −0.26 0.01 0.01 −0.26 −0.26 0.01 0.01 −0.07 −0.08 −0.06 −0.55 −0.55
Class size (number 
of students) −0.007 −0.006 −0.008 −0.005 −0.007 −0.007 −0.007 −0.007 −0.007 −0.008 −0.009 −0.007 −0.008 −0.007 −0.006 −0.007 −0.007 −0.019 −0.019 −0.018 −0.018 −0.019 −0.019 −0.019 −0.019 −0.018 −0.016 −0.016
−0.70 −0.62 −0.77 −0.52 −0.69 −0.64 −0.65 −0.71 −0.71 −0.80 −0.88 −0.64 −0.76 −0.75 −0.52 −0.67 −0.63 (2.12)** (2.12)** (2.14)** (2.14)** (2.12)** (2.12)** (2.18)** (2.12)** (2.06)** (1.84)* (1.84)*
School private 0.097 0.124 0.087 0.105 0.121 0.135 0.081 0.239 0.239 0.101 0.114 0.124 0.106 0.157 0.081 0.113 0.125 0.133 0.133 0.087 0.087 0.133 0.133 0.142 0.144 0.154 0.131 0.131
0.53 0.62 0.47 0.53 0.61 0.70 0.39 1.23 1.23 0.52 0.62 0.64 0.56 0.83 0.42 0.59 0.60 0.59 0.59 0.44 0.44 0.59 0.59 0.66 0.67 0.71 0.60 0.60
School religious 0.142 0.187 0.185 0.233 0.217 0.214 0.214 0.229 0.229 0.228 0.235 0.217 0.223 0.222 0.239 0.219 0.219 0.195 0.195 0.156 0.156 0.195 0.195 0.184 0.185 0.19 0.194 0.194
1.04 1.35 1.37 (1.67)* 1.64 1.66 1.56 (1.70)* (1.70)* (1.71)* (1.85)* 1.64 (1.69)* 1.65 (1.78)* 1.66 1.65 1.28 1.28 1.09 1.09 1.28 1.28 1.24 1.23 1.28 1.49 1.49
School size (number 
of students) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(1.79)* −1.65 (1.85)* −1.62 (1.75)* (1.74)* (1.75)* (1.78)* (1.78)* (1.80)* (1.89)* −1.60 (1.71)* (1.74)* −1.35 (1.72)* (1.74)* (2.76)*** (2.76)*** (3.15)*** (3.15)*** (2.76)*** (2.76)*** (2.78)*** (2.81)*** (2.90)*** (2.35)** (2.35)**
School materials 
shortage 0.003 −0.007 −0.001 −0.029 −0.006 0 −0.014 −0.02 −0.02 −0.017 −0.025 −0.009 −0.01 −0.011 −0.015 −0.01 −0.009 0.011 0.011 0.031 0.031 0.011 0.011 0.007 0.008 0.015 0.007 0.007
0.05 −0.11 −0.02 −0.39 −0.08 −0.01 −0.22 −0.30 −0.30 −0.26 −0.42 −0.14 −0.15 −0.17 −0.23 −0.15 −0.14 0.17 0.17 0.52 0.52 0.17 0.17 0.12 0.14 0.23 0.11 0.11
School building 
deficiency −0.077 −0.065 −0.074 −0.062 −0.065 −0.067 −0.061 −0.084 −0.084 −0.058 −0.063 −0.069 −0.066 −0.075 −0.052 −0.064 −0.065 −0.088 −0.088 −0.094 −0.094 −0.088 −0.088 −0.082 −0.083 −0.085 −0.089 −0.089
−1.54 −1.32 −1.50 −1.29 −1.33 −1.37 −1.22 (1.76)* (1.76)* −1.08 −1.28 −1.30 −1.40 −1.61 −1.03 −1.28 −1.32 (1.75)* (1.75)* (1.99)* (1.99)* (1.75)* (1.75)* −1.67 (1.69)* (1.74)* (1.92)* (1.92)*
School library 
deficiency 0.018 0.024 0.017 0.026 0.024 0.024 0.017 0.014 0.014 0.02 0.024 0.027 0.024 0.023 0.014 0.023 0.024 −0.026 −0.026 −0.011 −0.011 −0.026 −0.026 −0.016 −0.02 −0.018 −0.011 −0.011
0.31 0.43 0.30 0.45 0.43 0.42 0.29 0.25 0.25 0.34 0.44 0.48 0.42 0.41 0.24 0.41 0.42 −0.48 −0.48 −0.22 −0.22 −0.48 −0.48 −0.30 −0.35 −0.33 −0.21 −0.21
Frequency students 
skip class 0.026 0.032 0.02 0.035 0.024 0.019 0.026 0.004 0.004 0.038 0.047 0.023 0.029 0.019 0.034 0.026 0.025 0.039 0.039 −0.002 −0.002 0.039 0.039 0.018 0.016 0.012 0.052 0.052
0.33 0.39 0.26 0.43 0.29 0.23 0.32 0.05 0.05 0.48 0.59 0.29 0.36 0.24 0.42 0.33 0.31 0.48 0.48 −0.03 −0.03 0.48 0.48 0.24 0.21 0.17 0.67 0.67
Frequency students 
late −0.062 −0.059 −0.056 −0.056 −0.054 −0.053 −0.052 −0.044 −0.044 −0.052 −0.051 −0.055 −0.054 −0.049 −0.053 −0.054 −0.055 −0.029 −0.029 −0.01 −0.01 −0.029 −0.029 −0.021 −0.022 −0.027 −0.038 −0.038
(1.70)* −1.62 −1.59 −1.51 −1.46 −1.42 −1.41 −1.20 −1.20 −1.38 −1.39 −1.49 −1.48 −1.33 −1.43 −1.44 −1.47 −0.79 −0.79 −0.27 −0.27 −0.79 −0.79 −0.56 −0.60 −0.68 −1.07 −1.07
Frequency bullying 0.089 0.097 0.089 0.096 0.098 0.107 0.098 0.142 0.142 0.082 0.095 0.109 0.101 0.103 0.11 0.097 0.098 0.078 0.078 0.084 0.084 0.078 0.078 0.073 0.075 0.076 0.095 0.095
1.00 1.08 0.99 1.07 1.08 1.21 1.11 1.54 1.54 0.82 1.05 1.16 1.14 1.13 1.19 1.08 1.07 0.86 0.86 0.91 0.91 0.86 0.86 0.80 0.81 0.81 1.12 1.12
Community size −0.021 −0.01 −0.023 −0.013 −0.012 −0.008 −0.01 0.008 0.008 −0.01 −0.014 −0.016 −0.013 −0.012 −0.001 −0.013 −0.015 −0.03 −0.03 0.002 0.002 −0.03 −0.03 −0.037 −0.034 −0.026 −0.031 −0.031
−0.45 −0.21 −0.48 −0.26 −0.26 −0.16 −0.21 0.17 0.17 −0.21 −0.31 −0.32 −0.28 −0.25 −0.02 −0.28 −0.30 −0.56 −0.56 0.04 0.04 −0.56 −0.56 −0.70 −0.63 −0.45 −0.58 −0.58
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Community poor 
(%) 0.015 −0.01 0.015 −0.008 −0.009 −0.008 −0.009 −0.012 −0.012 −0.005 −0.012 −0.013 −0.007 −0.003 −0.018 −0.009 −0.01 0.043 0.043 0.037 0.037 0.043 0.043 0.034 0.035 0.035 −0.026 −0.026
0.25 −0.17 0.23 −0.13 −0.15 −0.14 −0.15 −0.23 −0.23 −0.08 −0.19 −0.22 −0.11 −0.05 −0.28 −0.15 −0.16 0.73 0.73 0.65 0.65 0.73 0.73 0.58 0.60 0.60 −0.46 −0.46
Community affluent 
(%) −0.073 −0.076 −0.074 −0.068 −0.076 −0.071 −0.078 −0.058 −0.058 −0.08 −0.08 −0.074 −0.073 −0.061 −0.065 −0.077 −0.077 −0.061 −0.061 −0.071 −0.071 −0.061 −0.061 −0.068 −0.07 −0.072 −0.099 −0.099
−1.51 −1.63 −1.49 −1.41 −1.60 −1.46 −1.63 −1.18 −1.18 (1.68)* −1.65 −1.54 −1.48 −1.17 −1.29 −1.61 −1.60 −1.18 −1.18 −1.42 −1.42 −1.18 −1.18 −1.34 −1.39 −1.41 (2.17)** (2.17)**
Region Java 0.173 0.049 0.149 0.02 0.04 0.028 0.031 0.078 0.078 0.016 0.002 0.047 0.058 0.025 0.039 0.039 0.033 0.018 0.018 0.114 0.114 0.018 0.018 0.015 0.018 0.022 0.002 0.002
1.11 0.30 0.93 0.12 0.24 0.17 0.20 0.49 0.49 0.09 0.01 0.29 0.34 0.15 0.24 0.24 0.19 0.10 0.10 0.67 0.67 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.13 0.01 0.01
Region Sumatera 0.225 0.114 0.208 0.081 0.107 0.071 0.093 0.073 0.073 0.1 0.103 0.115 0.13 0.101 0.104 0.109 0.106 0.159 0.159 0.178 0.178 0.159 0.159 0.151 0.153 0.152 0.138 0.138
1.37 0.68 1.23 0.46 0.63 0.41 0.55 0.45 0.45 0.58 0.62 0.69 0.76 0.62 0.64 0.65 0.62 0.97 0.97 1.02 1.02 0.97 0.97 0.90 0.92 0.90 0.84 0.84
Region Kalimantan 0.122 0.069 0.143 0.075 0.087 0.048 0.076 0.075 0.075 0.088 0.062 0.083 0.094 0.059 0.082 0.09 0.075 0.363 0.363 0.465 0.465 0.363 0.363 0.363 0.363 0.363 0.078 0.078
0.53 0.27 0.63 0.31 0.36 0.18 0.32 0.34 0.34 0.37 0.27 0.34 0.39 0.25 0.34 0.37 0.29 1.38 1.38 (1.86)* (1.86)* 1.38 1.38 1.37 1.37 1.38 0.36 0.36
Region Bali/NTT/
NTB 0.097 0.025 0.101 0.013 0.029 −0.005 0.032 0.072 0.072 0.002 −0.036 0.038 0.023 0.009 0.025 0.033 0.025 0.164 0.164 0.324 0.324 0.164 0.164 0.154 0.175 0.263 0.065 0.065
0.50 0.13 0.52 0.07 0.15 −0.02 0.17 0.37 0.37 0.01 −0.17 0.20 0.12 0.05 0.13 0.17 0.12 0.83 0.83 1.53 1.53 0.83 0.83 0.74 0.85 1.12 0.35 0.35
Constant 0.419 −0.489 −0.563 −0.479 −0.398 −0.373 −0.33 −0.392 −1.033 −0.186 −0.225 −0.36 −0.397 −0.553 −0.435 −0.373 −0.359 0.115 −0.287 0.091 −0.465 0.115 −0.287 −0.175 −0.195 −0.285 −0.013 0.473
0.51 −0.76 −0.87 −0.77 −0.59 −0.57 −0.50 −0.65 −1.66 −0.26 −0.35 −0.54 −0.61 −0.80 −0.66 −0.56 −0.55 0.15 −0.49 0.16 −0.78 0.15 −0.49 −0.29 −0.32 −0.44 −0.02 0.68
Observations 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2116 2116 2116 2116 2116 2116 2116 2116 2116 2296 2296
R2 0.49 0.47 0.49 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.47 0.50 0.50 0.47 0.48 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.47 0.47 0.52 0.52 0.55 0.55 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.53 0.53
Adj. R2 0.48 0.46 0.48 0.47 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.50 0.50 0.46 0.47 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.51 0.51 0.54 0.54 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.52
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Regressions run on multiple-imputed data.
Significance level: * = 10 percent, ** = 5 percent, *** = 1 percent.
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Community poor 
(%) 0.015 −0.01 0.015 −0.008 −0.009 −0.008 −0.009 −0.012 −0.012 −0.005 −0.012 −0.013 −0.007 −0.003 −0.018 −0.009 −0.01 0.043 0.043 0.037 0.037 0.043 0.043 0.034 0.035 0.035 −0.026 −0.026
0.25 −0.17 0.23 −0.13 −0.15 −0.14 −0.15 −0.23 −0.23 −0.08 −0.19 −0.22 −0.11 −0.05 −0.28 −0.15 −0.16 0.73 0.73 0.65 0.65 0.73 0.73 0.58 0.60 0.60 −0.46 −0.46
Community affluent 
(%) −0.073 −0.076 −0.074 −0.068 −0.076 −0.071 −0.078 −0.058 −0.058 −0.08 −0.08 −0.074 −0.073 −0.061 −0.065 −0.077 −0.077 −0.061 −0.061 −0.071 −0.071 −0.061 −0.061 −0.068 −0.07 −0.072 −0.099 −0.099
−1.51 −1.63 −1.49 −1.41 −1.60 −1.46 −1.63 −1.18 −1.18 (1.68)* −1.65 −1.54 −1.48 −1.17 −1.29 −1.61 −1.60 −1.18 −1.18 −1.42 −1.42 −1.18 −1.18 −1.34 −1.39 −1.41 (2.17)** (2.17)**
Region Java 0.173 0.049 0.149 0.02 0.04 0.028 0.031 0.078 0.078 0.016 0.002 0.047 0.058 0.025 0.039 0.039 0.033 0.018 0.018 0.114 0.114 0.018 0.018 0.015 0.018 0.022 0.002 0.002
1.11 0.30 0.93 0.12 0.24 0.17 0.20 0.49 0.49 0.09 0.01 0.29 0.34 0.15 0.24 0.24 0.19 0.10 0.10 0.67 0.67 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.13 0.01 0.01
Region Sumatera 0.225 0.114 0.208 0.081 0.107 0.071 0.093 0.073 0.073 0.1 0.103 0.115 0.13 0.101 0.104 0.109 0.106 0.159 0.159 0.178 0.178 0.159 0.159 0.151 0.153 0.152 0.138 0.138
1.37 0.68 1.23 0.46 0.63 0.41 0.55 0.45 0.45 0.58 0.62 0.69 0.76 0.62 0.64 0.65 0.62 0.97 0.97 1.02 1.02 0.97 0.97 0.90 0.92 0.90 0.84 0.84
Region Kalimantan 0.122 0.069 0.143 0.075 0.087 0.048 0.076 0.075 0.075 0.088 0.062 0.083 0.094 0.059 0.082 0.09 0.075 0.363 0.363 0.465 0.465 0.363 0.363 0.363 0.363 0.363 0.078 0.078
0.53 0.27 0.63 0.31 0.36 0.18 0.32 0.34 0.34 0.37 0.27 0.34 0.39 0.25 0.34 0.37 0.29 1.38 1.38 (1.86)* (1.86)* 1.38 1.38 1.37 1.37 1.38 0.36 0.36
Region Bali/NTT/
NTB 0.097 0.025 0.101 0.013 0.029 −0.005 0.032 0.072 0.072 0.002 −0.036 0.038 0.023 0.009 0.025 0.033 0.025 0.164 0.164 0.324 0.324 0.164 0.164 0.154 0.175 0.263 0.065 0.065
0.50 0.13 0.52 0.07 0.15 −0.02 0.17 0.37 0.37 0.01 −0.17 0.20 0.12 0.05 0.13 0.17 0.12 0.83 0.83 1.53 1.53 0.83 0.83 0.74 0.85 1.12 0.35 0.35
Constant 0.419 −0.489 −0.563 −0.479 −0.398 −0.373 −0.33 −0.392 −1.033 −0.186 −0.225 −0.36 −0.397 −0.553 −0.435 −0.373 −0.359 0.115 −0.287 0.091 −0.465 0.115 −0.287 −0.175 −0.195 −0.285 −0.013 0.473
0.51 −0.76 −0.87 −0.77 −0.59 −0.57 −0.50 −0.65 −1.66 −0.26 −0.35 −0.54 −0.61 −0.80 −0.66 −0.56 −0.55 0.15 −0.49 0.16 −0.78 0.15 −0.49 −0.29 −0.32 −0.44 −0.02 0.68
Observations 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2116 2116 2116 2116 2116 2116 2116 2116 2116 2296 2296
R2 0.49 0.47 0.49 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.47 0.50 0.50 0.47 0.48 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.47 0.47 0.52 0.52 0.55 0.55 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.53 0.53
Adj. R2 0.48 0.46 0.48 0.47 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.50 0.50 0.46 0.47 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.51 0.51 0.54 0.54 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.52
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Regressions run on multiple-imputed data.
Significance level: * = 10 percent, ** = 5 percent, *** = 1 percent.
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Appendix F
Coefficient and z-statistic data for figure 5.12: Relationship of Teacher Degree to 
Student Learning Outcomes.
Variables highlighted in brown below were used in creating the figure.
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Degree in mathematics 
education 0.023 0.033
(1.74)* (2.48)**
Degree in pure 
mathematics −0.032 −0.043
(−2.22)** (−2.87)***
Degree not mathematics 0.005 −0.002
0.35 −0.1
Student pretest score 0.529 0.543 0.530 0.545 0.529 0.542
(21.05)*** (20.8)*** (21.11)*** (20.98)*** (21.07)*** (20.74)***
Student age −0.001 −0.003 0.000 −0.003 −0.001 −0.003
−0.16 −0.82 −0.14 −0.78 −0.18 −0.88
Hours homework/week 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
(1.69)* (1.71)* (1.68)* (1.68)* (1.69)* (1.71)*
Student  job hours/week 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
0.38 −0.13 0.4 −0.08 0.33 −0.12
Student sports hours/
week −0.001 0.001 −0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001
−0.23 0.23 −0.22 0.25 −0.16 0.27
Student reads hours week 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003
0.77 0.99 0.76 1 0.75 0.95
Student has dictionary at 
home 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.005 0.008 0.006
0.84 0.59 0.86 0.62 0.91 0.67
Student has computer at 
home 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
1.08 1.02 1.14 1.08 1.12 1.09
Student’s mom education 
level −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−0.66 −0.74 −0.63 −0.7 −0.73 −0.8
Student hours tutoring/
week −0.001 −0.002 −0.001 −0.002 −0.001 −0.002
−0.82 −1.29 −0.8 −1.25 −0.8 −1.3
Teacher female 0.003 0.007 0.015
0.19 0.4 0.84
Teacher civil servant −0.007 −0.010 −0.005
−0.2 −0.32 −0.15
Teacher school-hired −0.015 −0.015 −0.004
−0.59 −0.64 −0.15
table continues next page
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Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Teacher math satisfaction 
level 0.007 0.005 0.003
0.48 0.33 0.21
Teacher attends working 
group −0.015 −0.022 −0.004
−0.8 −1.24 −0.25
Teacher experience years 0.002 0.002 0.001
1.62 (1.72)* 1.12
Teacher 4-year degree 0.031 0.026 0.040
1.02 0.9 1.35
Teacher certified
Teacher assessment score 0.227 0.231 0.249
(2.4)** (2.58)** (2.63)**
Class size (number of 
students) 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.32 −0.01 0.4 0.16 0.19 −0.18
School private 0.016 0.018 0.013 0.010 0.013 0.012
0.79 0.59 0.65 0.34 0.61 0.39
School religious −0.005 0.007 0.001 0.014 −0.011 0.006
−0.25 0.39 0.03 0.77 −0.55 0.33
School size (number of 
students) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1.03 0.2 1 0.07 1.66 0.49
School materials shortage −0.008 0.008 −0.010 0.006 −0.010 0.009
−1.04 0.98 −1.28 0.79 −1.24 1.05
School building deficiency 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.008 0.009
0.69 0.51 0.69 0.44 1 1.29
School library deficiency −0.012 −0.012 −0.011 −0.012 −0.012 −0.012
−1.4 −1.48 −1.34 −1.52 −1.4 −1.43
Frequency students skip 
class −0.008 −0.013 −0.009 −0.014 −0.008 −0.016
−0.6 −1.23 −0.76 −1.4 −0.66 −1.43
Frequency students skip 
class −0.026 −0.029 −0.028 −0.031 −0.029 −0.039
(−1.87)* (−2.24)** (−2.1)** (−2.56)** (−2.06)** (−2.96)***
Frequency students late 0.008 0.022 0.008 0.023 0.009 0.024
1.07 (3.05)*** 1.11 (3.32)*** 1.29 (3.33)***
Frequency bullying 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.007 −0.004 −0.003
0.04 0.1 0.46 0.55 −0.28 −0.25
Community size 0.006 0.008 0.006 0.008 −0.002 0.006
0.66 1.03 0.69 1.13 −0.31 0.79
Community poor (%) −0.013 −0.015 −0.017 −0.019 −0.010 −0.014
−1.51 (−1.88)* (−1.97)** (−2.49)** −1.22 (−1.83)*
Community affluent (%) −0.005 −0.006 −0.005 −0.006 −0.008 −0.007
−0.67 −0.76 −0.66 −0.81 −1.15 −0.92
table continues next page
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Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Constant 0.200 0.092 0.232 0.141 0.249 0.104
(2.36)** 0.9 (2.81)*** 1.43 (3.02)*** 1.02
Random effects parameters
Level 1: Student level 
estimate 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 
Standard error 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Level 2: Classroom level 
estimate 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 
Standard error 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Level 3: Region level 
estimate 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 
Standard error 0.000  –   0.000  –    –    –   
Note: Robust z-statistics in parentheses. Regressions are multi-level models run with MLwIN.
Significance level: * = 10 percent, ** = 5 percent, *** = 1 percent.
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Appendix G
Coefficient and t-statistic data for figure 5.13: Practices of Teachers with 
Mathematics Education Degrees vs. Those with Pure Mathematics or 
Nonmathematics Degrees.
Variables shaded gray below were used in creating the figure.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28)
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Teaching practice 
variable (listed in 
columns above) 0.624 1.322 −0.846 −0.557 0.147 −0.158 0.795 0.856 −0.856 0.442 −0.711 −0.024 0.642 −0.702 1.196 0.028 0.38 0.686 −0.686 −0.286 0.286 0.686 −0.686 0.012 0.019 2.795 1.029 −1.029
0.86 0.64 −1.12 −1.53 0.75 −0.68 (2.13)** (3.42)*** (3.42)*** (2.28)* (2.30)** −0.07 (2.33)** (4.52)*** (2.39)** 0.09 (2.19)** 1.11 −1.11 −1.6 1.6 1.11 −1.11 (2.04)** (2.13)** 0.86 (2.59)** (2.59)**
Student age −0.042 −0.035 −0.04 −0.046 −0.042 −0.039 −0.035 −0.04 −0.04 −0.024 −0.022 −0.039 −0.043 −0.035 −0.033 −0.04 −0.032 −0.014 −0.014 −0.016 −0.016 −0.014 −0.014 −0.014 −0.014 −0.011 −0.03 −0.03
(1.97)* (1.73)* (1.96)* (2.28)** (2.02)** (1.84)* −1.65 (1.88)* (1.88)* −1.20 −1.08 (1.78)* (2.07)** (1.69)* −1.54 (1.92)* −1.48 −0.66 −0.66 −0.73 −0.73 −0.66 −0.66 −0.65 −0.66 −0.50 −1.41 −1.41
Hours homework/
week 0.013 0.017 0.014 0.01 0.015 0.016 0.013 0.005 0.005 0.015 0.011 0.015 0.019 0.012 0.013 0.015 0.013 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.018 0.019 0.019 0.021 0.021 0.02 0.017 0.017
1.44 (1.91)* 1.50 1.14 1.57 1.66 1.48 0.56 0.56 1.59 1.19 1.62 (2.09)** 1.22 1.45 1.65 1.41 (2.25)** (2.25)** (2.08)** (2.08)** (2.25)** (2.25)** (2.37)** (2.35)** (2.33)** (1.85)* (1.85)*
Student  job hours/
week −0.001 0.001 −0.001 0.003 0.001 0 −0.003 −0.002 −0.002 0 0 0 −0.001 −0.004 0.002 0 0 0.004 0.004 0 0 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
−0.10 0.11 −0.09 0.34 0.11 −0.04 −0.31 −0.27 −0.27 −0.01 −0.01 −0.03 −0.06 −0.47 0.26 −0.02 −0.03 0.51 0.51 −0.03 −0.03 0.51 0.51 0.19 0.19 0.26 0.14 0.14
Student sports hours/
week 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.004 −0.002 −0.002 0.008 0.004 0.003 −0.001 −0.001 0 0 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.002 0.002 0.002
0.35 0.40 0.28 0.43 0.39 0.40 0.53 0.87 0.87 0.66 0.48 0.45 −0.27 −0.27 1.00 0.44 0.35 −0.11 −0.11 −0.05 −0.05 −0.11 −0.11 −0.16 −0.14 −0.22 0.22 0.22
Student reads hours 
week −0.005 −0.005 −0.005 −0.004 −0.005 −0.004 −0.003 0.001 0.001 −0.003 −0.001 −0.004 −0.004 −0.001 −0.007 −0.004 −0.001 −0.009 −0.009 −0.008 −0.008 −0.009 −0.009 −0.01 −0.01 −0.008 −0.008 −0.008
−0.49 −0.47 −0.53 −0.41 −0.47 −0.44 −0.27 0.11 0.11 −0.29 −0.14 −0.43 −0.43 −0.10 −0.75 −0.43 −0.13 −0.98 −0.98 −0.88 −0.88 −0.98 −0.98 −1.05 −1.07 −0.84 −0.77 −0.77
Student has dictionary 
at home 0.038 0.042 0.038 0.038 0.042 0.043 0.042 0.025 0.025 0.044 0.041 0.04 0.049 0.034 0.039 0.04 0.041 0.032 0.032 0.038 0.038 0.032 0.032 0.047 0.048 0.042 0.037 0.037
0.87 0.95 0.88 0.87 0.96 1.00 1.00 0.62 0.62 1.05 0.94 0.92 1.21 1.03 0.85 0.90 1.01 0.71 0.71 0.83 0.83 0.71 0.71 1.05 1.06 0.95 0.90 0.90
Student has computer 
at home −0.016 −0.016 −0.016 −0.004 −0.017 −0.02 −0.017 −0.007 −0.007 −0.023 −0.01 −0.016 −0.022 −0.019 −0.014 −0.016 −0.016 0.004 0.004 0.01 0.01 0.004 0.004 0 0 0.004 −0.019 −0.019
−0.59 −0.54 −0.58 −0.16 −0.61 −0.77 −0.60 −0.25 −0.25 −0.84 −0.36 −0.64 −0.82 −0.71 −0.51 −0.56 −0.56 0.12 0.12 0.30 0.30 0.12 0.12 −0.01 0.00 0.11 −0.67 −0.67
Student’s mom 
education level −0.008 −0.008 −0.008 −0.007 −0.007 −0.007 −0.008 −0.007 −0.007 −0.008 −0.006 −0.008 −0.007 −0.009 −0.007 −0.008 −0.011 −0.011 −0.011 −0.011 −0.011 −0.011 −0.011 −0.01 −0.01 −0.011 −0.007 −0.007
(2.25)** (2.05)** (2.19)** (1.95)* (1.94)* (1.97)* (2.19)** (2.13)** (2.13)** (2.11)** (1.72)* (2.13)** (1.87)* (2.61)** (2.03)** (2.09)** (2.87)*** (2.83)*** (2.83)*** (2.92)*** (2.92)*** (2.83)*** (2.83)*** (2.70)*** (2.67)*** (2.90)*** (2.00)** (2.00)**
Student hours 
tutoring/week 0.002 0.006 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.009 0.007 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.008
0.37 0.91 0.44 0.62 0.55 0.58 0.82 0.66 0.66 1.32 1.14 0.69 0.80 0.25 0.80 0.60 0.50 0.86 0.86 0.88 0.88 0.86 0.86 1.15 1.16 1.07 1.25 1.25
Teacher female 0.061 0.054 0.069 0.085 0.054 0.043 0.043 0.007 0.007 0.06 0.076 0.049 0.1 0.054 0.033 0.049 0.024 0.087 0.087 0.105 0.105 0.087 0.087 0.092 0.095 0.101 0.036 0.036
0.70 0.63 0.79 0.94 0.61 0.49 0.48 0.08 0.08 0.69 0.94 0.56 1.20 0.63 0.37 0.56 0.27 0.99 0.99 1.22 1.22 0.99 0.99 1.04 1.07 1.14 0.40 0.40
Teacher civil servant −0.082 −0.037 −0.062 −0.067 −0.05 −0.065 −0.15 −0.241 −0.241 0.031 −0.04 −0.069 −0.07 −0.236 −0.062 −0.077 −0.128 −0.041 −0.041 −0.134 −0.134 −0.041 −0.041 −0.056 −0.063 −0.058 −0.152 −0.152
−0.61 −0.27 −0.45 −0.52 −0.33 −0.44 −0.98 (1.94)* (1.94)* 0.21 −0.28 −0.45 −0.50 −1.62 −0.46 −0.57 −0.90 −0.35 −0.35 −1.03 −1.03 −0.35 −0.35 −0.47 −0.53 −0.47 −1.01 −1.01
Teacher school-hired −0.02 −0.015 −0.01 0.044 0 −0.021 −0.045 −0.058 −0.058 0.019 0.009 −0.025 −0.065 −0.079 −0.013 −0.027 −0.033 0.091 0.091 0.049 0.049 0.091 0.091 0.028 0.026 0.029 −0.068 −0.068
−0.14 −0.10 −0.07 0.30 0.00 −0.14 −0.30 −0.43 −0.43 0.12 0.06 −0.17 −0.42 −0.56 −0.09 −0.18 −0.23 0.59 0.59 0.32 0.32 0.59 0.59 0.18 0.17 0.19 −0.47 −0.47
Teacher math 
satisfaction level 0.055 0.068 0.061 0.036 0.059 0.062 0.04 0.087 0.087 0.032 0.02 0.056 0.043 0.075 0.038 0.06 0.035 −0.001 −0.001 0.01 0.01 −0.001 −0.001 0.049 0.048 0.003 0.052 0.052
0.72 0.83 0.81 0.47 0.77 0.81 0.54 1.26 1.26 0.44 0.28 0.73 0.55 1.03 0.48 0.69 0.43 −0.01 −0.01 0.14 0.14 −0.01 −0.01 0.58 0.57 0.04 0.73 0.73
Teacher attends 
working group 0.136 0.126 0.124 0.131 0.146 0.153 0.162 0.06 0.06 0.144 0.141 0.141 0.155 0.107 0.136 0.139 0.145 0.184 0.184 0.164 0.164 0.184 0.184 0.14 0.138 0.159 0.111 0.111
1.34 1.14 1.21 1.25 1.39 1.41 1.50 0.66 0.66 1.41 1.40 1.35 1.57 1.12 1.30 1.30 1.44 (1.87)* (1.87)* (1.68)* (1.68)* (1.87)* (1.87)* 1.35 1.32 1.59 1.07 1.07
Teacher experience 
years −0.003 −0.003 −0.002 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.002 −0.003 −0.003 −0.004 −0.004 −0.003 −0.003 0.001 −0.002 −0.003 −0.003 −0.009 −0.009 −0.005 −0.005 −0.009 −0.009 −0.008 −0.008 −0.008 −0.003 −0.003
−0.40 −0.51 −0.38 −0.46 −0.43 −0.41 −0.39 −0.46 −0.46 −0.73 −0.62 −0.49 −0.56 0.26 −0.28 −0.48 −0.47 −1.61 −1.61 −0.90 −0.90 −1.61 −1.61 −1.44 −1.43 −1.47 −0.56 −0.56
Teacher 4-year degree 0.304 0.279 0.3 0.275 0.277 0.275 0.264 0.243 0.243 0.25 0.264 0.291 0.251 0.32 0.294 0.291 0.343 0.357 0.357 0.381 0.381 0.357 0.357 0.347 0.349 0.317 0.256 0.256
(2.04)** (1.87)* (1.98)* (1.81)* (1.80)* (1.79)* (1.75)* (1.77)* (1.77)* 1.63 (1.79)* (1.90)* (1.85)* (2.80)*** (1.97)* (1.95)* (2.47)** (2.48)** (2.48)** (2.55)** (2.55)** (2.48)** (2.48)** (2.38)** (2.40)** (2.00)** (1.79)* (1.79)*
Teacher certified 0.062 0.039 0.065 0.059 0.042 0.035 0.03 0.121 0.121 0.055 0.071 0.044 0.058 0.072 0.061 0.045 0.047 0.009 0.009 −0.037 −0.037 0.009 0.009 −0.01 −0.006 0 0.079 0.079
0.57 0.39 0.61 0.57 0.40 0.32 0.28 1.25 1.25 0.56 0.72 0.42 0.57 0.77 0.60 0.43 0.48 0.10 0.10 −0.39 −0.39 0.10 0.10 −0.11 −0.07 0.00 0.78 0.78
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Teaching practice 
variable (listed in 
columns above) 0.624 1.322 −0.846 −0.557 0.147 −0.158 0.795 0.856 −0.856 0.442 −0.711 −0.024 0.642 −0.702 1.196 0.028 0.38 0.686 −0.686 −0.286 0.286 0.686 −0.686 0.012 0.019 2.795 1.029 −1.029
0.86 0.64 −1.12 −1.53 0.75 −0.68 (2.13)** (3.42)*** (3.42)*** (2.28)* (2.30)** −0.07 (2.33)** (4.52)*** (2.39)** 0.09 (2.19)** 1.11 −1.11 −1.6 1.6 1.11 −1.11 (2.04)** (2.13)** 0.86 (2.59)** (2.59)**
Student age −0.042 −0.035 −0.04 −0.046 −0.042 −0.039 −0.035 −0.04 −0.04 −0.024 −0.022 −0.039 −0.043 −0.035 −0.033 −0.04 −0.032 −0.014 −0.014 −0.016 −0.016 −0.014 −0.014 −0.014 −0.014 −0.011 −0.03 −0.03
(1.97)* (1.73)* (1.96)* (2.28)** (2.02)** (1.84)* −1.65 (1.88)* (1.88)* −1.20 −1.08 (1.78)* (2.07)** (1.69)* −1.54 (1.92)* −1.48 −0.66 −0.66 −0.73 −0.73 −0.66 −0.66 −0.65 −0.66 −0.50 −1.41 −1.41
Hours homework/
week 0.013 0.017 0.014 0.01 0.015 0.016 0.013 0.005 0.005 0.015 0.011 0.015 0.019 0.012 0.013 0.015 0.013 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.018 0.019 0.019 0.021 0.021 0.02 0.017 0.017
1.44 (1.91)* 1.50 1.14 1.57 1.66 1.48 0.56 0.56 1.59 1.19 1.62 (2.09)** 1.22 1.45 1.65 1.41 (2.25)** (2.25)** (2.08)** (2.08)** (2.25)** (2.25)** (2.37)** (2.35)** (2.33)** (1.85)* (1.85)*
Student  job hours/
week −0.001 0.001 −0.001 0.003 0.001 0 −0.003 −0.002 −0.002 0 0 0 −0.001 −0.004 0.002 0 0 0.004 0.004 0 0 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
−0.10 0.11 −0.09 0.34 0.11 −0.04 −0.31 −0.27 −0.27 −0.01 −0.01 −0.03 −0.06 −0.47 0.26 −0.02 −0.03 0.51 0.51 −0.03 −0.03 0.51 0.51 0.19 0.19 0.26 0.14 0.14
Student sports hours/
week 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.004 −0.002 −0.002 0.008 0.004 0.003 −0.001 −0.001 0 0 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.002 0.002 0.002
0.35 0.40 0.28 0.43 0.39 0.40 0.53 0.87 0.87 0.66 0.48 0.45 −0.27 −0.27 1.00 0.44 0.35 −0.11 −0.11 −0.05 −0.05 −0.11 −0.11 −0.16 −0.14 −0.22 0.22 0.22
Student reads hours 
week −0.005 −0.005 −0.005 −0.004 −0.005 −0.004 −0.003 0.001 0.001 −0.003 −0.001 −0.004 −0.004 −0.001 −0.007 −0.004 −0.001 −0.009 −0.009 −0.008 −0.008 −0.009 −0.009 −0.01 −0.01 −0.008 −0.008 −0.008
−0.49 −0.47 −0.53 −0.41 −0.47 −0.44 −0.27 0.11 0.11 −0.29 −0.14 −0.43 −0.43 −0.10 −0.75 −0.43 −0.13 −0.98 −0.98 −0.88 −0.88 −0.98 −0.98 −1.05 −1.07 −0.84 −0.77 −0.77
Student has dictionary 
at home 0.038 0.042 0.038 0.038 0.042 0.043 0.042 0.025 0.025 0.044 0.041 0.04 0.049 0.034 0.039 0.04 0.041 0.032 0.032 0.038 0.038 0.032 0.032 0.047 0.048 0.042 0.037 0.037
0.87 0.95 0.88 0.87 0.96 1.00 1.00 0.62 0.62 1.05 0.94 0.92 1.21 1.03 0.85 0.90 1.01 0.71 0.71 0.83 0.83 0.71 0.71 1.05 1.06 0.95 0.90 0.90
Student has computer 
at home −0.016 −0.016 −0.016 −0.004 −0.017 −0.02 −0.017 −0.007 −0.007 −0.023 −0.01 −0.016 −0.022 −0.019 −0.014 −0.016 −0.016 0.004 0.004 0.01 0.01 0.004 0.004 0 0 0.004 −0.019 −0.019
−0.59 −0.54 −0.58 −0.16 −0.61 −0.77 −0.60 −0.25 −0.25 −0.84 −0.36 −0.64 −0.82 −0.71 −0.51 −0.56 −0.56 0.12 0.12 0.30 0.30 0.12 0.12 −0.01 0.00 0.11 −0.67 −0.67
Student’s mom 
education level −0.008 −0.008 −0.008 −0.007 −0.007 −0.007 −0.008 −0.007 −0.007 −0.008 −0.006 −0.008 −0.007 −0.009 −0.007 −0.008 −0.011 −0.011 −0.011 −0.011 −0.011 −0.011 −0.011 −0.01 −0.01 −0.011 −0.007 −0.007
(2.25)** (2.05)** (2.19)** (1.95)* (1.94)* (1.97)* (2.19)** (2.13)** (2.13)** (2.11)** (1.72)* (2.13)** (1.87)* (2.61)** (2.03)** (2.09)** (2.87)*** (2.83)*** (2.83)*** (2.92)*** (2.92)*** (2.83)*** (2.83)*** (2.70)*** (2.67)*** (2.90)*** (2.00)** (2.00)**
Student hours 
tutoring/week 0.002 0.006 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.009 0.007 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.008
0.37 0.91 0.44 0.62 0.55 0.58 0.82 0.66 0.66 1.32 1.14 0.69 0.80 0.25 0.80 0.60 0.50 0.86 0.86 0.88 0.88 0.86 0.86 1.15 1.16 1.07 1.25 1.25
Teacher female 0.061 0.054 0.069 0.085 0.054 0.043 0.043 0.007 0.007 0.06 0.076 0.049 0.1 0.054 0.033 0.049 0.024 0.087 0.087 0.105 0.105 0.087 0.087 0.092 0.095 0.101 0.036 0.036
0.70 0.63 0.79 0.94 0.61 0.49 0.48 0.08 0.08 0.69 0.94 0.56 1.20 0.63 0.37 0.56 0.27 0.99 0.99 1.22 1.22 0.99 0.99 1.04 1.07 1.14 0.40 0.40
Teacher civil servant −0.082 −0.037 −0.062 −0.067 −0.05 −0.065 −0.15 −0.241 −0.241 0.031 −0.04 −0.069 −0.07 −0.236 −0.062 −0.077 −0.128 −0.041 −0.041 −0.134 −0.134 −0.041 −0.041 −0.056 −0.063 −0.058 −0.152 −0.152
−0.61 −0.27 −0.45 −0.52 −0.33 −0.44 −0.98 (1.94)* (1.94)* 0.21 −0.28 −0.45 −0.50 −1.62 −0.46 −0.57 −0.90 −0.35 −0.35 −1.03 −1.03 −0.35 −0.35 −0.47 −0.53 −0.47 −1.01 −1.01
Teacher school-hired −0.02 −0.015 −0.01 0.044 0 −0.021 −0.045 −0.058 −0.058 0.019 0.009 −0.025 −0.065 −0.079 −0.013 −0.027 −0.033 0.091 0.091 0.049 0.049 0.091 0.091 0.028 0.026 0.029 −0.068 −0.068
−0.14 −0.10 −0.07 0.30 0.00 −0.14 −0.30 −0.43 −0.43 0.12 0.06 −0.17 −0.42 −0.56 −0.09 −0.18 −0.23 0.59 0.59 0.32 0.32 0.59 0.59 0.18 0.17 0.19 −0.47 −0.47
Teacher math 
satisfaction level 0.055 0.068 0.061 0.036 0.059 0.062 0.04 0.087 0.087 0.032 0.02 0.056 0.043 0.075 0.038 0.06 0.035 −0.001 −0.001 0.01 0.01 −0.001 −0.001 0.049 0.048 0.003 0.052 0.052
0.72 0.83 0.81 0.47 0.77 0.81 0.54 1.26 1.26 0.44 0.28 0.73 0.55 1.03 0.48 0.69 0.43 −0.01 −0.01 0.14 0.14 −0.01 −0.01 0.58 0.57 0.04 0.73 0.73
Teacher attends 
working group 0.136 0.126 0.124 0.131 0.146 0.153 0.162 0.06 0.06 0.144 0.141 0.141 0.155 0.107 0.136 0.139 0.145 0.184 0.184 0.164 0.164 0.184 0.184 0.14 0.138 0.159 0.111 0.111
1.34 1.14 1.21 1.25 1.39 1.41 1.50 0.66 0.66 1.41 1.40 1.35 1.57 1.12 1.30 1.30 1.44 (1.87)* (1.87)* (1.68)* (1.68)* (1.87)* (1.87)* 1.35 1.32 1.59 1.07 1.07
Teacher experience 
years −0.003 −0.003 −0.002 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.002 −0.003 −0.003 −0.004 −0.004 −0.003 −0.003 0.001 −0.002 −0.003 −0.003 −0.009 −0.009 −0.005 −0.005 −0.009 −0.009 −0.008 −0.008 −0.008 −0.003 −0.003
−0.40 −0.51 −0.38 −0.46 −0.43 −0.41 −0.39 −0.46 −0.46 −0.73 −0.62 −0.49 −0.56 0.26 −0.28 −0.48 −0.47 −1.61 −1.61 −0.90 −0.90 −1.61 −1.61 −1.44 −1.43 −1.47 −0.56 −0.56
Teacher 4-year degree 0.304 0.279 0.3 0.275 0.277 0.275 0.264 0.243 0.243 0.25 0.264 0.291 0.251 0.32 0.294 0.291 0.343 0.357 0.357 0.381 0.381 0.357 0.357 0.347 0.349 0.317 0.256 0.256
(2.04)** (1.87)* (1.98)* (1.81)* (1.80)* (1.79)* (1.75)* (1.77)* (1.77)* 1.63 (1.79)* (1.90)* (1.85)* (2.80)*** (1.97)* (1.95)* (2.47)** (2.48)** (2.48)** (2.55)** (2.55)** (2.48)** (2.48)** (2.38)** (2.40)** (2.00)** (1.79)* (1.79)*
Teacher certified 0.062 0.039 0.065 0.059 0.042 0.035 0.03 0.121 0.121 0.055 0.071 0.044 0.058 0.072 0.061 0.045 0.047 0.009 0.009 −0.037 −0.037 0.009 0.009 −0.01 −0.006 0 0.079 0.079
0.57 0.39 0.61 0.57 0.40 0.32 0.28 1.25 1.25 0.56 0.72 0.42 0.57 0.77 0.60 0.43 0.48 0.10 0.10 −0.39 −0.39 0.10 0.10 −0.11 −0.07 0.00 0.78 0.78
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Teacher assessment 
score 0.206 0.176 0.183 0.291 0.236 0.203 0.149 0.219 0.219 0.124 0.199 0.205 0.141 0.064 0.077 0.217 0.111 0.369 0.369 0.431 0.431 0.369 0.369 0.25 0.257 0.275 0.176 0.176
0.61 0.51 0.55 0.84 0.68 0.59 0.44 0.75 0.75 0.37 0.61 0.60 0.40 0.22 0.22 0.62 0.34 1.08 1.08 1.29 1.29 1.08 1.08 0.70 0.72 0.77 0.54 0.54
Student pretest score −0.076 −0.007 −0.056 −0.072 −0.052 −0.048 −0.064 −0.084 −0.084 −0.038 0.036 −0.053 −0.003 −0.078 −0.106 −0.057 −0.002 0.138 0.138 0.153 0.153 0.138 0.138 0.183 0.183 0.17 0 0
−0.37 −0.03 −0.28 −0.37 −0.26 −0.24 −0.31 −0.45 −0.45 −0.20 0.21 −0.27 −0.02 −0.40 −0.52 −0.30 −0.01 0.87 0.87 0.93 0.93 0.87 0.87 1.10 1.10 1.01 0.00 0.00
Class size (number of 
students) −0.005 −0.005 −0.004 −0.008 −0.006 −0.005 −0.005 −0.004 −0.004 −0.001 −0.001 −0.005 −0.003 −0.003 −0.008 −0.005 −0.007 −0.004 −0.004 −0.005 −0.005 −0.004 −0.004 −0.006 −0.006 −0.005 0.003 0.003
−0.57 −0.51 −0.49 −0.90 −0.68 −0.59 −0.55 −0.52 −0.52 −0.15 −0.10 −0.60 −0.38 −0.43 −0.90 −0.60 −0.91 −0.51 −0.51 −0.58 −0.58 −0.51 −0.51 −0.73 −0.73 −0.59 0.25 0.25
School private −0.134 −0.126 −0.121 −0.126 −0.106 −0.123 −0.218 −0.302 −0.302 −0.101 −0.138 −0.14 −0.118 −0.275 −0.083 −0.145 −0.221 −0.15 −0.15 −0.199 −0.199 −0.15 −0.15 −0.182 −0.184 −0.184 −0.214 −0.214
−0.98 −0.91 −0.88 −0.93 −0.72 −0.86 −1.42 (2.18)** (2.18)** −0.73 −0.99 −1.01 −0.85 (1.85)* −0.59 −1.05 −1.42 −1.17 −1.17 −1.54 −1.54 −1.17 −1.17 −1.45 −1.47 −1.42 −1.48 −1.48
School religious −0.256 −0.339 −0.268 −0.315 −0.302 −0.297 −0.297 −0.291 −0.291 −0.314 −0.314 −0.297 −0.296 −0.273 −0.326 −0.296 −0.29 −0.193 −0.193 −0.182 −0.182 −0.193 −0.193 −0.173 −0.173 −0.183 −0.262 −0.262
(1.88)* (2.43)** (2.06)** (2.28)** (2.28)** (2.29)** (2.41)** (2.33)** (2.33)** (2.38)** (2.38)** (2.30)** (2.31)** (2.21)** (2.46)** (2.27)** (2.39)** −1.43 −1.43 −1.36 −1.36 −1.43 −1.43 −1.33 −1.33 −1.41 (1.97)* (1.97)*
School size (number 
of students) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 0.001 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(1.83)* (1.76)* (1.74)* (2.05)** (1.89)* (1.88)* (1.99)** (1.72)* (1.72)* −1.04 −1.29 (1.76)* (1.95)* (1.74)* (2.46)** (1.94)* (1.85)* (2.67)*** (2.67)*** (2.72)*** (2.72)*** (2.67)*** (2.67)*** (2.40)** (2.37)** (2.56)** −1.48 −1.48
School materials 
shortage 0.017 0.027 0.016 0.056 0.042 0.032 0.013 0.035 0.035 0.045 0.053 0.024 0.022 0.024 0.032 0.024 0.018 0.031 0.031 0.044 0.044 0.031 0.031 0.029 0.029 0.027 0.009 0.009
0.38 0.62 0.39 1.26 0.88 0.72 0.28 0.88 0.88 0.98 1.10 0.54 0.49 0.56 0.74 0.54 0.40 0.67 0.67 0.98 0.98 0.67 0.67 0.64 0.65 0.58 0.22 0.22
School building 
deficiency 0.146 0.135 0.146 0.132 0.133 0.134 0.139 0.154 0.154 0.117 0.13 0.138 0.139 0.16 0.115 0.14 0.146 0.128 0.128 0.113 0.113 0.128 0.128 0.126 0.127 0.124 0.157 0.157
(3.15)*** (3.02)*** (3.17)*** (3.01)*** (2.90)*** (2.91)*** (3.11)*** (3.89)*** (3.89)*** (2.53)** (2.95)*** (3.00)*** (3.16)*** (4.12)*** (2.36)** (2.96)*** (3.35)*** (2.61)** (2.61)** (2.24)** (2.24)** (2.61)** (2.61)** (2.54)** (2.55)** (2.49)** (3.39)*** (3.39)***
School library 
deficiency −0.046 −0.048 −0.044 −0.052 −0.046 −0.048 −0.064 −0.032 −0.032 −0.035 −0.049 −0.048 −0.048 −0.041 −0.031 −0.049 −0.053 −0.044 −0.044 −0.046 −0.046 −0.044 −0.044 −0.039 −0.039 −0.057 −0.046 −0.046
−0.87 −0.91 −0.83 −1.06 −0.91 −0.93 −1.19 −0.73 −0.73 −0.69 −0.95 −0.92 −0.91 −0.87 −0.56 −0.94 −1.02 −0.96 −0.96 −0.95 −0.95 −0.96 −0.96 −0.82 −0.81 −1.18 −0.93 −0.93
Frequency students 
skip class −0.062 −0.054 −0.057 −0.076 −0.07 −0.067 −0.061 −0.027 −0.027 −0.096 −0.1 −0.063 −0.067 −0.031 −0.074 −0.061 −0.051 −0.174 −0.174 −0.138 −0.138 −0.174 −0.174 −0.123 −0.123 −0.13 −0.052 −0.052
−0.62 −0.52 −0.57 −0.78 −0.71 −0.67 −0.62 −0.30 −0.30 −0.94 −0.96 −0.62 −0.72 −0.34 −0.77 −0.61 −0.51 (1.77)* (1.77)* −1.53 −1.53 (1.77)* (1.77)* −1.27 −1.28 −1.38 −0.51 −0.51
Frequency students 
late 0.081 0.069 0.078 0.079 0.076 0.076 0.079 0.058 0.058 0.066 0.066 0.076 0.073 0.048 0.072 0.075 0.077 0.065 0.065 0.06 0.06 0.065 0.065 0.058 0.058 0.059 0.074 0.074
(1.91)* 1.63 (1.88)* (2.16)** (1.95)* (1.88)* (1.94)* (1.99)* (1.99)* 1.50 1.41 (1.84)* (1.75)* 1.44 (1.72)* (1.80)* (1.86)* 1.61 1.61 1.41 1.41 1.61 1.61 1.39 1.38 1.36 (1.79)* (1.79)*
Frequency bullying −0.169 −0.171 −0.167 −0.169 −0.164 −0.162 −0.162 −0.221 −0.221 −0.122 −0.162 −0.171 −0.18 −0.176 −0.194 −0.172 −0.182 −0.149 −0.149 −0.14 −0.14 −0.149 −0.149 −0.153 −0.155 −0.148 −0.155 −0.155
(2.09)** (2.13)** (2.07)** (2.12)** (2.09)** (2.02)** (2.03)** (2.85)*** (2.85)*** −1.40 (2.01)** (2.04)** (2.33)** (2.21)** (2.52)** (2.15)** (2.24)** (1.74)* (1.74)* (1.68)* (1.68)* (1.74)* (1.74)* (1.76)* (1.77)* (1.71)* (1.93)* (1.93)*
Community size −0.121 −0.123 −0.116 −0.124 −0.124 −0.122 −0.116 −0.138 −0.138 −0.131 −0.116 −0.128 −0.12 −0.111 −0.144 −0.128 −0.108 −0.089 −0.089 −0.071 −0.071 −0.089 −0.089 −0.098 −0.096 −0.095 −0.134 −0.134
(2.49)** (2.73)*** (2.44)** (2.64)** (2.61)** (2.58)** (2.42)** (2.98)*** (2.98)*** (2.90)*** (2.58)** (2.67)*** (2.63)** (2.40)** (3.03)*** (2.82)*** (2.32)** (1.96)* (1.96)* −1.49 −1.49 (1.96)* (1.96)* (2.09)** (2.07)** (1.96)* (2.75)*** (2.75)***
Community poor (%) 0.132 0.143 0.124 0.14 0.145 0.145 0.14 0.133 0.133 0.127 0.142 0.145 0.133 0.106 0.157 0.145 0.149 0.174 0.174 0.188 0.188 0.174 0.174 0.182 0.182 0.192 0.146 0.146
(1.93)* (2.24)** (1.77)* (2.13)** (2.23)** (2.25)** (2.23)** (2.00)** (2.00)** (1.94)* (2.42)** (2.19)** (2.12)** 1.63 (2.70)*** (2.38)** (2.41)** (3.16)*** (3.16)*** (3.54)*** (3.54)*** (3.16)*** (3.16)*** (3.47)*** (3.45)*** (3.59)*** (2.33)** (2.33)**
Community affluent 
(%) −0.01 −0.009 −0.01 −0.023 −0.008 −0.005 −0.013 −0.026 −0.026 0.004 0.001 −0.009 −0.019 −0.057 −0.028 −0.01 −0.008 0.007 0.007 0.024 0.024 0.007 0.007 0.033 0.033 0.025 −0.008 −0.008
−0.19 −0.16 −0.18 −0.42 −0.15 −0.09 −0.26 −0.51 −0.51 0.08 0.02 −0.17 −0.37 −1.17 −0.51 −0.20 −0.16 0.13 0.13 0.48 0.48 0.13 0.13 0.65 0.66 0.51 −0.14 −0.14
Region of Java −0.207 −0.118 −0.222 −0.097 −0.129 −0.142 −0.147 −0.172 −0.172 −0.057 −0.054 −0.132 −0.184 −0.069 −0.13 −0.132 −0.087 −0.088 −0.088 −0.044 −0.044 −0.088 −0.088 −0.104 −0.103 −0.096 −0.133 −0.133
−1.32 −0.96 −1.43 −0.75 −1.06 −1.15 −1.22 −1.36 −1.36 −0.39 −0.37 −1.04 −1.33 −0.64 −0.99 −1.06 −0.72 −0.69 −0.69 −0.39 −0.39 −0.69 −0.69 −0.83 −0.82 −0.77 −1.10 −1.10
Region of Sumatera 0.148 0.221 0.128 0.255 0.204 0.183 0.168 0.227 0.227 0.233 0.21 0.217 0.142 0.206 0.215 0.218 0.224 0.158 0.158 0.184 0.184 0.158 0.158 0.16 0.159 0.175 0.215 0.215
0.84 1.44 0.74 (1.75)* 1.33 1.13 1.12 1.56 1.56 1.37 1.24 1.41 0.86 1.56 1.35 1.43 1.48 0.97 0.97 1.27 1.27 0.97 0.97 0.99 0.98 1.09 1.41 1.41
Region of Kalimantan 0.263 0.252 0.235 0.302 0.263 0.247 0.238 0.263 0.263 0.28 0.321 0.283 0.26 0.35 0.29 0.28 0.393 0.266 0.266 0.332 0.332 0.266 0.266 0.268 0.262 0.272 0.312 0.312
1.43 1.48 1.22 (2.03)** 1.57 1.37 1.45 (1.81)* (1.81)* 1.66 (1.89)* 1.65 1.50 (2.38)** (1.67)* 1.55 (2.17)** 1.13 1.13 1.39 1.39 1.13 1.13 1.15 1.11 1.12 (1.89)* (1.89)*
Region of Bali, NTT 
and NTB 0.062 0.085 0.041 0.129 0.077 0.065 0.091 0.031 0.031 0.194 0.228 0.099 0.123 0.167 0.109 0.095 0.158 0.38 0.38 0.415 0.415 0.38 0.38 0.275 0.286 0.254 −0.006 −0.006
0.34 0.46 0.22 0.72 0.41 0.35 0.48 0.15 0.15 1.05 1.32 0.53 0.66 0.89 0.56 0.51 0.84 (2.17)** (2.17)** (2.59)** (2.59)** (2.17)** (2.17)** 1.45 1.53 1.18 −0.03 −0.03
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Teacher assessment 
score 0.206 0.176 0.183 0.291 0.236 0.203 0.149 0.219 0.219 0.124 0.199 0.205 0.141 0.064 0.077 0.217 0.111 0.369 0.369 0.431 0.431 0.369 0.369 0.25 0.257 0.275 0.176 0.176
0.61 0.51 0.55 0.84 0.68 0.59 0.44 0.75 0.75 0.37 0.61 0.60 0.40 0.22 0.22 0.62 0.34 1.08 1.08 1.29 1.29 1.08 1.08 0.70 0.72 0.77 0.54 0.54
Student pretest score −0.076 −0.007 −0.056 −0.072 −0.052 −0.048 −0.064 −0.084 −0.084 −0.038 0.036 −0.053 −0.003 −0.078 −0.106 −0.057 −0.002 0.138 0.138 0.153 0.153 0.138 0.138 0.183 0.183 0.17 0 0
−0.37 −0.03 −0.28 −0.37 −0.26 −0.24 −0.31 −0.45 −0.45 −0.20 0.21 −0.27 −0.02 −0.40 −0.52 −0.30 −0.01 0.87 0.87 0.93 0.93 0.87 0.87 1.10 1.10 1.01 0.00 0.00
Class size (number of 
students) −0.005 −0.005 −0.004 −0.008 −0.006 −0.005 −0.005 −0.004 −0.004 −0.001 −0.001 −0.005 −0.003 −0.003 −0.008 −0.005 −0.007 −0.004 −0.004 −0.005 −0.005 −0.004 −0.004 −0.006 −0.006 −0.005 0.003 0.003
−0.57 −0.51 −0.49 −0.90 −0.68 −0.59 −0.55 −0.52 −0.52 −0.15 −0.10 −0.60 −0.38 −0.43 −0.90 −0.60 −0.91 −0.51 −0.51 −0.58 −0.58 −0.51 −0.51 −0.73 −0.73 −0.59 0.25 0.25
School private −0.134 −0.126 −0.121 −0.126 −0.106 −0.123 −0.218 −0.302 −0.302 −0.101 −0.138 −0.14 −0.118 −0.275 −0.083 −0.145 −0.221 −0.15 −0.15 −0.199 −0.199 −0.15 −0.15 −0.182 −0.184 −0.184 −0.214 −0.214
−0.98 −0.91 −0.88 −0.93 −0.72 −0.86 −1.42 (2.18)** (2.18)** −0.73 −0.99 −1.01 −0.85 (1.85)* −0.59 −1.05 −1.42 −1.17 −1.17 −1.54 −1.54 −1.17 −1.17 −1.45 −1.47 −1.42 −1.48 −1.48
School religious −0.256 −0.339 −0.268 −0.315 −0.302 −0.297 −0.297 −0.291 −0.291 −0.314 −0.314 −0.297 −0.296 −0.273 −0.326 −0.296 −0.29 −0.193 −0.193 −0.182 −0.182 −0.193 −0.193 −0.173 −0.173 −0.183 −0.262 −0.262
(1.88)* (2.43)** (2.06)** (2.28)** (2.28)** (2.29)** (2.41)** (2.33)** (2.33)** (2.38)** (2.38)** (2.30)** (2.31)** (2.21)** (2.46)** (2.27)** (2.39)** −1.43 −1.43 −1.36 −1.36 −1.43 −1.43 −1.33 −1.33 −1.41 (1.97)* (1.97)*
School size (number 
of students) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 0.001 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(1.83)* (1.76)* (1.74)* (2.05)** (1.89)* (1.88)* (1.99)** (1.72)* (1.72)* −1.04 −1.29 (1.76)* (1.95)* (1.74)* (2.46)** (1.94)* (1.85)* (2.67)*** (2.67)*** (2.72)*** (2.72)*** (2.67)*** (2.67)*** (2.40)** (2.37)** (2.56)** −1.48 −1.48
School materials 
shortage 0.017 0.027 0.016 0.056 0.042 0.032 0.013 0.035 0.035 0.045 0.053 0.024 0.022 0.024 0.032 0.024 0.018 0.031 0.031 0.044 0.044 0.031 0.031 0.029 0.029 0.027 0.009 0.009
0.38 0.62 0.39 1.26 0.88 0.72 0.28 0.88 0.88 0.98 1.10 0.54 0.49 0.56 0.74 0.54 0.40 0.67 0.67 0.98 0.98 0.67 0.67 0.64 0.65 0.58 0.22 0.22
School building 
deficiency 0.146 0.135 0.146 0.132 0.133 0.134 0.139 0.154 0.154 0.117 0.13 0.138 0.139 0.16 0.115 0.14 0.146 0.128 0.128 0.113 0.113 0.128 0.128 0.126 0.127 0.124 0.157 0.157
(3.15)*** (3.02)*** (3.17)*** (3.01)*** (2.90)*** (2.91)*** (3.11)*** (3.89)*** (3.89)*** (2.53)** (2.95)*** (3.00)*** (3.16)*** (4.12)*** (2.36)** (2.96)*** (3.35)*** (2.61)** (2.61)** (2.24)** (2.24)** (2.61)** (2.61)** (2.54)** (2.55)** (2.49)** (3.39)*** (3.39)***
School library 
deficiency −0.046 −0.048 −0.044 −0.052 −0.046 −0.048 −0.064 −0.032 −0.032 −0.035 −0.049 −0.048 −0.048 −0.041 −0.031 −0.049 −0.053 −0.044 −0.044 −0.046 −0.046 −0.044 −0.044 −0.039 −0.039 −0.057 −0.046 −0.046
−0.87 −0.91 −0.83 −1.06 −0.91 −0.93 −1.19 −0.73 −0.73 −0.69 −0.95 −0.92 −0.91 −0.87 −0.56 −0.94 −1.02 −0.96 −0.96 −0.95 −0.95 −0.96 −0.96 −0.82 −0.81 −1.18 −0.93 −0.93
Frequency students 
skip class −0.062 −0.054 −0.057 −0.076 −0.07 −0.067 −0.061 −0.027 −0.027 −0.096 −0.1 −0.063 −0.067 −0.031 −0.074 −0.061 −0.051 −0.174 −0.174 −0.138 −0.138 −0.174 −0.174 −0.123 −0.123 −0.13 −0.052 −0.052
−0.62 −0.52 −0.57 −0.78 −0.71 −0.67 −0.62 −0.30 −0.30 −0.94 −0.96 −0.62 −0.72 −0.34 −0.77 −0.61 −0.51 (1.77)* (1.77)* −1.53 −1.53 (1.77)* (1.77)* −1.27 −1.28 −1.38 −0.51 −0.51
Frequency students 
late 0.081 0.069 0.078 0.079 0.076 0.076 0.079 0.058 0.058 0.066 0.066 0.076 0.073 0.048 0.072 0.075 0.077 0.065 0.065 0.06 0.06 0.065 0.065 0.058 0.058 0.059 0.074 0.074
(1.91)* 1.63 (1.88)* (2.16)** (1.95)* (1.88)* (1.94)* (1.99)* (1.99)* 1.50 1.41 (1.84)* (1.75)* 1.44 (1.72)* (1.80)* (1.86)* 1.61 1.61 1.41 1.41 1.61 1.61 1.39 1.38 1.36 (1.79)* (1.79)*
Frequency bullying −0.169 −0.171 −0.167 −0.169 −0.164 −0.162 −0.162 −0.221 −0.221 −0.122 −0.162 −0.171 −0.18 −0.176 −0.194 −0.172 −0.182 −0.149 −0.149 −0.14 −0.14 −0.149 −0.149 −0.153 −0.155 −0.148 −0.155 −0.155
(2.09)** (2.13)** (2.07)** (2.12)** (2.09)** (2.02)** (2.03)** (2.85)*** (2.85)*** −1.40 (2.01)** (2.04)** (2.33)** (2.21)** (2.52)** (2.15)** (2.24)** (1.74)* (1.74)* (1.68)* (1.68)* (1.74)* (1.74)* (1.76)* (1.77)* (1.71)* (1.93)* (1.93)*
Community size −0.121 −0.123 −0.116 −0.124 −0.124 −0.122 −0.116 −0.138 −0.138 −0.131 −0.116 −0.128 −0.12 −0.111 −0.144 −0.128 −0.108 −0.089 −0.089 −0.071 −0.071 −0.089 −0.089 −0.098 −0.096 −0.095 −0.134 −0.134
(2.49)** (2.73)*** (2.44)** (2.64)** (2.61)** (2.58)** (2.42)** (2.98)*** (2.98)*** (2.90)*** (2.58)** (2.67)*** (2.63)** (2.40)** (3.03)*** (2.82)*** (2.32)** (1.96)* (1.96)* −1.49 −1.49 (1.96)* (1.96)* (2.09)** (2.07)** (1.96)* (2.75)*** (2.75)***
Community poor (%) 0.132 0.143 0.124 0.14 0.145 0.145 0.14 0.133 0.133 0.127 0.142 0.145 0.133 0.106 0.157 0.145 0.149 0.174 0.174 0.188 0.188 0.174 0.174 0.182 0.182 0.192 0.146 0.146
(1.93)* (2.24)** (1.77)* (2.13)** (2.23)** (2.25)** (2.23)** (2.00)** (2.00)** (1.94)* (2.42)** (2.19)** (2.12)** 1.63 (2.70)*** (2.38)** (2.41)** (3.16)*** (3.16)*** (3.54)*** (3.54)*** (3.16)*** (3.16)*** (3.47)*** (3.45)*** (3.59)*** (2.33)** (2.33)**
Community affluent 
(%) −0.01 −0.009 −0.01 −0.023 −0.008 −0.005 −0.013 −0.026 −0.026 0.004 0.001 −0.009 −0.019 −0.057 −0.028 −0.01 −0.008 0.007 0.007 0.024 0.024 0.007 0.007 0.033 0.033 0.025 −0.008 −0.008
−0.19 −0.16 −0.18 −0.42 −0.15 −0.09 −0.26 −0.51 −0.51 0.08 0.02 −0.17 −0.37 −1.17 −0.51 −0.20 −0.16 0.13 0.13 0.48 0.48 0.13 0.13 0.65 0.66 0.51 −0.14 −0.14
Region of Java −0.207 −0.118 −0.222 −0.097 −0.129 −0.142 −0.147 −0.172 −0.172 −0.057 −0.054 −0.132 −0.184 −0.069 −0.13 −0.132 −0.087 −0.088 −0.088 −0.044 −0.044 −0.088 −0.088 −0.104 −0.103 −0.096 −0.133 −0.133
−1.32 −0.96 −1.43 −0.75 −1.06 −1.15 −1.22 −1.36 −1.36 −0.39 −0.37 −1.04 −1.33 −0.64 −0.99 −1.06 −0.72 −0.69 −0.69 −0.39 −0.39 −0.69 −0.69 −0.83 −0.82 −0.77 −1.10 −1.10
Region of Sumatera 0.148 0.221 0.128 0.255 0.204 0.183 0.168 0.227 0.227 0.233 0.21 0.217 0.142 0.206 0.215 0.218 0.224 0.158 0.158 0.184 0.184 0.158 0.158 0.16 0.159 0.175 0.215 0.215
0.84 1.44 0.74 (1.75)* 1.33 1.13 1.12 1.56 1.56 1.37 1.24 1.41 0.86 1.56 1.35 1.43 1.48 0.97 0.97 1.27 1.27 0.97 0.97 0.99 0.98 1.09 1.41 1.41
Region of Kalimantan 0.263 0.252 0.235 0.302 0.263 0.247 0.238 0.263 0.263 0.28 0.321 0.283 0.26 0.35 0.29 0.28 0.393 0.266 0.266 0.332 0.332 0.266 0.266 0.268 0.262 0.272 0.312 0.312
1.43 1.48 1.22 (2.03)** 1.57 1.37 1.45 (1.81)* (1.81)* 1.66 (1.89)* 1.65 1.50 (2.38)** (1.67)* 1.55 (2.17)** 1.13 1.13 1.39 1.39 1.13 1.13 1.15 1.11 1.12 (1.89)* (1.89)*
Region of Bali, NTT 
and NTB 0.062 0.085 0.041 0.129 0.077 0.065 0.091 0.031 0.031 0.194 0.228 0.099 0.123 0.167 0.109 0.095 0.158 0.38 0.38 0.415 0.415 0.38 0.38 0.275 0.286 0.254 −0.006 −0.006
0.34 0.46 0.22 0.72 0.41 0.35 0.48 0.15 0.15 1.05 1.32 0.53 0.66 0.89 0.56 0.51 0.84 (2.17)** (2.17)** (2.59)** (2.59)** (2.17)** (2.17)** 1.45 1.53 1.18 −0.03 −0.03
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Constant 0.237 0.502 0.821 0.841 0.545 0.66 0.75 0.643 1.499 0.065 0.348 0.672 0.715 1.2 0.766 0.667 0.555 −0.56 0.126 0.147 −0.14 −0.56 0.126 0.067 0.067 0.087 0.38 1.409
0.29 0.88 1.39 1.47 0.86 1.11 1.24 1.13 (2.73)*** 0.11 0.64 1.12 1.25 (2.07)** 1.24 1.09 0.96 −0.71 0.22 0.26 −0.24 −0.71 0.22 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.66 (1.95)*
Observations 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2116 2116 2116 2116 2116 2116 2116 2116 2116 2296 2296
R2 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.51 0.51 0.47 0.48 0.44 0.47 0.52 0.46 0.44 0.46 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.46 0.46
Adj. R2 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.51 0.51 0.46 0.47 0.44 0.46 0.51 0.46 0.44 0.45 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.47 0.45 0.45
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Regressions run on multiple-imputed data.
Significance level: * = 10 percent, ** = 5 percent, *** = 1 percent.
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Constant 0.237 0.502 0.821 0.841 0.545 0.66 0.75 0.643 1.499 0.065 0.348 0.672 0.715 1.2 0.766 0.667 0.555 −0.56 0.126 0.147 −0.14 −0.56 0.126 0.067 0.067 0.087 0.38 1.409
0.29 0.88 1.39 1.47 0.86 1.11 1.24 1.13 (2.73)*** 0.11 0.64 1.12 1.25 (2.07)** 1.24 1.09 0.96 −0.71 0.22 0.26 −0.24 −0.71 0.22 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.66 (1.95)*
Observations 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2116 2116 2116 2116 2116 2116 2116 2116 2116 2296 2296
R2 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.51 0.51 0.47 0.48 0.44 0.47 0.52 0.46 0.44 0.46 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.46 0.46
Adj. R2 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.51 0.51 0.46 0.47 0.44 0.46 0.51 0.46 0.44 0.45 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.47 0.45 0.45
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Regressions run on multiple-imputed data.
Significance level: * = 10 percent, ** = 5 percent, *** = 1 percent.
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Appendix h
Coefficient and z-statistic data for figure 5.14: Relationship between Teacher 
Knowledge and Student Learning.
Variables shaded gray below were used in creating the figure.
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Overall teacher 
assessment score 0.200 0.172
(3.74)*** (3.05)***
Subject matter 
assessment 0.159 0.142
(3.75)*** (3.22)***
Pedagogy assessment 0.132 0.132
(2.19)** (2.02)**
Student pretest score 0.530 0.544 0.530 0.543 0.534 0.546
(20.58)*** (20.84)*** (20.52)*** (20.82)*** (20.74)*** (20.97)***
Student age −0.001 −0.003 −0.001 −0.003 −0.001 −0.003
−0.35 −0.85 −0.33 −0.84 −0.33 −0.85
Hours homework/week 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
(1.77)* 1.67 (1.78)* (1.69)* (1.77)* (1.68)*
Student  job hours/
week 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
0.21 −0.17 0.17 −0.17 0.21 −0.19
Student sports hours/
week −0.001 0.001 −0.001 0.001 −0.001 0.001
−0.25 0.2 −0.23 0.22 −0.24 0.22
Student reads hours 
week 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
0.83 0.96 0.85 0.99 0.78 0.93
Student has dictionary 
at home 0.006 0.005 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.005
0.75 0.57 0.77 0.59 0.74 0.57
Student has computer 
at home 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.007
1.07 1.03 1.08 1.03 1.02 1
Student’s mom 
education level −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−0.64 −0.77 −0.61 −0.75 −0.72 −0.83
Student hours tutoring/
week −0.002 −0.002 −0.002 −0.002 −0.002 −0.002
−1.12 −1.33 −1.12 −1.3 −1.19 −1.41
Teacher female −0.003 0.002 −0.012
−0.18 0.09 −0.73
Teacher civil servant −0.007 −0.004 −0.001
−0.21 −0.12 −0.04
Teacher school-hired −0.020 −0.018 −0.028
−0.77 −0.7 −1.09
table continues next page
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Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Teacher math 
satisfaction level 0.007 0.007 0.008
0.46 0.47 0.53
Teacher attends 
working group −0.008 −0.013 −0.008
−0.45 −0.72 −0.43
Teacher maths 
education degree 0.026 0.025 0.029
1.62 1.6 (1.77)*
Teacher experience 
years 0.002 0.002 0.002
(1.93)* (1.92)* (1.87)*
Teacher 4-year degree 0.040 0.045 0.039
1.23 1.39 1.15
Teacher certified −0.024 −0.020 −0.029
−1.3 −1.07 −1.5
Class size (number of 
students) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
−0.22 −0.17 −0.13 −0.11 0.01 −0.02
School private 0.024 0.019 0.021 0.021 0.020 0.021
1.19 0.6 1.09 0.66 0.96 0.64
School religious −0.013 0.009 −0.015 0.010 −0.011 0.006
−0.66 0.49 −0.77 0.52 −0.53 0.32
School size (number of 
students) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(2)** 0.81 (1.89)* 0.6 (1.96)** 0.96
School materials 
shortage 0.003 0.006 0.005 0.008 −0.004 0.000
0.39 0.83 0.57 1.02 −0.5 0.06
School building 
deficiency 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.006 0.003
0.7 0.43 0.6 0.41 0.77 0.36
School library deficiency −0.015 −0.010 −0.015 −0.011 −0.013 −0.008
(−1.78)* −1.28 (−1.82)* −1.36 −1.54 −1.01
Frequency students skip 
class −0.009 −0.015 −0.008 −0.014 −0.008 −0.013
−0.74 −1.35 −0.65 −1.32 −0.66 −1.18
Frequency students skip 
class −0.021 −0.027 −0.023 −0.028 −0.020 −0.025
−1.64 (−2.06)** (−1.79)* (−2.18)** −1.49 (−1.87)*
Frequency students late 0.016 0.022 0.015 0.022 0.016 0.021
(2.27)** (3.07)*** (2.06)** (3.02)*** (2.09)** (2.79)***
Frequency bullying −0.007 0.004 −0.008 0.003 −0.005 0.007
−0.51 0.35 −0.64 0.21 −0.34 0.52
Community size 0.003 0.006 0.004 0.007 −0.002 0.002
0.41 0.81 0.58 1.02 −0.26 0.22
table continues next page
Appendix h (continued)
230 Appendixes
Teacher Reform in Indonesia • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-9829-6
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Base 
regression
w/teacher 
variables
Community poor (%) −0.009 −0.016 −0.009 −0.016 −0.011 −0.017
−1.05 (−2.01)** −1.04 (−1.96)** −1.31 (−2.11)**
Community affluent (%) −0.002 −0.008 −0.002 −0.008 −0.006 −0.011
−0.21 −1.06 −0.23 −0.97 −0.76 −1.34
Constant 0.098 0.089 0.107 0.079 0.172 0.144
1.07 0.88 1.17 0.78 (1.94)* 1.45
Random effects parameters
Level 1: Student level 
estimate 0.0111 0.0109 0.0111 0.0109 0.0111 0.0109
Standard error 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004
Level 2: Classroom level 
estimate 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109
Standard error 0.0005 0.0004 0.0005 0.0004 0.0005 0.0004
Level 3: Region level 
estimate 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109
Standard error 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Note: Robust z-statistics in parentheses. Regressions are multi-level models run with MLwIN.
Significance level: * = 10 percent, ** = 5 percent, *** = 1 percent.
Appendix h (continued)
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Appendix i
Coefficient and t-statistic data for figure 5.15: Relationship between Teaching 
Practices and Teacher Knowledge (Assessment Score Percentage).
Variables shaded gray below were used in creating the figure.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28)
Regressions with 
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Teaching practice 
variable (listed in 
columns above) 0.008 0.453 −0.08 0.125 −0.035 −0.008 0.095 −0.022 0.022 0.064 0.003 −0.113 0.062 −0.051 0.325 −0.092 0.079 −0.12 0.12 0.135 −0.135 −0.12 0.12 0.005 0.007 3.145 0.016 −0.016
0.04 0.92 −0.39 1.23 −0.77 −0.14 0.68 −0.27 0.27 0.85 0.03 −1.21 0.72 −0.82 (2.76)*** −1.57 1.24 −1.11 1.11 (2.22)** (2.22)** −1.11 1.11 (2.50)** (2.38)** (3.66)*** 1.94 −1.94
Student age −0.003 −0.001 −0.003 −0.001 −0.002 −0.003 −0.002 −0.002 −0.002 −0.001 −0.003 −0.001 −0.003 −0.003 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.002 −0.002 −0.001 −0.001 −0.002 −0.002 −0.003 −0.003 −0.001 −0.002 −0.002
−0.52 −0.24 −0.52 −0.15 −0.36 −0.50 −0.43 −0.46 −0.46 −0.12 −0.49 −0.28 −0.62 −0.50 −0.20 −0.26 −0.25 −0.37 −0.37 −0.11 −0.11 −0.37 −0.37 −0.59 −0.60 −0.19 −0.44 −0.44
Hours homework/
week 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
1.06 1.28 1.01 1.46 0.99 1.05 0.98 1.13 1.13 1.04 1.02 1.26 1.21 1.03 0.90 1.14 0.94 1.36 1.36 (1.75)* (1.75)* 1.36 1.36 1.34 1.32 1.05 1.14 1.14
Student  job hours/
week −0.003 −0.002 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.002 −0.002 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.001 −0.001 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003
−1.10 −0.98 −1.14 −1.33 −1.14 −1.11 −1.25 −1.07 −1.07 −1.10 −1.09 −1.12 −1.13 −1.24 −0.89 −0.92 −1.13 −1.28 −1.28 −0.62 −0.62 −1.28 −1.28 −1.22 −1.22 −1.16 −1.08 −1.08
Student sports hours/
week 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −0.001 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −0.001 0 0
−0.06 −0.11 −0.10 −0.06 0.00 −0.06 −0.01 −0.09 −0.09 −0.05 −0.05 −0.10 −0.28 −0.20 0.53 −0.03 −0.11 −0.12 −0.12 −0.05 −0.05 −0.12 −0.12 0.00 −0.04 −0.39 −0.16 −0.16
Student reads hours 
week 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002
0.94 0.86 0.90 0.92 0.98 0.94 1.05 0.93 0.93 1.02 0.93 0.89 0.94 1.04 0.54 0.96 1.24 0.83 0.83 0.78 0.78 0.83 0.83 0.48 0.49 1.13 0.83 0.83
Student has 
dictionary at 
home −0.004 −0.003 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004 −0.003 −0.004 −0.004 −0.003 −0.004 −0.003 −0.003 −0.004 −0.004 −0.002 −0.003 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0 −0.003 −0.003
−0.42 −0.35 −0.43 −0.41 −0.46 −0.40 −0.37 −0.38 −0.38 −0.32 −0.42 −0.33 −0.30 −0.42 −0.38 −0.19 −0.39 0.43 0.43 0.50 0.50 0.43 0.43 0.35 0.36 −0.01 −0.31 −0.31
Student has 
computer at 
home 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004 −0.001 −0.001 −0.004 −0.004 −0.001 −0.001 −0.004 −0.003 −0.003 0.004 0.004
0.61 0.59 0.60 0.27 0.67 0.57 0.59 0.58 0.58 0.44 0.61 0.21 0.52 0.56 0.61 0.56 0.61 −0.19 −0.19 −0.56 −0.56 −0.19 −0.19 −0.48 −0.44 −0.35 0.59 0.59
Student’s mom 
education level 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0 0.001 0.001
0.85 0.91 0.83 0.69 0.68 0.86 0.79 0.83 0.83 0.82 0.84 0.67 0.90 0.72 0.88 0.66 0.43 0.44 0.44 0.58 0.58 0.44 0.44 0.63 0.64 −0.17 0.80 0.80
Student hours 
tutoring/week −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.004 −0.004 −0.003 −0.003 −0.004 −0.004 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003
−1.49 −1.13 −1.49 −1.39 −1.37 −1.44 −1.36 −1.43 −1.43 −1.27 −1.45 −1.26 −1.40 −1.44 −1.29 −1.34 −1.49 −1.42 −1.42 −1.46 −1.46 −1.42 −1.42 −1.35 −1.36 −1.32 −1.37 −1.37
Teacher female −0.051 −0.048 −0.049 −0.058 −0.052 −0.051 −0.051 −0.05 −0.05 −0.048 −0.051 −0.051 −0.045 −0.05 −0.053 −0.05 −0.055 −0.044 −0.044 −0.045 −0.045 −0.044 −0.044 −0.051 −0.05 −0.052 −0.052 −0.052
(1.95)* (1.82)* (1.89)* (2.16)** (1.95)* (1.90)* (1.93)* (1.85)* (1.85)* (1.74)* (1.79)* (1.94)* −1.56 (1.89)* (1.99)* (1.89)* (2.03)** −1.51 −1.51 −1.56 −1.56 −1.51 −1.51 (1.83)* (1.78)* (1.79)* (1.93)* (1.93)*
Teacher civil servant 0.106 0.117 0.107 0.103 0.1 0.107 0.096 0.111 0.111 0.12 0.106 0.126 0.106 0.093 0.105 0.113 0.093 0.102 0.102 0.133 0.133 0.102 0.102 0.11 0.107 0.114 0.103 0.103
(2.48)** (2.77)*** (2.49)** (2.31)** (2.16)** (2.44)** (1.96)* (2.40)** (2.40)** (2.57)** (2.44)** (2.65)*** (2.46)** (2.05)** (2.34)** (2.56)** (2.01)** (2.44)** (2.44)** (3.06)*** (3.06)*** (2.44)** (2.44)** (2.74)*** (2.67)*** (2.77)*** (2.20)** (2.20)**
Teacher school-hired −0.053 −0.048 −0.051 −0.067 −0.059 −0.052 −0.055 −0.052 −0.052 −0.046 −0.053 −0.046 −0.056 −0.056 −0.047 −0.05 −0.053 −0.081 −0.081 −0.071 −0.071 −0.081 −0.081 −0.08 −0.081 −0.092 −0.055 −0.055
−1.24 −1.16 −1.21 −1.46 −1.34 −1.24 −1.27 −1.21 −1.21 −1.06 −1.23 −1.08 −1.31 −1.30 −1.13 −1.22 −1.28 (1.68)* (1.68)* −1.54 −1.54 (1.68)* (1.68)* (1.77)* (1.78)* (1.87)* −1.28 −1.28
Teacher math 
satisfaction level −0.001 0.003 −0.001 0.003 −0.002 −0.001 −0.003 −0.002 −0.002 −0.004 −0.001 −0.002 −0.002 0.001 −0.006 −0.012 −0.005 −0.01 −0.01 −0.014 −0.014 −0.01 −0.01 0.01 0.008 −0.007 −0.002 −0.002
−0.05 0.13 −0.02 0.15 −0.08 −0.03 −0.13 −0.09 −0.09 −0.21 −0.04 −0.07 −0.10 0.04 −0.26 −0.54 −0.23 −0.41 −0.41 −0.58 −0.58 −0.41 −0.41 0.38 0.31 −0.28 −0.09 −0.09
Teacher attends 
working group 0.015 0.009 0.013 0.016 0.013 0.015 0.018 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.017 0.014 0.014 0.021 0.016 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.01 0.009 0.016 0.013 0.013
0.52 0.33 0.46 0.55 0.47 0.55 0.60 0.55 0.55 0.56 0.52 0.54 0.58 0.48 0.50 0.74 0.58 0.43 0.43 0.48 0.48 0.43 0.43 0.35 0.34 0.56 0.45 0.45
Teacher maths 
education degree 0.016 0.013 0.014 0.023 0.018 0.016 0.012 0.019 0.019 0.01 0.016 0.015 0.011 0.006 0.006 0.016 0.009 0.033 0.033 0.036 0.036 0.033 0.033 0.021 0.022 0.023 0.014 0.014
0.61 0.51 0.55 0.84 0.68 0.59 0.44 0.73 0.73 0.37 0.61 0.60 0.40 0.22 0.22 0.62 0.34 1.08 1.08 1.32 1.32 1.08 1.08 0.71 0.73 0.77 0.54 0.54
Teacher experience 
years −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.004 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.005 −0.005 −0.003 −0.003 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004 −0.003 −0.003
(2.00)** (2.03)** (1.97)* (2.03)** (2.02)** (2.03)** (1.94)* (2.03)** (2.03)** (2.12)** (2.01)** (2.12)** (2.05)** (1.71)* (1.71)* (2.22)** (1.87)* (2.00)** (2.00)** (2.77)*** (2.77)*** (2.00)** (2.00)** (2.27)** (2.24)** (2.39)** (1.98)* (1.98)*
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28)
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Teaching practice 
variable (listed in 
columns above) 0.008 0.453 −0.08 0.125 −0.035 −0.008 0.095 −0.022 0.022 0.064 0.003 −0.113 0.062 −0.051 0.325 −0.092 0.079 −0.12 0.12 0.135 −0.135 −0.12 0.12 0.005 0.007 3.145 0.016 −0.016
0.04 0.92 −0.39 1.23 −0.77 −0.14 0.68 −0.27 0.27 0.85 0.03 −1.21 0.72 −0.82 (2.76)*** −1.57 1.24 −1.11 1.11 (2.22)** (2.22)** −1.11 1.11 (2.50)** (2.38)** (3.66)*** 1.94 −1.94
Student age −0.003 −0.001 −0.003 −0.001 −0.002 −0.003 −0.002 −0.002 −0.002 −0.001 −0.003 −0.001 −0.003 −0.003 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.002 −0.002 −0.001 −0.001 −0.002 −0.002 −0.003 −0.003 −0.001 −0.002 −0.002
−0.52 −0.24 −0.52 −0.15 −0.36 −0.50 −0.43 −0.46 −0.46 −0.12 −0.49 −0.28 −0.62 −0.50 −0.20 −0.26 −0.25 −0.37 −0.37 −0.11 −0.11 −0.37 −0.37 −0.59 −0.60 −0.19 −0.44 −0.44
Hours homework/
week 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
1.06 1.28 1.01 1.46 0.99 1.05 0.98 1.13 1.13 1.04 1.02 1.26 1.21 1.03 0.90 1.14 0.94 1.36 1.36 (1.75)* (1.75)* 1.36 1.36 1.34 1.32 1.05 1.14 1.14
Student  job hours/
week −0.003 −0.002 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.002 −0.002 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.001 −0.001 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003
−1.10 −0.98 −1.14 −1.33 −1.14 −1.11 −1.25 −1.07 −1.07 −1.10 −1.09 −1.12 −1.13 −1.24 −0.89 −0.92 −1.13 −1.28 −1.28 −0.62 −0.62 −1.28 −1.28 −1.22 −1.22 −1.16 −1.08 −1.08
Student sports hours/
week 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −0.001 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −0.001 0 0
−0.06 −0.11 −0.10 −0.06 0.00 −0.06 −0.01 −0.09 −0.09 −0.05 −0.05 −0.10 −0.28 −0.20 0.53 −0.03 −0.11 −0.12 −0.12 −0.05 −0.05 −0.12 −0.12 0.00 −0.04 −0.39 −0.16 −0.16
Student reads hours 
week 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002
0.94 0.86 0.90 0.92 0.98 0.94 1.05 0.93 0.93 1.02 0.93 0.89 0.94 1.04 0.54 0.96 1.24 0.83 0.83 0.78 0.78 0.83 0.83 0.48 0.49 1.13 0.83 0.83
Student has 
dictionary at 
home −0.004 −0.003 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004 −0.003 −0.004 −0.004 −0.003 −0.004 −0.003 −0.003 −0.004 −0.004 −0.002 −0.003 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0 −0.003 −0.003
−0.42 −0.35 −0.43 −0.41 −0.46 −0.40 −0.37 −0.38 −0.38 −0.32 −0.42 −0.33 −0.30 −0.42 −0.38 −0.19 −0.39 0.43 0.43 0.50 0.50 0.43 0.43 0.35 0.36 −0.01 −0.31 −0.31
Student has 
computer at 
home 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004 −0.001 −0.001 −0.004 −0.004 −0.001 −0.001 −0.004 −0.003 −0.003 0.004 0.004
0.61 0.59 0.60 0.27 0.67 0.57 0.59 0.58 0.58 0.44 0.61 0.21 0.52 0.56 0.61 0.56 0.61 −0.19 −0.19 −0.56 −0.56 −0.19 −0.19 −0.48 −0.44 −0.35 0.59 0.59
Student’s mom 
education level 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0 0.001 0.001
0.85 0.91 0.83 0.69 0.68 0.86 0.79 0.83 0.83 0.82 0.84 0.67 0.90 0.72 0.88 0.66 0.43 0.44 0.44 0.58 0.58 0.44 0.44 0.63 0.64 −0.17 0.80 0.80
Student hours 
tutoring/week −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.004 −0.004 −0.003 −0.003 −0.004 −0.004 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003
−1.49 −1.13 −1.49 −1.39 −1.37 −1.44 −1.36 −1.43 −1.43 −1.27 −1.45 −1.26 −1.40 −1.44 −1.29 −1.34 −1.49 −1.42 −1.42 −1.46 −1.46 −1.42 −1.42 −1.35 −1.36 −1.32 −1.37 −1.37
Teacher female −0.051 −0.048 −0.049 −0.058 −0.052 −0.051 −0.051 −0.05 −0.05 −0.048 −0.051 −0.051 −0.045 −0.05 −0.053 −0.05 −0.055 −0.044 −0.044 −0.045 −0.045 −0.044 −0.044 −0.051 −0.05 −0.052 −0.052 −0.052
(1.95)* (1.82)* (1.89)* (2.16)** (1.95)* (1.90)* (1.93)* (1.85)* (1.85)* (1.74)* (1.79)* (1.94)* −1.56 (1.89)* (1.99)* (1.89)* (2.03)** −1.51 −1.51 −1.56 −1.56 −1.51 −1.51 (1.83)* (1.78)* (1.79)* (1.93)* (1.93)*
Teacher civil servant 0.106 0.117 0.107 0.103 0.1 0.107 0.096 0.111 0.111 0.12 0.106 0.126 0.106 0.093 0.105 0.113 0.093 0.102 0.102 0.133 0.133 0.102 0.102 0.11 0.107 0.114 0.103 0.103
(2.48)** (2.77)*** (2.49)** (2.31)** (2.16)** (2.44)** (1.96)* (2.40)** (2.40)** (2.57)** (2.44)** (2.65)*** (2.46)** (2.05)** (2.34)** (2.56)** (2.01)** (2.44)** (2.44)** (3.06)*** (3.06)*** (2.44)** (2.44)** (2.74)*** (2.67)*** (2.77)*** (2.20)** (2.20)**
Teacher school-hired −0.053 −0.048 −0.051 −0.067 −0.059 −0.052 −0.055 −0.052 −0.052 −0.046 −0.053 −0.046 −0.056 −0.056 −0.047 −0.05 −0.053 −0.081 −0.081 −0.071 −0.071 −0.081 −0.081 −0.08 −0.081 −0.092 −0.055 −0.055
−1.24 −1.16 −1.21 −1.46 −1.34 −1.24 −1.27 −1.21 −1.21 −1.06 −1.23 −1.08 −1.31 −1.30 −1.13 −1.22 −1.28 (1.68)* (1.68)* −1.54 −1.54 (1.68)* (1.68)* (1.77)* (1.78)* (1.87)* −1.28 −1.28
Teacher math 
satisfaction level −0.001 0.003 −0.001 0.003 −0.002 −0.001 −0.003 −0.002 −0.002 −0.004 −0.001 −0.002 −0.002 0.001 −0.006 −0.012 −0.005 −0.01 −0.01 −0.014 −0.014 −0.01 −0.01 0.01 0.008 −0.007 −0.002 −0.002
−0.05 0.13 −0.02 0.15 −0.08 −0.03 −0.13 −0.09 −0.09 −0.21 −0.04 −0.07 −0.10 0.04 −0.26 −0.54 −0.23 −0.41 −0.41 −0.58 −0.58 −0.41 −0.41 0.38 0.31 −0.28 −0.09 −0.09
Teacher attends 
working group 0.015 0.009 0.013 0.016 0.013 0.015 0.018 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.017 0.014 0.014 0.021 0.016 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.01 0.009 0.016 0.013 0.013
0.52 0.33 0.46 0.55 0.47 0.55 0.60 0.55 0.55 0.56 0.52 0.54 0.58 0.48 0.50 0.74 0.58 0.43 0.43 0.48 0.48 0.43 0.43 0.35 0.34 0.56 0.45 0.45
Teacher maths 
education degree 0.016 0.013 0.014 0.023 0.018 0.016 0.012 0.019 0.019 0.01 0.016 0.015 0.011 0.006 0.006 0.016 0.009 0.033 0.033 0.036 0.036 0.033 0.033 0.021 0.022 0.023 0.014 0.014
0.61 0.51 0.55 0.84 0.68 0.59 0.44 0.73 0.73 0.37 0.61 0.60 0.40 0.22 0.22 0.62 0.34 1.08 1.08 1.32 1.32 1.08 1.08 0.71 0.73 0.77 0.54 0.54
Teacher experience 
years −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.004 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.005 −0.005 −0.003 −0.003 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004 −0.003 −0.003
(2.00)** (2.03)** (1.97)* (2.03)** (2.02)** (2.03)** (1.94)* (2.03)** (2.03)** (2.12)** (2.01)** (2.12)** (2.05)** (1.71)* (1.71)* (2.22)** (1.87)* (2.00)** (2.00)** (2.77)*** (2.77)*** (2.00)** (2.00)** (2.27)** (2.24)** (2.39)** (1.98)* (1.98)*
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Teacher 4-year degree −0.02 −0.023 −0.019 −0.017 −0.017 −0.021 −0.022 −0.019 −0.019 −0.024 −0.02 −0.025 −0.022 −0.015 −0.016 −0.017 −0.007 −0.033 −0.033 −0.047 −0.047 −0.033 −0.033 −0.027 −0.026 −0.061 −0.022 −0.022
−0.43 −0.52 −0.41 −0.39 −0.37 −0.45 −0.49 −0.43 −0.43 −0.52 −0.43 −0.58 −0.47 −0.32 −0.35 −0.36 −0.15 −0.78 −0.78 −1.05 −1.05 −0.78 −0.78 −0.65 −0.63 −1.46 −0.47 −0.47
Teacher is certified −0.017 −0.019 −0.015 −0.02 −0.017 −0.018 −0.019 −0.019 −0.019 −0.015 −0.017 −0.018 −0.016 −0.015 −0.012 −0.017 −0.016 −0.015 −0.015 0.004 0.004 −0.015 −0.015 −0.016 −0.014 −0.009 −0.012 −0.012
−0.51 −0.57 −0.46 −0.62 −0.51 −0.54 −0.58 −0.56 −0.56 −0.45 −0.51 −0.57 −0.46 −0.44 −0.35 −0.50 −0.50 −0.41 −0.41 0.10 0.10 −0.41 −0.41 −0.45 −0.40 −0.23 −0.33 −0.33
Student pretest score 0.13 0.144 0.13 0.133 0.13 0.13 0.128 0.131 0.131 0.131 0.13 0.117 0.134 0.127 0.11 0.145 0.138 0.142 0.142 0.14 0.14 0.142 0.142 0.135 0.135 0.119 0.135 0.135
(2.78)*** (2.98)*** (2.77)*** (2.89)*** (2.78)*** (2.85)*** (2.72)*** (2.85)*** (2.85)*** (2.85)*** (2.71)*** (2.65)*** (2.90)*** (2.77)*** (2.47)** (3.08)*** (2.93)*** (2.95)*** (2.95)*** (2.96)*** (2.96)*** (2.95)*** (2.95)*** (2.95)*** (2.94)*** (2.73)*** (2.92)*** (2.92)***
Class size (number of 
students) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0 0 0 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0 0 0 0.001 0.001
0.36 0.56 0.42 0.67 0.44 0.37 0.40 0.35 0.35 0.60 0.33 0.51 0.46 0.41 −0.03 −0.03 −0.11 0.43 0.43 0.50 0.50 0.43 0.43 −0.12 −0.15 −0.19 0.53 0.53
School private 0.026 0.031 0.028 0.023 0.017 0.027 0.016 0.03 0.03 0.031 0.026 0.035 0.027 0.015 0.04 0.032 0.008 0.045 0.045 0.059 0.059 0.045 0.045 0.044 0.044 0.036 0.024 0.024
0.55 0.67 0.58 0.47 0.35 0.58 0.30 0.61 0.61 0.65 0.55 0.73 0.58 0.30 0.82 0.67 0.17 1.00 1.00 1.34 1.34 1.00 1.00 1.04 1.03 0.82 0.49 0.49
School religious −0.011 −0.026 −0.009 −0.005 −0.009 −0.011 −0.012 −0.01 −0.01 −0.015 −0.011 −0.012 −0.012 −0.012 −0.021 −0.014 −0.012 −0.03 −0.03 −0.028 −0.028 −0.03 −0.03 −0.032 −0.032 −0.039 −0.011 −0.011
−0.30 −0.78 −0.25 −0.13 −0.26 −0.32 −0.35 −0.29 −0.29 −0.42 −0.31 −0.34 −0.35 −0.35 −0.59 −0.40 −0.33 −0.87 −0.87 −0.84 −0.84 −0.87 −0.87 −0.95 −0.95 −1.24 −0.31 −0.31
School size (number 
of students) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
−0.45 −0.58 −0.48 −0.62 −0.47 −0.45 −0.38 −0.45 −0.45 −0.72 −0.43 −0.76 −0.41 −0.45 −0.10 −0.25 −0.46 −0.63 −0.63 −0.84 −0.84 −0.63 −0.63 −0.73 −0.75 −0.42 −0.57 −0.57
School materials 
shortage −0.036 −0.035 −0.037 −0.043 −0.041 −0.036 −0.037 −0.037 −0.037 −0.033 −0.036 −0.035 −0.036 −0.036 −0.032 −0.037 −0.037 −0.038 −0.038 −0.042 −0.042 −0.038 −0.038 −0.039 −0.039 −0.043 −0.037 −0.037
(2.59)** (2.59)** (2.64)** (3.20)*** (2.80)*** (2.48)** (2.68)*** (2.66)*** (2.66)*** (2.20)** (2.54)** (2.50)** (2.67)*** (2.60)** (2.35)** (2.73)*** (2.67)*** (2.66)*** (2.66)*** (3.06)*** (3.06)*** (2.66)*** (2.66)*** (2.71)*** (2.71)*** (2.96)*** (2.65)*** (2.65)***
School building 
deficiency −0.006 −0.007 −0.005 −0.005 −0.005 −0.006 −0.005 −0.007 −0.007 −0.008 −0.006 −0.01 −0.005 −0.003 −0.011 −0.009 −0.003 −0.007 −0.007 −0.002 −0.002 −0.007 −0.007 −0.004 −0.004 −0.005 −0.005 −0.005
−0.41 −0.46 −0.35 −0.35 −0.32 −0.42 −0.35 −0.47 −0.47 −0.55 −0.41 −0.67 −0.36 −0.20 −0.74 −0.59 −0.24 −0.45 −0.45 −0.15 −0.15 −0.45 −0.45 −0.26 −0.25 −0.29 −0.29 −0.29
School library 
deficiency 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.002 0 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.002 0.001 0.012 0.012 0.01 0.01 0.012 0.012 0.017 0.017 0.006 0.003 0.003
0.17 0.20 0.20 0.25 0.11 0.17 −0.01 0.14 0.14 0.31 0.17 0.42 0.16 0.18 0.55 0.14 0.07 0.95 0.95 0.81 0.81 0.95 0.95 1.39 1.39 0.46 0.27 0.27
Frequency students 
skip class −0.015 −0.012 −0.014 −0.011 −0.013 −0.015 −0.015 −0.016 −0.016 −0.02 −0.015 −0.017 −0.016 −0.013 −0.018 −0.017 −0.013 −0.005 −0.005 −0.008 −0.008 −0.005 −0.005 −0.009 −0.009 −0.01 −0.016 −0.016
−0.77 −0.60 −0.74 −0.54 −0.65 −0.78 −0.77 −0.79 −0.79 −0.98 −0.73 −0.89 −0.82 −0.69 −0.97 −0.90 −0.66 −0.22 −0.22 −0.42 −0.42 −0.22 −0.22 −0.44 −0.45 −0.47 −0.81 −0.81
Frequency students 
late −0.015 −0.017 −0.015 −0.016 −0.015 −0.015 −0.014 −0.015 −0.015 −0.016 −0.015 −0.015 −0.015 −0.016 −0.015 −0.011 −0.014 −0.012 −0.012 −0.013 −0.013 −0.012 −0.012 −0.009 −0.009 −0.005 −0.015 −0.015
−1.21 −1.34 −1.19 −1.22 −1.26 −1.19 −1.16 −1.22 −1.22 −1.27 −1.21 −1.24 −1.21 −1.28 −1.20 −0.99 −1.18 −1.08 −1.08 −1.15 −1.15 −1.08 −1.08 −0.75 −0.79 −0.43 −1.25 −1.25
Frequency bullying 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.012 0.01 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.019 0.012 0.023 0.011 0.01 0.005 0.008 0.009 0.012 0.012 0.008 0.008 0.012 0.012 0.008 0.008 0.012 0.012 0.012
0.54 0.54 0.55 0.53 0.44 0.55 0.57 0.61 0.61 0.75 0.53 0.97 0.47 0.46 0.20 0.34 0.40 0.50 0.50 0.34 0.34 0.50 0.50 0.36 0.34 0.50 0.51 0.51
Community size 0 0.001 0.001 0 −0.001 0 0.001 0.001 0.001 −0.001 0 −0.003 0 0 −0.006 0.003 0.003 −0.004 −0.004 −0.012 −0.012 −0.004 −0.004 −0.008 −0.007 −0.011 0.001 0.001
−0.01 0.11 0.07 −0.01 −0.05 −0.02 0.07 0.06 0.06 −0.10 0.00 −0.22 −0.02 −0.01 −0.46 0.22 0.27 −0.29 −0.29 −0.91 −0.91 −0.29 −0.29 −0.66 −0.57 −0.94 0.07 0.07
Community poor (%) 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.009 0.009 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.004 0.004 0.007 0.007 0.003 0.003 0.008 0.005 0.005
0.32 0.28 0.20 0.38 0.34 0.35 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.21 0.34 0.04 0.30 0.24 0.63 0.65 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.28 0.28 0.45 0.45 0.20 0.19 0.50 0.40 0.40
Community affluent 
(%) −0.005 −0.005 −0.005 −0.002 −0.005 −0.005 −0.006 −0.005 −0.005 −0.003 −0.005 −0.003 −0.006 −0.009 −0.01 −0.001 −0.005 −0.003 −0.003 −0.005 −0.005 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.006 −0.004 −0.004
−0.35 −0.34 −0.35 −0.12 −0.36 −0.33 −0.38 −0.32 −0.32 −0.22 −0.35 −0.22 −0.41 −0.57 −0.69 −0.08 −0.33 −0.18 −0.18 −0.36 −0.36 −0.18 −0.18 −0.19 −0.19 −0.42 −0.25 −0.25
Region Java 0.117 0.122 0.109 0.109 0.116 0.118 0.115 0.119 0.119 0.127 0.118 0.123 0.112 0.12 0.114 0.111 0.125 0.119 0.119 0.092 0.092 0.119 0.119 0.113 0.114 0.111 0.119 0.119
(1.79)* (2.03)** 1.62 (1.79)* (2.01)** (1.98)* (1.97)* (1.98)* (1.98)* (2.21)** (1.98)* (2.26)** (1.90)* (2.04)** (1.94)*** (2.14)** (2.25)** (2.00)** (2.00)** (1.71)*** (1.71)*** (2.00)** (2.00)** (1.93)*** (1.95)*** (1.87)*** (1.98)*** (1.98)***
Region Sumatera 0.035 0.038 0.027 0.024 0.037 0.034 0.03 0.034 0.034 0.039 0.035 0.04 0.029 0.037 0.036 0.027 0.038 0.045 0.045 0.034 0.034 0.045 0.045 0.039 0.039 0.046 0.033 0.033
0.52 0.60 0.40 0.40 0.61 0.54 0.49 0.56 0.56 0.67 0.58 0.72 0.48 0.58 0.59 0.52 0.65 0.73 0.73 0.66 0.66 0.73 0.73 0.66 0.66 0.76 0.55 0.55
Region Kalimantan −0.009 −0.02 −0.013 −0.015 −0.004 −0.011 −0.013 −0.01 −0.01 −0.008 −0.009 −0.016 −0.01 −0.001 −0.005 0.005 0.016 0.099 0.099 0.064 0.064 0.099 0.099 0.096 0.094 0.094 −0.009 −0.009
−0.10 −0.20 −0.14 −0.16 −0.05 −0.11 −0.14 −0.10 −0.10 −0.08 −0.10 −0.17 −0.11 −0.02 −0.05 0.06 0.17 0.74 0.74 0.51 0.51 0.74 0.74 0.71 0.70 0.73 −0.09 −0.09
Region Bali/NTT/NTB 0.079 0.074 0.074 0.07 0.084 0.078 0.078 0.081 0.081 0.093 0.079 0.082 0.082 0.085 0.081 0.087 0.091 0.03 0.03 0 0 0.03 0.03 0.009 0.016 −0.067 0.077 0.077
1.00 0.98 0.91 0.90 1.05 0.98 1.00 1.05 1.05 1.24 0.97 1.18 1.07 1.08 1.04 1.17 1.15 0.32 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.32 0.10 0.16 −0.82 1.00 1.00
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Teacher 4-year degree −0.02 −0.023 −0.019 −0.017 −0.017 −0.021 −0.022 −0.019 −0.019 −0.024 −0.02 −0.025 −0.022 −0.015 −0.016 −0.017 −0.007 −0.033 −0.033 −0.047 −0.047 −0.033 −0.033 −0.027 −0.026 −0.061 −0.022 −0.022
−0.43 −0.52 −0.41 −0.39 −0.37 −0.45 −0.49 −0.43 −0.43 −0.52 −0.43 −0.58 −0.47 −0.32 −0.35 −0.36 −0.15 −0.78 −0.78 −1.05 −1.05 −0.78 −0.78 −0.65 −0.63 −1.46 −0.47 −0.47
Teacher is certified −0.017 −0.019 −0.015 −0.02 −0.017 −0.018 −0.019 −0.019 −0.019 −0.015 −0.017 −0.018 −0.016 −0.015 −0.012 −0.017 −0.016 −0.015 −0.015 0.004 0.004 −0.015 −0.015 −0.016 −0.014 −0.009 −0.012 −0.012
−0.51 −0.57 −0.46 −0.62 −0.51 −0.54 −0.58 −0.56 −0.56 −0.45 −0.51 −0.57 −0.46 −0.44 −0.35 −0.50 −0.50 −0.41 −0.41 0.10 0.10 −0.41 −0.41 −0.45 −0.40 −0.23 −0.33 −0.33
Student pretest score 0.13 0.144 0.13 0.133 0.13 0.13 0.128 0.131 0.131 0.131 0.13 0.117 0.134 0.127 0.11 0.145 0.138 0.142 0.142 0.14 0.14 0.142 0.142 0.135 0.135 0.119 0.135 0.135
(2.78)*** (2.98)*** (2.77)*** (2.89)*** (2.78)*** (2.85)*** (2.72)*** (2.85)*** (2.85)*** (2.85)*** (2.71)*** (2.65)*** (2.90)*** (2.77)*** (2.47)** (3.08)*** (2.93)*** (2.95)*** (2.95)*** (2.96)*** (2.96)*** (2.95)*** (2.95)*** (2.95)*** (2.94)*** (2.73)*** (2.92)*** (2.92)***
Class size (number of 
students) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0 0 0 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0 0 0 0.001 0.001
0.36 0.56 0.42 0.67 0.44 0.37 0.40 0.35 0.35 0.60 0.33 0.51 0.46 0.41 −0.03 −0.03 −0.11 0.43 0.43 0.50 0.50 0.43 0.43 −0.12 −0.15 −0.19 0.53 0.53
School private 0.026 0.031 0.028 0.023 0.017 0.027 0.016 0.03 0.03 0.031 0.026 0.035 0.027 0.015 0.04 0.032 0.008 0.045 0.045 0.059 0.059 0.045 0.045 0.044 0.044 0.036 0.024 0.024
0.55 0.67 0.58 0.47 0.35 0.58 0.30 0.61 0.61 0.65 0.55 0.73 0.58 0.30 0.82 0.67 0.17 1.00 1.00 1.34 1.34 1.00 1.00 1.04 1.03 0.82 0.49 0.49
School religious −0.011 −0.026 −0.009 −0.005 −0.009 −0.011 −0.012 −0.01 −0.01 −0.015 −0.011 −0.012 −0.012 −0.012 −0.021 −0.014 −0.012 −0.03 −0.03 −0.028 −0.028 −0.03 −0.03 −0.032 −0.032 −0.039 −0.011 −0.011
−0.30 −0.78 −0.25 −0.13 −0.26 −0.32 −0.35 −0.29 −0.29 −0.42 −0.31 −0.34 −0.35 −0.35 −0.59 −0.40 −0.33 −0.87 −0.87 −0.84 −0.84 −0.87 −0.87 −0.95 −0.95 −1.24 −0.31 −0.31
School size (number 
of students) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
−0.45 −0.58 −0.48 −0.62 −0.47 −0.45 −0.38 −0.45 −0.45 −0.72 −0.43 −0.76 −0.41 −0.45 −0.10 −0.25 −0.46 −0.63 −0.63 −0.84 −0.84 −0.63 −0.63 −0.73 −0.75 −0.42 −0.57 −0.57
School materials 
shortage −0.036 −0.035 −0.037 −0.043 −0.041 −0.036 −0.037 −0.037 −0.037 −0.033 −0.036 −0.035 −0.036 −0.036 −0.032 −0.037 −0.037 −0.038 −0.038 −0.042 −0.042 −0.038 −0.038 −0.039 −0.039 −0.043 −0.037 −0.037
(2.59)** (2.59)** (2.64)** (3.20)*** (2.80)*** (2.48)** (2.68)*** (2.66)*** (2.66)*** (2.20)** (2.54)** (2.50)** (2.67)*** (2.60)** (2.35)** (2.73)*** (2.67)*** (2.66)*** (2.66)*** (3.06)*** (3.06)*** (2.66)*** (2.66)*** (2.71)*** (2.71)*** (2.96)*** (2.65)*** (2.65)***
School building 
deficiency −0.006 −0.007 −0.005 −0.005 −0.005 −0.006 −0.005 −0.007 −0.007 −0.008 −0.006 −0.01 −0.005 −0.003 −0.011 −0.009 −0.003 −0.007 −0.007 −0.002 −0.002 −0.007 −0.007 −0.004 −0.004 −0.005 −0.005 −0.005
−0.41 −0.46 −0.35 −0.35 −0.32 −0.42 −0.35 −0.47 −0.47 −0.55 −0.41 −0.67 −0.36 −0.20 −0.74 −0.59 −0.24 −0.45 −0.45 −0.15 −0.15 −0.45 −0.45 −0.26 −0.25 −0.29 −0.29 −0.29
School library 
deficiency 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.002 0 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.002 0.001 0.012 0.012 0.01 0.01 0.012 0.012 0.017 0.017 0.006 0.003 0.003
0.17 0.20 0.20 0.25 0.11 0.17 −0.01 0.14 0.14 0.31 0.17 0.42 0.16 0.18 0.55 0.14 0.07 0.95 0.95 0.81 0.81 0.95 0.95 1.39 1.39 0.46 0.27 0.27
Frequency students 
skip class −0.015 −0.012 −0.014 −0.011 −0.013 −0.015 −0.015 −0.016 −0.016 −0.02 −0.015 −0.017 −0.016 −0.013 −0.018 −0.017 −0.013 −0.005 −0.005 −0.008 −0.008 −0.005 −0.005 −0.009 −0.009 −0.01 −0.016 −0.016
−0.77 −0.60 −0.74 −0.54 −0.65 −0.78 −0.77 −0.79 −0.79 −0.98 −0.73 −0.89 −0.82 −0.69 −0.97 −0.90 −0.66 −0.22 −0.22 −0.42 −0.42 −0.22 −0.22 −0.44 −0.45 −0.47 −0.81 −0.81
Frequency students 
late −0.015 −0.017 −0.015 −0.016 −0.015 −0.015 −0.014 −0.015 −0.015 −0.016 −0.015 −0.015 −0.015 −0.016 −0.015 −0.011 −0.014 −0.012 −0.012 −0.013 −0.013 −0.012 −0.012 −0.009 −0.009 −0.005 −0.015 −0.015
−1.21 −1.34 −1.19 −1.22 −1.26 −1.19 −1.16 −1.22 −1.22 −1.27 −1.21 −1.24 −1.21 −1.28 −1.20 −0.99 −1.18 −1.08 −1.08 −1.15 −1.15 −1.08 −1.08 −0.75 −0.79 −0.43 −1.25 −1.25
Frequency bullying 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.012 0.01 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.019 0.012 0.023 0.011 0.01 0.005 0.008 0.009 0.012 0.012 0.008 0.008 0.012 0.012 0.008 0.008 0.012 0.012 0.012
0.54 0.54 0.55 0.53 0.44 0.55 0.57 0.61 0.61 0.75 0.53 0.97 0.47 0.46 0.20 0.34 0.40 0.50 0.50 0.34 0.34 0.50 0.50 0.36 0.34 0.50 0.51 0.51
Community size 0 0.001 0.001 0 −0.001 0 0.001 0.001 0.001 −0.001 0 −0.003 0 0 −0.006 0.003 0.003 −0.004 −0.004 −0.012 −0.012 −0.004 −0.004 −0.008 −0.007 −0.011 0.001 0.001
−0.01 0.11 0.07 −0.01 −0.05 −0.02 0.07 0.06 0.06 −0.10 0.00 −0.22 −0.02 −0.01 −0.46 0.22 0.27 −0.29 −0.29 −0.91 −0.91 −0.29 −0.29 −0.66 −0.57 −0.94 0.07 0.07
Community poor (%) 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.009 0.009 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.004 0.004 0.007 0.007 0.003 0.003 0.008 0.005 0.005
0.32 0.28 0.20 0.38 0.34 0.35 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.21 0.34 0.04 0.30 0.24 0.63 0.65 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.28 0.28 0.45 0.45 0.20 0.19 0.50 0.40 0.40
Community affluent 
(%) −0.005 −0.005 −0.005 −0.002 −0.005 −0.005 −0.006 −0.005 −0.005 −0.003 −0.005 −0.003 −0.006 −0.009 −0.01 −0.001 −0.005 −0.003 −0.003 −0.005 −0.005 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.006 −0.004 −0.004
−0.35 −0.34 −0.35 −0.12 −0.36 −0.33 −0.38 −0.32 −0.32 −0.22 −0.35 −0.22 −0.41 −0.57 −0.69 −0.08 −0.33 −0.18 −0.18 −0.36 −0.36 −0.18 −0.18 −0.19 −0.19 −0.42 −0.25 −0.25
Region Java 0.117 0.122 0.109 0.109 0.116 0.118 0.115 0.119 0.119 0.127 0.118 0.123 0.112 0.12 0.114 0.111 0.125 0.119 0.119 0.092 0.092 0.119 0.119 0.113 0.114 0.111 0.119 0.119
(1.79)* (2.03)** 1.62 (1.79)* (2.01)** (1.98)* (1.97)* (1.98)* (1.98)* (2.21)** (1.98)* (2.26)** (1.90)* (2.04)** (1.94)*** (2.14)** (2.25)** (2.00)** (2.00)** (1.71)*** (1.71)*** (2.00)** (2.00)** (1.93)*** (1.95)*** (1.87)*** (1.98)*** (1.98)***
Region Sumatera 0.035 0.038 0.027 0.024 0.037 0.034 0.03 0.034 0.034 0.039 0.035 0.04 0.029 0.037 0.036 0.027 0.038 0.045 0.045 0.034 0.034 0.045 0.045 0.039 0.039 0.046 0.033 0.033
0.52 0.60 0.40 0.40 0.61 0.54 0.49 0.56 0.56 0.67 0.58 0.72 0.48 0.58 0.59 0.52 0.65 0.73 0.73 0.66 0.66 0.73 0.73 0.66 0.66 0.76 0.55 0.55
Region Kalimantan −0.009 −0.02 −0.013 −0.015 −0.004 −0.011 −0.013 −0.01 −0.01 −0.008 −0.009 −0.016 −0.01 −0.001 −0.005 0.005 0.016 0.099 0.099 0.064 0.064 0.099 0.099 0.096 0.094 0.094 −0.009 −0.009
−0.10 −0.20 −0.14 −0.16 −0.05 −0.11 −0.14 −0.10 −0.10 −0.08 −0.10 −0.17 −0.11 −0.02 −0.05 0.06 0.17 0.74 0.74 0.51 0.51 0.74 0.74 0.71 0.70 0.73 −0.09 −0.09
Region Bali/NTT/NTB 0.079 0.074 0.074 0.07 0.084 0.078 0.078 0.081 0.081 0.093 0.079 0.082 0.082 0.085 0.081 0.087 0.091 0.03 0.03 0 0 0.03 0.03 0.009 0.016 −0.067 0.077 0.077
1.00 0.98 0.91 0.90 1.05 0.98 1.00 1.05 1.05 1.24 0.97 1.18 1.07 1.08 1.04 1.17 1.15 0.32 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.32 0.10 0.16 −0.82 1.00 1.00
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Constant 0.537 0.481 0.557 0.489 0.568 0.542 0.552 0.541 0.519 0.454 0.544 0.542 0.547 0.583 0.557 0.537 0.513 0.615 0.495 0.426 0.561 0.615 0.495 0.534 0.534 0.589 0.526 0.509
(2.72)*** (3.12)*** (3.80)*** (3.28)*** (3.82)*** (3.78)*** (3.80)*** (3.76)*** (3.06)*** (2.48)** (3.68)*** (3.85)*** (3.91)*** (3.78)*** (3.98)*** (3.85)*** (3.74)*** (3.78)*** (3.46)*** (2.99)*** (4.22)*** (3.78)*** (3.46)*** (3.97)*** (3.95)*** (4.16)*** (3.63)*** (2.48)**
Observations 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2116 2116 2116 2116 2116 2116 2116 2116 2116 2296 2296
R2 0.457 0.463 0.458 0.468 0.461 0.458 0.461 0.458 0.458 0.462 0.457 0.467 0.46 0.462 0.476 0.471 0.467 0.451 0.451 0.475 0.475 0.451 0.451 0.464 0.461 0.481 0.458 0.458
Adj. R2 0.449 0.455 0.45 0.459 0.452 0.449 0.453 0.45 0.45 0.454 0.449 0.458 0.452 0.453 0.467 0.462 0.459 0.442 0.442 0.466 0.466 0.442 0.442 0.454 0.451 0.471 0.449 0.449
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Regressions run on multiple-imputed data.
Significance level: * = 10 percent, ** = 5 percent, *** = 1 percent.
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Constant 0.537 0.481 0.557 0.489 0.568 0.542 0.552 0.541 0.519 0.454 0.544 0.542 0.547 0.583 0.557 0.537 0.513 0.615 0.495 0.426 0.561 0.615 0.495 0.534 0.534 0.589 0.526 0.509
(2.72)*** (3.12)*** (3.80)*** (3.28)*** (3.82)*** (3.78)*** (3.80)*** (3.76)*** (3.06)*** (2.48)** (3.68)*** (3.85)*** (3.91)*** (3.78)*** (3.98)*** (3.85)*** (3.74)*** (3.78)*** (3.46)*** (2.99)*** (4.22)*** (3.78)*** (3.46)*** (3.97)*** (3.95)*** (4.16)*** (3.63)*** (2.48)**
Observations 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2116 2116 2116 2116 2116 2116 2116 2116 2116 2296 2296
R2 0.457 0.463 0.458 0.468 0.461 0.458 0.461 0.458 0.458 0.462 0.457 0.467 0.46 0.462 0.476 0.471 0.467 0.451 0.451 0.475 0.475 0.451 0.451 0.464 0.461 0.481 0.458 0.458
Adj. R2 0.449 0.455 0.45 0.459 0.452 0.449 0.453 0.45 0.45 0.454 0.449 0.458 0.452 0.453 0.467 0.462 0.459 0.442 0.442 0.466 0.466 0.442 0.442 0.454 0.451 0.471 0.449 0.449
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Regressions run on multiple-imputed data.
Significance level: * = 10 percent, ** = 5 percent, *** = 1 percent.
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One of the noteworthy global achievements of the past two decades has been the remarkable increase in 
the number of children attending school and the number of children completing the primary cycle. As more 
children start school, the focus has shifted toward the quality of their education—on true learning, not just 
schooling. 
The critical role played by teachers to enhance the quality of education is especially salient in a populous, 
geographically dispersed, and culturally diverse country such as Indonesia. With close to three million teachers, 
Indonesia has one of the largest and most diverse cadres of educators in the world. The comprehensive Teacher 
and Lecturer Law, approved by the Indonesian government in 2005, radically reformed the management and 
development of those teachers.
Teacher Reform in Indonesia: The Role of Politics and Evidence in Policy Making features a comprehensive analysis 
of the teaching profession and the impact of recent reforms, which included the doubling of a teacher’s basic 
pay once he/she satisfies the conditions necessary for certification—a factor that has improved the status 
of teachers and attracted better candidates to teacher training institutions. This book provides a description of 
the political and economic context in which the reform was developed and implemented as well as an analysis 
of how the reform affected teacher quality and student outcomes. The book’s framework promotes an 
approach to reforms based on improving the nature of teacher recruitment; preservice education; induction, 
mentoring, and probation; formal certification; continuing professional development; teacher performance 
appraisal; and ongoing career development.
The recent history of teacher reform in Indonesia can inform other countries seeking to improve their 
educational systems and, ultimately, the success of their teachers and students. This book should therefore be 
of particular interest to Ministries of Education that contemplate similar reforms and development agencies and 
practitioners that seek to support country efforts to strengthen the teaching profession.
SKU 19829
ISBN 978-0-8213-9829-6
Teacher Reform
 in Indonesia
Chang, Shaeffer, Al-Sam
arrai, Ragatz, de Ree, and Stevenson
